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Abstract 
 
 
As the “Short Twentieth Century” came to an end, more and more democracies seriously 
considered the possibility –often for the first time in their history- of changing their national 
electoral system. Since then, the total number of electoral reforms enacted in countries that select 
their rulers through free and fair elections has sharply increased: in the last two decades over 
33% of the world’s democratic states modified the formula employed for choosing the members 
of their national legislatures, and a similar percentage adjusted other elements of the rules of the 
game such as the district magnitude, the legal threshold, the assembly size or the ballot structure. 
Unfortunately, the academic examination of the causes and consequences of these episodes of 
institutional change has lagged well behind these empirical developments with single case 
studies and small n studies still the norm. In light of this gap, research on the determinants and 
the outcomes of electoral reform processes is increasingly needed. The aim of this study is to 
transcend the analysis of a small number of cases, and instead to comparatively examine the 
universe of electoral system changes that have occurred in 60 contemporary democracies 
between 1945 and 2010.  
The thesis has three main findings. First, the levels of party system fragmentation and 
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy have strong potential to explain electoral system changes in 
contemporary democracies. Contrary to what is usually implied by the literature on electoral 
reform, parties are seen to have strong tendencies to pass restrictive rather than permissive 
electoral system changes in circumstances where the electoral system might be considered to be 
already overly-permissive resulting in excessive numbers of parties. Moreover, electoral reforms 
in the intraparty dimension usually take place when large numbers of voters are currently 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country.  
The second main finding is that electoral reforms can reshape the morphology of 
established party systems through two distinct mechanisms of electoral engineering. The first 
mechanism takes place at the interparty level, with permissive reforms reducing the difference 
between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats obtained by a party, and 
restrictive reforms enlarging this gap. The second mechanism operates at the intraparty level, 
where candidate-centred reforms decrease the level of party system nationalization while party-
centred reforms leave party system nationalization unchanged.  
Finally, the third main finding of the thesis is that parties’ positions regarding the 
possible modification of the rules of the game have an electoral effect. Parties that advocate a 
permissive reform in countries with low party system fragmentation are more likely to 
electorally benefit. By contrast, support for such reforms when the number of parties is large is 
more likely to result in electoral loses. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The race is over! 
But who has won? 
Everybody has won, and all must have prizes. 
        (Lewis Carroll 1865) 
 
If God were to write an electoral law, He would write a majoritarian one. 
(Andrzej Olechowski, Convention of the Platforma Obywatelska (PO), 24 January 2001) 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Electoral reforms
1
 have gone from rarity to an almost everyday occurrence over the last twenty 
years. Changing the rules of the game is not uncommon anymore in some countries, and so 
Arend Lijphart’s (1994) conclusions about the essential stickiness of electoral institutions look a 
bit outdated. In recent times, some well established democracies like New Zealand, Japan, and 
Italy introduced a sort of mixed system of representation.
2
 In other countries like the United 
Kingdom or Canada, advocates of electoral reform were less lucky. And, finally, the French case 
in 1985 and 1992 illustrates the trickiness of establishing the causes of electoral reforms: facing a 
similar electoral defeat in both years, the incumbent Socialist Party opted for changing the rules 
of the game in the former episode but not in the latter.
3
 As can be seen below, some 
heterogeneity also emerges in Latin America and Eastern Europe, where some countries reform 
quite often their electoral systems while others have kept them more or less unmodified since the 
very beginning of the current democratic period. In the last decade, two Colombian Presidents 
publicly advocated electoral reform, but only Álvaro Uribe was able to get his proposal passed. 
All in all, there are too many such reforms to be dismissed simply as aberrations, but the 
situations are diverse enough to prevent us from making easy generalizations on them. In this 
                                                          
1
 Electoral reforms, electoral system changes, modifications of the electoral law or in the rules of the game are used 
interchangeably in this thesis 
2
 Italy abandoned its mixed-member rules in 2005 (Renwick et al. 2009). 
3
 And these are only examples of major electoral reforms. If we also look at minor electoral reforms as I do in this 
thesis, the number of cases is almost countless.  
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thesis, I aim to explain why electoral reforms take place in contemporary democracies, and to 
examine some of their effects.  
 
The study is limited to electoral reforms between 1945 and 2010 in countries where free 
and fair elections are held. In particular, I only take into consideration nations where 
“incumbents lose elections and leave office when the rules so dictate” (Przeworski et al. 2000: 
54). The main advantage that derives from this election is parsimony and the avoidance of 
excessive proliferation of new terms and concepts (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Moreover, praise 
is most justified in the case of Przeworski et al.’s (2000) conception of democracy because they 
were particularly insightful concerning the selection of indicators and especially clear and 
detailed concerning coding rules despite being a bit narrow and weak when it comes to the 
selection of measurement level (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). 
 
I only examine democracies because the reasons for changing the electoral system are 
more intriguing there. In autocratic systems, rulers can theoretically modify the rules of the game 
at will to restrict political competition (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002). 
Moreover, the consequences of this kind of institutional change might radically differ if citizens 
cannot hold governments to account. By the same token, note that the instances of electoral 
reform are restricted to situations in which the first elections after the democratic transition have 
already taken place. Hence, the present volume does not deal with transitions from authoritarian 
regimes towards a democratic system (Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  
 
Given the set of countries and time frame, which type of electoral reforms do I study? I 
define electoral reform as a significant change in at least one of the following elements of an 
electoral system: the electoral formula, the number of districts, the assembly size, the electoral 
threshold, the presence (or absence) of a ban on pre-electoral coalitions and linked lists, the 
number and relationship between electoral tiers, and the ballot structure. Note that this is slightly 
more comprehensive than the list that previous studies use (Golder 2005a; Lijphart 1994). 
However, because I am interested in explaining not only the occurrence of electoral reforms but 
also the direction in which the electoral systems change, I need to provide a definition of their 
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different types. In order to do that, I first classify reforms in the interparty dimension
4
 by 
distinguishing between permissive and restrictive electoral system changes (Taagepera 2007a).
5
 
In a nutshell, the former are supposed to improve the proportionality of electoral outcomes 
whereas the latter are expected to produce an opposite change. Second, I take into account the 
intraparty dimension of electoral systems, and differentiate between candidate-centred and party-
centred reforms (Carey and Shugart 1995). In brief, the former are supposed to increase 
candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote whereas the latter are expected to decrease 
them. 
 
 Apparently, one of the historical modifications in electoral laws that has drawn most 
attention in the last decade have been those that followed the suffrage extensions to the lower 
classes and women at the end of the 19
th
 century and the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Lizzeri and Persico 2004; Przeworski 2009). By contrast, 
changes in electoral institutions since 1945 rarely concern the enfranchisement or 
disenfranchisement of citizens. Yet, tinkering with the electoral system has been frequent after 
the Second World War. This is one of the reasons why I choose it as my period of study. The 
second reason why I mainly focus on changes in “electoral formulas, district magnitudes, and 
structure of ballots” (Massicotte et al. 2004: 4) is because they are the elements of the rules of 
the game with the most marked impact on incumbents’ chances of re-election and other party 
system features I am interested in.   
 
The project revolves around three main questions. Firstly, why do some national contexts 
lead to electoral reforms while others do not? To continue with some additional examples, what 
is it about Greece (or Poland) that makes these countries more likely to reform their electoral 
systems than Portugal (or Hungary)?
6
 A second question is what are the consequences of the 
electoral reforms at several different levels? For example, do inclusive changes in the rules of the 
                                                          
4
 Just as electoral systems affect the concentration or dispersion of authority across parties (the interparty 
dimension) they also affect the concentration or dispersion within parties (the intraparty dimension).  
5
 As I will explain below, the terms proportional, permissive, inclusive or weak, on the one hand, and majoritarian, 
restrictive, exclusive or strong, on the other hand, are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
6
 In December 2011, Hungary’s parliamentarians passed a new electoral law that involved the first significant 
overhaul of the Hungarian electoral system since the country’s first post-communist democratic elections in 1990. 
However, I do not address either the causes nor the consequences of this electoral system change because it lies 
beyond the temporal scope of this study: 1945-2010. 
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game improve the overall proportionality of electoral outcomes? Do party-centred electoral 
reforms increase party system nationalization? How do voters react to the position adopted by 
parties in processes of electoral system change? Does it pay off electorally to support some 
particular reforms? Finally, what happens when voters are confronted with new electoral rules? 
Do voters everywhere respond in the same way to particular changes? Are the effects the same 
for all voters alike? 
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of the relevance of 
the puzzles at hand and the significance of my findings, I elaborate upon the two central research 
questions in the following two sections. Building on this, I overview the main analytical 
approach adopted and outline the theory underlying this study. In the next step, I discuss case 
selection, and explain my research design in the methods and data section. This chapter 
concludes by outlining this dissertation’s main findings and structure.   
 
 
1.2. Motivations and contributions 
The interest of the topic lies basically in the fact that the occurrence of electoral reforms entails 
the essential paradox or aporia of incumbent parties changing the rules of the game they are 
winning (Katz 2005). Theoretically, parties in office should have an interest in preserving the 
same electoral system that brought them into power. Hence, the continuity of electoral rules 
could be explained in terms of a natural tension between the losers’ will to enact the reform and 
the winners’ power to do it. In the same vein, Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts (1995) argue 
that it is not only parties that have vested interests in maintaining the institutional status quo, but 
also individual incumbents and strong interest groups (Rahat 2011). Nevertheless, the paradox 
might have become less evident in recent times because of the high proportion of parties in office 
that do not get re-elected. Partially as a consequence of this so-called increasing negative 
incumbency effect theory (Müller and Strøm 2000),
7
 parties in power should in principle reform 
electoral systems more frequently nowadays than in the past. However, not every incumbent 
                                                          
7
 These two leading scholars find that government incumbency has been an electoral liability in the 1980s and 1990s 
in the 13 Western European countries they analyse (see also, for example, Paldam 1986: 19; Nannestad and Paldam 
2002: 21; Powell and Whitten 1993: 410; Mackie and Rose 1983; Strøm 1990: 124).  
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party in trouble changes the electoral system. In these latter cases, “explaining the absence of 
change is harder than explaining change itself” (Bowler 2006: 577). 
 
 Yet, the central research questions in this dissertation have not been addressed before in 
the way I plan to do it. First of all, electoral reform has never been studied with quantitative 
methods across so many countries and over so many years. This is perhaps surprising given the 
relatively high frequency of the phenomenon and the considerable importance of electoral rules. 
Secondly, there is a paucity of studies that focus on the reasons that parties have for reforming 
the electoral system (first group of research questions) so as to make normative evaluations of 
this behaviour. Finally, from a policy-oriented point of view, the analysis of the effects of 
changing the rules of the game (second group of research questions) allows us to assess to what 
extent we can really talk of the existence of electoral engineering (Norris 2004).  
 
 The goal of this study is to open the black box of electoral reform by focusing on the 
determinants of its occurrence as well as its consequences. In so doing, the thesis gets into what 
Matthew Shugart (2005: 51) considers being a “research frontier for the twenty-first century”. 
The shortage of studies on the origins of electoral systems was already noted by Lijphart in 1985. 
In recent times, there has been some progress relating to the shift of many European countries 
from majoritarian to proportional representation (PR) systems at the beginning of the twentieth 
century (e.g., Boix 1999; Cusack et al. 2007; Rokkan 2009 [1970]). Although some of these 
studies are reviewed below, they are not at the centre of this thesis because they occurred in a 
substantially different context (Rahat 2011), characterized by a considerably diverse set of 
actors.
8
 Moreover, most of the existing analyses of the politics of electoral reform concentrate on 
single episodes, and cross-national comparisons that include a large number of cases are only 
now starting to appear (Best 2011; Harfst 2013; Pilet and Bol 2011; Remmer 2008). This change 
in research strategy will expand the scope of case studies (Leyenaar and Hazan 2011).  
 
Furthermore, there are in my view two additional problems with existing approaches 
(e.g., Norris 1995; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001) that need to be addressed. First of all, many 
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 For explanations wherein suffrage extension becomes the trigger, old ruling centre-right parties and new emerging 
socialist parties are the most commonly identified actors involved in the process of electoral reform. By contrast, 
political actors other than these two may play a role in contemporary reforms.  
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works give exclusive attention to major electoral system changes without encompassing a 
broader set of modifications that also have important effects on political systems. By contrast, 
following Kristof Jacobs and Monique Leyenaar (2011), I aim to focus on the electoral system 
changes that might have consequences for seat distribution between (interparty dimension) and 
within (intraparty dimension) parties. Secondly, I acknowledge that one of the fronts in this 
debate that remain also rather open is concerning the cases of study (Norris 2011). Previous 
research usually refers to a quite restricted group of countries (mainly, established democracies). 
By contrast, if we want to have enough and sufficiently diverse cases of reform to permit 
theoretically and statistically valid generalizations, I need to combine an adequate number of 
cases from consolidated and new democracies.   
 
The study of electoral reforms gains in importance if these phenomena turn out to have 
effects on the political arena. If, for instance, electoral system change affects party choice, this 
has important implications for electoral studies in general, and for the applicability of commonly 
used assumptions about the strategic behaviour of actors (parties/candidates and voters) in 
particular (Cox 1997). It would imply that major parties can rely on restrictive electoral reforms 
to not only increase the underrepresentation of small parties but also reduce their presence on the 
ballot, and/or the number of voters willing to support them. Moreover, by demonstrating this 
manipulative aspect of electoral reforms (Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1968; Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989), this dissertation’s findings may also be important in two additional senses.  
 
First of all, my findings may help to adjudicate between the different theoretical 
approaches used to study the politics of electoral reform (i.e., power-maximization [Benoit 2004] 
and inherent and contingent factors [Shugart 2008]). Second, the fact that electoral systems are 
shaped by the parties they supposedly determine or the incumbents whose re-election they help 
to assure casts serious doubts on the conclusions about the independent causal effect exerted by 
the rules of the game (Benoit 2007). If the science of electoral systems enables political actors to 
anticipate the consequences of changes in the rules of the game, then the effects of electoral 
reforms cannot be fully understood without examining their determinants (Penadés 2006). In the 
same spirit, Alexander (2001: 265) argues that “when actors treat institutions as effects, our 
ability to treat them as causes is circumscribed”. 
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In overall terms, electoral system changes raise a first-order problem from a normative 
point of view because they give to political parties the opportunity to establish the rules that 
bring and keep them in power. In a world in which firms do not usually pass anti-trust laws and 
students do not play any role at all in deciding grading policies, letting political parties choose at 
will about the electoral system is at best questionable from the normative point of view. Without 
a careful analysis of the context in which electoral reforms take place, a normative judgment 
regarding the reasons that lead politicians to change the rules of the game would be difficult. On 
the one hand, democracy is supposed to be a political regime characterized by the accountability 
of rulers to the ruled, and elections are believed to work as the mechanism through which this 
can be enforced (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). On the other hand, politicians are usually 
considered as perfect re-election seekers who prefer to avoid accountability if possible. Of these 
two arguments, "which one has the upper hand?" is thus a critical question and it is perhaps one 
the most important questions addressed in this dissertation. In this regard, examining the origins 
of electoral systems may give us some clues about reformers' democratic objectives. 
 
This dissertation’s findings may also be important beyond their scientific relevance, and, 
in particular, for public debate about how to deal with problems that are rooted in the rules of the 
game. Although it is widely argued that there is no such thing as the ideal electoral system 
(Carey and Hix 2011),
9
 and that the answer to the question about which electoral system is the 
best depends on ‘who you are, where you are, and where you want to go’ (Katz 1997: 308),10 this 
has not deterred specialists from proffering advice on where to place greatest emphasis in 
electoral system design and reform (for a recent illustration, see Taagepera 2002), and trying to 
discover the particular electoral system towards which the specialists are themselves leaning 
(Bowler et al. 2005).
11
 In this regard, first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems tend to yield majority 
                                                          
9
 Just as Carey and Hix (2011) sought to identify a “sweet spot” on the interparty dimension where the goals of 
representation and accountability should be tried to maximize, Bergman et al. (forthcoming) share a similar ambition 
for the intraparty dimension by pursuing the design of an non-transferable preference votes system where a 
proliferation of candidates may provoke that many voters will be unrepresented by a candidate of their choice.  
10
 The idea that there is no single electoral system that is likely to be best for all socities is also present in other 
theorists’work (see, for example, Diamond and Plattner 2006; Norris 1997; Reilly and Reynolds 1999). Likewise, 
Mackenzie (1957: 255) warns us against the dangers of transplanting of electoral systems from one country to 
another.   
11
 Although compensatory mixed systems were the most highly ranked in this study, those who study electoral 
systems are far from being in agreement about which if any is the best one. For example, Sartori (1997 [1994]) 
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governments but not proportionality of electoral outcomes and PR systems tend to yield 
proportionality but sometimes at the expense of majority governments (Farrell 2011 [2001]: 227-
229). Candidate-centred rules feature strong incentives for personal votes but at the expense of 
broad policy preferences while party-centred electoral institutions make legislators’ incentives to 
be aligned with the collective goals of their parties but do not ensure a transparent relationship 
between politicians and voters. Within this framework, much effort has been put into designing 
hybrid systems that provide some aspects of personal voting without sacrificing PR (Shugart 
2001) and even systems (so-called, "bonus-adjusted proportional representation" systems)
12
 that 
guarantee a government even with PR.
13
 In this thesis, I intend to see whether these various 
compromises motivate politicians to “tweak” their electoral system to give it more of the 
attributes it lacks. 
  
All in all, this dissertation takes some steps towards an evaluation of a relevant object of 
study (i.e., electoral reforms) from an analytical and normative point of view. At first glance, 
enduring electoral institutions seem to be superior in every respect. For example, potential 
advantages of changing the rules of the game could be offset by the continuous working of the 
current electoral system over time. In Taagepera and Shugart’s words (1989: 236), “Keeping the 
ills we know of may be better than leaping into the unknown”.14  However, this is only half of 
the story. To complete the picture we need to examine more in depth the long-run impact of 
stable electoral systems on the formation of partisan preferences. As Joergen Boelstad et al. 
(forthcoming) show, parties that gain from tactical voting due to restrictive electoral rules may 
also obtain more long-term support as voters come to identify with the parties they vote for; and 
so the increases in efficiency that becomes possible with a smaller party system may in the long 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
favours two-round systems, while Lijphart (1994) is a supporter of the Danish system with lists a little less open 
than they are. Both Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Carey and Hix (2011) have expressed sympathy for small, 
multi-member constituencies, with some kind of proportional representation formula. Likewise, Hermens (1984) and 
Taagepera (1984) propose three and two-member districts, respectively, as acceptable alternatives to the usual 
plurality methods in single-member districts. For Duveger (1984) and Johnston (1984), PR is not a threat to stable 
government as long as the executive is not dependent on a legislative vote of confidence in a parliamentary system. 
Within the forms of PR, Lakeman (1984) prefers STV to list PR. Finally, Gallagher (2005) summarizes the criteria 
identified by a number of scholars evaluating electoral systems and creates his own list.  
12
 “Bonus-adjusted proportional representation” is the terminology employed by Shugart in his blog to refer to the 
current Italian electoral system.  
13
 The 2012 Greek elections and the 2013 Italian elections cast serious doubts about the validity of this statement. 
14
 Talking about the 1993 new Italian electoral law, Reed (2001) argues that the equilibrium is rarely established in 
the first elections under new rules. 
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run not leave voters dissatisfied with their more restricted choice options, even if certain small 
parties have paid a large penalty. 
 
Summing up, studies of electoral systems constitute a strong branch in the field of 
comparative politics. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify two serious shortcomings in the 
literature. The first one is substantive: the impact of the consequences of electoral systems on the 
institutional preferences of political actors is still poorly understood. The second problem is an 
imbalance between large-N and small-N studies. On the one hand, we often see in depth case-
studies whose conclusions are not easily exportable to other historic or national contexts. On the 
other hand, there are comparative works that fail to capture the main causal mechanisms that lead 
to electoral system change. This project aims to offer a comprehensive and theoretically well-
grounded explanation of why electoral reforms takes place in a contemporary democracy and 
what are their consequences. Hence, the added value of this thesis could be summarized as 
follows: better theory, better data, and better methods. However, I am also aware of the 
limitations of this study. It is simply not easy to come up with a definitive explanation of 
electoral reform. This is pretty much what Blais (2008: 6) suggests when he points out that “no 
simple and parsimonious model can explain why electoral reform does or does not emerge on the 
political agenda, and, when it does, why it sometimes succeeds, and, more often, fails”. And, 
likewise, Benoit (2007: 387) concludes in his review article that “we are unlikely ever to 
discover any unified field theory of institutional change that can perfectly fit every applied 
setting.”  
 
Bearing all this in mind, examining the determinants and impact of electoral reforms 
involves a daunting number of tasks for this study. First of all, the definition and 
operationalization of the concept of electoral system change is one of my main tasks. Political 
scientists have mainly addressed questions about electoral reforms while either lacking an 
explicit definition of the object of study, or implicitly equating system change with formula 
change. Although it might seem only a modest improvement, the absence of a universally 
accepted and exhaustive definition of electoral reform suggests the need for devoting some 
efforts to this task. Secondly, there is an additional job that needs to be done that is concerned 
with the collection of data. I think that the only way the causes and consequences of electoral 
10 
 
reform can be unpacked is by complementing the existing datasets on electoral systems (mainly 
but not only, Golder and Johnson and Wallack’s) with new information obtained directly from 
the electoral laws themselves, or acquired after a careful study of secondary sources.
15
 And an 
analogous argument could be made regarding the calculation of some of the main variables (i.e., 
party system fragmentation,
16
 electoral disproportionality and volatility).  
 
 
1.3. Research questions 
There has been a wide variety of research questions concerning the origins of electoral systems. 
That being said, one significant theoretical and empirical issue in the literature that needs to be 
taken into account in the first place is the direction of reforms. There is a major claim made by 
Josep Maria Colomer (2005: 2) about “a general trend toward proportional representation over 
time”. Likewise, Renwick and Pilet (2011) hypothesize that changes in electoral systems in 
recent decades have trended towards candidate-centrism and away from party-centrism. 
Although the logic underlying these two statements is somewhat appealing, neither the 
theoretical arguments nor the empirical evidence are fully persuasive (Shugart 2005). Moreover, 
the reality of major electoral reforms in four established democracies in the 1990s (i.e., Israel, 
Italy, Japan and New Zealand) raises an important question in the light of previous consensus by 
commentators that such episodes of institutional change were rare (Birch et al. 2002; Gallagher 
2005; Katz 2005; Lijphart 1994; Nohlen 1984b; Norris 1995; Taagepera 2007b).
17
 To sum up, 
the purpose of a first group of questions is to provide an overview of the recent evolution of 
electoral systems in the interparty and intraparty dimensions. More specifically, the aim is to 
evaluate different claims about the increasing proportionality and personalization of the rules of 
the game, and to assess the existence of temporal and cross-regional variation regarding 
modifications of electoral systems as well.  
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 On 8 February 2013 the article “Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011” (Bormann and 
Golder forthcoming) was made available online on the Electoral Studies website. In a nutshell, this research note 
describes an update to Democratic Electoral Systems dataset. I employed this update to identify any possible 
inconsistency in my data regarding the 10 last years.  
16
 In the whole manuscript, party system fragmentation and party system size are used interchangeably.  
17
 Against this, see Colomer (2001a). 
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Why are electoral systems reformed in some contexts but not in others? This is the 
second research question of the dissertation. An obvious starting point for an answer to it is to 
look at the motivations stated by the politicians that engage in this type of electoral engineering 
in one country, and to see whether they share a common pattern with other cases. For example, 
one of the reasons that representatives of the established Italian parties usually provided for the 
1993 electoral reform was to offer cabinets more stability and capacity to govern (Katz 1996; 
Sakamoto 1999). And it would seem reasonable to take this explanation at face value: During its 
nearly fifty years of history, the so-called “First Italian Republic” (1946–1994) had the highest 
rate of cabinet turnover in Western Europe, at more than twice the regional average (Müller and 
Strøm 2000). There are valid arguments for reforming in a restrictive direction electoral systems 
that produce high cabinet instability and, as a result, substantial policy immobilism (Curini 
2011). And this was an objective agreed by elites of both sides of the political spectrum.
18
 Eleven 
years later, when the issue of electoral reform returned to the political agenda, the rules of the 
game changed again, although a bonus-adjusted PR system was adopted that time. However, the 
most important feature of that change for my purposes is that seat-maximization on its own 
cannot account for it either (Renwick 2010). In fact, the party that initiated the change (UDC) 
suffered a fall in its seat share despite doubling its vote share.
19
 Hence, the 1993 and the 2005 
electoral reforms in Italy poins to the existence of other kinds of motivations that go well beyond 
the strict maximization of seats (e.g., ensure a stable party system structure).
20
   
  
 Turning now to the determinants of electoral reform from a comparative perspective, 
Colomer (2005: 1) argues that “it is the number of parties that can explain the choice of electoral 
systems, rather than the other way round”. In making this case, he challenges the so-called 
Duverger’s Propositions (Benoit 2007; Grumm 1958; Lipson and Hanus 1964). Unfortunately, 
the link is more complex (Renwick 2010). For example, if we limit our focus to situations of 
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 Achille Occhetto (first National Secretary of the Partito Democratico della Sinistra) advocated the electoral 
reform “to facilitate the formations of homogenous and compact parliamentary majorities from the moment of the 
vote” (Atti della Camera, April 23, 1992:2), whereas Mario Segni (formerly, a long-time member of the Democrazia 
Cristiana) argued that “governability cannot be assured by any technique of constitutional engineering, unless there 
is also a simplification and homogenization of the political scene” (Il Sole 24 ore, July 16, 1993:2).  
19
 It might also be claimed that the UDC just made a mistake. In the same vein, Andrews and Jackman (2005) argue 
that the British Liberals made a similar mistake by not pushing for PR in the early 20
th
 century.  
20
 Were we to focus on seat-maximization alone, other cases like for example the opposition to PR within the French 
Socialist Party in 1991 and 1992 would be difficult to understand (Renwick 2010: 106). 
12 
 
high party system fragmentation in established democracies since 1962, it is striking that the 
electoral rules either remain unchanged or are repeatedly reformed in a restrictive direction, 
whereas almost none of them are modified in a permissive way.  
 
Regarding to electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension, Renwick and Pilet (2011) 
hypothesize that changes in electoral systems towards more personalized rules in the last decades 
are provoked because voters are becoming distrustful of the way representative democracy works 
in their countries. However, the fact that this widespread dissatisfaction brings about in recent 
times either party-centred or candidate-centred reforms seems to indicate that it is not only by 
fostering candidates’ (and MPs’) incentives to cultivate a personal vote that parties try to handle 
such dissatisfaction. Apparently, there are institutional formulas to address the democratic 
malaise other than increasing “the extent to which individual politicians can benefit by 
developing personal reputations distinct from those of their party” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 
418-419). A candidate-centred reform may be only one of the possible ways in which to address 
the progressive disengagement of citizens in conventional political participation. If anything, 
electoral system changes in the intraparty dimension have in common that they seem to be 
adopted in case of a malfunctioning of the established political power that is perceived as such 
by the electorate. Thus, in addition to testing theories that link voters’ discontent and increasing 
personalization of the electoral systems, I also aim to see whether public discomfort leads to the 
adoption of more party-centred rules. 
 
The third main group of questions that I would like to address in this dissertation 
concerns the consequences of electoral reforms. At the macro-level, restrictive electoral system 
changes in the interparty dimension can be an effective strategy to prevent small parties from 
gaining seats by boosting the overall degree of disproportionality –that is the difference between 
the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats obtained by a party in the resulting 
legislature- produced by the rules. The latter occurs because, unless parties and voters react 
immediately to the modification in the incentives provided by the electoral laws, the relationship 
between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats a party gets in the resulting 
legislature fundamentally changes after such a reform. Regarding the consequences of electoral 
reform in the intraparty dimension, this investigation examines the impact of movements 
13 
 
towards more or less candidate-centred electoral rules on party system nationalization.
21
 Hence, 
other macro-level effects of interest, such as their consequences for turnout, satisfaction with 
democracy or provision of public goods, fall outside of its scope. Although it might be 
interesting to see whether electoral reforms have an impact on these phenomena, due to space 
and time constraints, I am only concerned with their effects for electoral disproportionality and 
party system nationalization. 
 
There are, however, other levels at which the consequences of electoral reforms can be 
assessed. Perhaps more important than consequences for the functioning of the party system are 
effects on the votes obtained by parties that take one side or the other in terms of support for a 
given reform before it is enacted. Only if there are such consequences will it be possible for 
voters to influence the reform process. In this study I argue and show that taking the “wrong” 
side in a process of reform electorally hurts the party in question.  
 
In conclusion, in this dissertation I intend to address three types of questions. First of all, 
and from a descriptive point of view, I plan to examine the overall evolution of electoral systems 
in both the interparty and the intraparty dimension. Second, and with regard to the determinants 
of electoral reforms, I aim to find out which factors better explain them in both the interparty and 
the intraparty dimension across countries and over time, and to see whether these different 
causes interact with each other. Finally, and concerning the consequences of electoral reforms, I 
would like to address the following three questions: 
 Does electoral reform matter at all? 
 Do politicians generally achieve the goals they pursue when they reform the rules of 
the game? 
 How long does it take for an electoral reform to have its full effects? 
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 According to a relatively widespread definition, the level of party system nationalization refers to the “degree to 
which parties are uniformly successful in winning votes across districts” (Moenius and Kasuya 2004: 545).  
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1.4. Theoretical framework and main argument(s) 
Analyzing the causes and consequences of electoral reform requires a theory of parties’ (and 
voters’) preferences on electoral system change, and a notion of how political actors react once it 
has been put in place. However, let me start by pointing out that several different approaches are 
taken to study this phenomenon. Admittedly, this decision entails a considerable effort. But, 
otherwise, over-simplification would make it impossible to successfully address such a complex 
area of research.  
 
 Needless to say, this study is limited to describe how things “are”, as opposed to how 
they “should be” (Hume 1890 [1739]). Hence, it is a positive rather than normative project in the 
sense that it intends to be “value free”. Its main aim is not to investigate which is the best 
electoral system but to employ the standard trade-offs that electoral rules commonly involve in 
trying to predict electoral system continuity and change.
22
 In order to do that, I incorporate a 
norms-based approach into the model of electoral reform developed in this dissertation. No party 
in office will reform the electoral system against its self-interest; but no incumbent party will be 
able to pursue its institutional goals at will. Norms matter in that politicians’ strategies of 
survival through electoral reform are heavily constrained by voters’ considerations of what 
constitutes a fair representation of interests. This is partly due to the importance of the 
“sociological” concept of legitimacy of the electoral system. In his classic study, Political Man, 
Seymour Lipset (1963: 64) defines it as “the capacity of a political system to engender and 
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones 
for the society”. Likewise, Shugart (2008: 15) employs the term act-contingent reasons of 
electoral reform to refer to those motivations present when “the concept of ‘reform’, albeit 
perhaps vaguely understood among the public, is itself popular”. It is worth emphasizing, 
however, that the argument that norms matter does not imply that strategic interests of rational 
political actors are thrown aside. In this regard, electoral reforms are not automatic responses to 
failures of the current institutions in meeting their normative expectations, but reasoned and 
negotiated reactions of parties to a variety of circumstances (Sakamoto 1999).  
                                                          
22
 These trade-offs are perfectly exemplified by the words of the Norwegian politician Jan P. Sye (Conservative), 
who during the late 1980s summed up the essential elements of any electoral reform saying that: “An electoral 
system must be a compromise between desires for the best possible degree of proportionality, regional 
representation and the need for a parliamentary situation that can give stable governments” (Stortingsforhandlinger 
1987-88, nr. 31: 3252; 3274). 
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 Yet, in this dissertation several different approaches to understand actors’ behaviour are 
presented as well, yielding alternative answers to the research questions. In doing so, I argue and 
empirically demonstrate that it is most fruitful to assume that actors have a variety of different 
concerns and that which of these concerns comes to the fore in any reform situation in a 
contemporary democracy depends on the circumstances. Part of the answer to the question of 
why reforms take place, and what are their consequences, can be based on rational choice theory 
and, broadly speaking, a political economy approach. With regard to the former, suffice it to say 
that I adopt a view of rationality according to which political actors are assumed to follow a 
reasonable process for choosing (Simon 1957 [1947]). Hence, my starting point is the usual 
assumption of bounded or procedural rationality, that is, “behaviour that is adaptive within the 
constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker” 
(Simon 1957 [1947: 294, original italics]). Concerning the political economy theoretical 
framework, I assume that private and public decision makers can be described in the same way 
(Caporaso and Levine 1992: 154). Moreover, I also agree with Peter Ordeshook (1990: 1) when 
he says that “political and economic processes cannot be separated”. I hereby present an 
approach that combines theoretical insights from political science, and empirical devices from 
economics (Levi 2000). However, the fact that many forms of political economy do not take into 
account historical obstacles to electoral reform (i.e., the role played by tradition) has been widely 
criticized (e.g., Green and Shapiro 1994; Rahat 2011). Following Sven Steinmo et al. (1992), I 
believe that any institutional change is context-dependent at least in the sense that it is a 
consequence of political circumstances at a given point in time (see also Taagepera and Shugart 
1989).  
 
Finally, I am primarily interested in using institutionalism as a methodology and not as a 
body of substantive work (Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003). These scholars define a political 
institution “as a set of contextual features in a collective choice setting that defines constraints 
on, and opportunities for, individual behaviour in the setting” (2003: 125); and they also 
differentiate between institutional theories (in which institutions are exogenous) and theories of 
institutions (in which some institutions are endogenous). This distinction corresponds to the two 
propositions of “new institutionalism” raised by Adam Przeworski (2004: 527): “(1) Institutions 
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matter”; (2) “Institutions are endogenous”. In this dissertation, I aim to evaluate these two 
statements. In fact, Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel argue that “a theory of institutions 
cannot exist without institutional theories” (2003: 130).  
 
 The core actor of this dissertation is the party. How do the parties make their decisions on 
electoral reforms? The field of electoral engineering is dominated by two main theoretical 
claims. With regard to changes in the interparty dimension, the micro-mega rule explains 
electoral reform on the basis of party system fragmentation (Colomer 2004b: 3).
23
 Typically, 
larger parties prefer more restrictive (i.e., small assemblies and districts but high thresholds), and 
smaller parties more permissive (i.e., big assemblies and districts but low thresholds) electoral 
systems (Benoit 2007: 378). Colomer himself (2005) demonstrates that this approach has some 
merit in explaining the adoption of PR from the nineteenth century onwards. True, a large 
number of parties generate incentives to change the electoral system. However, as can be seen in 
Chapter 4, I argue and demonstrate contrary to Colomer that a rise in the number of parties in 
contemporary democratic life precedes the adoption of a more majoritarian rather than a more 
proportional system because parties are not only seat-maximizers.  
 
 Following Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm’s (1999) theoretical framework, I assume 
that parties change the electoral system with a view to maximizing votes, office and policy. 
Several scholars have argued that parties’ attempts to maximize their seat shares provide a 
powerful explanation for electoral reform (e.g., Benoit 2004).
24
 However, I also focus on other 
kinds of instrumental motivations parties have in mind when adopting an electoral system 
change. Although I do not deny the importance of the seat-maximization goal, parties seem to 
pursue other types of objectives in processes of electoral reform. In the same vein, Richard Katz 
(2005: 69) comes to the conclusion from his review of 14 cases of major reforms since 1950 in 
established democracies that there are six general reasons why politicians change the rules of the 
game they are winning: first, negative electoral prospects; second, lack of control over the 
electoral reform process; third, conflict of interests among members of the winning coalition; 
                                                          
23
 Micromega refers to the title of a tale by Voltaire (Micromégas 1752) in which dwarfs and giants dialogue.  
24
 The most clearly specified version of the conventional wisdom is Benoit’s model (2004: 373-374) when he states 
that “a change in electoral institutions will occur when a political party or coalition of political parties supports an 
alternative which will bring it more seats than the status quo electoral system, and also has the power to affect 
through fiat that institutional alternative”. 
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fourth, short-term seat-maximization; fifth, long-term change in the competitive system; and 
sixth, exchange of non-electoral interests for electoral gains. 
 
Yet, parties’ behaviour regarding electoral reform is also completely in accordance with 
the cartel party theory (Katz and Mair 1995). According to them, parties have adapted 
themselves to declining levels of participation and involvement in party activities by not only 
turning to resources provided by the state but also by doing so in a collusive manner. Because the 
electoral rules are determined by the parties themselves, they can also enhance their capacity to 
resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives by enacting an electoral reform (p. 16). Katz 
and Mair do not mention electoral systems (and their reforms) as one of the most powerful 
devices to ensure parliamentary parties’ survival. Hence, it is original to apply this theory to the 
ruling parties’ attempts of protecting their interests by tailoring the electoral system accordingly 
(Tworzecki 2003).
25
 Building on Katz and Mair’s ideas, I more specifically expect insider parties 
to become less interested in efficient reforms (i.e., restrictive electoral system changes in case of 
high party system fragmentation) when electoral disproportionality and/or volatility is already 
high.
26
  
 
Until recently, political parties have been the most commonly identified actor involved in 
the processes of electoral reform (Benoit 2007). However, I think that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, other types of actors (i.e., voters and all sorts of veto players) may contribute to an 
explanation of these phenomena. Regarding the former, voters come into my explanation of 
institutional change by disliking blatant manipulation of the rules of the game, constraining 
political leaders’ attempts to pass a merely self-interested electoral reform, and appreciating 
those modifications that are (or tend to be) Pareto-improving (e.g., improving cabinet stability, 
increasing the legislative passage rate, and so on). In other words, citizens may conceive an 
electoral reform as either redistributive or efficient (Tsebelis 1990). The closer we get to the 
                                                          
25
 Unfortunately, this is only be part of the story. As Kitschelt (2000) highlights, one of the potential shortcomings 
of the cartel party theory is the prisoner’s dilemma that it involves. Cartel members have powerful incentives to 
defect and let the other major parties pass a restrictive electoral reform while winning the support of junior coalition 
partners and, more broadly, the entire population of the country by advocating the preservation of the (permissive) 
statu quo. This element could explain why we do not see as frequently as expected the manipulation of the electoral 
rules by the major parties in countries like Germany (Jesse 1990; Saalfeld 2005) or Israel (Rahat and Hazan 2005). 
26
 Hereafter I define efficiency of electoral institutions (or changes in the rules of the game) as those promoting 
“responsiveness to the collective-goods preferences of the majority of the electorate” (Shugart 2001: 173). 
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efficiency pole with a reform that improves the condition of all (or almost all) individuals or 
groups in a society, the more likely it is that the voters will appreciate it. In this regard, a main 
hypothesis linked to voters’ political attitudes and the occurrence of electoral reforms in the 
intraparty dimension can be expressed along the following lines: Widespread dissatisfaction with 
the way democracy works among the citizenry of a country leads to electoral system changes 
that either increase or decrease candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Finally, 
actors other than political parties and voters may play a role in the choice of electoral institutions 
if they are veto players and can block a change from the status quo at different levels and/or 
stages of the reform process (Blau 2008; Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011; Nikolenyi 2011; 
Tsebelis 2002).  
 
 With regard to the consequences of electoral reforms, several research pieces that date 
back at least from the early 1950s (e.g., Duverger 1964 [1954]) and that are impossible to 
summarize here suggest that electoral systems have an impact on various important outcomes 
either at the aggregate or at the individual levels.
27
 However, a still empirically open question is 
how these cross-sectional findings show themselves from a dynamic point of view. In this 
regard, the Duvergerian gradual learning process based on experience and information (see also 
Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Taagepera 2007a) and the McPhee and Ferguson’s (1962) political 
immunization thesis (see also Butler and Stokes 1974) are the two main theoretical approaches 
that account for the fact that the overall impact of a reform can hardly be evaluated in the first 
election after it is enacted. To be more specific, some aspects of reform might be best assessed 
immediately (i.e., the mechanical effects), while the psychological ones remain initially 
“controlled” because it takes actors several elections to adjust their behaviour to them.   
 
In effect, because voters know the distortion entailed by the transformation of votes into 
seats –namely, the mechanical effects of electoral systems-, they adapt their behaviour so as to 
make their votes count –namely, the psychological effect- (Cox 1997; Duverger (1964 [1954]).28 
Yet, the gradual anticipation by voters (and parties and candidates) of the mechanical effects 
                                                          
27
 For a summary of them, see Chapter 2. 
28
 There's a debate whether to conceive the latter as a pre-electoral (i.e., strategic entry or the small parties’ decision 
of not running because they would be the victims of strategic desertion by voters) or a post-electoral effect (i.e., 
tactical vote or the fact that some candidates are just ignored by voters on the election day). 
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requires, among others, a rather stringent assumption about the repeated organization of elections 
over time under the same electoral rules. For example, Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart 
(1989) argue that it takes at least two elections with the same institutional framework for the 
psychological effect to manifest itself (see also Bielasiak 2002; Dawisha and Deets 2006); and 
Bruno Fey (1997: 142) summarizes contemporary received wisdom in the political science 
literature about the process of strategic voting development:  
 
Indeed, the reasoning Duverger offers for his law is a dynamic story in which voters, over 
time, gradually abandon an unpopular party in larger and larger numbers until no support 
remains.
29
 
 
Finally, the idea that generational replacement plays a role in voting behaviour change 
after an electoral reform is one that has not been extensively explored in the literature. Newly 
enfranchised individuals are known to be particularly affected by political events and to be 
largely responsible for changes in the support for existing parties (Dinas 2010; Franklin 2004). 
Such individuals are also known to rapidly become immunized against changing their minds if 
they support the same party at even a quite small number of consecutive elections. The 
implications of this last insight for electoral change after a reform in the rules of the game has 
not been addressed, though it might well supply an explanation for the fact it takes several 
elections with a new institional framework to see its full effects.    
 
 
1.5. Research design: Case selection, data and method 
The causes and consequences of electoral reforms have been analysed in several case studies 
(e.g., Bawn 1993; Benoit and Schiemann 2001; Hazan and Rahat 2000; Kaminski 2002; Katz 
1996; Moraski 2007; Nagel 2004; Reed and Thies 2001; Renwick et al. 2009; Shugart et al. 
2007; Pachón and Shugart 2010), and in comparative research on various countries, including 
contemporary (e.g., Best 2012; Bielasiak 2006; Birch et al. 2002; García Díez 2001; Harfst 2013; 
Ishiyama 1997; Remmer 2008; Renwick 2010) and earlier democracies (Boix 1999; Cusack et al. 
                                                          
29
 An unpopular party is, according to Fey, a party that does not obtain a considerable vote share rather than a party 
that lacks citizens’ popularity. 
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2007; Rokkan 2009 [1970]). However, their determinants and effects have never been 
systematically analyzed. For this reason, in this thesis I intend to formulate a body of 
theoretically driven and empirically rigorous comparative work on the causes and consequences 
of this phenomenon by bringing together several theoretical frameworks and employing various 
empirical strategies. Moreover, I plan to widen the scope of study from a single reform or small 
set of reforms to a wider group of episodes of this kind of institutional changes. This provides 
more leverage for my statistical analysis, and gives the opportunity for broader generalizations. 
 
 In this dissertation, I examine more than 100 electoral reforms in 60 democratic countries 
from four continents (Europe, America, Asia and Oceania) between 1945 and 2010. More 
specifically, I study modifications in the rules that shape electoral outcomes at the national level. 
It is obvious that electoral reforms can happen at all levels of government at which elections take 
place. However, I prefer to avoid studying electoral reforms at the international, the regional or 
the local level because this research attempts to obtain results as comparable as possible. 
Consequently, I only study them at the national level. After all, some authors argue that changes 
in voting systems at other electoral levels than the national should be categorized as minor 
(Bowler and Donovan 2008; Dalton and Gray 2003). Moreover, there is still a second reason to 
focus on electoral reforms at this tier of government. If we take seriously the “second-order” 
elections theory (Reif and Schmitt 2006 [1980]), national elections are the most important ones. 
In fact, they are perceived to be so by both voters and parties (candidates), in spite of the 
processes of supranational integration and territorial devolution that have taken place all over the 
world in recent times. Therefore, the cases selected for this study concern the electoral system at 
the national level.
30
  
 
Finally, an explanation needs to be given concerning the countries that elect more than 
one office at the national level. With regard to presidential and semi-presidential systems, I 
prefer to stick to legislative elections in order to maximize comparability across countries.
31
 With 
regard to bicameralism in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, I choose to focus on 
                                                          
30
 For a study of the adoption of the mixed-member proportional systems in Scotland, Wales and for the London 
Assembly, see Dunleavy and Margetts (2001). 
31
 For a study of the adoption or the change of the electoral formula in presidential elections in Latin America, see 
Negretto (2006). 
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the rules employed to elect the chamber of parliament to which the national government is 
mainly responsible. This solution also avoids giving more weight to countries with presidential 
or bicameral systems. Problems, however, begin to arise as soon as we start to think about 
countries where cabinets have to win confidence votes in both chambers in order to stay in office 
(like in Italy). In such cases (not that many, to be frank), I take into account the rules employed 
to elect the chamber that is traditionally considered the lower house.
32
 And the same solution 
applies to those presidential countries that are bicameral. 
 
I take into consideration as many political contexts as reasonably feasible in order to 
circumvent small-N problems related to scarcity of statistical power, and avoid large-N problems 
associated with lack of comparability. In particular, three criteria regarding case selection are 
applied. First of all, I only look at countries and periods in which free and fair elections take 
place, as I said earlier. This criterion rules out many electoral systems around the world. A 
second criterion that guides case selection is the availability and reliability of comparable data on 
electoral laws and party system features across all the countries under study. For this reason, the 
case selection is limited to post-World War II democracies and third-wave democracies from 
Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Table 1.1 displays the list of countries 
and time periods comprised. Notwithstanding the incomplete nature of this catalogue, the aim is 
to draw valid inferences on the origins and consequences of electoral reforms in all 
contemporary democracies. Finally, I examine presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary 
regimes. After all, in spite of their distinct institutional setup, the basic logic of bargaining should 
be similar there (Strøm et al. 2008). Thus, I think it is a worthwhile attempt to formulate decision 
theories that cover all three types of systems (Amorim Neto 2006). 
 
With regard to the data and methods employed, various research strategies are here 
combined to answer the central questions of this study. In brief, the empirical part of my 
dissertation tries to maximize the evidence supporting my theory.
33
 However, this involves 
several tasks.  
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 For example, because the president of the Senate stands in the role of Head of State when the president of the 
Republic needs to be replaced, the Senate is traditionally considered the upper house in Italy. 
33
 It was my first intention to use a so-called mixed method and combine a cross-country large-N part with some 
evidence from in-depth case-studies. I think this nested research had a synergistic value (Lieberman 2005), and 
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Table 1.1. Countries and time periods analysed 
Countries Time Periods Countries Time Periods 
Albania 1992-2010 Italy 1946-2010 
Argentina 1983-2010 Japan 1946-2010 
Armenia 1995-2010 Latvia 1993-2010 
Australia 1946-2010 Lithuania 1992-2010 
Austria 1945-2010 Luxembourg 1945-2010 
Belgium 1946-2010 Macedonia 1994-2010 
Bolivia 1985-2010 Malta 1966-2010 
Brazil 1982-2010 Mexico 2000-2010 
Bulgaria 1990-2010 Moldova 1994-2010 
Canada 1945-2010 Netherlands 1946-2010 
Chile 1993-2010 New Zealand 1946-2010 
Colombia 1958-2010 Nicaragua 1984-2010 
Costa Rica 1948-2010 Norway 1945-2010 
Croatia 1992-2010 Panama 1989-2010 
Cyprus 1970-2010 Paraguay 1989-2010 
Czech Republic 1996-2010 Peru 1980-1989; 2001-2010 
Denmark 1945-2010 Poland 1991-2010 
Dominican Republic 1966-2010 Portugal 1975-2010 
Ecuador 1979-2010 Romania 1990-2010 
El Salvador 1985-2010 Slovakia 1994-2010 
Estonia 1992-2010 Slovenia 1992-2010 
Finland 1945-2010 Spain 1977-2010 
France 1945-2010 Sweden 1948-2010 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
single-unit and cross-unit research designs could be complementary (Coppedge 1999; Gerring 2004). On the one 
hand, statistical analyses could help me with the case selection for the in-depth research and be used to provide 
additional tests of hypotheses generated from small-N studies. On the other hand, case-study analyses could be used 
to assess the plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables and to generate theoretical insights 
from outliers. In the same vein, James Fearon and David Laitin (2008: 773) believe that case studies can be quite 
useful for ascertaining and assessing the causal mechanisms that give rise to the empirical regularities discovered in 
large-N analyses. So, combining these two approaches would have allowed me to overcome the usual pitfalls that 
each type of method presents. However, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) identify several weaknesses 
recurrent limitations of case-study methods such as the problem of case selection, the trade-off between parsimony 
and richness, and the related tension between achieving high internal validity of particular cases versus making 
generalizations that apply to broad populations. For these reasons, and because of time and space constraints, I 
finally decided to take in-depth studies out of the research and confine a preliminary skecth of the cases in Appendix 
4 to this thesis.  
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Germany 1949-2010 Switzerland 1947-2010 
Greece 1974-2010 Ukraine 1994-2010 
Guatemala 1990-2010 United Kingdom 1945-2010 
Honduras 1985-2010 United States 1946-2010 
Hungary 1990-2010 Uruguay 1989-2010 
Iceland 1946-2010 Venezuela 1963-2010 
Ireland 1948-2010 
  
Israel 1949-2010 
   
First of all, the electoral systems of all the countries and for each year under study have to 
be identified and classified as either “reform” or “no reform” and coded as to reform type (see 
below) on the basis of the criteria stated earlier. In order to do that, I examine all the electoral 
laws available in the languages that I read (i.e., Spanish, English, Italian, French and 
Portuguese), and cross-validate the results with an extensive review of secondary sources. 
Having collected the data, I perform quantitative analyses using the appropriate statistical tools. 
In the first part of the dissertation, I use the aforementioned two typologies of electoral reform as 
dependent variables in order to explain the variation in the likelihood of occurrence of each 
category of institutional change. More specifically, the estimation of several dynamic models on 
the basis of two-self built datasets allows me to find out why electoral system change takes place 
in some cases, and not in other highly similar ones.  
 
The two typologies of electoral reform are the main independent variables in the first two 
chapters of the third part of this research (i.e., Chapters 6 and 7), which aim at exploring the 
consequences of this type of institutional change at the macro-level. In a set of comparative 
analyses based on several cross-sectional times series models, I assess the consequences of 
changes in the rules of the game for disproportionality and party system nationalization. In the 
chapter concerning the effect of the position adopted by each party during electoral reform 
processes (i.e., Chapter 8), their performance in the immediately following legislative election at 
the national level serves as dependent variable. This last potential impact is measured by 
implementing the corresponding hierarchical lineal models, and after having updated a dataset on 
parties’ preferences about electoral reform that Damien Bol has kindly shared with me. This 
innovative data source has been built on the basis of an expert survey conducted regarding 30 
24 
 
different national processes of electoral reform. Finally, Appendix 6 to this thesis employs 
individual-level data from several New Zealand Election Studies. The availability of data limits 
the analysis of the consequences of electoral reforms at the individual level to only this country. 
In this appendix, a combination of various econometric techniques specially designed to deal 
with endogeneity problems are employed. 
 
  
1.6. Main findings 
As seen above, I make two types of proposition about electoral reforms in contemporary 
democracies. First of all, I examine their determinants and conclude that parties change the rules 
of the game on the basis of a combination of redistributive and efficiency considerations. The 
difference between cases in which a permissive electoral system change is implemented, cases in 
which the rules of the game stay the same, and cases in which the electoral system becomes more 
restrictive lies in the level of party system fragmentation: the higher the effective number of 
parties, the more likely it is that it will be reformed in a restrictive direction. Parties clearly take 
into account the need for governability when deciding whether and how to reform the interparty 
dimension of the electoral system. This is not the whole story, however, and once electoral 
disproportionality or volatility interacts with the degree of party system fragmentation, the 
impact of the latter on restrictive electoral reform becomes less obvious. Likewise, one could 
expect that the impact of party system fragmentation on the likelihood of electoral reform in the 
interparty dimension varies across different democratic ages. And, in fact, it does. Furthermore, 
if citizens are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, reforms in the 
intraparty dimension of the system are also more likely.  
 
 A second group of findings concerns the effects of electoral reforms at different levels of 
analysis. The results of the econometric models with both aggregate and individual data suggest 
that this type of institutional change is highly consequential in several ways. First of all, 
permissive electoral system changes in the interparty dimension contribute to reduce the overall 
deviation of the parties’ seat shares from their vote shares. In the same vein, candidate-centred 
electoral reforms decrease the level of party system nationalization. The magnitude of these two 
effects decisively hinge at the same time on the values of several other modifying variables. 
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Particularly important in this respect is the number of elections that have taken place after the 
implementation of the reform. In brief, electoral system changes are deemed to have powerful 
consequences that are increasingly felt over time through the processes of generational 
replacement (of voters) and gradual learning (by voters and parties).  
 
 Finally, there are still other important findings in this dissertation regarding the 
performance of parties at the subsequent election after a reform process has taken place. In this 
vein, parties’ stances on electoral reform lead them to gain or lose votes in the following 
elections. More specifically, supporting a restrictive electoral system change when party system 
fragmentation is high and advocating a permissive one when the number of parties is low 
improve the electoral fortunes of the parties. Second, I demonstrate that major parties are 
electorally hurt after the implementation of a permissive reform through three mechanisms (i.e., 
party switching, differential abstention and new voters), and assess the importance of each of 
them. Finally, I confirm that the type of electoral system matters for individual political 
behaviour by changing the explanatory power of several independent variables. 
 
 
1.7. Plan of the dissertation 
The dissertation contains three main parts, consisting of two, two and three chapters, 
respectively, as well as an introductory and a concluding chapter. Part 1, entitled “Electoral 
systems in contemporary democracies: Theoretical and empirical insights”, reviews the literature 
on the effects and origins of electoral rules, as well as the definition and measurement of 
electoral reforms in contemporary democracies. More specifically, I develop a theoretical 
framework for the comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of the occurrence of 
electoral reforms to be conducted in the next chapters. Chapter 3 introduces the electoral system 
changes under study, mainly focusing on the conceptualization and operationalization of the 
notion of “electoral reform”.  
 
Part 2, titled “The occurrence of electoral reform and its causes”, consists of two chapters 
in which I successively examine the determinants of electoral reform in the interparty and the 
intraparty dimension. 
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 And Part 3, labelled as “The occurrence of electoral reforms and their consequences at 
different levels”, consists of three chapters. The first two chapters examine the effects of 
electoral system changes at the macro (i.e., country) level while Chapter 8 does so at the meso 
(i.e., party) level.
34
 In Chapter 6, the impact of electoral system changes in the interparty 
dimension on the degree of disproportionality of electoral outcomes is analyzed in depth. In 
Chapter 7, the consequences of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension for the level of 
nationalization of the party systems are evaluated. This chapter is followed by Chapter 8 in 
which I investigate the effects of the positions adopted by parties in the processes of change of 
the rules of the game on their subsequent electoral performance.  
 
The dissertation’s last chapter, Chapter 9, summarizes the findings, discusses the 
limitations of the study as well as its theoretical and practical implications, and sketches several 
avenues for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 My initial plan was to have a Chapter 9, the last one in Part 3, in which I would have assessed the significance of 
electoral reforms at the individual level by employing survey evidence from New Zealand and Italy. Unfortunately, 
space and time constraints forced me to get rid of this chapter and only include some preliminary analyses on New 
Zealand in Appendix 6 to this thesis. 
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Part 1 
Electoral systems in contemporary democracies: Theoretical and empirical insights 
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Chapter 2. Electoral systems: Theoretical approaches on their causes and consequences 
 
[Electoral systems] are strange devices-simultaneously cameras and projectors. They register 
images which they have partly created themselves.  
(Maurice Duverger 1984: 34) 
 
The choice of the electoral system is among the most important constitutional choices that have 
to be made in democracies. 
(Arend Lijphart 1994: 202) 
 
 
2.1. Introduction: The interparty and the intraparty dimensions of electoral systems 
In 1985, Arend Lijphart concluded in a survey of the literature of comparative electoral systems 
that the field was underdeveloped.
35
 Twenty years later, Matthew Shugart considered that we 
could speak of a mature field (2005). Nowadays, the ostracism of studies on electoral rules with 
a comparative perspective has ceased to exist. However, the room for improvement has not. In 
this chapter, I will briefly discuss the state of the art in this research field. In order to do that, I 
will firstly elaborate on the basic distinction between the interparty and the intraparty dimensions 
of electoral systems. After doing so, the most relevant works on the consequences of electoral 
systems will be presented, which will constitute a short but I hope exhaustive assessment of the 
main effects of the rules of the game. Finally, I will confine the last part of my review to the 
literature on the causes of electoral systems and, more broadly, institutional change.  
 
 Most of the research over several decades of the development of the field has been 
concerned with the so-called interparty dimension of electoral systems, that is, the part of the 
                                                          
35
 The state of the art on comparative electoral systems was even worse 20 years before Lijphart. According to Rae 
(1971 [1967]: 6): 
The limitations of the existing literature reflect the three most persistent shortcomings of its component 
studies: (1) categories of analysis are seldom defined precisely, (2) data are almost never treated 
systematically, and (3) the standards of verification are usually left inexplicit. The properties of electoral 
laws – ballot form, districts, “formulae” – are not classified according to explicit, precise categories, and 
party systems are usually described in similarly vague terms. Data are often confined to the experience of a 
single country, and the population of facts is either small or, worse yet, undefined. Standards of 
evidence…are typically left flexible or even unstated… 
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electoral systems that affect the concentration or dispersion of authority across parties (Shugart 
2001). Research on this dimension has shown, on the one hand, how electoral systems affect the 
translation of votes into seats for competing political parties, and, as a result, the overall structure 
of the party system (e.g., Taagepera 2007a); and, on the other hand, why electoral rules that 
increase the number of parties and foster a proportional allocation among them are chosen over 
other more restrictive methods (e.g., Colomer 2004b and 2005). However, electoral systems also 
affect the concentration or dispersion of power within parties. This is what I will call the 
intraparty dimension of electoral systems (Shugart 2005). The group of works that speak to this 
second dimension of electoral systems address questions like, on the one hand, how do variations 
in the rules of the game affect the balance between a “personal” and a “partisan vote”, or the 
ways in which individual legislators (or legislative candidates) relate to constituents; and, on the 
other hand, why candidate-centred rules are chosen over other less personalistic ones (Carey and 
Shugart 1995). 
 
 Although some significant findings have emerged in all these areas, we can safely say 
that the literature on the intraparty dimension lags behind that on the interparty dimension, an 
observation already made by Lijphart back to 1985. Moreover, there is still a considerable 
shortage of studies on the origins of electoral systems in both dimensions, a gap that this 
dissertation aims to address. With regard to the former, suffice it to say that the distinction 
between systems in which voters select parties and those in which they select candidates is at 
least as important as the proportional representation (PR) versus plurality/majority debate 
(Grofman 1999). Concerning the latter, Shugart (2005: 51) considers studies of electoral system 
choice to be a “research frontier for the twenty-first century”.   
 
 The chapter has two main goals. First, it highlights some remaining puzzles in the study 
of the consequences of electoral systems. The explanation of the electoral system outcomes is 
directly addressed by two literatures that are in many respects similar. These literatures are an 
extensive group of works on the effects of electoral rules in the interparty dimension and a less-
extensive corpus of research on their impact in the intraparty dimension. The former consists 
mainly of large-N, cross-national studies of the direct and indirect effects of electoral systems. 
The latter consists of single-country studies as well as cross-national comparative work. Finally, 
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the chapter discusses the literature on the origins of electoral systems and their analytical 
successes, as well as identifying the puzzles that have not yet been fully addressed.      
 
 
2.2. The consequences of electoral systems 
There are at least two main types of effects of electoral rules that need to be dealt with. The first 
regards all the variables related to the interparty dimension. The second refers to the impact of 
the intraparty dimension. I address each of these issues in turn. 
 
2.2.1. The interparty dimension 
2.2.1.1. Direct effects 
It seems fair to credit Maurice Duverger with being the most distinguished French political 
scientist of the last century (Benoit 2006). His chief contribution deals with party politics and 
electoral systems, and can be summarized in what have come to be called Duverger’s Law and 
Duverger’s Hypothesis (1964 [1954]). At least since his seminal contribution, probably the vast 
majority of works on electoral systems that have been published have revolved around two main 
questions: How do the electoral rules shape the party system? And to what extent are voters 
influenced by electoral systems? According to Duverger, the negative consequences of restrictive 
electoral rules on party system fragmentation are understood as the result of two mechanisms. 
First, minor parties typically are awarded a much smaller share of seats than the share of votes 
they receive. Second, the existence of this mechanical effect creates incentives for electoral 
coordination. As defined by Gary Cox (2000: 49), electoral coordination “refers to a variety of 
processes by which groups of voters and politicians coordinate their electoral actions in order to 
win more legislative seats or executive portfolios” (see also Riker 1982). Therefore, we expect 
electoral restrictiveness to decrease the number of parties by generating incentives for strategic 
entry or withdrawal on the part of political entrepreneurs and tactical voting on the part of voters 
(Cox 1997). Duverger uses the term psychological for these behavioural consequences of non-
permissive electoral laws on the party system size.  
 
Yet, the effects of electoral rules are not as straightforward as most institutional studies 
suggest (Benoit 2001; Blais and Carty 1991; Duverger 1964 [1954]; Katz 1980; Lijphart 1994; 
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Rae 1971 [1967]; Sartori 1997 [1994]; Shamir 1985; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Recently, 
some prominent scholars have successfully argued that the strength of electoral rules interacts 
with the number of sociological cleavages to shape party systems (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; 
Golder 2006; Guinjoan 2009; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Taagepera 
1999). These works suggest that the district-level number of parties should be an interactive 
function of the number of social cleavages and electoral permissiveness. If this general 
conclusion were valid, multipartism would arise as the joint product of many exploitable 
cleavages and a permissive electoral system. Unfortunately, this proposition is largely untested at 
the district level, even though that is the level at which relevant pressures are expected to work.
36
 
 
The second source of deviation from Duverger’s Law among single-member districts 
(SMDs) with plurality rule has an exclusively institutional origin. Strategic entry and tactical 
voting assume the complete independence of a majoritarian system from other sets of electoral 
rules; and this assumption simply does not hold most of the time. In fact, some previous research 
has shown that there are interaction or contamination effects between the different kinds of 
electoral systems used in a given country (Ferrara and Herron 2005). Although the presence of 
contamination has been demonstrated in scenarios of incongruent bicameralism (Lago and 
Martínez 2007), presidential systems (Shugart and Carey 1992), multilevel polities (Lago and 
Montero 2009) or high district magnitude variance under PR rules (Lago 2009), recent literature 
has been particularly successful at showing evidence of this type of effects in mixed-member 
electoral systems between their PR and SMD tiers (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Crisp et al. 2013; 
Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Krauss et al. 2012).
37
 
 
 Further work on the direct effects of the interparty dimension of electoral systems has 
built upon Duverger’s contribution and has cumulated into a literature that consistently produces 
findings about levels of disproportionality of electoral outcomes (Anckar 1997; Benoit 2000; 
Carey and Hix 2011; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971 [1967]; Taagepera and Shugart 1989), amount of 
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 For three exceptions, see Crisp et al. (2012), Hicken and Stoll (2011), Riera (2013), Singer (2013), and Singer and 
Stephenson (2009). 
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 Another systematic account of deviant cases from Duverger’s Law among plurality systems is the presence of 
what have come to be called sectionalist third parties, that is, non-national parties that are sufficiently competitive 
locally to benefit from, rather than be punished by, Duverger’s Law (Rae 1971 [1967]; Riker 1982). Given the fact 
that the central concern of this thesis pertains to party system size at the national level, I will not attempt to explain 
why the number of parties inflates at the local level (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Cox 1999a).    
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wasted votes (Queralt 2009; Tavits and Annus 2006; Uggla 2008), the emergence of new 
political parties (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2001; Lago and Martínez 2011; Tavits 2006), 
and the likelihood of formation of pre-electoral coalitions (Golder 2006a and b; Golder 2005b). 
In a nutshell, the more inclusive the electoral formula, the higher the district magnitude and the 
lower the legal threshold, the less disproportionality may be generated, the fewer votes may be 
wasted, the more new parties may emerge, and the fewer pre-electoral coalitions may be formed. 
As an explanation of some of the consequences of electoral rules, most of these findings suffer 
from two important shortcomings: either they lack an adequate econometric basis, or they do not 
use information at the district-level.
38
  
 
 Several efforts to understand the direct effects of the interparty dimension of electoral 
systems have focused on other types of possible consequences. Some have suggested that there is 
simply a centre-left bias under PR according to which governments of that ideology are more 
frequent with this particular electoral formula (Iversen and Soskice 2006). In a similar vein, 
Monroe and Rose (2002) note that there is a partisan bias effect in PR systems that results from 
variation in district magnitude and favours rural parties. Furthermore, the underrepresentation of 
urban parties may also be a result of densely populated areas having lower magnitude districts 
than they would have if the ratio of voters to seats were more uniform across districts (Samuels 
and Snyder 2001). However, we still have a poor understanding of the relationship between these 
two last phenomena called variance effect and malapportionment, respectively (Shugart 2005).  
 
In a very nice article, Bernard Grofman et al. (1997) provide an integrated analysis of the 
three potential sources of partisan bias in single-member districts with plurality rule –namely, 
malapportionment, turnout differences, and the geographic distribution of party vote shares-; but 
these authors cannot obviously examine the role possibly played by the variance effect because 
magnitude does not change across districts there. It is well known that partisan bias in such 
institutional context is, at least to a large extent, a function of the asymmetry in the distribution 
of partisan voting strength across constituencies (among others, Johnston 1979; Rodden 2011). 
However, causes of partisan bias under PR are still a puzzle. To the best of my knowledge, there 
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 Finally, John Carey and Simon Hix (2011) posit that low-magnitude multi-member districts (the so-called limited 
PR systems) produce a distance between the median voter and the median government (in case of majority cabinets) 
or legislature (in case of minority cabinets) party that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
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are only two empirical studies on Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 2004) and Spain (Lago and 
Montero 2005) on this issue that point to the reinforcement of malapportionment and the 
variance effect; and a more theoretical paper by Alberto Penadés and Pedro Riera (2011) that 
tries to conceptualize and operationalize the sources of partisan bias in systems with multi-
member districts from a comparative perspective. But I definitely agree with Shugart (2005: 33) 
when he claims that more work on these topics is “in order”. 
 
Two types of electoral systems arguments are especially relevant for explaining electoral 
volatility. First, Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (2007 [1990]) discovered that institutional 
modifications which lead to significant changes in the proportionality of electoral outcomes are 
associated with higher levels of volatility in Western Europe. In the same vein, Roberts and 
Wibbels (1999) find that forms of institutional instability can foster electoral instability in Latin 
America. Second, Bartolini and Mair’s (2007 [1990]) findings indicate the existence of a positive 
relationship between volatility and the number of parties in Western Europe. However, this 
second connection is slightly less robust in Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and post-
communist Europe (Tavits 2005 and 2008). 
 
 Finally, there is at least one important group of direct consequences of the interparty 
dimension of electoral systems that are built into the theories of political attitude formation and 
voting behaviour. First, candidate recognition is higher in plurality and majority systems as well 
as under mixed-member rules, than in PR systems (Holmberg 2009). Third, the literature 
concludes that incumbents under majoritarian electoral institutions are more vulnerable to voters’ 
evaluation of the economy than are their counterparts under PR systems (Fisher and Hobolt 
2010). Finally, Susan Banducci et al. (1999) and Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci (1999) find, 
respectively, that there was a general shift towards more positive attitudes on some measures of 
political efficacy and reversal in a long-term downward trend in voter turnout as a consequence 
of the adoption of the mixed-member system in New Zealand in the mid-1990s, although the 
latter effect turned out to be rather short-lived (Vowles 2010).   
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2.2.1.2. The “consequences of the consequences”  
A second set of open questions in the interparty dimension of electoral systems relate to what 
Penadés (2006: 194) calls the “consequences of the consequences”: indirect effects of the rules 
of the game that perhaps have a bigger impact on citizens’ lives. These outcomes can be reduced 
to four dimensions: the parties’ policy positions and the issue of political representation, the 
dynamics of coalition government formation and duration, the macroeconomic policies of 
resulting governments and provision of public goods by political institutions, and the level of 
voters’ turnout. In what follows, I delineate these different aspects found in the literature on 
electoral systems, starting with the most common.   
 
 At least since one of the first formulations of the median voter theorem (Downs 1957), 
two-party systems observed under plurality rule are thought to produce “tweedledum–
tweedledee” political competition where the policy moderation is the dominant party strategy.39 
Conversely, proportional electoral rules should enhance the distinctiveness of parties’ policy 
programmes and promote extreme party positioning (Cox 1990). In the same vein, Katz (1980) 
shows issue extremism, consistency, and appeal to a codified party doctrine to be associated with 
proportional electoral formulas. Although political scientists and analysts have long been in 
agreement on that, Lawrence Ezrow’s (2008) empirical analyses do not support these claims. 
However, working with only fifteen countries increases the probability of incurring in a type II 
error
40
 and, hence, limits considerably the reliability of this last author’s findings.  
 
 Studies of congruence between citizens and policymakers constitute another category of 
research concerned with the indirect impact of electoral rules on political representation. For 
example, several studies demonstrate that governments elected under PR rules are significantly 
closer to their national median voter than are cabinets elected according to other types of 
electoral systems (Huber and Powell 1994; Powell and Vanberg 2000). By contrast, André Blais 
and Marc André Bodet (2006) argue that the net overall impact of PR on congruence between 
represented and representatives is nil because this type of electoral systems has two contradictory 
effects that cancel out: more parties that are less centrist and, as a result, more distant from the 
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 However, see Grofman’s piece (2004) against “a simplistic notion” that in plurality elections we ought to expect 
party convergence to the views of the median voter. 
40
 According to Kennedy (2003), a type II error is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis. 
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voters, and more coalition governments that are closer to the centre of the policy spectrum and, 
hence, reduce the distance between the government and voters. Moreover, Wlezien and Soroka 
(2012) demonstrate that governments in proportional systems are less responsive to changing 
public opinion. Finally, Matt Golder and Jacek Stramski (2010) distinguish between 
governments in proportional democracies, which are not substantively more congruent with their 
voters in policy terms than those in majoritarian countries; and legislatures in proportional 
democracies, which are more representative.  
 
 The literature also contains strong arguments as to why cabinet formation and stability 
might be indirectly affected by the interparty dimension of the electoral system. For example, the 
direct relationship between the proportionality of the rules and the number of parties lead 
scholars to predict single-party governments or minimal winning coalitions under majoritarian 
rules, and a mix of minority (in consensual systems) and undersized and oversized cabinets (in 
highly conflictual ones) under proportional rules (Grofman 1989). In the same vein, the effective 
number of parties allows us to account well for much of the variation in cabinet duration 
(Taagepera and Sikk 2010). By contrast, Gary King et al. (1990) find no statistically significant 
effect of party system fragmentation on the likelihood of government survival.  
 
  Third, a number of empirical studies have found that the interparty dimension of the 
electoral system also has an effect on the size of the public sector (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; 
Persson and Tabellini 2005), the type of policy outputs that governments in such systems provide 
(Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Weingast et 
al. 1981), and the degree of redistribution (Iversen and Soskice 2006). Although the claims of 
these scholars about the theoretical mechanisms are different, all of them argue that PR systems 
increase the fraction of GDP accounted for by government spending. Above all, this is because 
left-wing parties enjoy larger seat shares in European parliaments under PR, and have spent more 
years than have their ideological comrades in other OECD countries that did not adopt PR 
(Iversen and Soskice 2006; Rodden 2011). Turning now to a second group of works that explain 
variations in macroecononomic variables (e.g, Persson and Tabellini 2005), the literature 
suggests that targetable policy outputs and pork-barrel goods are more common in majoritarian 
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electoral systems rather than under PR.
41
 By contrast, the latter should generate more 
redistribution than the former (Iversen and Soskice 2006). 
 
 Finally, there is wide agreement that the proportionality of electoral systems, measured 
with different indexes, is positively associated with voters’ turnout (Blais and Carty 2006; Cox 
1999b; Franklin 2004; Jackman 1987). For example, Benny Geys (2006) finds in his meta-
analysis of studies on the determinants of electoral participation that 70 per cent of them succeed 
in actually demonstrating a positive effect of proportionality on turnout. Despite the unequivocal 
evidence in favour of this relationship, disagreement emerges on its explanation (Blais 2006). 
For this reason, the recent work by Peter Selb (2009) showing that variable levels of local 
competitiveness and, hence, uneven turnout across districts make voters’ participation rates to be 
lower in majoritarian systems is particularly refreshing. Finally, a couple of studies by Aina 
Gallego (2010) and Gallego et al. (2012) point to new agendas to pursue on the relationship 
between electoral rules, party system fragmentation, disproportionality and turnout. In the first 
one, Gallego (2010) shows that the negative effect of party system fragmentation on turnout is 
lower for the highly educated. In the second of these studies, Gallego et al. (2012) propose and 
test a theory to account for the puzzle that disproportionality of electoral outcomes has a negative 
effect on voter participation in established democracies, but not in new ones. 
  
2.2.2. The intraparty dimension 
Although the initial underdevelopment of the field of comparative electoral systems was 
particularly salient in the case of the intraparty dimension, we can see it nowadays as one of the 
areas of most profound progress in the subfield (Shugart 2005). In order to systematically 
explore the questions outlined in this area, I will subdivide this part of the review into two big 
sections. I will first offer a summary of the patterns of descriptive representation provoked by 
electoral systems. I will then devote the core of the review on the intraparty dimension to the 
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 The literature certainly suggests that incentives to pork-barrel are more common in the US, and the US is a 
majoritarian system. But the US is also a system with separated powers in which pork replaces party discipline. This 
latter logic suggests that we would not find pork barrel politics in majoritarian parliamentary systems. This remark 
notwithstanding, Stratman and Baur (2002) identify the effect of electoral rules on German legislators’ behaviour 
and show that pork barrel politics are due to the electoral rule employed. More specifically, they find significant 
differences in committee membership depending whether the legislator is elected through FPTP or PR. Hence, the 
government funds legislators obtain for their constituencies in order to win reelection cannot be fully attributed to 
the separation of powers.  
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study of the impact of electoral systems on the legislators’ (and legislative candidates) incentives 
to cultivate a personal vote.  
 
2.2.2.1. Socio-demographic effects 
The impact of electoral rules on the representation of social and demographic groups in the 
electorate –namely, “descriptive representation” in Hanna Pitkin’s (1972 [1967]) words- could 
be erroneously conceptualized on both the interparty and intraparty dimension (Shugart 2005). 
On the one hand, if we started with the observation that levels of representation of ethnic and 
religious minorities and women is higher under proportional representation than in single-
member districts (Duverger 1964 [1954]; Matland and Studlar 1996; Norris 1985), we could 
think we are in front of an interparty effect. In addition, incumbents are consistently found to 
have an electoral advantage over their challengers in majoritarian systems –the so-called, 
incumbency advantage- (e.g., Mayhew 2004 [1974]); and this effect is detrimental for non-
incumbent politicians, including those from traditionally under-represented groups such as 
women (Henig 2001). However, we are not speaking of the interparty dimension when 
discussing effects of electoral systems on representation of women, unless PR means more 
“women’ parties”; given that the usual effect is more women in various parties, it is an intraparty 
effect.
42
 Moreover, as soon as we stop implicitly equating PR with closed lists, and focus on 
proportional systems that promote intraparty competition for preference votes, we observe that 
not all inclusive electoral formulas favour female representation. And the latter is also basically 
an intraparty effect.  
 
Although ethnic and religious groups can frequently gain representation through single-
member districts where their own geographic concentration permits them to do that, women (and 
other socio-demographic groups) are typically better represented under proportional rules. By 
contrast, proportional representation with multi-member districts –especially, where there is only 
one constituency that is national and the list is closed like in Israel- could lead to little or no 
representation at all of regional groups. Despite the soundness of the latter argument, Michael 
Latner and Anthony McGann (2005) provide evidence of the type of geographical representation 
we should not be likely to see when there are no institutions that enforce specific geographical 
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 I would like to thank Matthew Shugart for having raised this point. 
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patterns (i.e., proportional representation with a single national constituency). Looking at two of 
the most ‘‘extreme’’ cases of proportional representation, Israel and the Netherlands, they find 
that not only central metropolitan areas but also most peripheral regions are somewhat over-
represented in the respective legislatures. Hence, these last findings point out some limitations on 
the expected intraparty effects of electoral systems. First of all, representation remains more 
territorialized than a deterministic reading of the national constituency would have suggested in 
those countries. Second, it makes no substantial difference to the functioning of a national 
constituency whether or not the parties present ranked ballots and voters simply select one party 
list over another (Israel’s closed lists), or the allocation of seats to candidates takes into account 
both the party-provided rank order and the preference votes (the Netherlands’ flexible lists).43 
 
2.2.2.2. The personal vote 
Turning now to the second main consequence of the variations in the intraparty dimension, 
electoral systems have also been found to have an impact on the personal vote, typically defined 
as “that portion of a candidate´s electoral support which originates in his or her personal 
qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 1987: 9). Hence, the personal vote 
may be based on either actual behaviour or assigned attributes. First, some empirical studies 
examine the impact of the variations in the rules of the game on the characteristics of candidates. 
If the electoral system promotes a personal vote, candidates will exhibit personal attributes that 
may attract preference votes away from co-partisan, or even from candidates of a different party. 
By contrast, if citizens cast votes strictly for a political party, with little or no regard to, or 
evaluation of, the individual(s) representing that party in electoral contests, there is no personal 
vote. Shugart et al. (2005) provide the first comparative empirical evidence in this regard. Using 
data from six European cases under proportional representation, they find that the probability 
that a legislator will display personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs) -operationalized as local 
birthplace and prior representative experience at the municipal or regional level- is higher with 
specific institutional characteristics on the intraparty dimension of electoral systems that foster 
candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote, but is lower when those institutional 
characteristics are absent. In the same vein, using the case of Japan’s second chamber, Kuniaki 
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 The fact that Dutch voters vote in one of nineteen electoral districts casts some doubts about the convenience of 
the research design adopted by these authors (Andeweg 2005). 
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Nemoto and Matthew Shugart (2012) demonstrate that local profiles are effective PVEAs to 
mobilize votes under the two personalistic systems (single-non transferable vote or SNTV and 
open list proportional representation or OLPR), while they do not matter under party-centred 
(closed list proportional representation or CLPR); and Crisp et al. (forthcoming), using data from 
Slovakia, show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference 
vote earnings with better pre-election list positions in the future.   
 
Second, there clearly are behavioural consequences of the intraparty dimension of 
electoral systems that go beyond parties’ incentives to nominate candidates with diverse 
characteristics and profiles that appeal to constituent subgroups. For example, Heithusen et al. 
(2005) examine the constituency focus of MPs in six legislative chambers that span a variety of 
electoral systems. In the same vein, Shaun Bowler and David Farrell (2008 [1993]) suggest that 
institutional variables of electoral systems affect the frequency with which members of the 
European Parliament engage in constituency service. By contrast, the contribution of Roger 
Scully and David Farrell (2003) on members of the European Parliament counter-intuitively 
suggests that those elected from open lists place more emphasis on traditional parliamentary 
activities.
44
 This effect, however, tends to disappear as district magnitude increases. Finally, in a 
slightly different way, Shane Martin (2011) shows that the impact of ballot structure on 
committee system strength is dependent on how legislators cultivate a personal vote.  
 
The intraparty dimension has also an effect on the types of bills that legislators initiate. In 
this regard, Brian Crisp et al. (2004) provide evidence that perfectly fits with the incentives 
allegedly generated by the electoral system to cultivate a personal vote, and show that the 
probability that a legislator initiates a local bill is higher in candidate-centred rather than in 
party-centred systems. Likewise, another interesting avenue of research in the field in the recent 
past has been the analysis of the assignment of legislators to committees. To my knowledge, 
there are at least a couple of papers that consider the committee assignments according to the tier 
(nominal or list) by which a member was elected in Germany (Gschwend et al. 2009; Sieberer 
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 I believe that this is counter-intuitive because, if the theory was true, representatives elected through open lists 
should be more focused on constituency service rather than parliamentary activities. By contrast, it could be argued 
the opposite by claiming that constituency service implies voters can reward incumbents for “bringing home the 
bacon” (Samuels 2002: 845), and with M much greater than 1 under open-list proportional representation rules that 
may not be possible. In other words, personal vote seeking and constituency service should not be conflated.  
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2010; Stratmann and Baur 2002). Robert Pekkanen et al. (2006) also show that members of the 
Japanese Parliament elected from PR lists and single-member districts receive different types of 
positions, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Unfortunately, it is yet untested how voter 
interests match with the committee system in closed-list PR systems (Shugart 2005: 48). Jones et 
al. (2002) provide the only study on committee assignment under party-centred electoral rules 
that I am aware of, but they do not use district magnitude as an explanatory factor. Finally, the 
electoral connection between legislators and voters affects the extent of party unity within the 
chambers. Legislative factionalism is higher in countries where candidates compete against 
members of their own parties for personal votes (either in primaries or in the general election) 
than where nominations are controlled by party leaders and electoral lists are closed (Hix 2004; 
Katz 1980; Sieberer 2006). In other words, where legislators have to please only one principal, 
that is, the party leader, defections do not exist in practice (Carey 2009).  
 
 Nor are intraparty effects of electoral systems confined to legal behaviours or merely 
aspects of electoral campaigns or parliamentary daily life. Broadly speaking, there are two main 
alternative perspectives on which electoral system generates more opportunities for incumbents 
to advance narrow over general interests, and extract political rents. On the one hand, Lijphart 
(1999) advocates the use of PR systems to avoid political corruption. On the other hand, Torsten 
Persson and Guido Tabellini (2005) argue that the freedom to choose individual candidates 
(rather than party lists) is associated with less corruption. Likewise, Jana Kunicová and Susan 
Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that rules that reduce individual accountability (i.e., proportional 
representation systems) are associated with higher corruption.
45
 Finally, Eric Chang and Miriam 
Golden (2007) provide the most recent test to date on the relationship between electoral rules and 
corruption by looking at a large sample of contemporary democratic nations. In contrast to the 
previous works, they find that open lists can increase or have no effect on political corruption 
depending on district magnitude.  
 
 The impact of electoral rules on the level of voters’ turnout can also be conceptualized on 
the intraparty dimension. If the intraparty competition promoted by an electoral system hampers 
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 For them, all proportional representation systems reduce individual accountability but this is obviously not true if 
we also take into consideration preferential-list electoral rules. Unfortunately, they do not distinguish between the 
latter and closed lists. 
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electoral turnout, we are obviously speaking of an intraparty effect. Prominent among the group 
of works that study this relationship are those of Eva Anduiza (1999) and Joseph Robbins 
(2010). The former posits that the possibility of expressing a preference acts as an incentive to 
participation only for individuals with high levels of resources and motivations, while it 
increases the level of abstention for disadvantaged electors. Likewise, Gallego (2010) argues that 
the poorly educated people vote more frequently when the voting procedure is easy, that is, in a 
non-preferential vote system. Finally, Robbins (2010) finds that where electoral competition is 
predicated on party, rather than candidates’ reputations, turnout levels rise. However, these last 
results seem to be at odds with those that show that preferential systems promote a greater sense 
of fairness about election outcomes among citizens and, in turn, a higher public's satisfaction 
with the democratic system (Farrell and McAllister 2006).  
 
 Closely related to the personal vote and to constituency service is the political economy 
literature that takes as dependent variable macroeconomic policies and outcomes. In this vein, 
several works posit that the extent of intra-party competition can be expected to shape the levels 
of government expenditure (Edwards and Thames 2007), trade protection (Hankla 2006; Nielson 
2003), budget discipline (Hallerberg and Marier 2004), and efficacy in education spending 
(Hicken and Simmons 2008). A complementary perspective sees economic reform as less 
successful in countries where electoral rules encourage the personal vote (Bagashka 2012).  
 
To sum up, the literature that examines the relationship between electoral systems and 
personal vote across countries, although with a scope increasingly comparative, have long been 
hampered by variation in the numerous intervening variables that influence legislative behaviour. 
As a consequence of this, several scholars have examined whether personal vote exists (or not) in 
a large collection of single-country studies that focus on a different electoral system: single 
transferable (Marsh 2007; Martin 2010) and non-transferable (Hirano 2006) vote, closed (Crisp 
and Desposato 2004; Riera 2011) and open (Ames 1995; Golden 2003; Samuels 1999) list 
proportional representation, mixed-member proportional and majoritarian rules (Canache and 
Mondak 2000), and single-member districts with plurality rule (Gaines 1998). In the same vein, 
Johnson and Hoyo (2012) argue that personal vote building is likely to occur in ways that 
promote good vote divisions where strong vote division incentives are present (e.g., under the 
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former Japan’s SNTV system).46 And, likewise, other political scientists have taken advantage of 
the recent proliferation of countries adopting mixed-member systems, or of the current existence 
of bicameral systems where members of each chamber are elected according to different rules 
(e.g., Desposato 2006; Kunicová and Remington 2008; Moser and Scheiner 2004; Nemoto et al. 
2008; Thames 2005). In spite of this large literature, Scott Morgenstern and Stephen Swindle 
(2005) find, however, only limited evidence that electoral systems affect the personal vote. 
 
Finally, I will close this section by briefly disentangling the ways in which electoral 
systems affect party system nationalization. Broadly speaking, the impact of the rules of the 
game on the degree of similarity of parties’ electoral support across districts can be 
conceptualized both on the interparty and intraparty dimensions. First, institutional incentives in 
the interparty dimension pertain to economies of scale and have the following form: some 
political group from one district seeks to induce a number of legislative candidates or members 
of parliament from other constituencies to participate in a larger organization to accomplish a 
task that requires their help. In this regard, different versions of linkage emerge because the task 
can broadly range from securing more seats and votes to increasing the likelihood to pass 
legislative packages through the improvement of the chances of winning the presidency or 
controlling the government. For example, the existence of upper tiers and national thresholds, 
and the requirement of qualified majorities all promote the nationalization of party systems (Cox 
1997 and 1999).
47
 Second, candidate-centred electoral rules should also hamper the 
nationalization of the party system by encouraging the pursuit of personal votes and, hence, 
fostering candidates’ strategies of differentiation from other members of their parties 
(Morgenstern and Swindle 2005).
48
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 By contrast, Nemoto et al. (forthcoming) find that ambitious factions of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party under 
the former single non-transferable vote system nominated too many candidates. 
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 The existence of national thresholds and upper tiers lead politicians to run in different districts under a common 
party label. As long as this strategic entry decision provokes a high degree of homogeneity in parties’ electoral 
success across districts, it can be argued that these two institutional features encourage party system nationalization.   
48
 Although party system nationalization will be deemed to be cause and consequence of electoral reforms in the 
intraparty dimension in this thesis (see Chapters 5 and 7), I admit that this feature of the party system falls into a 
slightly different dimension than the other matters I have been discussing, and dealing with it in a cursory fashion 
along with other intraparty effects can make it a bit awkward.   
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2.3. The origins of electoral systems 
The consequences of electoral laws are a research topic that is considerably more developed than 
the causes of those laws. Following Kenneth Benoit (2007), I will divide the main studies 
explaining electoral system adoption and reform according to three criteria. First, a key question 
revolves around the actors and the forces involved in the modification. By addressing the issue of 
who or what effects the change, we can distinguish between party-centric (Benoit 2004; Birch et 
al. 2002; Boix 1999; Colomer 2004b; Lundberg 2009), president-centric (Benoit and Hayden 
2004; Hazan 1996; Lehoucq 2000; Remington and Smith 1996), democratic (Bielasiak 2006; 
Birch 2006; Blais et al. 2005), technocratic (Benoit and Schiemann 2001; Nagel 2004), economic 
(Cusack et al. 2007; Katzenstein 1985; Rogowski 1987), geographical (Dahl and Tufte 1973), 
historical (Brady and Mo 1992; Carstairs 1980; Elster et al. 1998; Jesse 1990; Mikkel and Pettai 
2004) international (Blais and Massicotte 1997; Lundell 2009) or societal (Lijphart 1992; Nohlen 
1993; Rokkan 2009 [1970]) approaches to electoral adoption and reform. 
  
Second, the analysis of electoral system adoption and change points to another traditional 
division in comparative politics concerning the number of countries analyzed. A full review of 
the studies that address this topic means not only taking into account non-quantitative (e.g., 
Bielasiak 2006; Birch et al. 2002; Elster et al. 1998; García Díez 2001; Ishiyama 1997; Jones 
Luong 2002; Lijphart 1992; Negretto 2009; Renwick 2010; Sakamoto 1999; Zovatto and Orozco 
Henríquez 2008) or quantitative (e.g., Best 2012; Colomer 2005; Harfst 2013; Nobbe 2013; 
Remmer 2008; Wills-Otero 2009) examinations of multiple cases, but also considering 
propositions inductively generated from single case-studies (e.g., Bawn 1993; Benoit and 
Schiemann 2001; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Kaminski 2002; Lago and Montero 2005; 
Moraski 2007; Remington and Smith 1996; Shugart et al. 2007). 
  
 Finally, four broad categories of contexts in which the origins of electoral systems are 
rooted can be identified. The first category links electoral system adoption and change to the 
extension of the suffrage in Western Europe in the years immediately before and after World 
War I (e.g., Ahmed 2010; Andrews and Jackman 2005; Blais et al. 2005; Boix 1999; Calvo 
2009; Carstairs 1980; Cusack et al. 2007; Kreuzer 2010; Leemann and Mares 2012; Penadés 
2008 and 2011; Rodden 2011). I consider this group of studies to be at the core of the research 
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on the origins of electoral systems. For this reason, I will review it separately below. Second, the 
analysis of electoral reform in well developed democracies constitutes another category of 
studies that take the electoral system as dependent variable (e.g., Hazan and Rahat 2000; Katz 
1996; Nagel 2004; Reed and Thies 2001; Renwick et al. 2009; Renwick 2010). Third, scholars 
may also examine the adoption of a new electoral system in the context of a democratic 
transition (e.g., Bawn 1993; Benoit and Schiemann 2001; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; 
Elster et al. 1998; Jones Luong 2002; Kaminski 2002; Lijphart 1992; Lago and Montero 2005; 
Nobbe 2013; Remington and Smith 1996). Finally, several studies address electoral system 
changes in new democracies (e.g., Birch et al. 2002; Dawisha and Deets 2006; García Díez 2001; 
Harfst 2013; Remmer 2008; Wills-Otero 2009).  
 
 Of course, the core concerns of the field can be traced back to Stein Rokkan’s 
examination of the introduction of PR in continental Europe at the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
as a consequence of suffrage extension. According to him, shifts to PR came about “through a 
convergence of pressures from below and from above” (Rokkan 2009 [1970: 157]). In other 
words, both the established bourgeois parties and the new socialist parties had strong interests in 
changing a system that jeopardized the survival of the former and prevented the emergence of 
the latter. These claims are especially relevant for predicting electoral reform in contemporary 
democracies because they suggest that a coalition of competing and even more hostile parties 
may have an interest in changing the electoral system in order to maximize their representation.  
 
 Almost three decades later, Carles Boix’s work (1999) constitutes the first attempt to 
fully test Rokkan at al.’s argument. However, the key point in his argument is slightly different: 
while Boix attributes switches to PR to failed electoral coordination between the parties of the 
property owning classes, Rokkan argues that the right changes the rules of the game because it is 
highly divided by noneconomic issues –namely, “the inheritance of hostility and distrust” 
(Rokkan 2009 [1970: 158]). Boix then verifies that PR was adopted not only when the right-wing 
parties were fragmented but also when the recently emerged social democratic party was 
electorally powerful. Boix (2010) himself checks the robustness of the theoretical model by 
regressing the position publicly favoured with regard to PR by non-socialist parties on whether 
the party was electorally vulnerable. 
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Although theoretically valuable, I think that Boix’s work is wrong in terms of the logic he 
develops and the cross-national evidence he uses. First, the failed coordination argument has 
difficulties. Following its logic, the solution of the problem might have simply resulted from the 
adoption of a runoff system that would have enabled voters on the right to coordinate on the 
leading bourgeois party in the second round on a constituency-by-constituency basis (Cusack et 
al. 2007); and, in fact, this is what seems to have initially happened because at the turn of the 20
th
 
century majority systems were more common than plurality systems (Blais et al. 2005).  
 
Second, Boix’s main independent variable is the effective number of parties at the 
national level. But this does not distinguish cases of two parties equally sized at the district-level 
from cases with two right parties’ dominanting in half of the districts each. For example, as 
Penadés (2005) shows, there was a mean gap of about 30 percent in the vote share of the two 
established parties at the district-level before the adoption of PR in continental Europe at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Hence, voters would have been able to strategically abandon the 
locally weakest right-wing party had the electoral rules remained the same. Moreover, nor is 
Boix’s (1999) argument borne out by statistical evidence. Penadés (2005), for example, shows 
that Boix’s findings decisively hinge on the selection of cases. Likewise, Cusack et al. (2007) 
point out three measurement issues that in their view cast doubt on the robustness of the results. 
In the same vein, Josephine Andrews and Robert Jackman (2005) and Blais et al. (2005) also 
consider Boix’s account not to be entirely appealing for introducing country size in the 
specifications or for excluding strict controls, respectively. Ernesto Calvo (2009) is quick to 
point to a number of cases (for example, Belgium) that considerably deviate from the causal 
mechanism specified by Boix (see also Ahmed 2010). Finally, there is also a serious problem in 
the way the key interaction is specified in two out of three models (Brambor et al. 2006). As we 
already know, the strength of the new Socialist Party encourages the adoption of proportional 
representation in countries with a high effective number of old parties. However, he draws this 
conclusion based on a couple of models that include an interation term without any of the 
constitutive terms. 
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Bearing all these considerations in mind, Thomas Cusack et al.’s (2007) economic 
approach can be seen as an appropriate supplement to the Rokkan-Boix argument. For them, the 
adoption of PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century was largely driven by the structure of 
the organization of economic interests. Proto-corporatist democracies in which economic 
interests were collectively organized (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) adopted PR whereas liberal countries (like the UK, the 
United States, New Zealand, Canada and Australia) remained majoritarian.
49
 However, this 
essentially long-run economic argument is severely criticized for neglecting the shorter-term 
politics of electoral choice (Kreuzer 2010). This last point breeds quite acceptable criticism 
regarding the validity of economic analysis because it is useless for explaining substantial 
electoral reforms in established democracies in the 1990s. Cusack et al. (2010: 394) defend 
themselves in a more recent piece by claiming that they “are not proposing a general theory of 
PR adoption”. Even more importantly for my purposes here, they argue that all parties from the 
same country should prefer one electoral system over another. Nevertheless, this last prediction 
is not borne out in Boix’s empirical analysis (2010) of partisan preferences for proportional 
representation. 
 
Despite the fact that Boix and Cusack et al.’s arguments constitute the two most well-
known attempts to establish the determinants of the adoption of proportional representation, they 
are not of course the only ones dealing with the historical origins of electoral systems. In fact, the 
literature is loaded with accounts of this phenomenon. For example, Andrews and Jackman 
(2005) highlight the role played by uncertainty and suggest that any strategic behaviour with 
regard to electoral engineering was at best short-term, reflecting the largest party’s seats/votes 
ratio in the most recent election. This formulation stands in stark contrast to Cusack et al.’s 
contention that the choice of PR was fostered by a disproportional electoral outcome.  
 
Blais et al.’s (2005) work is not exempt from criticism on the basis of Boix’s argument 
either. In their account of the adoption of PR between 1865 and 1939, they do not find support 
for the socialist threat thesis once they control for the effect of other explanatory factors like the 
spread of democracy and existing electoral institutions. In particular, they claim using a more 
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 For an alternative economic story, see also Katzenstein (1985) and Rogowski (1987). 
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detailed dataset that the relationship between multi-party systems and PR adoption is mainly 
spurious and largely driven by the electoral formula previously employed. Wherever majority 
systems had replaced plurality rule, party system fragmentation and coalition governments 
pushed for the adoption of PR (see also Penadés 2005).  
 
In recent developments, there are also cases of wholesale critiques of Boix’s work that 
claim that the socialist “threat” cannot explain 1900s adoption of PR in certain countries where a 
strong socialist party is absent. In fact, Penadés (2008) shows variation within the group of 
socialist parties in terms of their institutional preferences with regard to electoral reform and 
attributes this variation to the strength of labour unions and the nature of union-party relations. In 
a nutshell, he claims that only socialist parties with weak ties to small unions ended up 
supporting PR. In the same vein, he argues in a recent piece that preferences for PR also differed 
across centre-right parties, and decisively hinged on whether they were religious or not and, 
hence, were less or more likely to coordinate with liberal forces (Penadés 2011).  
 
To explain cases in which an electoral socialist threat was an unlikely explanatory factor 
for the adoption of PR, Calvo (2009) develops an alternative hypothesis according to which new 
inclusive electoral rules were implemented in situations where partisan biases did systematically 
hurt an established party or coalition. Finally, one recent study puts historical knowledge back on 
the agenda on the origins of proportional representation (Ahmed 2010). In an in-depth analysis 
of the cases of the United Kingdom and Belgium, this author claims that both single-member 
plurality (SMP) and PR were devised as electoral safeguards to protect right-wing parties against 
the impact of suffrage expansion. Hence, she proposes an exclusively political explanation of the 
choice of proportional representation that fundamentally departs from Cusack et al.’s (2007) 
economic arguments.  
 
Jonathan Rodden (2011) also believes it is important to establish why some countries 
retained small plurality electoral districts while other rejected it in the early 20
th
 century. In his 
opinion, the former electoral rules survived in either of two rather different types of situations. 
First, there was little interest in electoral reform among the “established” parties of the right 
when socialist entry was sufficiently limited. Second, when socialist parties supplanted the pre-
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existing “left-wing” party very quickly, the former had few incentives to change the electoral 
system, and the latter did not get an opportunity. Hence, Rodden’s argument accomplishes two 
objectives. First, he shows (like Penadés [2008] does) that not all socialist parties favoured 
proportional representation. Second, he introduces a specific coordination problem that 
concerned the “left-wing” rather the “right-wing” parties. 
 
Finally, Leemann and Mares (2012) offer a test of some of these competing explanations 
for the adoption of proportional representation. Taking advantage of a historical dataset in late-
19
th
 century Germany, they show that the skill structure of a district has no predictive power in 
accounting for support for changes in electoral institutions at the level of the individual 
legislator. Alternatively, they find that legislative support for the adoption of proportional 
representation can be explained by a combination of district specific vulnerabilities to the rise of 
Social Democratic candidates and partisan calculations concerning the disproportionality of the 
translation of votes to seats. 
 
Summing up, the works just reviewed form the foundation upon which the field would 
later be built. However, adopting them to study electoral reform in contemporary democracies is 
not cost free for two main reasons. First of all, it seems that a more flexible framework is better 
suited to the purpose of studying the politics of electoral reform after the Second World War 
because it enables us to take into account the fact that elections in this period were conducted 
under different rules across countries and over time. In other words, in the case of contemporary 
democracies, it is worth including more factors and variables in a broader explanation because ex 
ante variation in electoral rules will likely develop substantially different patterns and produce 
substantially different results. Second, it seems illogical to apply any of these theories due to the 
lack of an exogenous shock in contemporary democracies comparable to the suffrage extension 
that takes place at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. For example, all four phenomena that Boix 
(1999) mentions as possible triggers for the switch to PR – the extension of universal suffrage, 
introduction of competitive elections, massive political realignment among voters, and a high 
turnover of party organization – fail to account for the most recent reforms (Rahat 2011).   
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The increased scholarly interest in the question of electoral system origins owes much to 
the more general literature on institutional change that focuses from an empirical point of view 
on the origins of several central institutions of modern democracies like the regime type 
(Colomer 2001b; Sartori 1997 [1994]), the power of the cabinet (Cox 2005 [1987]), the territorial 
division of power (de Figuereido Jr. and Weingast 2005), and the rules of the parliamentary 
game (Sieberer et al. 2011). On the theoretical level, rational choice theory (Calvert 1995; Greif 
and Laitin 2004; Héritier 2007; Knight 1992; Milgrom et al. 2006; North 1990; Shepsle 2006; 
Tsebelis 1990) and historical institutionalism (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Pierson 2000) 
constitute the two main research paradigms in this regard. Broadly speaking, the former focuses 
on rational decisions by political actors trying to achieve their goals by changing the rules of the 
game, whereas the latter concentrates on the question of how historical continuities guide and 
constrain institutional development. Hence, institutions are not, according to most of the rational 
choice work, a “deus ex machina” of a political system but are themselves devices created, 
maintained and changed by human agency (Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003). Given actors’ 
preferences, institutions can be viewed as an equilibrium emerging from an underlying game in 
which they constantly decide whether to keep or change the formal rules. This institutions-as-
equilibrium perspective is theoretically more powerful than earlier views of institutions as 
exogenous rules of the game because it allows us to explain decisions within institutions and 
decisions about institutions using the same model of strategic interaction among rational actors 
(Sieberer et al. 2011). Moreover, it is very useful in analyzing the balance of interests that lead to 
the frequent preservation of the rules (Rahat 2011). But there is also a price for adopting this 
approach that we as researchers might not want to pay.   
 
  First, stability in any political institution can derive not only from political equilibrium—
in the absence of exogenous changes—but also from what Kenneth Shepsle (1979) refers to as a 
structurally induced equilibrium. In other words, changes in political institutions are governed by 
other institutional rules (“second-order” institutions or meta-institutions), which might, in turn, 
induce institutional stability (Benoit 2007). George Tsebelis’ (2002) veto players can also be 
seen through this lens. Second, any institutional reform involves transaction costs that may deter 
changes (Shepsle 1989). According to this idea, institutions would exhibit stability in spite of not 
being well-suited to the actors’ preferences because transaction costs provide them with 
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something of a cushion that increase the costs of enacting the institutional reform (Dunleavy and 
Margetts 1995). In the same vein, it is also possible that a party that is seen to change institutions 
too frequently will be discredited as manipulating the rules for its own political gain (Benoit 
2004). And Shugart (2008) uses the concept of act-contingent motivations of electoral reform to 
refer to electoral system changes pushed by a party that expects to gain electorally for supporting 
them.  
 
Third, actors have to decide on how to discount future compared to current payoffs, and 
how to deal with the lack of information about the effect of institutional change and about their 
own position under the new rules (Andrews and Jackman 2005). Similarly, Gallagher (2005: 
567) argues that the consequences of electoral systems and, hence, reforms are to some degree 
country specific and, thus, unpredictable. This also helps to explain why actors do not constantly 
reshape institutions as was originally expected by William Riker (1980). Finally, on an empirical 
ground, rational choice is not particularly suitable for explaining institutional reform (Rahat 
2011). That is, this perspective predicts that changes in the rules of the game should occur when 
the equilibrium in the underlying game about institutions is disturbed (Sieberer et al. 2011). Such 
disturbances can originate either from an endogenous development or from an exogenous shock. 
These two sources are frequently tied, in turn, to the distinction between redistributive and 
efficient institutions and reforms (Tsebelis 1990). In the latter scholar’s view, “redistributive” 
institutions have a zero-sum character in the sense that payoffs awarded to one actor can only 
come at the expense of someone else. By contrast, efficient institutions can enhance the welfare 
of all the actors. Although it is usually worthwhile to differentiate between these two types of 
institutions, the distinction does not always hold in practice. For example, electoral reforms that 
curb the excessive proportionality of a system producing cabinet instability and legislative 
paralysis are likely to be of the efficient type; but they also advance the interests of some actors, 
usually the major parties, at the expense of others, usually minor ones. Likewise, reforms in 
reaction to external developments can also have redistributive consequences (Sieberer et al. 
2011). This point is also nicely illustrated in Birch’s argument on how transition to democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe overwhelmingly led rational actors to adopt PR systems. This change 
not only solved the legitimacy problem regarding the electoral system but at the same time made 
possible the survival of some former communist parties.  
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2.4. Conclusion: The challenges ahead 
In this chapter, I have discussed the state of the field regarding consequences and causes of the 
rules of the game. More specifically, I have referred to the effects of the interparty and intraparty 
dimension of the electoral system, pointing out some remaining gaps. After this, I have presented 
the bulk of the literature that addresses the origins of the electoral rules. A disadvantage of this 
second branch of the field is that the study of the effects of an institution lends itself better to 
systematic theory (and quantification) than does the study of its genesis (Shugart 2005). 
Moreover, it may sometimes be more difficult to assess why one electoral system is chosen over 
another because there are (naturally) fewer cases to analyze (Rahat 2011).
50
 For instance, in most 
systems of single-member districts and plurality rule, the same electoral rules have been in use 
since their initial adoption. And the same can be said about the PR and mixed-member systems 
of several countries like Argentina or Japan. These cases are quite rare, however. 
 
 In the next chapter, I will identify the cases of electoral reform that are the subject of this 
dissertation and that I will employ as dependent and main independent variable in Part 2 and 
Three, respectively. Note that not all the episodes of electoral law changes will be classified as 
electoral reforms. This will conclude Part 1 of the dissertation. The aim of Part 2 will be to tease 
out the causes of electoral reforms in contemporary democracies.   
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 Katz (2005: 74) warns in the same vein that “While it may be possible statistically to estimate the probability of 
reform in any particular year, it would appear that even the ‘peaks’ in predicted probability will be so low as to leave 
accounting for specific instances in the realm of historical reconstruction rather than statistical prediction.” 
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Chapter 3. Electoral systems in movement: Towards a definition and a classification of 
electoral reforms 
 
It is the easiest thing in the world to get inextricably tangled among the complexities of electoral 
systems. 
(Harry Eckstein 1963: 249) 
 
The whiff of electoral reform is in the air. Everywhere you look some government or other 
seems to be discussing whether to change its electoral system. 
(David Farrell 2011 [2001]: 172) 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Historically, various kinds of electoral reforms have been enacted in democratic countries. For 
example, several established governing parties at the beginning of the 20
th
 century adopted a 
proportional representation (PR) system so that they could keep a voice in parliament even if 
they became a minority after the extension of the suffrage. Of all the possible modifications of 
the electoral laws, this study will only focus on electoral system changes in its interparty and 
intraparty dimensions. Electoral reforms in the former dimension are relatively easy to define 
and identify as they tend to be more prominent both in reality and the relevant literature. Having 
critically reviewed the literature that takes the adoption and the modification of electoral systems 
as the dependent variable in the previous chapter, I will devote the following pages to provide a 
definition and a classification of electoral reforms. Partly as a consequence of the extension of 
this field, scholars do not agree on the features that characterize an episode of electoral reform. 
In this chapter, I aim to clarify the situation by offering my own notion and typology of electoral 
reforms.  
 
In the rest of the chapter, I first discuss the most relevant classifications of electoral 
systems and definitions of electoral reforms that we find in the literature. I then offer my own 
definition and typology of electoral reforms. Third, I present some preliminary data on the main 
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dynamics of electoral system change in the examined countries. Finally, the last section 
summarizes the main points in the chapter. 
 
 
3.2. Defining and classifying electoral institutions 
3.2.1. Electoral systems 
In recent decades, scholars have attempted to construct a common framework for the 
comparative analysis of electoral systems. Part of this significant effort has involved the 
establishment of a widely accepted classification of the object of study. Nevertheless, these 
attempts have been often fruitless. As I will point out below, electoral systems present many 
sources of variation, the most important concerning the ballot structure, the form and number of 
districts, and the electoral formula (Rae 1971 [1967]). It is impossible to discern whether one of 
these elements is more important than the others. Although most scholars prefer to start by 
addressing the types of electoral formulas, Rae in the book that establishes the foundations of the 
modern science of comparative electoral systems chooses to start by analysing the different kinds 
of ballot structure. By contrast, and in conformity with the other chapters in this thesis, the 
analysis of the elements that have an impact in the interparty dimension will precede here the 
review of the body of research that explores the different types of ballot structure. 
 
3.2.1.1. The interparty dimension 
The original classification of electoral systems based on formulas dates back to 1951, when 
Duverger states his famous Law and Hypothesis
51
 (Riker 1982). As Maurice Duverger originally 
does in 1951, Rae (1971 [1967]) identifies three kinds of electoral formulas: plurality, majority, 
and proportional representation (see also Blais 1988). However, Gary Cox (1997: 58) points out 
that the distinction between plurality/majority and proportional representation (PR) does not 
exhaust the distinctions to be made. PR formulas can be classified into highest average and quota 
systems (Farrell 2011 [2001]; Norris 2004). The latter are usually known as largest remainders 
systems as well, but this is not completely appropriate because the largest remainders method is 
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 I follow Riker’s (1982: 754) terminology and distinguish between Duverger’s Law, that links the simple-majority 
single-ballot formulas and the two-party systems, and Duverger’s Hypothesis, that associates simple-majority 
systems with second ballot and proportional representation to multi-partyism. 
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just one way of distributing the unallocated seats (Golder 2005a). The D’Hondt52 method (within 
the category of the highest average systems) and the Hare quota with largest remainders (among 
the quota-based proportional systems) are by far the most common.  
 
In spite of the apparent consensus on the importance of the distinction between 
plurality/majority and PR, things have become trickier in the course of time. First of all, some 
authors refer to semi-proportional systems (Lijphart 1994). The limited vote and its most well-
known subtype, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV), are labelled this way because they are 
“providing only rough accuracy of representation” (Bogdanor 1983: 8). This line of reasoning is 
a bit problematic because it confuses the outcome of an electoral formula with its mechanics 
(Golder 2005a). In fact, each of these systems requires successful candidates to win either a 
plurality or a majority of the vote. For this reason, I will consider these types of electoral rules to 
be majoritarian. Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart (1989) introduce a different approach to 
the topic when they firstly distinguish two methods by which votes are translated into seats: 
those which apply to single-member districts and those which apply to multi-member districts. 
This peculiar way of classifying electoral systems provokes strange results: for example, the 
SNTV and the limited vote appear just after the explanation of the PR formulas rather than being 
with the rest of electoral systems that use a majoritarian formula because they are employed in 
multi-member districts (just like the PR formulas). 
 
In recent times, a second controversy arises around those systems in which seats are 
allocated in more than one tier. Additional tiers of seat allocation are usually implemented to 
correct disproportionalities that arose at the lower tiers (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005b: 13).
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Scholars who propose a classification of electoral systems differ enormously in the attention 
devoted to multi-tier methods of allocation. For example, some authors prefer not to deal with 
these kinds of systems because they consider them to be a mere mixture of some more basic 
components (Blais 1988). In the same vein, Cox’s (1997) remarks on multi-tier systems are very 
brief. By contrast, Arend Lijphart (1994) distinguishes two types of multi-tier methods: 
remainder-transfer and adjustment-seat systems. The former use a quota formula in the lower-tier 
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 Following Gallagher and Mitchell (2005a), the capitalized form D’Hondt will be used in this thesis. 
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 By contrast, these tiers sometimes have the main effect of giving additional benefit to the larger parties, as in the 
“reinforced proportional representation” used in Greece (Lijphart 1994). 
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districts, but instead of allocating any seats left to the parties with the largest remainders in these 
districts, all remaining votes and seats are transferred to, and allocated in, higher-tier districts. In 
turn, in adjustment-seat systems, the districts at the lower level are used for the initial allocation 
of seats, but the final allocation takes place at the higher level on the basis of all the votes cast in 
all the lower-tier districts that together make up the higher-tier district. 
 
A different particularly interesting debate revolves around the exact nature of the so-
called mixed systems. On the one hand, Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg (2001) contend 
that this sort of electoral systems is a subtype of multi-tier methods of allocation of seats; 
according to them, the specific proviso that characterizes this subset of systems is the fact that 
there are two overlapping tiers, and one of them allocates seats nominally whereas in the other 
the allocation is by lists. They identify then two broad subtypes: mixed-member proportional, 
that “lean” towards proportional, and mixed-member majoritarian, that “lean” towards 
majoritarian. The primary variable that allows us to distinguish between mixed-member 
majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems is the presence or 
absence of a linkage between tiers. David Farrell (2011 [2001]) also uses this classification in his 
book. 
 
On the other hand, Matt Golder (2005) claims that mixed systems are not a subset of 
multi-tier systems. In fact, he thinks that Shugart and Wattenberg’s (2001) typology is a bit 
problematic because it does not indicate how multi-tier systems that combine majoritarian and 
proportional formulas should be classified.
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 In order to remove this shortcoming, Golder defines 
“multi-tier systems as those in which a single electoral formula is used across multiple tiers” 
(2005: 110). In this point, he uses a very broad concept of single electoral formula that includes 
all the allocation methods that belong to the same main category (majoritarian or proportional). 
In turn, mixed systems are those “that employ a mixture of majoritarian and proportional rules” 
(Golder 2005a: 111). Hence, the combination of different types of electoral formulas 
(proportional versus majoritarian) rather than the mixture of different types of ballot structures or 
representatives (nominal versus lists) is the primary variable that allows Golder to identify mixed 
systems (see also Norris 2004). 
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 It is the case, for example, of Iceland between 1946 and 1959. 
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Following Louis Massicotte and André Blais (1999), Golder divides mixed systems into 
those in which the two electoral formulas work independently and those in which they are linked. 
In the former, the two formulas are implemented separately from each other, while in the latter 
the application of one of them is conditional on the outcome produced by the other. He then 
further separates these two main categories into different subtypes: first, independent systems 
into coexistence, superposition and fusion; and second, dependent into correction and 
conditional.
55
 Finally, Josep Maria Colomer (2004b) differentiates three types of mixed systems: 
coexistence, multiple tier, and parallel. Surprisingly, he applies the term multiple-tier allocation 
to a subtype of mixed systems. Moreover, it is not clear according to his classification whether 
the German electoral system, usually labelled as personalized proportional representation, is a 
mixed system or not. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the different classifications of mixed 
electoral systems. 
 
As I have already pointed out, electoral systems have been traditionally classified on the 
basis of their formulas. Several scholars, however, emphasize the role played by at least two 
more elements of the interparty dimension. The first one is district magnitude, and is defined as 
“the number of representatives elected in a district” (Lijphart 1994: 10). Although district 
magnitude is characterized as “the decisive factor” by Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 112), Blais 
(1988) and Cox (1997) propose the broader concepts of constituency and district structure, 
respectively, in order to capture not only the size but also the nature of the district. Douglas Rae 
(1971 [1967]) identifies two kinds of districts based on the magnitude: single-member and multi-
member. Unfortunately, this distinction incorrectly blurs the substantial variations that exist 
within the category of multi-member districts. In recent times, some scholars have highlighted 
the impact of district magnitude on the level of electoral disproportionality, the size of party 
system, the number of wasted votes, or the proportion of women in Parliament
56
 (Anckar 1997; 
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 A coexistence system is one in which some districts use a majoritarian formula, while others employ a 
proportional formula; a superposition system is one in which two different formulas are applied nationwide but the 
districts are not completely overlapping; a fusion system is one in which majoritarian and proportional formulas are 
used within a single district; a correction system is one in which seats distributed by proportional representation in 
one set of districts are used to correct the distortions created by the majoritarian formula in another; and a 
conditional system is one in which the actual use or not of one electoral formula depends on the outcome produced 
by the other. 
56
 The effects of electoral rules are analyzed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3.1. Classifications of mixed electoral systems 
Scholar Type Subtype Examples 
Golder (2005) Independent  Coexistence Iceland (1946-59) 
  Superposition Russia (1993-2003) 
  Fusion  Turkey (1987, 1991) 
 
 
Dependent  Correction Albania (1992, 2001, 2005) 
  Fusion  France (1951, 1965) 
Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) MMM No linkage Lithuania (1992-) 
  Vote linkage Hungary (1990-) 
 
 
MMP Seat linkage Albania (1992, 2001, 2005) 
Colomer (2004b) Coexistence   
 Multiple tier   
 Parallel   
Note: Golder’s (2005) classification is firstly established by Massicotte and Blais (1999) and used by Norris (2004). 
Shugart and Wattenberg’s (2001) scheme is also applied by Farrell (2011 [2001]). 
 
Golder 2006; Tavits and Annus 2006; Wängnerud 2009). In the same vein, Michael Gallagher 
and Paul Mitchell (2005) identify small district magnitude as one of the measures to limit the 
degree of proportionality. In addition, other authors claim that a high variation in the district 
magnitude tends to disadvantage large parties with a predominantly urban base (Monroe and 
Rose 2002). Finally, it is necessary to establish how we should calculate average district 
magnitude. In this regard, Gallagher and Mitchell (2005b) offer a very convenient way to 
calculate it when there is more than one tier of seat allocation. 
 
Significant vote thresholds that parties need to cross in order to get any representation are 
the second devices traditionally used to limit the degree of proportionality of electoral results 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2005b). Electoral thresholds can be imposed either at the national, the 
regional, or the district level. In this regard, Cox (1997: 62-63) differentiates two main categories 
of threshold: those defined at the level of the “primary district”, and those defined at the level of 
the “secondary district”. Almost every PR system employs some kind of threshold. By contrast, 
non-PR systems generally do not have rules specifying a threshold, mainly because they do not 
need it. As Taagepera and Shugart (1989) point out in their discussion of thresholds, the low 
magnitude of single-member districts makes prohibitively high the costs of entrance to 
Parliament for small parties. For that reason, Lijphart (1994: 12) claims that “legal thresholds 
59 
 
and district magnitudes can be seen as two sides of the same coin”. The concept of effective 
threshold illustrates very well the functional equivalence that exists between these two elements 
of the electoral systems. According to its most recent formulation, the effective threshold should 
be estimated by the formula (75 / (m+1)), where m refers to the district magnitude (Lijphart 
1994). A party has to gather a percentage of votes higher than the effective threshold in order to 
be likely to win at least one seat in a particular constituency.
57
 If the legal threshold (i.e., the 
legally stipulated minimum percentage of votes parties must obtain to be entitled to obtain seats) 
is higher than the result of this calculation, the effective threshold becomes the legal threshold.
58
  
 
The last two elements of electoral systems that have an impact in the interparty 
dimension are the assembly size (Lijphart 1994; Taagepera 2007a), and the levels of 
malapportionment (Horiuchi 2004; Samuels and Snyder 2001). These two variables have not 
been traditionally included among the different elements of the electoral systems. First of all, 
Rae (1971[1967]: 158) considers assembly size to be the “generally neglected variable”, though 
he does not include it in his empirical analysis either. In spite of this, the total number of 
available seats has an obvious impact on disproportionality and multipartism (Anckar 2000; 
Lijphart 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1993). Second, whether the seats are distributed among 
districts according to the size of their population or not, that is, what are the levels of 
malapportionment observed in a system, should have an evident impact on how proportional 
electoral outcomes are. In this regard, disproportionality should increase where 
malapportionment is sufficiently large as to permit some parties to perform particularly well in 
those overrepresented districts. Unfortunately, studies analyzing the possible existence of this 
relationship are still scarce. 
 
3.2.1.2. The intraparty dimension 
Thus far, I have paid attention to the elements of the electoral systems that have an impact in the 
interparty dimension. By contrast, the analysis of the consequences of electoral systems in the 
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 For other similar measures, see the aggregation threshold functions (Ruiz-Rufino 2007). 
58
 A common mistake, made in a surprisingly considerable number of highly regarded publications, is to project the 
effective threshold from the constituency to the national level. It is obvious upon reflection that if we want to 
estimate the national-level effective threshold, we need to take the number of constituencies into account; whatever 
the effective threshold may be within each constituency, the more such constituencies there are, the lower the 
national-level effective threshold will be (Taagepera 1998). 
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intraparty dimension forces me to review the traditional classifications of ballot structures. 
According to Rae (1971 [1967]), there are two types of ballots: categorical and ordinal (see also 
Farrell [2011 [2001]]). The former “asks the voter to decide which one of the parties he prefers” 
and the latter “allows the voter to express a more complex, equivocal preference by rank-
ordering the parties” (p. 17). Unfortunately, this typology fails to grasp the entire complexity of 
ballot structure in the real world (Blais 1988). For example, permitting simple-vote splitting, and 
enabling voters to rank-ordering candidates are two different features of electoral systems 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2005b). However, Rae wrongly lumps electoral systems allowing voters 
to do each of these things under the same label. Partly for this reason, Taagepera and Shugart 
(1989: 14) argue that the distinction between categorical and ordinal ballots is not clear-cut, and 
suggest that there is a continuum between these two ideal types. 
 
I believe the distinction between categorical and ordinal ballots is still valid. However, it 
only addresses two aspects of the ballot structure: the number of votes allowed, which may range 
from one to the number of candidates, and the type of information the voter is asked to provide, 
which can be nominal, ordinal or cardinal. In this regard, Blais (1988) warns his readers that 
sources of variation in the ballot structure cannot be reduced to these two aspects because they 
only identify how voters are asked to reveal their preferences. According to this scholar, it is also 
necessary to indicate whom the citizens can vote for. In order to cope with this problem, Shugart 
and Wattenberg (2001) distinguish between nominal and list voting (see also Farrell 2011 
[2001]). Whereas under the former citizens cast votes for candidates by name and seats are 
allocated to individual candidates on the basis of the votes they receive, list votes are pooled 
among multiple candidates nominated on a list submitted prior to the election by a party, 
alliance, or other political organization.
59
 This distinction has important practical implications 
because “Caligula’s horses” are less easily elected with single-person voting than with list 
systems in multi-member constituencies (Sartori 1997 [1994]: 17). Lastly, Lijphart (1994: 119) 
calls attention to a different shortcoming in Rae’s analysis of the ballot structure by pointing out 
that he misclassifies Germany as categorical, and Luxembourg and Switzerland as ordinal. 
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 See also below for Cox (1997) and Ortega Villodres’ (2004) classifications. 
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In the course of time, descriptions and classifications of electoral systems based on the 
ballot structure have gained importance. In fact, most scholars, once they have established the 
main categories of electoral systems based on allocation rules and district magnitude, employ the 
three aspects of ballot structure I have just sketched to refine their classification. In this regard, 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 24) distinguish between PR (closed) list systems in which the 
voter can only choose one of the many party symbols or names and hence automatically vote for 
all candidates of that party, and PR (preferential) list systems in which she/he is able to choose 
specific candidates separately. In the same vein, Farrell (2011 [2001]) divides list systems into 
closed and open; and Colomer (2004b) distinguishes between open ballot (panachage), 
preferential vote for individual candidates, and categorical vote. Finally, Shugart (2005) furthers 
the classification between closed and open lists by splitting preferential-list systems into four 
categories: open, flexible, quasi-list, and latent list.
60
 It is important to note that the logic behind 
Colomer and Shugart’s classifications are different: while the former highlights the degree of 
freedom the voter has regarding individual candidates, the latter also takes into account the 
presence (or absence) of other determinants of candidates’ rank on the list besides preference 
votes. On this basis, the former does not differentiate open and flexible lists.
61
 
 
In fact, one of the most significant changes in the literature on the intraparty dimension 
over the last couple of years has been the more frequent adoption of the voters’ perspective. 
Since the emergence in the mid1980s of the first studies that addressed these questions, one point 
of view (that of the candidates) and two particular scholars (Carey and Shugart) had dominated 
in the literature.
62
 However, this approach has been increasingly complemented by a second 
strand of research that emphasizes what Farrell and Gallagher (1998: 56) call the “openness” of 
the electoral system, by which they mean “how much choice is given to voters” (Farrell and 
Gallagher 1998: 56; Renwick and Pilet 2011). Similarly, Paulo Trigo Pereira and Joao Andrade e 
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 Open-list systems are those in which the ballots provided by parties are unranked and preference votes alone 
determine the order of election from a party’s list. In flexible-list systems, allocation of candidates takes into account 
the party-provided rank order and preference votes. Quasi-list and latent-list systems are two subtypes of open-list 
and flexible-list systems, respectively, in which the citizen only indicates preference votes. 
61
 In the 1980s, a similar controversy arose between Vernon Bogdanor (1983) and Michael Marsh (1985). The 
former did not address the issue of flexibility of lists (in Shugart’s terminology) at all, while the latter proposed to 
differentiate “systems where seats are allocated between candidates purely on the basis of preference votes and those 
where the ordering of the list by the party is also a factor” (Marsh 1985: 376). 
62
 For example, Karvonen (2010: 35-40) applies Shugart’s revised schema in order to assess the degree of 
“personalization” of electoral systems. The most important illustrations of this approach were given in Chapter 2. 
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Silva (2009) come up with an index of citizens’ freedom to choose their representatives. In order 
to do that, they take into account three different elements of the electoral system: voters’ 
“options” (the cardinality of the choice domain), “choices” (the number of revealed preferences 
on candidates/parties), and “information” (on candidates’ characteristics).  
 
Finally, also of interest is Carmen Ortega Villodres’ classification of preference voting 
systems (2004), that is, of those allocation methods where the voter has the possibility to choose 
among a party’s candidates. According to her, this kind of systems can be defined in terms of 
three variables: ballot structure, constituency structure, and formulaic structure. The added value 
of her research lies in her description of the three main sources of variation that the ballot 
structure has: ballot paper,
63
 system of voting and nominative votes. 
64
 Unfortunately, she does 
not address very thoroughly the way her classification improves the existing typologies of 
preferential voting systems. Ortega Villodres distinguishes between two basic types of voting 
systems: personal and list procedures. In the latter, a vote for a particular candidate may 
contribute to the election of all other candidates of the same party, while under personal voting 
systems votes are given only to candidates. This distinction resembles Cox’s between votes that 
affect only a single-seat relevant vote total (exclusive votes) and those that can affect more than 
one-seat relevant vote total (non-exclusive votes). In other words, some votes benefit only the 
candidate for whom they are cast (the exclusive ones), while others (the non-exclusive ones), 
besides appearing in the vote total of the candidate for whom they are cast, also affect a different 
vote total used in the allocation of legislative seats. He then differentiates three types of non-
exclusive votes: the transferable vote, which is transferred to the vote total of another individual 
candidate; the pooling vote, which is transferred to the vote total of the party list to which the 
candidate originally voted for belongs; and the fused vote, which simultaneously affects the vote 
totals of candidates running for two or more different offices. 
 
More in depth, Ortega Villodres further classifies personal voting systems according to 
the number of nominative votes allowed. In this regard, she distinguishes between: single-vote 
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 The ballot paper is not considered in most comparative studies on electoral systems as a basic component of 
electoral systems. For this reason, I will not make any further comments on it. 
64
 In her work, the constituency structure has the exact same meaning as the more well-known concept of district 
magnitude; and her observations on the formulaic structure are either inaccurate or redundant. 
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systems, that is, those where each voter can vote only for one candidate; the limited vote, under 
which voters have more than one but fewer votes than the district magnitude; the block vote, 
which allows voters to cast as many votes as seats are allocated to candidates in the district; and 
approval voting, which enables voters to cast a ballot for as many candidates as they wish. 
According to her, there are also many variations of list voting systems. In particular, she 
distinguishes between closed and open lists. Her definition of closed-list systems is astonishingly 
broad and includes not only those in which parties present ranked ballots and voters simply 
select one party list over another (see, for example, Shugart 2005), but also those where a voter is 
allowed to select particular candidates within a party list. She then distinguishes between those 
closed-list systems in which the rank of candidates is only determined by the number of 
individual votes they receive (that she terms as flexible), and those others where candidates are 
elected on a combined basis of party-ranking and preferential votes (the so-called rigid closed-
list systems).
65
 Finally, preference votes entirely determine the final candidates’ ranks in open-
list systems. In this type of electoral systems, the names of candidates can appear on the ballot in 
alphabetical order or by party.
66
 
 
Summing up, there is no universally accepted way of classifying electoral systems based 
on the ballot structure. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the different classifications of electoral 
systems according to the ballot structure. In addition, some scholars do not deal with ballot 
structure at all (e.g., Golder 2005a), and others consider it as a minor element of electoral 
systems (e.g., Lijphart 1994). By contrast, most authors would strongly agree today with the idea 
of establishing two main categories of electoral systems (majoritarian and proportional) based on 
the formula employed. According to Dieter Nohlen (1984a), electoral systems lean towards the 
majority/plurality or the proportional principles of representation. In the same vein, Giovanni 
Sartori (1997 [1994]: 42) distinguishes between strong and feeble electoral systems. However, 
there is a fundamental difference between Nohlen and Sartori’s conception of electoral systems: 
the former considers the majority/plurality and the PR principles as antithetical, while Sartori  
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 It is remarkable that systems that take into account both the party-provided rank order and preference votes are 
termed flexible and rigid lists systems by Shugart (2005) and Ortega Villodres (2004), respectively. 
66
 Ortega Villodres (2004) also differentiates preferential list systems according to the number of nominative votes 
allowed. The range of variation on it goes from 1 (e.g., in Chile) to the district magnitude (e.g., in Switzerland and 
Luxembourg). 
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Table 3.2. Classifications of electoral systems according to the ballot structure 
Scholar Type Subtype Examples 
Rae (1971 [1967]) Categorical   
 Ordinal   
Colomer (2004b) Categorical vote   
 Preferential vote   
 Open ballot   
Ortega Villodres (2004) 
 
Personal voting 
 
Multiple voting  
(block vote and limited vote) 
Ecuador (1999),  
Spanish Senate (1977-) 
  
Single voting  
(SNTV and STV) 
Japan (1947-1993), Australia (1949-), 
Ireland (1920-) 
 
 
List voting Closed lists (rigid and flexible) Czech Republic (1996-), Chile (1989-) 
  
Open lists  
(party and alphabetical) 
Switzerland (????),  
Luxembourg (????) 
Shugart (2005) 
 
 
Non-list  
 
 
Non-transferable  
(single-member plurality [SMP],  
two-round majority [TRM], SNTV,  
limited and unlimited vote) 
United Kingdom (1885-),  
France (1958-1981; 1988-),  
Japan (1947-1993)   
  Transferable (AV and STV) Australia (1949-), Ireland (1920-) 
 
 
Preferential-list 
 
Unranked ballots  
(open list and quasi-list) 
Brazil (1979-),  
Chile (1989-) 
  
Party-provided rank  
(flexible and latent list) 
Czech Republic (1996-),  
Estonia (1992-) 
Note: Ortega Villodres’ (2004) classification only takes into account preferential electoral systems. 
 
defines them as the two extremes of a unipolar continuum on which all electoral systems can be 
located (see also Rose 1984). 
 
3.2.2. Electoral reforms 
Thus far, I have dealt with electoral systems from a static point of view without taking into 
consideration their dynamics of continuity and change. However valuable is this approach, it is 
not enough for a dissertation that tries to establish the causes and consequences of electoral 
reforms. In the following pages, I will thus overview the most successful attempts at defining 
electoral reforms that we find in the literature. Unfortunately, this task of definition is usually 
overlooked. Many scholars who address the issue of why proportional representation was 
adopted in some countries at the beginning of the twentieth century (e.g., Andrews and Jackman 
2005; Blais et al. 2005; Cusack et al. 2007; Penadés 2008) consider the electoral system to be a 
dichotomous variable. In other words, countries use either a PR or a non-PR formula. Hence, this 
approach does not take into account the extraordinary heterogeneity that exists within these two 
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main categories. In order to overcome this potential shortcoming, Carles Boix (1999) takes the 
changes in the effective threshold of representation as his dependent variable. This solution 
certainly reduces the bias that we introduce when we lump together all the PR systems. 
Nevertheless, determining the effective threshold is certainly anything but easy (Lijphart 1994). 
More importantly, taking the effective threshold as the dependent variable underestimates the 
rate of occurrence of electoral reforms. In this regard, if we take, for example, 20 per cent or 
greater changes in the effective threshold as electoral reforms, we only count 11 actual episodes 
in the 27 countries
67
 examined by Lijphart (1994) between 1945 and 1990.
68
 
 
 A different solution is provided by Lijphart (1994) in his path-breaking work on electoral 
systems. According to him (1994: 13), electoral systems can be defined in terms of the following 
four elements: the electoral formula, the district magnitude, the electoral threshold, and the 
assembly size. And then he adds that “if there is a significant change on one or more of the four 
dimensions, this means that a new electoral system must be distinguished”. Immediately, two 
questions emerge: first, which kind of institutional modification can be considered as a 
significant change; and second, how new is the reformed electoral system. The definition of 
significant change will depend on the element of the electoral system under consideration. On 
the one hand, characterizing a modification of the electoral formula as significant does not entail 
any problem: every change can be described in this way because this is a discrete variable. By 
contrast, a criterion has to be specified for the other three variables since all of them are 
continuous. In this regard, Lijphart (1994: 13) proposes a 20 per cent criterion. In other words, 
the assembly size, the district magnitude or the electoral threshold have to change by at least 20 
per cent in order to identify an actual episode of reform. As I will argue below, this is a prudent 
cut-off point designed so the number of cases is not artificially inflated. On the basis of it, 
Lijphart counts 30 reforms in the democracies he analyzes between 1945 and 1990.
69
 By 
contrast, according to Richard Katz’s more stringent rules, the list of major reforms in 
established democracies since 1950 numbers 14 (Katz 2005: 58). In particular, this last scholar 
“limits the meaning of ‘major reforms of national electoral systems’ to the wholesale 
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 The countries he examines are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and United Kingdom. 
68
 By contrast, Lijphart identifies up to 30 cases of electoral reform.  
69
 See also Ruiz-Rufino (2005). 
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replacement of the electoral formula through which a strong president, or the chamber of 
parliament to which the national government is responsible, is elected”.70 Hence, the conclusion 
about the essential stickiness of the electoral system still stands if we look only at developed 
democracies (Birch et al. 2002: 1; Lijphart 1994: 52; Nohlen 1984b: 218; Norris 1995: 297). 
 
 Lijphart’s work has had an undoubted impact on the way other scholars define electoral 
reforms. Golder (2005), for example, characterizes an electoral reform by looking at changes in 
the same four elements that Lijphart does. However, he adds to the definition of electoral reform 
several extra features. First of all, the introduction of presidential elections or the introduction of 
presidential runoffs entails a change in the electoral system. Second, a different electoral system 
emerges when there is an introduction or abolition of electoral tiers, or a change in the way they 
are connected. Finally, two electoral systems are classified as different if they are separated by a 
period of dictatorial rule. Following these criteria, he distinguishes 261 different democratic 
electoral systems between 1946 and 2000. All in all, Golder (2005) improves and clarifies some 
of the obscure points in Lijphart’s definition. For this reason, I will introduce some of his 
amendments in my own definition of electoral reform. 
 
Colomer (2004b) defines electoral reforms in a very different way. According to him, 
four basic categories of legislative electoral systems should be distinguished: indirect, majority 
rule (including multi-member districts with bloc ballot, multi-member districts with limited or 
cumulative ballots, and single-member districts), mixed systems, and proportional representation 
(including those where the average district magnitude is lower than nine with any formula and 
procedure, those where the average district magnitude is higher than eight with closed lists, and 
those where the average district magnitude is higher than eight with open lists, open ballot or 
personalized PR). He then counts 82 major electoral system changes for assemblies between the 
four basic categories, and 126 changes between the eight subcategories. These numbers could 
look impressive, but it should be remembered that his period of observation starts in the early 
nineteenth century for the countries that were democratic then (and for which data are available). 
When the set of electoral system changes is limited to those produced during the current 
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 Katz devotes attention to the established democracies (roughly, democratic since 1950), though he does not 
include the exact list of the countries he analyzes. 
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democratic period, major changes between the four basic categories and eight subcategories are 
only 19 and 30, respectively. Hence, the stringent rules that Colomer uses leads him to 
underestimate the number of electoral reforms as well. Finally, it is a remarkable fact that 
electoral reforms tend to always happen in the same countries. In this regard, the changes 
between the four basic categories and eight subcategories occur only in 41 and 49 out of 89 
countries, respectively. 
 
 Kristof Jacobs and Monique Leyenaar (2011) distinguish between major, minor and 
technical reforms. Referring to electoral system changes that affect the proportionality of the 
outcomes, they label any movement from one to another of the three main sub-dimensions of 
electoral formulas as a major change. They also consider reforms to be major when the average 
district magnitude or the effective threshold changes by at least 20 percent. With regard to the 
intraparty dimension, changes of type of the ballot structure also fall in the category of major 
reforms. By contrast, changes within a category of electoral formula, modifications of more than 
1 percent and less than 20 percent in the average district magnitude or the effective threshold, or 
alterations in the number of votes or their impact on the identity of the candidate actually elected 
between 1 and 20 percent are conceptualized as minor electoral reforms. Finally, technical 
reforms involve really tiny modifications of the rules of the game. Changes of less than 1 percent 
in the average district magnitude, the effective threshold, or the number and impact of votes can 
be found within this category.   
 
 
3.3. Electoral reforms in my dissertation 
3.3.1. Electoral reforms in principle: Definition and typologies 
An electoral system is defined either as “a set of essentially unchanged election rules under 
which one or more successive elections are conducted in a particular democracy” (Lijphart 1994: 
13), or as a collection of laws “which govern the process by which electoral preferences are 
articulated as votes and by which these votes are translated into distributions of governmental 
authority (typically parliamentary seats) among the competing parties” (Rae 1971 [1967]: 14).71 
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 Other scholars offer similar definitions to these ones. For example, Blais (1988: 100) defines electoral systems as 
“those rules which govern the processes by which preferences are articulated as votes and by which these votes are 
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By electoral reform I mean a significant change of at least one of the major elements of an 
electoral system. The list of these components comprises the electoral formula, the number of 
districts, the assembly size, the electoral threshold, the presence (or absence) of a ban on pre-
electoral coalitions and linked lists, the number and relationship between electoral tiers, and the 
ballot structure. Thus, as in Rae (1971 [1967]), electoral systems are taken to be a subset of 
election laws, which correspond to the whole set of rules according to which the elections are 
conducted (Blais 1988). On this basis, the definition of electoral reform does not include changes 
dealing with other aspects of the electoral law like: 
1. the franchise extension,72 suffrage restrictions and registration requirements;73  
2. the ease of voter and party/access to the electoral process; 
3. special features of the ballot format;74 
4. campaign financing and timing rules; 
5. the degree of “bundling” of elections; and75 
6. the implementation or elimination of term limits.76 
 
In sum, I do not aim to provide a legal definition of electoral reform. In fact, changes in 
the rules of the game may come through a constitutional amendment, a law, or a decree. More in 
depth, the criteria that I use to identify an electoral reform are the following seven. The first six 
refer to reforms in the interparty dimension whereas the last one is about changes in the 
intraparty dimension.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
translated into the election of decision-makers”. Finally, Cox (1997: 38) understands an electoral system “to be a set 
of laws and party rules that regulate electoral competition between and within parties”. Hence, this last scholar is the 
only one that explicitly mentions party rules as an element of electoral systems. 
72
 By contrast, Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) propose referring to wider universe of changes in electoral laws that 
include the suffrage extension, among others.  
73
 In several Eastern Europe countries like the Czech Republic or Poland, the so-called lustration laws limited the 
political participation of former communists. As time went by, these regulations were gradually abolished. 
Furthermore, those who did not speak the official language in Estonia or Latvia were prevented from becoming 
members of the Parliament. 
74
 The colour of the ballots was a key issue, for example, in Bulgaria because it had been a major means of partisan 
identification. For that reason, it had to be addressed by a reform of the Electoral Law on 12 September 1991 which 
provided more flexibility in the ballot design so that parties could be identified with their traditional colours despite 
the multiplication of new organizations. 
75
 As Remmer (2008) points out, several Latin American countries modified the status of temporal concurrence of 
presidential and legislative elections during the period of observation by reducing the presidential mandate. 
76
 Mexico has prohibited consecutive terms for legislators since the 1930s, as Costa Rica since the 1940s. Ecuador 
did it at one time, but the prohibition was then lifted (Carey 1998). 
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1. A change in the electoral formula. This kind of modifications may include a transition 
either between the main categories of electoral formulas (majoritarian and proportional) 
or within them. In order to classify an electoral formula either as majoritarian or 
proportional, I take into account its mechanics rather than its outcome.
77
 First-past-the-
post and absolute and qualified majority are considered to be majoritarian formulas.
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By contrast, proportional representation formulas are divided into two main categories: 
highest averages (including D’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, and modified Sainte-Laguë, among 
others), and quotas (including Hare, Droop, Imperiali, and Reinforced Imperiali, among 
others).The replacement of any of these formulas implies a change of the electoral 
system. In addition, some electoral systems employ more than one formula or the same 
formula twice. For example, multi-tier systems are those in which a formula of the same 
family (proportional or majoritarian) is used across multiple tiers. Multi-tier systems can 
be divided into those in which the electoral tiers are connected and those in which they 
are not (Golder 2005a). Finally, mixed-member electoral systems are those that combine 
the “plurality principle” and the “proportional principle” of electoral representation 
(Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Mixed systems can be divided into those in which the 
operation of the two electoral formulas is dependent and those in which they work 
independently. Even more in depth, independent mixed systems can be separated into 
coexistence, superposition, and fusion subtypes, while dependent mixed systems can be 
divided into correction and conditional subtypes (Golder 2005a; Massicotte and Blais 
1999). Summing up, an electoral reform can take place through two channels in multi-
tier and mixed systems: one, through a change of any of the electoral formulas that are 
in use; and two, through a change of the way in which the formulas are working. 
 
2. A change in the number of districts. This criterion of electoral reform separates me from 
Lijphart (1994) and Golder (2005) since both of them use the district magnitude to 
identify an electoral reform. I do so for at least two reasons. First, I argue that using the 
number of districts rather than the district magnitude allows me to avoid the 
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 As Katz (1997: 109) argues, the approach of classifying electoral rules based on their outcomes is both “circular 
and self-contradictory”. 
78
 There are only these three kinds of majoritarian formulas because other kinds of electoral systems of this family 
(i.e., the limited vote, the alternative vote (AV), the single non-transferable vote (SNTV), and the Borda count) 
require successful candidates to win either a plurality or a majority of the vote.  
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complications that entail the calculus of average district magnitude in some electoral 
systems (specially, in the so-called remainder-transfer two-tier systems). Second, it 
seems to me a bit arbitrary to take the mean as the best measure of the impact that the 
district magnitude has on the proportionality of the electoral outcomes. In fact, Octavio 
Amorim Neto and Gary Cox (1997) use the median rather than the mean magnitude in 
their research on the determinants of party system size. Obviously, the average and the 
median district magnitude on one hand, and the number of districts on the other are 
highly correlated, and replacing the former by the latter will have virtually no impact on 
the final results. Finally, a somewhat numeric criterion has to be specified since district 
magnitude is a continuous variable. I will follow Lijphart (1994) and Golder (2005) on 
this, and an electoral reform is considered to have taken place when there has been a 
modification of at least 20 per cent in the number of districts.
79
 Lijphart himself admits 
that this is necessarily an arbitrary decision. However, I think it as a good way to avoid 
artificial inflations of the number of cases of electoral reforms.
80
 
 
3. A change of the assembly size. It could be argued that this institutional feature is largely 
out of the control of institutional designers (Harfst 2007). In fact, Taagepera (2007) 
proves that assembly sizes usually fit the cube root of population. However, this scholar 
himself admits that the population of a country just puts broad limits on the size of its 
national assembly. Hence, electoral reformers enjoy certain autonomy when they 
establish the size of the legislature, and that is why changing it entails the emergence of 
a new electoral system. Finally, it should be said that the 20 per cent criterion proposed 
by Golder (2005) and Lijphart (1994) also applies here, and only those cases in which 
the assembly size changes by at least 20 per cent are considered actual cases of reform. 
 
4. A change of the electoral threshold. As Lijphart (1994) points out, electoral thresholds 
can exist at the district, the regional or the national level. Even more important, they can 
be calculated as proportions over the total of votes, or over the electoral quota. A change 
                                                          
79
 This will be the same criterion I will use for changes of the assembly size and the electoral threshold. 
80
 Taking a lower percentage as a cut off could lead to consider as actual cases of electoral reforms slightly 
modifications in the number of districts that produce a tiny impact on the proportionality of outcomes. By contrast, 
requiring a change of more than 20 per cent in the number of districts in order to identify an actual case could mean 
that significant modifications in the rules of the game are not considered as electoral reforms. 
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is considered to have taken place when there has been a modification of at least 20 per 
cent in it (Golder 2005a; Lijphart 1994). An electoral reform also occurs when the 
electoral threshold for pre-electoral coalitions of parties changes by at least 20 percent. 
 
5. The introduction (or the suppression) of a ban on pre-electoral coalitions, or the linkage 
of lists (or apparentment). With regard to the former, the banning of pre-electoral 
coalitions (where they were previously allowed) or their lifting (if they were prohibited 
before) could be considered as extreme cases of changes of the electoral threshold for 
this kind of electoral agents. With regard to the latter, the question of whether or not 
apparentment is permitted can be of great importance for small parties. 
 
6. A change in the number of electoral tiers. Although most electoral systems have only 
one level of seat allocation, some countries have implemented one and, even, two 
additional tiers to distribute seats among parties. 
 
7. A change in the ballot structure. Following Blais (1988), I will classify the ballot 
structure according to several aspects. The first one refers to whom the citizens can vote 
for. In this regard, citizens can vote for individuals (e.g., in the single transferable and 
single non-transferable vote), groups of individuals (e.g., in PR-list systems), or a 
combination of them (e.g., in mixed systems). The second aspect to take into account is 
the number of pieces of information imparted by the voter. In this regard, the number of 
votes or preferences permitted may be one (e.g., under single-member plurality and 
SNTV), two (e.g., under most mixed systems and majority runoff systems),
81
 more than 
one but less than the number of seats (e.g., under some preferential-list systems and 
most limited vote systems),
82
 equal to the number of seats (e.g., under some other 
preferential-list systems and the unlimited vote), or equal to the total number of 
candidates in the district (e.g., under the alternative or the single transferable vote). The 
third aspect is the type of information the voter is asked to provide. In this regard, a 
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 For example, Mexico’s mixed electoral system allows citizens to provide just one piece of information. 
82
 I equal here the number of seats to the number of candidates in a list, though in Brazil, for example, it is not the 
same. 
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piece of information can be nominal, ordinal, or numerical (or cardinal).
83
 Nominal 
ballots are members of a group or not. In other words, either citizens cast a ballot for a 
party or a candidate, or they do not.
84
 This category covers ballot papers in most 
countries. By contrast, ordinal voting permits voters to rank-order the parties or 
candidates on the ballot paper. In Ireland or Australia, for example, voters may rank all 
the candidates in the constituency in order of their choice. Finally, the term numerical is 
referred to instances in which voters are able not only to rank candidates
85
 but also to 
indicate the exact distances between them. This last category includes cumulative 
voting, a system that is not currently in use for electing the national Parliament of any 
country in the world. According to the fourth aspect, we can distinguish between 
categorical (where voters express support for the sole candidate of a party, for a party 
list, or for one candidate or perhaps several candidates on one party’s list), and 
“dividual” ballots (where voters can “divide” the vote among different parties). 86 
Categorical ballots include plurality rule, two-round, and PR-list without panachage 
systems; and dividual ballots include mixed and PR-list with panachage systems 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2005b). The fifth aspect is the degree of choice a voter has 
regarding individual candidates. As is well known, in the closed-list systems the voter 
can choose among parties but not among candidates within parties. By contrast, other 
PR-list systems, broadly termed preferential-list systems, enable the voter to indicate a 
preference for one candidate on her/his party’s list. Third, the single transferable vote 
(STV) and the alternative vote (AV) give voters a choice not only among their party’s 
candidates, but also across party lines (see also the preferential-list systems with 
panachage). Finally, some other electoral systems (e.g., most mixed ones) allow voters 
to express a preference across party lines, but not among their party’s candidates. The 
sixth and last aspect of the ballot structure to take into consideration only varies within 
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 Although using “nominal” for the type of information voters are asked to provide in list systems seems an 
unfortunate choice given the other very different meaning of “nominal” in electoral systems, I follow here the 
seminal typology proposed by Stevens in a 1946 Science article titled “On the theory of scales of measurement”.   
84
 Although it should be theoretically possible to rank parties, the only empirical cases of ordinal ballots I know are 
referred to candidates. 
85
 As far as I know, numerical voting does not exist with respect to parties. 
86
 I use the term “dividual” following Gallagher and Mitchell’s terminology. Dividual is defined by the Oxford 
English Dictionary as meaning “capable of being divided into parts, divisible, divided into parts, fragmentary, 
divided or distributed among a number”. 
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preferential-list PR systems. And it does so according to two primary criteria. First of 
all, preferential-list PR systems are heterogeneous in terms of which are the 
determinants of the order of election. Based on it, we can distinguish between those 
systems where the rank order of the candidates on the list is determined exclusively by 
the voter (i.e., open and quasi lists) and those others where the preference votes are not 
the sole criterion for determining candidates’ ranks (i.e., flexible and latent lists). The 
second source of variation is whether the voter is not given the option of simply 
favouring a party list, but must cast a preference vote (i.e., quasi and latent lists 
systems), or there is also the possibility of casting a list vote (i.e., open and flexible lists 
systems). In the former case, the systems are only list-systems in the sense that all 
candidate votes are pooled at the party level to determine the allocation of seats among 
parties (Shugart 2005). No possibility of a list vote or a party-provided ranking of 
candidates exist at all in them. For a summary on the different dimensions of my 
classification of ballot structure, see Table 3.3. 
 
A reform of the rules of the game is considered to have taken place if the ballot structure 
changes on any of the six aspects I have just sketched.
 87
 In fact, ballot structure usually changes  
in more than one way at the same time. Moreover, a change in the ballot structure often goes 
hand in hand with a modification of the electoral formula. However, a combination of reforms of 
the electoral formula and the ballot structure does not always happen, and we find cases in the 
real world in which the interparty dimension changes and the intraparty dimension remains 
unmodified, and vice versa. 
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 Thus, not every change in the number of pieces of information imparted is an electoral reform. In fact, only 
changes among the four categories I have just described will count as electoral reforms For example, an electoral 
reform does not take place in a hypothetic district whose magnitude is 5, and the number of votes allowed goes from 
3 to 4. By contrast, I would code this change in the electoral law as an actual case of electoral reform if the number 
of votes allowed would go from 3 to 5 since this would mean the replacement of a limited vote system by one of 
unlimited vote. 
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Table 3.3. Sources of variation in the ballot structure 
Criterion Category Examples 
Who the citizens can vote for? Individuals 
STV (Ireland [1920-]) 
SNTV (Japan [1947-1993]) 
 
Groups of individuals 
PR-list systems  
(Spain [1977-], Austria [1994-]) 
  Mixture of individuals and groups 
Mixed systems  
(Germany [1949-]) 
How many pieces of information are 
voters allowed to provide? 1 
SM plurality (UK [1885-]) 
TR majority (France [1988-]) 
Closed-list PR systems (Spain [1977-]) 
 
2 
Most mixed systems  
(Germany [1949-]) 
 
More than 1  Some preferential-list PR systems  
but less than the number of seats Limited vote  
 
Equal to the number of seats 
Some preferential-list PR systems 
Unlimited vote 
 
Equal to the number of candidates 
AV (Australia [1949-])  
STV (Ireland [1920-]) 
Which kind of information are 
voters asked to provide?  Nominal 
SM plurality (UK [1885-])  
TR majority (France [1988-])  
Mixed systems (Germany [1949-]) 
PR-list systems  
(Spain [1977-], Austria [1994-]) 
 
Ordinal  
AV (Australia [1949-]) 
STV (Ireland [1920-]) 
  Numerical Cumulative vote 
Are voters allowed to split their vote 
between two parties?  No: Categorical  
SM plurality (UK [1885-])  
Closed-list PR (Spain [1977-])  
PR-list without panachage  
(Austria [1994-]) 
 
Yes: Dividual 
TR majority (France [1988-]) 
Mixed systems (Germany [1949-])  
PR-list with panachage  
(Luxembourg [1924-]) 
How much choice do voters have 
regarding individual candidates? 
No choice of candidate neither 
within party nor across party lines 
SM plurality (UK [1885-])  
Closed list PR (Spain [1977-]) 
 
No choice of candidate within 
party but choice across party lines 
TR majority (France [1988-])  
Mixed systems (Germany [1949-])  
 
 
Choice of candidate within party  
 
Preferential-list PR systems without 
panachage (Austria [1994-]) but not across party lines 
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Choice of candidate within party  
Preferential-list PR systems with 
panachage (Luxembourg [1924-]) 
and across party lines AV (Australia [1949-]) 
  STV (Ireland [1920-]) 
Preferential-list allocation methods  
Are preference votes the sole 
determinant of candidates' rank? 
Yes: Open list (Brazil [1979-]),  
Quasi-list (Chile [1989-]) 
  
No: Flexible list  
(Czech Republic [1996-]),  
Latent list (Estonia [1992-])  
 
Does the voter indicate only Yes: Quasi-list (Chile [1989-]), 
preference vote? Latent list (Estonia [1992-]) 
  
No: Open list (Brazil [1979]),  
Flexible list  
(Czech Republic [1996-])  
 
The following examples illustrate how these criteria have been applied:
88
 
 
1. The electoral systems used in the Polish elections in 2001 and 2005 are treated as 
different because in 2001 the modified Sainte-Laguë formula was employed, while before 
the 2005 election the D’Hondt method was implemented. In Bolivia in 1991, the seats 
allocation formula changed from “double quota” (doble cociente)89 to Ste.-Laguë. For 
this reason, I will code this episode as an actual case of electoral reform. Albania is 
considered to have changed its electoral system in 1996 and 2001. In both cases, the main 
change deals with the linkage between tiers. Initially created as a mixed dependent 
system, Albania got rid of the linkage between tiers just before the 1996 election, and 
employed a non-compensatory hybrid system for the following two elections. However, 
the linkage between tiers was reinstated before the 2001 election. 
 
2. The electoral systems used in 1994 and 1998 Slovak elections are considered to be 
different because the number of districts changed by more than 20 percent: whereas in the 
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 The examples have been selected following two criteria: first, including cases as much heterogeneous as possible; 
and two, broadening the geographical scope of the sample. 
89
 This system allocates seats by simple quota and largest remainders, but has a threshold, known as the participation 
quota, equivalent to one simple quota of the valid votes. To further complicate matters, all the electoral laws in use 
from 1979 through 1985 contained a provision that permitted parties that failed to meet the participation quota to 
nonetheless obtain a seat, provided that their vote total was not less than the lowest remainder that earned a seat in 
the district (Mayorga 2001: 195). 
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former contest the seats were allocated in 4 districts, in the 1998 election this number 
decreased to 1. In the same vein, I will consider that Colombia introduced a new electoral 
system in 1991 because the number of districts changed from 26 to 33. 
 
3. In 1990, the Bulgarian National Assembly was composed of 400 members. In the 
following election in 1991, that number decreased to 240. An electoral reform is also 
considered to have taken place in 1998 in Guatemala because the size of the lower house 
increased from 80 to 113 deputies. 
 
4. In 2000, the Slovenian Parliament changed from 3 quotas (more or less, 3.3 per cent) to 4 
percent the minimum level of votes a party needs to obtain in order to be able to 
participate in the allocation of seats. For that reason, the systems used in 1996 and 2000 
Slovenian general elections are considered to be different. The Panamanian electoral 
system also changed in 1993 because of the elimination of a restriction that prevented 
parties from obtaining seats through remainders if they had not obtained a seat through 
quotas. 
 
5. Latvia enacted an electoral reform by banning pre-electoral coalitions in 1998. In 
addition, the only change in the Estonian electoral law that meets the requirements of my 
definition of electoral reform also occurred in 1998. That year, the apparentment of lists 
was prohibited. 
 
6. In El Salvador, an electoral system based on one tier of seats allocation was used in 1988; 
just before the 1991 election, an additional national constituency of 20 out of 84 deputies 
was created. By contrast, the 1998 Czech election was the last time in which two tiers of 
seats allocation were employed in that country. In the following contest in 2002, the 
whole legislature was elected in only one tier. 
 
7. Eight of the examined countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Ecuador, Italy, Macedonia, 
Russia and Ukraine) abandoned the mixed-member electoral system they used to employ 
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in order to implement a pure PR system.
90
 This electoral reform can be considered a 
change in the ballot structure in several senses. First of all, voters are not allowed to cast 
a vote for both candidates and parties anymore, and are forced to choose now among 
groups of individuals. Second, they cease to be asked for two pieces of information. 
Finally, they stop having the possibility of casting a split-ticket vote because the ballot 
structure changes from “dividual” to categorical. Another example of modification in the 
ballot structure took place in Honduras in 2004 when the system changed from 
proportional representation with closed lists to proportional representation with 
panachage. In this case, the ballot structure is considered to have changed for the same 
three reasons we have just seen: (1) a change of whom the citizens can vote for; (2) a 
change of the number of pieces of information they are asked to provide; and (3) a 
change from a categorical to a “dividual” ballot. Moreover, the degree of choice for 
voters widens because they are able to choose now among their party’s candidates and 
across party lines. Other examples of electoral reforms in which the ballot structure 
changes are the movement from closed to flexible lists in the proportional tier of the 
Lithuanian electoral system in 1996, and the introduction of preferential voting in the 
Dominican Republic in 2002 for the election of representatives to the lower house. 
 
To sum up, my definition of electoral reforms is pretty close to Lijphart’s (1994) even 
though I depart from it in some important senses. First of all, Lijphart barely talks about multi-
tier and mixed electoral systems. In addition, he states that in two-tier districting systems the 
definition of electoral reform should be applied to what he defines as the decisive tier. In general, 
the upper level is the decisive tier, and the only exception concerns the electoral formula in 
remainder-transfer systems. This criterion seems to me a bit arbitrary. In this regard, the formula 
employed in the nominal tier of mixed-member systems is often crucial in order to understand 
electoral outcomes in those countries. However, tinkering with it is not an electoral reform 
according to Lijphart’s criteria. For that reason, I propose to apply the seven elements of the 
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 Two of them (i.e., Bulgaria and Ukraine) adopted a law that reinstated the mixed system in the last couple of 
years. By contrast, Hungary’s parliamentarians passed a new electoral law in December 2011 that involved the first 
significant overhaul of the Hungarian electoral system since the country’s first post-communist democratic elections 
in 1990. However, I do not address either the causes or the consequences of Hungary and Ukraine’s recent electoral 
system changes because they lie beyond the temporal scope of this study: 1945-2010. 
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definition of electoral reform I have just sketched to any of the levels of seat allocation that exist 
either in multi-tier or in mixed electoral systems. 
 
 The second main difference between Lijphart’s and my definition of electoral reforms 
concerns the importance I attach to the changes in the number of tiers and the existence or 
absence of linkage between them. In this regard, Lijphart himself (1994: 36) states that large 
upper-tier districts in PR two-tier districting systems increase the overall level of proportionality 
and party fragmentation; and Shugart and Wattenberg (2001: 13) argue that the presence or 
absence of linkage between tiers is the “primary variable” to differentiate MMM and MMP. 
Thus, it is pretty reasonable to identify an actual case of electoral reform when the number of 
tiers or the kind of connection between them changes. 
 
 Finally, I devote more attention to the intraparty dimension of electoral systems than 
Lijphart does. Although ballot structure is one of Rae’s (1967) three basic elements of electoral 
systems, Lijphart (1994) considers it to be a minor component of electoral systems. On this basis, 
he does not use a change in the ballot structure as a criterion to identify a new electoral system. 
By contrast, scholars are becoming increasingly interested in the intraparty dimension; and since 
the publication in 1995 of Carey and Shugart’s seminal paper on the incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote, the analysis of the intraparty dimension is one of the areas of most profound 
progress in the field. In the same vein, Bernard Grofman (1999) argues that the distinction 
between systems in which voters select parties and those in which voters select candidates is at 
least as important as the PR versus plurality/majority debate (Carey 2009; Shugart 2005). This 
last remark and the fact of being an ongoing agenda of several scholars lead me to consider 
significant changes in the ballot structure as actual episodes of electoral reforms as well. 
 
 Thus far, I have offered my own definition of electoral reforms, and provided examples 
of actual episodes in some of the examined countries that fit it. Obviously, this definition can be 
controversial. In fact, the list of modifications of the electoral law enacted in the examined 
countries is longer and more complex than the one I have just described. For the sake of 
simplicity, I have opted to exclude from my definition some cases of institutional change. 
However, I think it is worthwhile to summarize them. These episodes are as follows: 
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1. A change in malapportionment. Regarded as “pathology” of electoral systems by 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989), in a malapportioned system the votes of some citizens 
weigh more than the votes of other citizens (Samuels and Snyder 2001). 
Malapportionment is sometimes included in the electoral law as a way of advantaging the 
least populated districts, that is, the rural ones. Although Gallagher (1991) warns his 
readers that malapportionment may also affect the degree of proportionality of election 
outcomes, Lijphart (1994) does not find in his multivariate analysis a statistically 
significant impact of this variable on the levels of disproportionality of electoral 
outcomes, or the likelihood of occurrence of parliamentary and manufactured majorities. 
 
2. A change in the variance effect. This feature of electoral systems is characterized by Burt 
Monroe and Amanda Rose (2002) as the group of political consequences that the district 
magnitude variation within a single electoral system has. I run the risk of mistaking the 
mechanics for the outcomes of electoral systems if I code changes in the variance effect 
as actual cases of electoral reform. 
 
3. A redistricting decision. It is undeniable that this kind of policy change have an impact on 
elections that is as profound as any of those changes of electoral law will be listed above 
(Bowler and Donovan 2008; Katz 2005). However, I contend that they are particularly 
important in single-member districts systems; and, as I will see below, almost every 
examined country allocates seats in multi-member districts. Obviously, not every 
redistricting process is excluded from my definition of electoral reforms. For example, 
every modification of the number of districts is logically tied to a redrawing of the 
boundaries of the constituencies, and, in these latter cases, an electoral reform is 
considered to have taken place. 
 
4. A change in the rules regarding ethnic minorities. Ethnic minority parties have been 
banned in some Central and Eastern Europe countries
91
 while in others special 
constituencies for national minorities have been created
92
 (Bochsler 2010c). Moreover, 
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 Albania and Bulgaria appear to be the examples. 
92
 Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, and Colombia appear to be the examples. 
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legal thresholds do not apply to ethnic minority parties in some countries.
93
 The impact of 
these kinds of rules on the representation of ethnic groups is undeniable. However, they 
do not have any effect on the proportionality of electoral outcomes, or the candidates’ 
incentives to cultivate a personal vote.
94
 
 
5. An implementation of gender quotas and their subsequent reforms. Jennifer Piscopo 
(2006) documents that 13 Latin American countries have currently gender quotas. 
According to her, the initial law introducing them has been reformed in most cases. In the 
same vein, Mona Lena Krook (2009) lists 15 European democracies in which this type of 
provisions were in force in 2007. However, the introduction of these quotas and their 
subsequent reforms do not have any impact on the two consequences of electoral systems 
I am interested in, that is, the proportionality of electoral outcomes and the incentives to 
cultivate a personal vote.
95
 
 
Let’s take the case of Bolivia in 2008 as an example of modification of the law that does 
not fit my definition of electoral reform. That year, the new Bolivian Constitution introduced a 
few changes in this Andean country’s legislative electoral system. In synthesis, the legislature 
was renamed Plurinational Legislative Assembly, though the MMP remained. From then on, the 
electoral system was required to have seats set aside for indigenous representation. However, 
these seats would have to come from the 130 total. Thus, none of the relevant elements of the 
electoral systems changed, and a reform did not take place according to my definition. 
 
Now that I have offered a definition of electoral reforms, I will deal with the thorny task 
of classifying them. In this regard, I aim to construct a twofold typology of the phenomenon on 
the basis of the consequences the electoral reforms are expected to have. The effects of electoral 
systems on (1) the proportionality or disproportionality of the electoral outcomes and (2) the 
degree of multipartism and the tendency to generate majority governments have been widely 
analyzed in the last half century. In fact, as already noted, the distinction between majoritarian, 
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 Lithuania during the first election and Poland during the whole period of observation appear to be the examples. 
94
 For example, the replacement of single-member by multi-member districts forces to perform a redistricting 
process. 
95
 Conversely, Celis et al. (2011) argue that the spread of gender quotas should also be included in the study of the 
politics of electoral reform. 
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which provoke a huge deviation from perfect correspondence between seats and votes, and 
proportional systems, which bolster it, is the most popular way to classify electoral rules 
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Hence, having defined disproportionality as “the deviation of 
parties’ seat shares from their vote shares” (Lijphart 1994: 57), I will divide electoral reforms 
into permissive, restrictive and ambiguous. Whereas reforms of the first type increase the 
capacity of a parliament to exactly capture the distribution of vote among parties, reforms of the 
second type increase the chances of getting a clear electoral winner. As I said earlier, the terms 
proportional, permissive, inclusive or weak, on the one hand, and majoritarian, restrictive, 
exclusive or strong are used interchangeably. Lastly, ambiguous electoral reforms do not change 
the overall degree of proportionality produced by the pre-reform electoral system either because 
the change only has to do with the intraparty dimension, or because the modification combines 
proportional and majoritarian features. I will consider the following modifications of the 
electoral law as cases of permissive reforms:
96
 
1. One of these changes in the electoral formula: 
a. Across families of electoral systems, the replacement of majoritarian rules either 
by mixed or by proportional ones, or the substitution of mixed rules by 
proportional ones. 
b. Within families of electoral systems: 
i.  Across types of majoritarian institutions, the replacement of plurality rule 
either by qualified or absolute majority, the substitution of absolute 
majority by qualified majority (if it is above 50 per cent), or the switch 
from qualified (if it is below 50 per cent) to absolute majority.
97
 
ii.  Within families of proportional formulas:98  
1. Across highest average formulas, a change in this direction: 
D’Hondt → modified Sainte-Laguë → Sainte Laguë. 
2. Across quota formulas, a change in this direction: Reinforced 
Imperiali → Imperiali → Droop → Hare. 
 
2. A reduction of the number of districts.99 
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 By contrast, a restrictive reform will occur in the opposite situations. 
97
 None of the examined countries uses a qualified majority system. For this reason, I do not take them into account. 
98
 This part of the typology follows Urdánoz Ganuza’s (2007) classification of proportional formulas. 
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3. A rise of the assembly size. 
 
4. A reduction of the electoral threshold.100 
 
5. The implementation of an additional tier to allocate seats in PR systems,101 a rise in the 
percentage of seats that are allocated in the PR tier in mixed systems, or the introduction 
of linkage between tiers in multi-tier or mixed systems. 
 
6. A significant reduction of the number of votes a citizen can cast in “first-M-past-the 
post” systems.102 A significant reduction is considered to have taken place when there 
has been a modification of at least 20 per cent. 
 
Frequently overlooked in the past, the analysis of the intraparty effects of the rules of the 
game has seen major progress in the last 20 years.
103
 By intraparty effects of electoral rules I 
mean “how do variations in electoral rules affect the internal organization of parties and the ways 
in which individual legislators (or legislative candidates) relate to constituents” (Shugart 2005: 
36). Although the literature on the intraparty dimension lags still behind that on the interparty 
dimension, we have considerably improved our knowledge in this area. For example, many 
scholars have paid attention to the institutional determinants of personal vote, that is, “the portion 
of a candidate´s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, 
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 In bloc vote systems, a reduction of the number of districts means decreasing the overall degree of proportionality 
of the electoral outcomes (Lijphart 1994). However, majoritarian systems with multi-member districts have 
gradually disappeared in world politics. In fact, none of the examined countries employs an electoral system of this 
kind. 
100
 As Lijphart (1994) shows, the effective threshold and the assembly size affect significantly the degree of 
disproportionality of the electoral outcomes. As the effective threshold is an index determined by the district 
magnitude, that is at the same time a function of the number of districts, and the legal threshold, we can conclude 
that modifications of these two elements of the electoral system change the overall degree of disproportionality of 
electoral outcomes. 
101
 In fact, the only two cases of majoritarian multi-tier countries are Papua New Guinea and Mauritius (Golder 
2005). As already noted, they are not included in this study. 
102
 For example, the SNTV system employed in Japan until 1993 might be considered a perfect example of a “first-
M-past-the post” system, where M is the number of members that gather most votes in the district and, hence, are 
elected from it.  
103
 The distinction between the interparty and intraparty dimensions of electoral systems closely resembles the two 
major trade-offs, that is, party versus individual representation and single-party versus coalition government, that 
arise in designing an electoral system (van der Eijk and Franklin 2009: 69). 
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activities, and record” (Cain et al. 1987: 9). In this regard, Carey and Shugart’s (1995) theory on 
how different systems affect the incentives to cultivate a personal vote provides the framework to 
analyze electoral reforms from the perspective of the intraparty dimension. 
 
Keeping this in mind, I will divide electoral reforms along the intraparty dimension into 
three groups. Candidate-centred reforms will increase the candidates’ incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote. By contrast, Party-centred reforms will decrease the candidates’ incentives to 
cultivate a personal vote. Finally, ambiguous reforms will be ambiguous from the perspective of 
the intraparty dimension either because they combine elements of change in both directions or 
because the candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote remain the same.104 I will consider 
the following modifications of the electoral law as cases of candidate-centred reforms:
105
 
1. A reduction in the degree of control party leaders can exercise over ballot rank. The 
degree of party leaders’ control decreases as the following score increases: 
0: Leaders present a fixed ballot, and voters may not “disturb” the list (for 
example, in closed-list PR); 
1: Leaders present party ballots, but voters may “disturb” the list (for example, in 
flexible-list PR); 
2: Leaders do not control rank (for example, in open-list PR). 
Thus, unlike Carey and Shugart (1995), I do not consider changes in the control over 
party endorsements as episodes of reform in the intraparty dimension of electoral 
systems. 
 
2. A reduction in the contribution that votes cast for one candidate of a given party 
makes to the number of seats won in the district by the party as a whole. This 
contribution is considered to decrease as the following score increases: 
0: A vote for any candidate of a given party is counted as a vote for the whole 
party in the district. Such systems include closed-list, open-list, and multiple-list 
methods. 
                                                          
104
 Unfortunately, ambiguous reforms are relatively frequent compared to straightforward reforms. The main 
problem lies in the fact that many electoral reforms change the allocation method of seats among parties without 
modifying the amount of incentives to cultivate a personal vote. 
105
 By contrast, a party-centred electoral reform will occur in the opposite situations. 
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1: Votes are also pooled, but they are pooled across candidates or across factions, 
rather than across entire parties. Such systems include those in which voters can 
designate to whom their votes should be transferred if they are not needed to elect 
their first choice, or if their first choice is too unpopular to be elected. This 
“selective” pooling takes place under the STV formula used in Ireland, and under 
the alternative vote (AV) used in Australia. 
2: No vote pooling occurs at all. Such systems include the SNTV used, for 
example, in Taiwan to allocate nominal seats in elections for the Legislative 
Yuan. 
 
3. A change in the number and the level at which citizens are allowed to cast votes. In 
order to capture this effect, incentives to cultivate a personal vote are assumed to 
increase as the following score increases: 
0: Voters cast a single vote for one party, as in Rae’s notion of a categorical vote. 
Examples include all types of closed-list systems. 
1: Voters cast more than one vote, as in dividual and ordinal ballot structures 
already defined. This can happen either within a given election (including mixed 
systems, PR-list with panachage, and the single transferable or the alternative 
vote) or over time (in runoff elections). 
2: Voters cast a single vote below the party level. This describes, among others, 
the SNTV formerly used in Japan, and the open-list proportional representation 
(for example, in Brazil). 
 
4. A reduction of the number of districts if the electoral formula itself fosters personal 
vote behaviours. As the number of districts decreases, the district magnitude 
increases; and, according to Carey and Shugart (1995: 430), personal reputation-
seeking increases as districts become bigger in those systems in which intraparty 
competition already exists. 
 
5. The introduction of a majoritarian tier in PR systems. 
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6. The elimination or a reduction in the size of the PR-tier in mixed systems. There are 
two alternative ways through which the latter may happen: one is direct and occurs 
when the number of PR seats decreases, and the other one is indirect and occurs when 
the number of majoritarian seats increases. 
 
7. A rise in the size of the so-called personal tier in multi-tier systems. By personal tier I 
mean that in which the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote behaviours. The 
personal tier can become bigger in either two ways: directly, by increasing the 
number of seats allocated in that tier in the so-called adjustment-seats systems; or 
indirectly, by lowering the amount of votes a candidate must win in that tier in order 
to obtain a seat in the so-called remainder-transfer systems. 
 
8. A decrease in the number of preferences a voter can express in preferential-list 
allocation methods. 
 
9. A rise in the degree by which preference votes may change the party-provided 
ranking in flexible-list systems. 
 
In conclusion, I will broadly follow John Carey and Matthew Shugart (1995), though I 
will make two main changes in their scheme. First of all, I will divide their ordinal scoring 
system of electoral systems into the four first variables I have just dealt with. Although these 
scholars combine the so-called ballot, pool and votes variables in only one index, I will not do it 
for substantive reasons. For example, it seems to me a bit arbitrary to argue that open-list, single-
vote systems increase incentives to cultivate a personal vote compared to the STV just because in 
the former citizens can only cast a single vote. In order to illustrate this, let’s take the Brazilian 
and the Irish electoral systems. In Brazil, candidates get automatically some benefit from the 
votes cast for other hopeless members of their own party running for office. By contrast, in 
Ireland votes are pooled across candidates of the same party only if the citizen wants it. Thus, it 
is at least dubious if personal reputation is more important in Brazil rather than in Ireland.
106
 
Lastly, my typology also differs from Carey and Shugart’s because I add several more features 
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 In the Appendix 1 to this thesis, I will indicate all the cases on which I disagree with Carey and Shugart. 
86 
 
(the numbers from 5 to 9 above) to the list of institutional changes that enhance personal vote-
seeking behaviours. 
 
3.3.2. Electoral reforms in practice: Empirical patterns
107
 
This last section of the chapter elaborates on the general dynamics of electoral system change in 
the countries examined and during the period of time under study. After the definition and 
operationalization of electoral reform, the next question is the following: how common are they? 
Although electoral systems have frequently captured the attention of comparative politics, the 
availability of data has been less than impressive. This problem gets worse when questions about 
the evolution of electoral systems are posed for a relatively long period of time and for a 
considerable number of countries. A typical way to address it is to use Golder’s data (2004). 
However, this solution is far from ideal because these data lack some relevant information (e.g., 
that concerning the legal thresholds or the variables regarding the intraparty dimension) and I 
must slightly amend his definition of electoral system change. Moreover, I will not consider the 
introduction of presidential elections or the introduction of presidential runoffs to be an electoral 
system change.
108
 The same is true for the alternation between presidential, parliamentary or 
mixed forms of government. Finally, I will not classify two electoral systems as different simply 
because they are separated by a period of dictatorial rule.
109
 To sum up, the use of Golder’s data 
will be confined to the broad pictures provided by Figures 3.1 and 3.2, and I will employ my 
own data in all the other figures and tables of the thesis. 
 
The third wave of democratization provides us with a unique opportunity to evaluate 
whether the impact of party system fragmentation on the likelihood of electoral reforms differs 
across diverse levels of democratic experience. From 1970 to 1990, most of the former 
autocracies in Latin America and Europe became democratic. Leaving aside more precise causal 
dynamics, to which I will return in Chapters 4 and 5, I exploit regional variation for plotting 
effects because I expect electoral reform type and frequency to at least roughly cluster in some 
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 For a complete list of electoral reforms in the examined countries, see the Appendix 1 to this thesis. 
108
 Since in my dissertation I am only addressing changes in the legislative electoral rules, these two institutional 
reforms are left out of my definition. 
109
 Theoretically, I should not find periods of dictatorial rule in my dataset. However, I find some cases (e.g., Peru) 
in which democracy turned into autocracy for a couple of years (i.e., between 1990 and 2000). If features of both the 
previous and the posterior electoral system are identical, I will not code these cases as episodes of electoral reform. 
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particular continents. And, in fact, it does so. In contrast to some of the most consolidated 
democracies, the proportion of them that adopted a majoritarian system was very low. The 
absence of free and fair elections for a relatively long period of time contributed without 
question to the adoption of notably permissive rules in most of these countries. More 
importantly, there were frequent reforms of the electoral rules initially adopted. Electoral system 
changes in recently democratized countries included the raising of thresholds, the transformation 
of mixed rules into full PR and several modifications in the assembly size. However, data 
presented in Figures 3.1-3.6 suggest that the occurrence of electoral reforms is far from being 
confined to either recent decades or young democracies. For instance, Figure 3.1 plots the 
proportion of reforms per election over time. As can be clearly seen, parties seem to have been 
particularly keen on the idea of electoral reform in the last decade of the 20
th
 century; but the 
proportion of electoral system changes was still higher between 1951 and 1955. Hence, the 
number of modifications in the rules of the game did not grow steadily from the Second World 
War as some more impressionistic pictures have suggested. 
 
Regarding the geographical distribution of electoral system changes, Figure 3.2 displays 
the cross-regional comparison of episodes of electoral reform in the world between 1946 and 
2000.
110
 This figure illustrates very well the enormous differences that exist across regions in the 
stability of electoral rules. In particular, the figure reports the ratio of elections that take place 
under a new electoral system in each region. For example, the figure indicates that around 30 per 
cent of the legislative elections in Middle East and North Africa, and in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union are held after an electoral reform. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin American 
countries also show high scores for institutional instability. These rates seem to indicate 
willingness to experiment with electoral institutions and the lack of equilibria in multi-party 
competition. By contrast, electoral systems appear to be more stable in the Caribbean and non-
Hispanic America region. It could be argued that the stability of electoral institutions is 
somewhat overstated in these regions due to the large number of elections that have occurred in  
completely consolidated political systems like the United States and Canada. However, let’s 
remember that stable systems exist across all the regions. The completely stable systems of 
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 This figure employs Golder’s dataset that covers the electoral institutions used in all of the democratic legislative 
and presidential elections in 199 countries only between 1946 (or independence) and 2000. 
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Figure 3.1. Proportion of electoral reforms in democracies over time, 1946-2000 
 
Source: Golder (2004). 
 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom, for example, do not lower the average of Western Europe 
below the mean. 
 
Despite the higher incidence of reforms in African countries, the proportion of them 
registered in Latin America and Eastern and Western Europe support the case selection adopted 
for this thesis. Moreover, the striking differences depicted in Figure 3.2 between established 
democracies from the Old and the New World seem to imply that the practice of reforming the 
electoral rules does not completely hinge on the age of the current democratic regime. Apart 
from looking at these two continents, I will also examine Australia, Japan, Israel and New 
Zealand in order to incorporate more variability in my sample. Summing up, I will analyze cases 
of electoral system change in all democratic terms from 1945 to 2010 in 60 countries. With 722 
legislative terms and 128 electoral reforms covered (about 20 per cent of the sample), the dataset 
includes almost 3,000 country-year cases.
111
 In sum, this is an impressive and, as far as I know, 
unique dataset that captures electoral reforms in a wide group of countries since World War II. 
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 Specifically, I examine data from Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 
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Figure 3.2. Proportion of electoral reforms in democracies across regions, 1946-2000 
 
Source: Golder (2004). 
 
 I now analyze the different types of changes in the interparty dimension of the rules of 
the game in all the elections from 1945 to 2010 (Figure 3.3). The overall proportion for all three 
types of reforms (i.e., permissive, restrictive and ambiguous) follows a U-shape pattern again. In 
the years from 1961 to 1985, only restrictive electoral system changes were relatively likely. 
Although the ratio of ambiguous reforms remained comparatively low after that year, the level of 
electoral engineering in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall appears to be particularly 
high (at least, until 2006) with regard to the other two types of institutional change. In fact, the 
most important spikes for these two types of electoral system changes can be observed between 
1991 and 1995 (for restrictive reforms) and 2001 and 2005 (for permissive reforms). Hence, the 
evidence in favour of a trend towards more proportionality described by Colomer (2005) seems 
to be weak.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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Figure 3.3. Types of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension over time, 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 The analyses that follow draw on data on the geographical distribution of electoral 
reforms in the interparty dimension. They span four regions and the period between 1945 and 
2010 (Figure 3.4). More often than in other regions, parties in Eastern Europe have changed their 
electoral system. For all 71 cases of legislative terms from this group of countries, both the 
proportions of permissive and restrictive reforms are above 20 per cent. The proportion of 
ambiguous electoral system changes is considerably lower (around 8 per cent). These figures 
also suggest that the incorporation of new information into the definition of electoral reform 
(those concerning electoral thresholds among others) makes the overall number of modifications 
go up. By contrast, electoral reforms among the 20 Western European democracies included in 
this study are relatively less frequent. To be more precise, in all but 5 per cent of cases only 
permissive electoral system changes take place. Permissive and restrictive electoral reforms are 
adopted in about 10 per cent of the cases in Latin American countries. For ambiguous electoral 
system changes in the interparty dimension, the proportion is less than 2 per cent. Finally, the 
proportion of electoral reforms in the countries from the rest of the world is almost negligible 
(i.e., less than 3 per cent in all three categories).
112
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 Six countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand and United States) belong to this category.  
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Figure 3.4. Types of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension across regions, 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 The existence of a U-shape curve is also evident in the evolution of the proportion of 
reforms registered in the intraparty dimension of the electoral systems over time (Figure 3.5). 
This is first of all because some ambiguous and candidate-centred changes are adopted just after 
the Second World War, and the number of countries already democratic by then is relatively low. 
But the explanation of this result also lies in the fact that the proportion of candidate-centred and 
party-centred reforms starts to grow steadily after 1985 and 1990, respectively. Although there is 
less evidence for such a positive trend in the last years under study, the post-2000 proportion of 
reforms in the intraparty dimension is far from negligible as well. All in all, data seem to cast 
serious doubts on the existence of the process of personalization of electoral systems 
hypothesized by Alan Renwick and Jean-Benoit Pilet (2011). Even though these scholars argue 
that changes in electoral systems in recent decades should trend towards candidate-centrism and 
away from party-centrism, data do not support this claim. 
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Figure 3.5. Types of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension over time, 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 The above trends are informative, but they do not tell us much about the geographical 
distribution of the electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension. For example, is the post-1985 
increase in the number of electoral system changes of this kind systematic, or does it vary 
depending on the level of democratic experience of each country? Put differently, is this upsurge 
simply a compositional effect produced by the incorporation into the study of new democracies 
after that year? To better understand the phenomenon, it is useful to approach it by analyzing the 
ratio of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension across continents (Figure 3.6). During the 
years under study, there were party-centred electoral reforms in more than 20 per cent of the 
legislative terms in Eastern Europe. The probability of other types of electoral system changes in 
the intraparty dimension in this same group of countries is slightly lower. By contrast, candidate-
centred reforms are more frequent than party-centred changes in Western European and most 
Latin American democracies, and the proportion of reforms in the intraparty dimension is almost 
negligible in the rest of the world.  
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Figure 3.6. Types of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension across regions, 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Data displayed in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 suggest that there is also variation within regions 
concerning the number and type of electoral reforms adopted in the interparty dimension. For 
instance, among European third-wave democracies, restrictive reforms appear to be almost three 
times more likely than permissive electoral system changes. By contrast, proportional reforms 
are twice as frequent as majoritarian ones in established democracies of this continent. Variation 
is also evident in the disaggregated figures by country. From 1945 onwards, there is not a single 
electoral system change in Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. By 
contrast, Norway and Romania each adopted three permissive and three restrictive reforms, 
respectively, in this same span of time.
113
 Likewise, the proportion of electoral reforms varies 
considerably outside of Europe. In countries like Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, United States 
and Uruguay, not a single-reform has been passed, although in two of them -Canada and United 
States- more than 20 elections have taken place since the end of the World War II. By contrast, 
the frequency with which electoral system changes occur in Israel and Venezuela appears to be 
quite remarkable.   
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 Obviously, Portugal, Spain and Romania are only taken into consideration once they became democratic. To 
complete its trend towards exclusiveness, Romania has changed its electoral system to FPTP in 2012. Since the 
temporal scope of this study ranges from 1945 to 2010, I leave this last reform out of it. 
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Figure 3.7. Types of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension, Europe 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Figure 3.8. Types of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension, rest of the world 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Finally, data displayed in Figures 3.9 and 3.10 suggest that here is also variation within 
regions concerning the number and type of electoral reforms adopted in the intraparty dimension. 
At first sight, this kind of reform appears to have taken place more often in European countries. 
Among these, there are two cases (i.e., Albania and Armenia) that come close to modifying their 
electoral system towards more party-centrism before each election. This striking fact fits the 
remarkable association seen above between being a new democracy in Eastern Europe and 
adopting a party-centred reform. However, not all the countries from this region present the same  
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Figure 3.9. Types of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension, Europe 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Figure 3.10. Types of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension, rest of the world 1946-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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pattern. For example, data reported in Figure 3.9 suggests that parties in Lithuania (like in 
France) are shying away from party-centeredness.
114
 Lastly, evidence in Figure 3.10 supports the 
argument that Venezuela is also an outlier in terms of electoral reform among Latin American 
democracies. Only this country and Ecuador change towards a more personalized system a 
considerable number of times (four and two, respectively). The frequency of consequential (i.e., 
non-ambiguous) reforms of the intraparty dimension in the rest of democracies outside of Europe 
is nearly insignificant.   
 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
The field of comparative electoral systems research is richer than 20 years ago. However, 
compelling definitions and classifications of the object of study have been missing. The lack of 
agreement on what constitutes an electoral reform and which is the best way of classifying them 
appears as particularly troubling for this dissertation. In this chapter, I have overviewed the main 
contributions to this task provided by the literature. Moreover, I have offered my own definition 
of electoral reforms. In this regard, I have argued that a reform takes place if a significant change 
occurs in any of the seven relevant components of electoral systems I have listed. These seven 
elements are: the electoral formula, the number of districts, the assembly size, the electoral 
threshold, the presence (or absence) of a ban on pre-electoral coalitions and linked lists, the 
number and relationship between electoral tiers, and the ballot structure. 
 
 The second goal I aimed to pursue in this chapter was to offer some appropriate criteria to 
classify electoral reforms. Obviously, the two most relevant are those based on the impact that 
the institutional change is supposed to have in the interparty (more or less proportionality) and 
the intraparty (more or less incentives to cultivate a personal vote) dimensions of electoral 
systems. I have then provided some preliminary information on the dynamics of electoral 
reforms in contemporary democracies. Although several problems might plague the 
measurement of a concept such as electoral reform, the results show interesting variations over 
time and space. First of all, data does not seem to support the existence of a general trend 
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 I should be a bit more careful about France because, although parties there move the electoral system towards 
candidate-centrism three times (like in Lithuania), the series of democratic elections is obviously longer.  
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towards more proportional electoral rules over time or across countries. The figures reported here 
clearly contradict Colomer’s expectations (2005). In fact, the overall picture of electoral reform 
in the interparty dimension is pretty messy, and there is not a universal tendency in the other 
direction either.  
Second, with regard to the intraparty dimension, there is clearly more to it than just 
increasing personalized electoral systems, as some authors have suggested (Renwick and Pilet 
2011). The fact that the rules of the game do not trend towards more candidate-centeredness does 
not mean that parties act out of mere self-interest. Perhaps different parties would, in the end, 
arrive at a different institutional answer (more party-centeredness versus more candidate-
centeredness) despite of the fact they share the same starting point (discontent with politics).  
 
Finally, the geographical and temporal scope of this study presents much variation with 
respect to the occurrence of electoral reforms that deserves further inquiry. Now that I have 
outlined my definition of electoral reform and conceptualized its different types, I am ready to 
put forward my theory of institutional change and test its validity. This is the task I aim to 
accomplish in the next two chapters. 
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Part Two 
The occurrence of electoral reforms and its causes 
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Chapter 4. “Changing things so that they stay as they are”: The determinants of electoral 
reforms in the interparty dimension 
 
Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga com’è, bisogna che tutto cambi. 
(Tancredi Falconeri in Il Gattopardo 1957: 41) 
 
Electoral systems do not arise from a vacuum but from political debate and struggle. They mirror 
the politics of the time of their creation and are altered when politics change to the point where 
the existing electoral system becomes too restrictive. 
      (Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart 1989: 234) 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Electoral reforms have been characterized as fairly uncommon in democratic regimes (Birch et 
al. 2002; Gallagher 2005; Lijphart 1994; Nohlen 1984b; Norris 1995; Taagepera 2007b).
115
 Fair 
and freely elected politicians in power may lack incentives to change the rules of the game they 
are winning (Katz 2005; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011). In fact, processes of electoral reform seem 
to be always governed by the inherent tension “between having the will and the power” to 
implement it (Mitchell 2005). Nevertheless, electoral system changes were quite prevalent in 
established democracies during the 1990s (e.g., Israel, Italy, Japan or New Zealand), and became 
prominent in the early stages of democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin American countries 
(Lijphart and Waisman 1996). The latter is perhaps not surprising considering that party systems 
in new democracies were in constant flux after the autocratic breakdown (Smith 2005; Toole 
2000). However, a similar pattern seems to have emerged following party system unfreezing 
even in established democracies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), as increasingly vulnerable parties 
lacked effective weapons to attract a sufficient number of voters (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), 
and party leaders had to turn to institutional devices for an adequate strategy of political survival 
(Mair 1997). In fact, previous studies of electoral reforms have pointed to attempts of the ruling 
class to perpetuate their power over the challenges from newly mobilized alternatives by 
changing state’s regulations to their own advantage (Katz and Mair 1995). 
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 Against this, see Colomer (2001a). 
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 Given the apparently increasing frequency of electoral reforms, one would expect 
explanations of such episodes of institutional change to flourish over time. Nevertheless, we do 
not yet have a body of theoretically driven comparative work on why one electoral system is 
used rather than another (Shugart 2005; Taagepera 2007a). Until very recently, there was still a 
scarcity of studies examining the processes of adoption and reform or the high degree of cross-
national variation in electoral systems. As can be seen in Chapter 2, it is well established that 
electoral rules have an impact on the number of parties that get into the Parliament (Cox 1997; 
Duverger 1964 [1954]; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971 [1967]; Sartori 1997 [1994]; Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989), the candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995), 
the incumbents’ opportunities to engage in corrupt behaviour (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 
2005), the government’s motivations to increase public expenditure or run budget deficits 
(Persson and Tabellini 2005), and the achievement of some sort of geographical (Latner and 
McGann 2005) or gender-balanced (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008) representation; but only in 
recent years has the long list of effects the literature attributes to electoral systems provoked the 
emergence of a true body of research on the determinants of their origins and changes.   
 
Previous studies of electoral reforms have focused on country-specific examinations of 
the determinants of these episodes of institutional change (e.g., Bawn 1993; Renwick et al. 2009; 
Shugart et al. 2007), or historical accounts of the adoption of proportional representation as a 
consequence of the suffrage extension in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century (Ahmed 2010; 
Andrews and Jackman 2005; Blais et al. 2005; Boix 1999; Calvo 2009; Carstairs 1980; Cusack et 
al. 2007; Kreuzer 2010; Leemann and Mares 2012; Penadés 2008 and 2011; Rodden 2011). The 
unsurprising conclusion that runs throughout many of these studies is that “it’s parties that 
choose electoral systems” (Colomer 2005). Yet, there have been few attempts thus far to 
investigate whether party system factors systematically contribute to the implementation of 
electoral reforms in contemporary democracies. Even more importantly, what is missing from 
these orthodox accounts of electoral reforms is a theoretical model of what causes some rules of 
the game to be replaced with an alternative (Laver and Shepsle 1998). For example, Colomer 
(2004b) predicts the occurrence of permissive reforms when the number of parties rises too high 
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under restrictive electoral rules.
116
 But in terms of the formation of the institutional preferences 
of political parties, episodes of hyper-fragmentation of the party system that tend to foster the 
incentives of legislators to pass a permissive electoral reform might also lower their capacity to 
do it. Even more importantly, very fragmented electoral (and/or parliamentary) contexts might 
affect the utility function of political actors in the opposite direction and lead them to prefer a 
more restrictive system. This institutional change would bestow more power on the eventual 
winners to "get things done".
117
 Indeed, and despite the theoretical soundness of many of these 
propositions, our knowledge about them is certainly far from systematic and is almost always 
confined to anecdotal evidence.  
 
In this chapter, I propose a theoretical framework to explain electoral reform in 
contemporary democracies that takes as its main explanatory factor systemic failures in the 
working of the political system provoked by the rules of the game. Specifically, I argue that the 
perceived value of a restrictive reform will be greater where electoral rules generate fragmented 
party systems and, as a consequence, the political forces in power have difficulty either forming 
durable governments, passing their legislative agenda or both, leading, hence, to a radical change 
in the institutional preferences of rational actors. In short, this series of system-level variables 
(i.e., cabinet instability and low legislative productivity) are considered as anomalous outcomes 
and can override a narrow interest in political survival operating at the party-level, and make 
political actors develop a concern with the overall efficiency of the whole system.  
 
For example, just prior to the 1993 election, the ruling centre-right coalition in Poland 
adopted a new electoral law that sought to decrease the overall proportionality of the system and 
reduce, thus, the number of parties in Parliament (Benoit and Hayden 2004; Birch et al. 2002; 
Millard 2004; Sanford 2002). Similarly, the Israeli Knesset passed an electoral reform in 1992 
which called for the direct election of the Prime Minister as a way of curbing the rampant 
fragmentation of the party system in that country and ensuring the necessary cabinet stability 
(Hazan and Rahat 2000; Rahat and Hazan 2005). In New Zealand, the problem seems to have 
                                                          
116
 As I mention above, the terms proportional, permissive, inclusive or weak, on the hand, and majoritarian, 
restrictive, exclusive or strong are used interchangeably.  
117
 The wholesale rejection of extremely fragmented party systems that bring about considerable instability into 
politics is not difficult to document in the literature (Daalder 2002: 45). Three major examples are the traditional 
treatment of the politics of the French Third and Fourth Republic, Weimar Germany, and post-1945 Italy.  
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been the opposite during the 1990s: the succession of three single-party majority governments 
that decided to implement radical and widely unpopular policies with a total lack of restraint led 
most New Zealanders to the conclusion that democracy was not working as it should and they 
had to move to a more proportional system (Denemark 2001; Nagel 2004; Vowles 2008). Even 
worse, two of these majorities (in 1981 and 1984) had been manufactured by the first-past-the-
post (FPTP) electoral system giving more seats to the party (National) that won fewer votes.  
 
This chapter evaluates the potential impact of the number of parties on electoral 
engineering by addressing the following interrelated questions: Which factors explain the reform 
of electoral systems in contemporary democracies, and why does the degree of institutional 
stability vary across countries and over time? Are democracies with different levels of party 
system fragmentation likely to adopt different types of electoral reforms? If manipulation of the 
rules of the game always provides parties in power with electoral advantage, why are reforms 
more frequent in some democracies than in others? 
 
I test my theory by employing my own dataset of electoral systems employed in 60 
democracies around the world between 1945 and 2010, and find that the likelihood of adopting a 
restrictive reform increases in very fragmented party systems. Although permissive electoral 
system changes are slightly more likely as the number of parties goes down, this finding is 
considerably less robust across different model specifications. More importantly, the positive 
effect of electoral disproportionality and volatility on the likelihood of observing a permissive 
reform
118
 is itself indicative of the need of a more comprehensive empirical approach to 
understand the occurrence of electoral system change in democratic countries. Finally, I find that 
electoral disproportionality and volatility, and the length of the democratic rule modify the 
impact of party system fragmentation on the likelihood of adopting electoral reforms. 
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I introduce a theoretical 
framework for understanding the causes of electoral reform in democratic countries. I then 
elaborate a series of working hypotheses that describe the conditions under which electoral 
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 According to the definition included in Chapter 3, a permissive reform is supposed to increase the overall 
proportionality of the electoral outcomes produced by the rules of the game. 
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reforms are more likely to occur. In the fourth and fifth section, I present my methods and data, 
and conduct the corresponding empirical tests. Finally, section six concludes. 
 
 
4.2. A model of electoral reform in contemporary democracies 
The analysis of electoral system change is a complex process composed of several building 
blocks. My purpose here is to set out a systematic theoretical framework to explain why a reform 
in the interparty dimension of the electoral rules
119
 takes place. In order to do so, I need to 
address who are the key actors, how they may be motivated, and what opportunities and 
constraints they face. The broad model which is used and specified in the pages below is 
summarised in Figure 4.1. 
 
More in depth, I consider first that electoral reforms occur through the conscious 
decisions of two main agents of change: parties and citizens. Hence, I deem negligible the role 
played by other sources of transformation like experts (Benoit and Schiemann 2001; Nagel 
2004), judges (Cox and Katz 2002; Katz 2011), or external actors (Blais and Massicotte 1997; 
Lundell 2009).
120
 The importance of parties and citizens lies in their power to translate their 
institutional preferences into outcomes.
121
 
  
Turning to the actors’ preferences over electoral systems, I analyze the goals that parties 
and citizens pursue when deciding to push an institutional change of this kind. As previously 
noted by Kenneth Benoit (2007), different electoral rules have diverse properties and come with 
various costs and benefits that motivate preferences among alternative choices. I thus have to  
 
                                                          
119
 According to the definition included in Chapter 2, the interparty dimension of an electoral system affects the seat 
distribution between parties. 
120
 On the one hand, transnational organizations like IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance) can rarely impose a particular electoral system. On the other hand, colonial influences can be helpful to 
understand why some given rules are adopted after the independence of a country, but not the frequency or the 
direction of changes once they are in use. 
121
 Citizens can be involved directly in the electoral reform process (LeDuc 2011) through referenda like in Italy 
(Donovan 1995) or New Zealand (Vowles 2008) or through citizens’ assemblies like British Columbia (Carty et al. 
2008) or the Netherlands (van der Kolk 2007), or indirectly through elections (Shugart 2008). In this vein, Renwick 
(2009: 379) documents nineteen referendums on significant electoral reform around the world since 1945-fifteen of 
them in the last twenty years.  
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Figure 4.1. Broad theoretical model of electoral reform in the interparty dimension 
 
 
identify and explain these motivations. In short, I argue that an electoral reform is enacted when 
it serves the interests and/or values of a party or coalition of parties with the power to affect it 
through fiat (Benoit 2004). However, the formation of preferences and the transformation of 
them into final outcomes is complicated by several factors (Renwick 2010). First, the full 
rationality of political actors may be seriously limited in contexts of high-uncertainty (Andrews 
and Jackman 2005). Second, politicians may also be subject to legitimacy constraints that bound 
the options that they seriously consider (Shugart 2008). For instance, it could be argued that 
governments decide to keep or change an electoral system by taking into serious consideration 
the voters’ ideas of what constitutes a good or bad representation of social interests (Blais 2008). 
Finally, institutions come to play a role by determining whether it is formally easy or difficult to 
adopt a new electoral law (Benoit 2007).  
 
Motivations/Preferences. PARTIES 
Interests/Power 
[policy, office, votes or seats]  
Non-interests/Values. IDEOLOGY 
[fairness, accountability, simplicity, and so on] 
Outcomes 
Uncertainty 
[dispropotionality,  
volatility, and so on] 
Ideas/Legitimacy Constraints  
[increasing returns, democratic 
age, and so on] VOTERS 
Institutions/Legal Constraints  
[veto players, decision rule, and so on] 
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Why would an electoral reform take place? Recent analysis of electoral system change 
has yielded the interests-driven explanation as the main theoretical perspectives regarding the 
adoption and modification of the rules of the game. This view “assumes that politicians control 
the choice of electoral system and that they are motivated to maximize their power” (Renwick 
2010: 7-9); and is specified most precisely by Benoit (2004), but also underlies the work of 
Carles Boix (1999) and Josep Maria Colomer (2004 and 2005), among others.
122
 
 
A change in electoral institutions will occur when a political party or coalition of political 
parties supports an alternative which will bring it more seats than the statu quo electoral 
system, and also has the power to affect through fiat that institutional alternative. 
(Benoit 2004: 373-4) 
 
Despite the widespread acceptance of this seat-maximization model, some serious 
problems emerge with it. First of all, as Benoit (2004: 367-8; 2007: 378-80) and Richard Katz 
(2005: 61-2) have pointed out, even if politicians simply pursue power, power may mean 
multiple other things beyond seats, and may be influenced by electoral system choice in many 
ways. In this regard, Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm (1999) argue that politicians value all 
three of the things that competing models have identified as important in their utility function 
(office, policy, and votes), and the manipulation of the rules of the game emerges as an attractive 
path to maximize all of them. In other words, seats matter, but so do, for example, possibilities 
for inter-party coalition building and parties’ popularity among the electorate. Obvious trade-offs 
exist between these three goals, and also between them and the maximization of parliamentary 
representation described as the main goal of electoral engineers in mainstream models of 
institutional change. Thus, a party’s decision regarding whether or not to reform an electoral 
system is a delicate one because the party’s assumed goals –maximization of office, policy, votes 
and seats – cannot simultaneously be pursued.  
 
Second, although William Riker (1984: 103) contends that “most actual choices [of 
electoral systems] have been made with the intention of promoting partisan advantage rather than 
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 This can be seen, for example, in the explanation of the choice of the Hungarian (Benoit and Schiemann 2001), 
Polish (Benoit and Hayden 2004), Russian (Remington and Smith 1996) or Taiwanese (Brady and Mo 1992) 
electoral systems; or the replacement of the French two-round majoritarian rules by PR in 1985 (Elgie 2005).  
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with the goal of incorporating sound constitutional principles into governmental structure”, some 
other authors argue that electoral engineers are also concerned with values when designing an 
electoral system (e.g., Blais and Massicotte 1997; Katz 2005). The list of values that explain 
preferences of actors over electoral systems is long and arises from the basic characteristics or 
the intrinsic qualities that they associate with particular institutional alternatives. For instance, 
Michael Gallagher (2005) summarizes eight key criteria for evaluating electoral systems. Values 
are usually behind what Benoit (2007) identifies as direct preferences among electoral system 
alternatives. In other words, institutional designers may hold a direct preference for proportional 
representation (PR) systems because of its fair representation of society, affirmation of links with 
national tradition or avoidance of connections with a formerly autocratic regime;
123
 or they can 
prefer first-past-the post because they value accountable governments, efficient decision-making, 
or simple electoral processes (Benoit 2007). In spite of these claims about the importance of 
values, I will mainly focus on power/interests-driven motivations here for problems of 
operationalization. 
 
Interests-driven explanations of reform start by noting that electoral systems serve a 
fundamentally distributive function (Tsebelis 1990). In this view, institutions (i.e., electoral 
rules) are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise them rather 
than to be socially efficient (North 1990: 16). Hence, an analysis of electoral system change has 
to explicitly recognise interest-based conflict over the rules of the game (Knight 1992). Electoral 
institutions have such important consequences in shaping party systems that we can assume they 
are chosen by incumbent parties in their own interest, and the implementation of institutions that 
produce a general improvement of the condition of the society is at best secondary (Colomer 
2005: 1). The anticipation of distributive consequences associated with different institutional 
alternatives lead political actors to form derived preferences for electoral systems (Benoit 2007).  
 
Derived preferences over institutional alternatives are related to Giovanni Sartori’s 
description of electoral systems as “the most specific manipulative instruments of politics” 
(1968: 273). As Rein Taagapera and Matthew Shugart (1989: 4) later argue, when compared to 
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 According to Birch et al. (2002), the promotion of fair outcomes was in the mind of designers of founding 
electoral systems in post communist countries. 
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other components of political systems, “electoral systems are the easiest to manipulate with 
specific goals in view” (see also Cox 1997: 17).124 Hence, the process of institutional design is 
less a co-operative process concerned with the collective good and more a self-interested move 
to secure partisan advantage (Bielasiak 2006). In short, the fundamental assumption across 
mainstream models of institutional change is that actors choose among alternatives in order to 
maximize their self-interest. Based on the fundamentally distributive function that rules of the 
game perform, the bargaining process over an electoral law is traditionally depicted as a zero-
sum game, and parties involved in its design are considered as self-interested actors that seek to 
maximize future seat shares. However, to what extent do these assumptions always hold? Can 
one conceive of some special situations in which an essentially zero-sum game ceases to exist 
and instead we see a coordination game?  
 
More importantly, as emphasized above, power-driven readings of electoral reforms have 
traditionally focused on seat-maximization and overlooked other types of interests. However, 
single-party majorities are rare in the context of multiparty systems (Amorim Neto 2006; 
Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001; Strøm 1990), and agents of representation need to cooperate 
between them in order to get into office. As an additional consequence of that, parties usually 
lack the number of seats necessary to change the electoral system on their own, and have to work 
together in order to get their way. This cooperation regarding electoral reform often presents two 
main problems: one, the substantial differences in terms of party size; and two, the fact that 
popularity rates and vote shares of the members of a coalition are not moving in step in most 
cases (van der Brug et al. 2007). In this light, the assumption of unitary rational actors is at best 
questionable, and there will be a division of interests among the members of the potential 
enacting coalitions of electoral reforms (Katz 2005). These facts mean that parties typically face 
a trade-off between seat-maximization and office-maximization. But this is not the only trade-off 
that parties have to address when trying to change the electoral system. 
 
An increasing concern with governance or governability has emerged in the past three 
decades (Saiegh 2009). Based on this idea, party leaders are mostly interested in obtaining 
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 In Cox´s view (1997: 17), “if electoral laws do indeed affect the ability of political parties to survive as 
independent organizations [...] then presumably parties will seek to manipulate those laws to their own advantage 
when they can”. 
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passage of their pieces of legislation. And this type of considerations comes to the fore when the 
need of an electoral reform is evaluated. As we have seen, there is a substantial record of 
minority governments in multi-party democracies; and parties in office that are short of a 
majority in parliament might trade away the electoral reform that apparently maximizes their 
seats in order to secure their legislative objectives (Katz 2005).
125
 Hence, there is often a second 
central trade-off involved in the decision to reform an electoral system between seat-
maximization and policy-maximization.  
 
The implication that governing coalitions are motivated by considerations of short-term 
advantage in terms of seats may be defective if we see electoral reform as the product of a mix of 
inherent and contingent factors (Shugart 2008). This latter approach departs fundamentally from 
the seat-maximizing model because it confers a role on a wider range of actors -in particular, 
ordinary citizens- (Gallagher 2005: 565; Renwick 2010: 7-8). Moreover, this perspective 
requires the concurrence of two types of contingencies (i.e., outcome and act-contingent) when 
an electoral reform is enacted. On the one hand, outcome-contingent motivations are present 
when parties in office expect to benefit from the operation of the new electoral system. On the 
other hand, act-contingent reasons lead incumbents to support reform because this issue is itself 
popular, and citizens will credit them for the very behaviour of voting for change.
126
 After all, as 
V. O. Key (1966) observed long ago, “voters are not fools” (see also Popkin 1991). The 
politicians’ anticipation that they will sooner or later be held accountable by the voters is the 
most powerful constraint shaping their decisions (Strøm et al. 2008).  
 
In short, this latter perspective expects a change in electoral institutions when a political 
party or coalition of political parties supports an alternative which will bring it more seats than 
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 For example, Bawn’s (1993) explanation of the electoral reforms in West Germany after the Second World War 
takes into consideration policy-oriented motivations of actors. According to her story, the SPD (one major party) 
pursues the adoption of a mixed system (a non seat-maximizing option for it) with two goals in mind: one, easing 
the entry of the FDP (a minor party and its potential legislative ally) to the Bundestag; and two, hampering the 
absolute majority of the CDU-CSU (the other major party and its main rival). In the same vein, see the opposition of 
the Japanese Socialist Party to the introduction of first-past-the post during the 1956 discussions (Reed and Thies 
2001).  But see Dawisha and Deets (2006: 702) for a contrary view. 
126
 Quintal (1970: 755) uses the expression “costs of voter affect” to refer to the penalization in terms of votes 
suffered by incumbents that try to blatantly manipulate the electoral system. According to Renwick (2010: 104-105), 
the French Socialists did not end up manipulating again the electoral systems before the 1993 election because the 
manoeuvre was harder to execute without high cost to voter affect. 
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the status quo electoral system (outcome-contingent motivations) and will at least not penalize it 
in terms of votes (act-contingent motivations). Shugart’s theory combines both the norms-based 
and the rational-actor approaches. No party in office will reform the electoral system against its 
self-interest; but no incumbent party will be able to pursue its institutional goals at will. Norms 
matter in that political leaders’ strategies of seat-maximization through electoral reform are 
heavily constrained by the voters’ (and other parties’) considerations of what constitutes a fair 
representation of interests. It is worth emphasizing, however, that an argument that norms matter 
does not imply that strategic interests of rational political actors are thrown aside. In this regard, 
electoral reforms are not automatic responses to inherent failures of the current institutions, but 
reasoned and negotiated reactions to a variety of circumstances. 
 
A final but also important consideration in electoral reform processes is the role played 
by self-reinforcement or a set of complementary institutions that encourage the initial electoral 
system choice to be sustained (Page 2006), the increasing returns generated by the current 
electoral rules (Pierson 2000), and the transaction costs that would be incurred as a result of the 
introduction of the new electoral institutions (Shepsle 1989). Although frequently ignored, the 
basic intuition here is that the probability of success of the electoral reform depends on the rules 
of the game (Blais 2008; Gallagher 2005; Massicotte et al. 2004; Rahat and Hazan 2011). Hence, 
we must consider first the meta-institutions governing change when developing any model of 
electoral system change (Benoit 2007), concerning either the number of veto players (Blau 2008; 
Nikolenyi 2011; Tsebelis 2002),
127
 or the majority or supermajority required to amend the 
electoral law (Birch 2003).
128
 Second, we have to be able to identify potential path-dependent 
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 Popularly-elected presidents in non-parliamentary systems can be seen as important veto players in electoral 
reform processes. In fact, some of them in former post communist countries like Vaclav Havel in the Czech 
Republic, Petru Lucinschi in Moldova, Lech Walesa in Poland, Boris Yeltsin in Russia, or Leonid Kuchma in 
Ukraine expressed preferences for specific electoral institutions or participated actively in processes of electoral 
reform in the past. 
128
 The non-exhaustive list of countries that have specified at least partially the electoral system in the national 
constitution is comprised by the Czech Republic, Georgia, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, 
Slovenia and Spain. By requiring a two-thirds majority to effect electoral rule change, the Hungarian electoral law of 
1989 was also quite resistant to change (Benoit 2005). Likewise, the requirement of a 4/7 majority in both Chilean 
houses for reform has probably contributed to the stability of the electoral system in that country after Pinochet’s 
dictatorship (Siavelis 2005). Finally, the possibility of altering the electoral system by a simple majority vote has 
meant that electoral reform is almost permanently on the political agenda in France (Elgie 2005) but not in Finland 
(Raunio 2005). 
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decisions of electoral system adoption (David 1985),
129
 and quantify the transaction costs that 
proponents of change incur when trying to modify the electoral law (Shepsle 1989). In the latter 
view, transaction costs provide electoral rules with something of a cushion, giving them a 
stability they might not otherwise enjoy because prospective gains from change are often 
outweighed by the costs of affecting it (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995). 
 
 In conclusion, I do not claim that this overview of my model of electoral reform is 
entirely exhaustive. In fact, I have only listed its components and the support given by other 
authors for those components. But the discussion here supports my main point: the seat-
maximization model of electoral system change is not all-encompassing either. Mine is not a 
general attack on the rationality paradigm or a claim that rational choice models are incapable of 
explaining electoral reforms (Green and Shapiro 1994). What I intend here is to draw 
conclusions on the determinants of electoral system change by trying to integrate competing 
explanations. The seat-maximization model gives an essential starting point in understanding 
electoral reform processes but does not provide the last word on them because it does not take 
into consideration other determinants of parties’ motivations like office or policy-seeking 
interests or their own values and those of their voters. Moreover, it fails to notice how 
uncertainty regarding the effects of reform or how legal and legitimacy constraints affect these 
motivations. I aim to take further steps in this direction by developing a series of hypotheses 
concerning the determinants that may explain the occurrence of electoral reforms in the next 
section.  
 
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
The factors analyzed so far suggest that parties fail to behave in a fully seat-maximizing way 
when they are involved in processes of electoral reform. However, let me return now to this 
theoretical perspective and its main empirical implication –the so-called, micro-mega rule- 
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 Path-dependence may also shape electoral reform at a “cultural” level. For example, Holger Eriksen, the Social 
Democratic spokesman on the Danish electoral law amendments in 1961, concluded: “Apart from the fact that such 
a system (the British single-member district system) would scarcely be in accord with the Constitution, there is no 
basis for discussing it in a country which for forthy years has had proportional representation, and thus has created 
completely different traditions from those prevailing, for example, in England” (Folketingstidende, Jan. 26, 1961, 
column 927).  
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(Colomer 2004b and 2005). Regarding the choice of electoral rules by political parties, this tenet 
predicts the occurrence of reforms when the electoral and the party systems become 
incompatible (Renwick 2010: 23). When the number of parties rises too high under restrictive 
rules, or falls too low under permissive systems, reforms are likely to be observed (Colomer 
2004). The causal mechanism that gives rise to this prediction is based on an upside-down 
reading of Duverger’s Law and Hypothesis130 (Colomer 2005; Grumm 1958). The intuition that 
small parties maximize their seat share in large districts with proportional formulas and low 
thresholds result in the prediction that this kind of rules tend to be adopted where there are many 
of them in Parliament. By contrast, large (and, subsequently, fewer) parties take advantage of 
majoritarian electoral institutions. For this reason, they aim to pass restrictive electoral reforms 
when party system fragmentation goes down. Hence, electoral system changes reinforce and not 
only follow voting trends (Colomer 2005): the introduction of permissive electoral rules is 
provoked by an increasing number of parties, whereas declining party system fragmentation is 
expected to yield shifts in the opposite direction (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995: 24).  
 
Despite the theoretical soundness of the positive link between party system fragmentation 
and electoral rules permissiveness, I will argue that it suffers from at least five different 
substantive flaws. First of all, for the micro-mega rule to operate as the fundamental explanation 
of political parties’ preferences over alternative electoral systems, the assumption of risk-averse 
actors is required. By contrast, I believe that parties may be characterized by risk neutrality, and 
do not always prefer to guarantee a secure partial victory rather than risk entire defeat. In fact, 
they may end up promoting new electoral rules with an uncertain but hopefully higher payoff 
rather than another bargain with certain but expectedly lower payoff (i.e., the status quo) if the 
guaranteed benefit is almost insignificant and the likely returns of the lottery are high enough. 
The fact that those able to adopt electoral reforms are often overly optimistic about their own 
prospects under one particular system, or misperceive its probable negative consequences is 
evident in several cases of institutional continuity (i.e., the United Kingdom) or change (i.e., 
Israel, New Zealand, Poland, Romania…).131 
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 I follow Riker’s (1982: 754) terminology and distinguish between Duverger’s Law, that links the simple-majority 
single-ballot formulas and the two-party systems, and Duverger’s Hypothesis, that associates simple-majority 
systems with second ballot and proportional representation to multi-partyism.  
131
 For the intricacies of these episodes, see Andrews and Jackman (2005), Birch et al. (2002), and Katz (2005). 
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A second logical requirement for Josep Maria Colomer’s argument to be true is the 
emergence of a situation of either uncertainty or threat for existing winners. More specifically, 
the proliferation of small parties makes incumbents feel less confident in their own electoral 
prospects and more sceptical about the convenience of keeping restrictive rules. In fact, they may 
believe that their continued subsistence is seriously threatened under the existing system (Katz 
2005). And the stronger the minor parties may happen to appear, the riskier the maintenance of 
the same electoral institutions. For this reason, large parties in power (or opposition) in highly-
fragmented party systems foresee either an uncertain or a bad electoral future and perceive a 
permissive reform as the unique device of lowering the stakes of political competition and, 
hence, guaranteeing their survival (Przeworski 1991). This is, in Rawlsian parlance, the 
“maximin” strategy: politicians seek to maximize their minimum return even if their popular 
support turns out to be low (Rawls 1999 [1971: 52-54]; Renwick 2010: 56). 
 
Yet, the lack of empirical evidence for the argument that powerful parties in fragmented 
contexts think the consequences of the current rules are uncertain or harmful for their interests 
suggests that this line of reasoning is problematic. As has been previously noted (Andrews and 
Jackman 2005), processes of institutional choice are often plagued with lack of information on 
the following three matters: (1) the number of competitors in subsequent elections; (2) the level 
of popular support that will be obtained by parties; and (3) the effect of the rules themselves. For 
this reason, we need to depict the rationality of actors at most as bounded (Simon 1957 [1947]). 
Colomer (2005) attributes the implementation of more inclusive rules to the increasing demands 
and pressures from opposition groups (see also Remmer 2008); and Katz (2005) refers to 
divisions of interests among the members of the winning coalition as a possible reason why 
parties change, or allow to be changed, the rules of the game they are winning. A high level of 
party system fragmentation obviously lies behind both situations. However, it is not clear to me 
that an increasing number of parties rather than other institutional factors (i.e., democratic age, 
electoral disproportionality, volatility…) are the main source of insiders’ electoral uncertainty in 
the near future. Moreover, the misperception of the political stances of potential parliamentary 
allies or enemies can become an additional source of incomplete information. Finally, let’s 
imagine a situation in which vote shares of small parties increase, and, as a result, the level of 
117 
 
party system fragmentation at the electorate level also does. As long as these parties remain 
either out of the Parliament, or sufficiently under-represented in it, they will not jeopardize the 
survival of the most established ones and will not provide them with incentives to reform an 
electoral system that is exactly producing the outcome it is supposed to generate. In fact, why 
should major parties open a window of opportunity for minor parties by adopting more 
permissive electoral rules? 
 
Third, Colomer’s logical model implies that parties should value short-term electoral 
advantage over long-term positive change in the competitive system or increasing opportunities 
for coalition-building (Katz 2005). Actors’ time horizons may at best vary (Renwick 2010; Rose 
1983). Even more importantly, parties may not be concerned simply with the result of the 
following election, and may attach weight to the outcomes of the elections after that. Or they 
may lay greatest stress on the long-term competitive dynamic that an electoral system 
encourages, or the achievement in the future of other goals (exerting policy influence, sharing 
spoils of office…). There is no simple, a priori way of predicting a party’s time horizons. They 
may be determined partly by actors’ enduring nature or by the characteristics of the party system: 
some parties may just think more to the long term than others; particular contexts can shape 
actors’ time horizons in many different ways. The bottom line, thus, is that short-term 
motivations of electoral reform only captures a limited part of the real-world story, but leaves 
much to be explained. Hence, there is clearly scope for further clarification. Indeed, policy-
oriented parties may think their support will increase in a system where they are able to achieve 
their policy objectives. 
 
Fourth, the micro-mega rule overlooks the fact that equal-size parties may be divided by 
non-institutional issues, rendering them unable to make common cause against the rising new 
political forces. According to Stein Rokkan (2009 [1970: 158]), the inheritance of mutual 
hostility and distrust among the parties of the old order prevented them from successful electoral 
coordination to face the socialist threat, and provoked the adoption of PR (see also Boix 1999). 
However, I do not really see how bitter enemies like these were able to collectively embrace 
inclusive electoral rules. Nowadays, this kind of coordination seems problematic on logical 
grounds as well. The micro-mega rule suggests that because of extreme party system 
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fragmentation, all parties will agree on the institutional solution that entails their own survival –
permissive electoral institutions. But the theory is silent about the way political forces will 
overcome sharp ideological divisions among them.
132
   
 
Fifth, Shugart’s (2001 and 2008) theory about inherent and contingent motivations of 
electoral reform casts some additional doubts on the validity of the micro-mega rule. Following 
his claims, we can argue that changes will occur only when electoral outcomes are extreme.
133
 
When electoral rules produce systemic failure,
134
 public opinion becomes more sceptical about 
its operation, and citizens see with clear eyes the idea of electoral reform as the best way of 
fixing it. Alan Renwick (2010) coins the concept “reform by elite-mass interaction” to refer to 
the types of institutional change when existing winners are not entirely in control of the situation, 
and can have reforms imposed upon them by the electorate. In the same vein, Pippa Norris 
(2011) demonstrates that democratic aspirations of the citizenry are a strong, significant, and 
robust predictor of the occurrence of subsequent electoral reforms  
 
There are several examples of situations that constitute deviations from the “efficient” 
ideal consequences of electoral systems (i.e., Shugart’s definition of extreme outcomes), and 
make more likely the reform. However, we are particularly interested here in how hyper-
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 Moreover, there are still other types of circumstances in which the desire for permissive reforms among deputies 
of small parties may not be as great as the parties’size alone would lead us to expect. Think, for example, about the 
case of a party of local notables who may prefer single-member districts to larger districts in which their strong local 
support would be diluted (i.e., the Nouveau Centre in France after the 2007 elections), or the case of locally strong 
non-statewide parties that may prefer low-magnitude districts to larger districts in which they would no longer be 
able to monopolize the representation of the regional interests (i.e., Convergència i Unió and the Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco in Spain after the 2008 elections). For a refinement of the latter argument, see Ziegfeld (2013). 
133
 Systems that generate governments representing well under a majority of the electorate (i.e., the so-called 
pluralitarian systems), and systems that provoke governments that are usually not identifiable in the election 
campaign that precedes their formation (i.e., the so-called hyper-representative systems) are deemed to be extreme 
in the interparty dimension. Pre-reform New Zealand and Italy are two prime examples (Shugart 2001). 
134
 In his work on the causes of reform of FPTP, Shugart (2008) argues that when the poor performance of the rules 
leads to clearly anomalous outcomes (i.e., lopsided majorities and plurality reversals) it can be said that we are in 
front of a systemic failure. And he then adds the following (p. 56):  
The concept of systemic failure, as defined here, could be applied to any other category of electoral       
system, including PR. For instance, a PR system could be said to have failed if a set of parties closely allied 
to with one another obtained a majority of votes, but not the seats to form a government (perhaps due to 
fragmentation, failure of some allied parties to cross the threshold, etc.). However, a PR system would not 
be said to have failed on its own normative criteria on account of frequent coalition governments or their 
breakdown between scheduled elections. The latter are occurrences that are expected under PR, and even 
considered advantages by the system’s advocates. The concept of systemic failure in systems other than 
FPTP deserves further treatment, but the present work will be confined only to FPTP. 
119 
 
representative and pluralitarian electoral systems provoke movements away from and towards 
more proportionality, respectively (Shugart 2001). Indeed, if we read carefully his theoretical 
development, we will note that the empirical predictions that we derive from it are completely at 
odds with what Colomer suggests. Hence, the lack of efficiency entailed by either the 
impossibility of identification of governments before the election in too proportional systems, or 
the emergence of manufactured majorities under too majoritarian rules lead to institutional 
change, but not in the direction suggested by Colomer.  
 
Christopher Wlezien’s (1995) research that public opinion responds to policy outputs and 
functions like a thermostat, demanding more right-wing policies as leftist policies accumulated, 
and then moderating the demand from right-wing policies as those policy demands in turn were 
met, eventually swinging back to the left as right-wing demands were satisfied, may be helpful 
as well. People notice what outcomes electoral systems produce. Even if people lack perfect 
information about the exact operation of electoral rules, they can still make a rational, reasoned 
judgment about their consequences and the need to change them or not (Lupia and McCubbins 
1998). If they do not get what they want (e.g., more parties), they keep wanting more 
proportional rules and they sometimes “throw the rascals out”; but if they do get what they want 
they notice too, and eventually stop wanting more of the same. In regard to the permissiveness of 
the rules of the game, public opinion could also operate like a thermostat, helping politicians to 
regulate the level of policy provision. When too much policy is provided (e.g., too much party 
system fragmentation), the public sends a signal to the effect of limiting the proportionality of 
the electoral institutions.  
 
Finally, the value of Colomer’s model is not determined solely by its theoretical 
consistency but also by its performance in an empirical test. In this regard, the figures provided 
by Renwick (2010: 249) clearly contradict Colomer’s expectations. Looking at electoral system 
changes in established democracies since 1962, Renwick shows that reforms towards more 
proportionality are more often preceded by a lower effective number of electoral parties than are 
restrictive reforms. In the same vein, the evidence regarding the impact of party system change 
on electoral reforms in Latin America over the past two decades is again not consistent with 
Colomer’s model (Remmer 2008). Likewise, Jack Bielasiak (2006: 421) argues that many former 
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communist countries adopted less inclusive electoral rules during the first democratic decade as a 
way of curbing the excessive number of parties.
135
 Finally, Robin Best (2011) demonstrates the 
impact of only some long-term cumulative changes in party system size on electoral reform by 
drawing on data from 23 established democracies from 1946 to 2010.  
 
 Bearing all these considerations in mind, the goal of this chapter is to analyze whether 
party system fragmentation provides a disincentive for permissive electoral reforms. My 
theoretical expectation is that a large number of parties will boost the likelihood of adopting a 
restrictive reform. I believe that even though there may be forces pushing for permissive 
electoral system changes when party system fragmentation goes up, parliamentary atomization 
proves able to explain the adoption of restrictive electoral rules. A less fragmented legislature 
brings several benefits to parties. First of all, a small number of parties can enhance their 
capacity to enjoy stable and durable cabinets (Diermeier and Stevenson 2000; King et al. 1990; 
Warwick 1994). If the effective number of parties goes up, so does the risk of early government 
termination. Limiting party system fragmentation, in turn, produces longer-lived governments. 
And cabinet stability is probably something valued by both parties and voters. This is why they 
might support a restrictive electoral reform in case of high party system fragmentation.  
 
Second, legislative passage rates appear to be lower when there is a multiparty coalition 
rather than a single-party government, and when there are more permissive electoral rules 
(Saiegh 2009). And party system fragmentation is arguably correlated with these two variables. 
Parties and voters concerned about the possibility of having ineffective legislatures unable to 
pass legislation may strategically be in favour of the adoption of a restrictive electoral law in 
case of high party system fragmentation. In other words, elections should be a device not only 
for determining who should govern (Schumpeter 2012 [1942]) but also for empowering a 
government. If the latter does not happen, the system becomes inefficient and offers considerable 
room for improvement and, hence, reform (Shugart 2001). In this regard, parties that advocate a 
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 These attempts of constraining high levels of party system fragmentation seem to have been matched by popular 
approval in East European party systems. In this sense, a public opinion survey during the 1990s in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Russia found that 54 percent of the interviewed persons on average favoured 
fewer parties (Rose and Munro 2009 [2003]: 88). 
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restrictive electoral reform when party system fragmentation is high are trying to electorally 
benefit from the likely improvement of legislative productivity.  
 
Finally, and on top of this, adopting a permissive electoral reform when party system 
fragmentation is high does not necessarily constitute the seat-maximizing (and vote-maximizing) 
strategy for parties. In fact, fostering the overall proportionality of the electoral rules may 
become a double-edged tactic for existing winners that want to create fewer opportunities to be 
converted into absolute losers. On the one hand, adopting more inclusive rules will have negative 
effects for established parties because voters can perceive minor political forces as more likely to 
re-enter the parliament and strengthen their presence there. On the other hand, the electoral 
appeal of large parties would most likely suffer if voters perceive them as blatant manipulators 
that take advantage of a low party system fragmentation to enact restrictive reforms. Hence, I put 
forward the following hypothesis: Party system fragmentation has a positive effect on the 
probability of restrictive electoral reforms; and the reverse is true for permissive reforms (H1). 
 
Before testing the impact of party system fragmentation, I first turn to other factors that 
may explain the occurrence of electoral reforms, and that could be formulated as complementary 
hypotheses. The first variable that is expected to play a role is the level of electoral 
disproportionality (Gallagher 1991). The likelihood of changes in the interparty dimension of the 
electoral system is predicted to vary according to the degree of correspondence between the 
percentage of votes and seats that each party obtains (Leemann and Mares 2012). In contexts of 
high disproportionality, established parties will be inclined to incorporate small/non-
parliamentary parties to the cartel by adopting an inclusive electoral reform (Katz and Mair 
1995). The rationale behind this is straightforward. We know that electoral systems that have a 
propensity to produce high disproportionality are, in general, more risky for parties than those 
using inclusive rules.
136
 Self-interested actors will prefer and tend to choose electoral rules 
creating low opportunities for them to become absolute losers under conditions of serious threat. 
And extremely disproportional systems seem to generate this serious threat. On the one hand, a 
party that competes under highly restrictive rules has to fare particularly well at the polls in order 
to obtain at least the same share of the seats as it won of the votes. On the other hand, the 
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 Highly disproportional rules are not usually risky for large parties in low-volatile countries.  
122 
 
difference between its share of votes and its share of seats will be substantial as long as it does 
not perform above this threshold.
137
  
 
Taking this into account, I expect the positive effect of party system fragmentation on the 
likelihood of restrictive reforms to be mitigated when electoral disproportionality is high. In 
other words, parties in very disproportional systems should not respond to atomized political 
scenarios with the same institutional strategies. As stated above, the process of electoral reform 
is driven by shifts in the electoral risks faced by politicians able to control the reform process. 
And, arguably, these risks are higher when electoral disproportionality is high. Hence, party 
system fragmentation can reduce, increase or have no effect on electoral reform depending on 
the level of electoral disproportionality. In the end, parties are not political kamikazes. Hence, 
they are not willing to curb the proportionality of an extremely permissive system whatever the 
cost, even one that produces a proliferation of parties in parliament and, hence, reduces cabinet 
stability and legislative productivity. Institutional change is also the product of a calculation of 
partisan self-interest. For this reason, an unconditional model specification that did not take into 
account the modifying impact of the level of electoral disproportionality would misleadingly 
suggest that party system fragmentation always lead to an increase in the likelihood of a 
restrictive reform.  
 
To sum up, I hypothesize that party system fragmentation has a positive effect on the 
probability of restrictive electoral reforms that gets weaker as electoral disproportionality 
increases; and the same is true for the expected negative effect of party system fragmentation on 
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 This reasoning would lead one to expect a PR system in Great Britain long ago. It has not happened because large 
parties expect to continue to benefit from the existing biases. The only time it might have happened was in 1918 
when the Liberal Party had the votes to enact universal male suffrage and could at the same time have saved 
themselves from the likely (and actual) consequences of keeping the FPTP system by introducing PR. But this 
solution either did not occur to them or appeared likely to create too much of a furor, providing some preliminary 
evidence of the role played by the values variable. By 1945 no-one with the power to change the system had the 
motivation to do so whatever the degree of disproportionality. This suggests an additional interaction (i.e., 
disproportionality*values) that can override self-interest; and, more importantly, an interaction with what might be 
termed "windows of opportunity". Once the British Liberal party had lost its position of dominance it could no 
longer save itself. Of course, I cannot actually include these additional interactions in my models because of 
problems of feasibility (i.e., operationalization), in practice falling into the error term. Moreover, the relatively low 
levels of electoral volatility observed in Great Britain during the whole 20
th
 century seem to have persuaded parties 
about the suitability of keeping the single-member districts and plurality rule system.   
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permissive reforms (H2).
138
 In other words, the marginal effect of party system fragmentation on 
the probability of restrictive (permissive) electoral reforms is positive (negative) when electoral 
disproportionality is at its lowest level. The magnitude of these effects may decline as electoral 
disproportionality goes up. At some value of electoral disproportionality, party system 
fragmentation has no effect on the probability of electoral reforms. As electoral 
disproportionality rises further, the initially positive (negative) effect of party system 
fragmentation on restrictive (permissive) electoral reforms becomes negative (positive) and 
strengthens in magnitude as electoral disproportionality increases. 
 
The second supplementary hypothesis also slightly qualifies the idea that only party 
system fragmentation creates increasing difficulties for existing winners. According to it, 
electoral volatility, defined as the net change within the party system resulting from individual 
vote transfers over elections (Gómez Martínez 2012; Pedersen 1979), affects parties’ calculations 
and increases uncertainty about their electoral prospects (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), creating 
incentives for a permissive reform. High electoral volatility means that existing winners today 
(i.e., those actors with enough parliamentary muscle to change the electoral system) have a high 
chance of becoming losers tomorrow and, hence, are interested in the adoption of more inclusive 
rules (Bielasiak 2006; Geddes 1996; Lijphart 1992; Przeworski 1991; Remmer 2008). Power and 
willingness to make the system more proportional exceptionally go hand in hand with in contexts 
of high volatility. Parties in power run a serious risk of being decimated after the following 
elections if they keep the same rules. By contrast, there is little incentive to amend the system 
since it already works to the benefit of the existing winners where the distribution of power is 
known and entrenched (i.e., when volatility is low). Thus, parties recognize the overwhelming 
importance of, first and foremost, guarantying their own survival and the difficulties for them to 
do it in high volatile contexts. Moreover, it is the existence of high levels of volatility that 
explains why the effects of electoral reform are sometimes unpredictable (Shepsle 2001: 324). 
The latter has been stressed in several studies that emphasize the ways that uncertainty 
undermines the effectiveness of the strategic behaviour of parties (Andrews and Jackman 2005: 
66 and 85). For this reason, what I suggest here is that the considerable security for existing 
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 In the formulation of hypotheses of this thesis positing interactions, I follow Berry et al.’s (2012) 
recommendations.  
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winners generated by low amounts of volatility may bias the outcomes of the processes of 
institutional change in favour of preserving the status quo and not opening up the can of worms 
of electoral reform even in case of mounting party system fragmentation. Parties in countries 
with permissive rules attempt to constrain the overall proportionality produced by the electoral 
institutions, and support reforms that hinder it. However, they are hypothesized to gradually 
become less interested in pushing for restrictive reforms as volatility goes up. The lesser extent 
of structure in elections conducted in highly-volatile contexts reduces the influence of these pro-
majoritarian preferences.  
 
In short, the marginal effect of party system fragmentation on the probability of 
restrictive (permissive) electoral reforms is positive (negative) when electoral volatility is at its 
lowest level. These effects may decline in magnitude as electoral volatility increases. At some 
value of electoral volatility, party system fragmentation has no effect on the probability of 
electoral reforms. As electoral volatility is even higher, the initially positive (negative) effect of 
party system fragmentation on restrictive (permissive) reforms becomes negative (positive) and 
strengthens in magnitude as electoral volatility increases. To sum up, I hypothesize that party 
system fragmentation has a positive effect on the probability of restrictive electoral reforms that 
gets weaker as electoral volatility increases; and the same is true for the expected negative effect 
of party system fragmentation on permissive reforms (H3).   
 
Finally, substantial differences between old and young democracies are expected with 
regard to the impact of party system fragmentation on electoral reform. The willingness of 
parties to recognize and act upon situations where voting for one’s supposedly seat maximizing 
option leads to a less desirable outcome heavily depends on the age of democracy. The main 
causal mechanisms that explain why actors in recently democratized countries behave differently 
when deciding to change or to keep the electoral system are several (Benoit 2007). First of all, 
uncertainty, lack of reliable information, and imperfect understanding of electoral rules and their 
effects often feature prominently in many transitional contexts. According to Robert Moser 
(1999), electoral systems affect the number of parties in post communist countries and more 
established democracies in very different ways. More specifically, he shows that some new 
democracies of this region of the world, most notably Russia and Ukraine, have not followed the 
125 
 
standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of electoral systems. In 
addition, the high volatility that characterized the first decades of democratic elections in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Epperly 2011; Powell and Tucker forthcoming; Roberts and Wibbels 
1999; Tavits 2005 and 2008) complicated the task of designing the right institutions to achieve 
the desired goals.  
 
A second, but also important, consideration in new democratic contexts is the perceived 
legitimacy of the institutions chosen. For instance, Sarah Birch et al. (2002) conclude that in post 
communist electoral systems the achievement of collective fairness was given high priority 
during the first electoral system choices in those countries. So, the need to keep palpably fair 
electoral rules after a long autocratic period could be a second reason that explains the low 
explanatory power of party system fragmentation in new democracies. Finally, the process by 
which governments are chosen in young democracies is often full of illustrations of how badly 
mechanisms of electoral accountability perform there (Rose and Shin 1999). Parties in power can 
easily circumvent the control of voters, and many of them may feel free to adopt “unacceptable” 
electoral rules because of the lack of opportunities for real accountability there.  
 
Yet, the argument continues and presumes the existence of a learning process based on 
the acquisition of experience and knowledge over the course of increasingly numerous elections. 
As a result, uncertainty about the consequences of electoral reform declines over decades. 
Further, the initially high levels of electoral volatility are overcome as democracies mature and, 
moreover, instrumentally rational voters are progressively more likely to attach weight to the 
positions adopted by parties in the processes of institutional change. Hence, the marginal effect 
of party system fragmentation on the probability of restrictive electoral reforms should be 
negative when democratic age is at its lowest level; and the reverse holds for permissive reforms. 
This effect would decline in magnitude as democracies aged; at some value of democratic age, 
party system fragmentation should have no effect on the probability of restrictive electoral 
reforms. As democracies aged further, the effect of party system fragmentation would become 
negative and strengthen in magnitude as democracy age increased. In short, I put forward the 
following hypothesis: Party system fragmentation has a positive effect on the probability of 
restrictive electoral reforms that gets more pronounced as democratic age increases; and the 
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same is true for the expected negative effect of party system fragmentation on permissive reforms 
(H4).
139
  
 
 
4.4. Data and research design 
4.4.1. Dependent variable 
My dependent variable is the existence (or absence) of an electoral reform, and its different 
types. For an extensive definition and typology of electoral reform, see Chapter 3.
140
 The 
identification of a case of electoral reform without specifying the direction in which the rules of 
the game change is clearly insufficient. On this basis, it is very useful to distinguish between 
permissive and restrictive reforms, which decrease and increase the overall disproportionality 
produced by the electoral rules, respectively (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). In general, 
disproportionality can be defined as “the deviation of parties’ seat shares from their vote shares” 
(Lijphart 1994: 57). Further details of all the episodes of electoral reform identified are given in the 
Appendix 1 to this thesis. 
 
4.4.2. Independent variables 
The first key independent variable is the level of party system fragmentation, which is captured 
by the effective number of electoral parties in the current term (ENEP). This index was first 
introduced by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera in 1979, and indicates “the number of 
hypothetical equal-size parties that would have the same total effect on fractionalization of the 
system as have the actual parties of unequal size” (p. 4). Its exact operationalization corresponds 
to the inverse of the sum of the square of all parties’ vote shares,141  and ranges from 1 to infinity 
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 My logic would also call for at least a higher-level interaction of democratic age with party system 
fragmentation*electoral disproportionality and party system fragmentation*electoral volatility. Unfortunately, I do 
not have a sufficient number of cases to test them.     
140
 Sources: Birch (2003), Birch et al. (2002), Bowler and Grofman (2000), Colomer (2004a), Gallagher and 
Mitchell (2005a), Golder (2004), Grofman et al. (1999), Grofman and Lijphart (2007 [2002]), the Inter-
Parliamentary Union  (n.d.), Johnson and Wallack (2010 [2003]), Jones (1995 and 1997), Lijphart (1994), Lundell 
and Karvonen (2003), Negretto (2009), Payne (2007), Remmer (2008), Renwick (2011), Shugart and Wattenberg 
(2001), Shvetsova (1999), Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán (2005), Zovatto and Orozco Henríquez (2008), and electoral 
laws of each country. 
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 To be more precise, the formula is: 
127 
 
(in fact, to the number of parties that obtain at least one vote).
142
 In the past two decades, the 
effective number of parties “has become the most widely used measure” of party system size 
(Lijphart 1994: 70) because it considerably improves on the merits of other previous measures of 
party system fragmentation. First, it is comparable across very diverse country cases. Moreover, 
it weights the count of parties by their relative electoral strength, and, hence, takes into account 
their “coalition” and “blackmail” power (Sartori 2005 [1976]). Maurice Duverger (1964 [1954]: 
207-208) clearly had the concept of effective parties in mind when discussing party systems (see 
also Clark and Golder 2006: 680). However, using it also entails potential problems that cannot 
be ignored.
143
 
 
I also include in the models the value of the Gallagher’s Index of electoral 
disproportionality in the current term. This measure is calculated according to the following 
formula: Disproportionality Index (DI) = √ 
 
  
 ∑     
     
     
 
 where vi is the percentage of vote 
obtained by party i and si is the percentage of seats obtained by party i.
144
 This index can range 
from 0 to 100 (Gallagher 1991). The disproportionality index not only helps me to test 
hypothesis 2, but also seeks to control for the presence of ceiling or floor effects.
145
 The third 
independent variable of interest is electoral volatility, which is measured on the basis of the 
Pedersen’s Index in the current term (Pedersen 1979). This index is created by adding the net 
difference (i.e., in absolute terms) in the percentage of votes obtained by each of the parties in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ENEP = __1__         
                n 
                 pi
2
, 
                i=1 
where pi is the percentage of votes obtained by party i. 
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 Source: Golder (2004) complemented by Gallagher’s dataset 
(www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php). 
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 One such potential problem corresponds to the “other” and “independent” categories. In this chapter, I correct the 
effective number of electoral parties by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera 
(1997). This operation essentially requires calculating the effective number of electoral parties treating both 
categories as a single party (smallest effective number of parties), then recalculating the effective number of parties 
as if every vote in the “other” and “independent” categories belonged to a different party (largest effective number 
of parties) and taking the mean. The incidence of independent candidacies is only high in Russia and Ukraine. 
144
 Source: Gallagher’s dataset (www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php). 
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 One could argue that there is a ceiling and floor effects problem in my analyses because extremely permissive 
(restrictive) systems, that produce a high (low) party system fragmentation, cannot become more permissive 
(restrictive). The introduction of the Gallagher’s Index of Disproportionality seeks to fix this problem by trying to 
control for the degree of permissiveness of the current system. As a robustness check, I also show some additional 
results in which the “extreme” systems (i.e., FPTP and PR systems with a single-national district) have been 
excluded.    
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given pair of elections and dividing it by two, and ranges from 0 to 100.
146
 Scott Mainwaring, 
Peter Mair and Joshua Tucker kindly shared their data on electoral volatility with me.
147
  
 
Summing up, I do not examine the long-term effect of any of these variables on electoral 
reform. In fact, it could be argued that the effect of these explanatory factors occur mostly over a 
series of two or three elections. However, this issue is far from having been completely 
demonstrated in the literature. Moreover, the way in which party system fragmentation, electoral 
disproportionality and electoral volatility should be theorized and calculated to affect the 
likelihood of electoral system change in the long-term (e.g., averaging their value in the last three 
elections) and the limited data availability lead me to exclude this idea from the empirical 
analysis.   
 
Finally, I also include in the models as an additional independent variable the duration of 
the current democratic period. A regime qualifies as democratic if all of the following conditions 
are met: one, direct or indirect election of the effective executive; two, election of the legislature; 
three, multiple parties are legally allowed; four, existence of parties outside of the ruling 
coalition; five, the alternation rule is not violated; and six, at no time during their current tenure 
in office the incumbent (person, party, military or hierarchy) unconstitutionally closed the lower 
house of the national legislature nor rewrote the rules in their favour.
148
  
 
4.4.3. Control variables 
I use the following two controls: first, Henisz’s political constraints index; second, the real GDP 
per capita; and third, the ideology of the party in government. The rationale behind the first 
control seems straightforward because it is necessary to take into account the number of potential 
veto players that can block the reform of the electoral system (Tsebelis 1990). In this regard, the 
higher the number of veto players that exist, the more difficult the electoral reform becomes. 
Henisz’s index (2000 and 2002) measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to 
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 To be more precise, electoral volatility is calculated according to the following formula: 
TV = ½ Σ | ∆ pi |, 
where the variation in vote share for each party is ∆ pi  = pi(t + 1) - pi(t), i = 1, ..., n. 
147
 Ideally, the amount of available voters in Bartolini and Mair’s sense (1990) would have been proxied by some 
other more precise measure (i.e., the proportion of non-identified citizens with a party). However, the lack of 
appropriate data in this respect has led me to employ Pedersen’s Index as a second best option.  
148
 Source: Cheibub et al. (2009). 
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which a change in the preferences of any one political actor any lead to a change in government 
policy. The index is composed from the following information: the number of independent 
branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the 
presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to more 
constraint); the extent of party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent 
to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of 
constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured 
as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, 
decreasing it for opposed executives). The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model 
and theoretically range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and 
thus less feasibility of policy change.
149
 
 
In addition, I introduce economic performance as a second control variable whose 
omission could bias the estimation of the coefficients of the main independent variables. Because 
electoral outcomes are shaped by economic performance in contemporary democracies (van der 
Brug et al. 2007), the real GDP per capita (in 1,000s) is added to the models.
150
 If the economy 
performs poorly, parties in power will probably lose votes in the following election. This should 
make them more likely to reform electoral rules in a permissive direction. Real GDP per capita is 
a chain index obtained by first applying the component growth rates between each pair of 
consecutive year, ‘t-1’ and ‘t’ (t = 1951 to 2007), to the current price component shares in year 
‘t-1’ to obtain the domestic absorption (DA) growth rate for each year. This DA growth rate for 
each year ‘t’ is then applied backwards and forwards from 2005, and summed to the constant 
price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series. 
 
Finally, the ideology of the government may be of importance as a control variable as 
well (Bol 2011; Bowler et al. 2011). In particular, it might be interesting to distinguish between 
left-wing and right-wing cabinets. As previous works have shown, left-wing parties should be 
more likely to support electoral reform than righ-wing parties. The ideology of the executive is 
proxied by the parties’ orientation with respect to economic policy using the following criteria: 
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the variable takes value 1 for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic or 
right-wing; 2 for parties that are defined as centrist; and 3 for parties that are defined as 
communist, socialist, social democratic or left-wing.
151
   
  
4.4.4. Econometric technique  
Event history data for discrete time processes generally record the dependent variable as a series 
of categorical outcomes denoting whether the events occurred or not at the observation point. In 
fact, discrete time data look a lot like Binary dependent variable Time-Series Cross-Section 
(BTSCS) data when we want to explain a dichotomous outcome (Beck et al. 1998). The only real 
difference between the discrete time duration models and other types of continuous time survival 
specifications is that in the former duration data is disaggregated into discrete time units 
(Bernardi 2006). Like in the OLS world, none of the models that belong to the familiar world of 
categorical dependent variables (logit, probit, multinomial logit/probit…) takes account of the 
problem of time dependence. If there is time dependence, models such as these produce 
estimates that are consistent but inefficient and with wrong standard errors (Poirier and Ruud 
1988). In fact, if serial correlation (time dependency) is high, simulations by Beck and Katz 
(1997) have shown that the standard errors from a normal categorical dependent variable may be 
underestimated by 50 per cent or more. In order to deal with time dependence, I will do two 
things. First of all, I will estimate all the models with several additional parameters or cubic 
splines (Beck et al. 1998) even though they will not be shown to save space. Smoothing 
functions such as cubic splines are attractive alternatives to temporal dummies when tackling 
serial correlation because they consume fewer degrees of freedom. Beck et al. (1998) argue that 
cubic splines are probably the most appropriate and flexible way to deal with temporal 
dependence in discrete time duration models. Additionally, I will employ robust standard errors 
clustered by legislative term. This second operation not only seeks to address serial correlation 
but also attempts to correct for possible problems of heteroskedasticity. 
 
Summing up, I will first test the hypotheses by way of a set of seven multinomial logistic 
regressions, since the dependent variable has more than two discrete and unordered categories 
(Long 1997). The observation is the country-year, and the time-period will go from 1945 to 
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 Source: Beck et al. (2001). 
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2010. I will deal with duration dependence by including cubic splines in all the specifications 
(Beck et al. 1998). However, I will also follow David Carter and Curtis Signorino’s 
recommendation (2010) as a robustness check, and all the models will be rerun including a cubic 
polynomial transformation of time (t, t
2 
and t
3
).
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 Finally, as an alternative to the BTSCS models that I have covered, I will specify several 
Cox models. The main characteristic of these transition rate models with continuous time is that 
the specific distributional form of the duration times is left unspecified. In other words, there is 
no need to assume that the duration times have a particular distribution. What we only care about 
is how a set of covariates moves the baseline hazard up or down. Because of the strong 
assumptions of parametric models about the shape of the hazard, parametric models are not as 
widely used outside the social sciences as is the Cox model (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). 
An important issue involved in model specification concerns treating permissive reforms as 
being subjected to different risks than restrictive electoral system changes. This feature points 
one to a competing risks framework, which makes it possible to explore separately the factors 
that increase the likelihood that politicians will modify the electoral system through either of 
these events.  
 
4.5. Empirical results 
4.5.1. The determinants of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension 
The effect of democratic experience on electoral reform is evident in the differences between old 
and young democracies displayed in Table 4.1. Drawing on comparisons across all the 
democracies included in the analysis, the data indicate that the probability of adopting a new 
electoral system is directly related to the level of democratic experience. The second interesting 
finding is that the ratio of institutional movements towards more and less proportionality in old 
democracies does not differ significantly from that observed in new ones. Finally, an additional 
general conclusion can be drawn from this evidence: in the countries analyzed, there has not 
been a predominant trend towards the adoption of more permissive electoral systems. Hence, the 
evidence does not fit Colomer’s expectation (2005: 2) about the existence of a general drift 
towards higher proportionality. 
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 Results are displayed in Table A2.5 of Appendix 2, and do not fundamentally change. 
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Table 4.1. Democratic age and the types of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension, 
1945-2010 
Democratic 
Age 
  
No 
Reform 
PR 
Reform 
Ambiguous 
Reform 
Maj. 
Reform 
Total 
Old 
368 23 13 16 420 
(87.61) (5.47) (3.09) (3.8) (63.54) 
Young 
165 34 13 29 241 
 (68.46) (14.1)  (5.39) (12.03)  (36.45) 
Total 
533 57 26 45 661 
(80.63) (8.62) (3.93) (6.8) (100) 
Note: Row percentages in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 Table 4.2 displays the descriptive statistics, and Table 4.3 shows the results of the 
multivariate regression analysis for seven separate models. Model 1 only measures the effect of 
party system fragmentation, while Models 2-4 introduce sequentially electoral disproportionality, 
volatility and democratic age. Models 5-7 test the validity of the interactive hypotheses, and 
Figures 4.3-4.5 show the marginal effects for them given an increasing level of 
disproportionality and volatility, and democratic age. According to Thomas Brambor et al. 
(2006) and Cindy Kam and Robert Franzese (2007), the effect of an interaction term cannot be 
evaluated through the p-value shown in the regression table. Thus, it is necessary to graphically 
illustrate the marginal effect of party system fragmentation on the likelihood of electoral reform 
as the value of the modifying variable changes. 
 
 Although party system fragmentation is a good predictor that the current electoral system 
will be replaced by a stronger one in the first two models, it is no longer more likely to observe a 
restrictive reform as the effective number of electoral parties goes up once we control for the 
level of volatility (Models 1-3). Likewise, the likelihood of permissive reforms also seems to be 
unaffected by party system fragmentation in all the three first models. By contrast, the predicted 
probability of adopting a weaker electoral system is higher under remarkably disproportional 
rules, and in considerably volatile contexts. Moreover, electoral volatility also shapes politicians’ 
incentives to adopt more restrictive rules. In this regard, results in Model 3 indicate that higher 
levels of this variable increase the attractiveness of movements towards stronger systems. Hence, 
high volatility in many democracies creates pressures to trim the permissive nature of the  
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. N 
Party System Fragmentation Electoral Level 4.16 1.74 1.35 12 2,679 
Party System Fragmentation Parliamentary 
Level 
3.49 1.42 1.06 10.4 2,679 
Electoral Disproportionality 5.73 4.81 0.34 34.5 2,679 
Electoral Volatility 16.91 16.59 0.3 100 2,679 
Democratic Age(logged) 3.31 0.91 0 4.52 2,679 
Time 18.706 15.67 1 66 2,679 
Political Constraints Index 0.43 0.12 0 0.72 2,657 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) 16.12 9.69 1.89 77.8 2,418 
Ideology of the Government 2.09 0.93 1 3 1,714 
Changes of Prime Minister 0.34 0.84 0 5 1,102 
Legislative Success Rates 76.98 18.12 10.7 100 852 
Polarization 1.09 0.92 0 2 1,728 
 
electoral system and try to impose structure through more restrictive rules (Bielasiak 2006: 421). 
Finally, the negative coefficient for democratic age with regard to both types of electoral system 
changes supports the argument that parties are shying away from electoral reforms as elites and 
voters get more experienced.  
 
Next, I explore the role of electoral disproportionality and volatility, and democratic age 
more in depth. Specifically, I aim to investigate the extent to which they modify the positive 
effect of party system fragmentation on restrictive electoral reform. I do this by re-estimating 
Models 2-4 but including as additional independent variables the following interaction terms: 
Effective_Number_of_Electoral_Parties*Disproportionality_Index, 
Effective_Number_of_Electoral_Parties*Volatility_Index, and 
Effective_Number_of_Electoral_Parties*Democratic_Age (logged). In the first two cases, the 
focus is on whether disproportionality and volatility are effective at removing the positive effect 
of party system fragmentation on restrictive reforms. And, in fact, they partially are. While the 
precise magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients are hard to interpret given the 
categorical and interactive nature of the dependent and independent variables, respectively, the 
estimates in columns 5 and 6 suggest that high levels of disproportionality and/or volatility undo 
some of the direct effect of party system fragmentation on restrictive reforms. By contrast, the  
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Table 4.3. Determinants of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Permissive  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        
Party System Fragmentation -0.019 -0.086 -0.056 -0.026 0.001 -0.114 -0.567*** 
(Electoral Level) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.137) (0.164) (0.214) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.094*** 
  
0.111** 0.018 0.073*** 
  
(0.015) 
  
(0.048) (0.031) (0.018) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.028*** 
 
0.018** 0.0194 0.021*** 
   
(0.007) 
 
-0.00782 (0.022) (0.008) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.373*** -0.303* -0.236 -1.037*** 
    
(0.128) (0.17) (0.266) (0.342) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.008 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.0108) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
0.001 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.003) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.175** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.073) 
Constant -3.345*** -3.936*** -4.240*** -2.570*** -4.147*** -3.535*** -1.892** 
  (0.439) (0.46) (0.542) (0.535) (0.903) (1.269) (0.879) 
Restrictive  
              Reform 
Party System Fragmentation 0.194*** 0.212*** 0.0899 0.170*** 0.331** 0.481** -0.326* 
(Electoral Level) (0.06) (0.057) (0.089) (0.057) (0.146) (0.215) (0.195) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
-0.008 
  
0.088 -0.099* -0.055 
  
(0.025) 
  
(0.082) (0.051) (0.033) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.029*** 
 
0.028*** 0.098*** 0.031*** 
   
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) (0.032) (0.008) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.535*** -0.460* -0.193 -1.236*** 
    
(0.197) (0.261) (0.406) (0.335) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.031* 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.018) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
-0.009* 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.005) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.168** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.068) 
Constant -4.579*** -4.582*** -5.415*** -3.456*** -4.999*** -6.587*** -2.194*** 
  (0.482) (0.494) (0.705) (0.545) (1.064) (1.898) (0.847) 
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N (Observations) 2,883 2,853 2,700 2,883 2,679 1,722 2,679 
Chi
2
 54.18*** 104.75*** 78.57*** 90.72*** 127.25*** 80.74*** 124.72*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.06 0.09   0.11 0.10 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to 
produce more disproportionality. Cluster standard errors by terms in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** 
Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of stability years and the cubic splines are 
included but not shown. 
 
estimates for permissive reforms are statistically insignificant again. These are some of the main 
results of the chapter.
153
 
 
Yet, perhaps one of the most important questions, given the heterogeneous sample of 
countries, is whether democratic experience contributes to effectively foster the impact of party 
system fragmentation on electoral reform. The estimates are reported in column 7 of Table 4.3 
and suggest that the important role of the number and size of parties in adopting a new electoral 
system changes radically as democracies age. First, the coefficient of the constitutive term of 
party system fragmentation on restrictive reforms is very close to zero and only statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This result supports the idea that short-term horizons of parties and 
failure of accountability mechanisms in new democracies offset the incentives of political actors 
to enact efficient electoral reforms despite their apparent popularity. But the positive estimate of 
the interaction term also suggests that lots of small parties lead to more restrictive systems in the 
long run. This indicates that an unconditional model specification that did not take account of the 
modifying impact of democratic age would misleadingly suggest that a fragmented party system 
always leads to an increase in the likelihood of a restrictive reform.
154
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 All the models of Table 4.3 are re-estimated but including the effective number of parliamentary instead of 
electoral parties as the main independent variable. The results for party system fragmentation at the parliamentary 
level displayed in Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 remain mainly similar, though the statistical significance of the 
coefficients is remarkably lower.     
154
 In a supplementary analysis, I also test the effect of the level of democratic age by including a dummy variable, 
EstablishedDemocracy, which is first coded as “1” for those countries that have remained democratic since the end 
of World War II and “0” otherwise; and then is coded as “1” for the first three elections since the end of the 
autocratic rules and “0” otherwise. Results are not shown, but corroborate those using the more elaborate measure of 
DemocraticAge. 
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 Simulations using the CLARIFY software (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003) and 
reported in Figures 4.2-4.5 facilitate the interpretation of the marginal effect of the main 
independent variables. While the information provided in Table 4.3 is informative, it remains 
somewhat limited for two reasons. First of all, since these are in the end multinomial logistic 
regressions, the magnitude of the effects cannot be assessed just by looking at the coefficients. 
Second, the results in the interactive models do not indicate after all whether party system 
fragmentation has a statistically significant impact on electoral reform when the value of the 
modifying independent variables is greater than zero. As a result, I graphically illustrate the 
probability of a given electoral reform to happen according to the variation of party system 
fragmentation at the electoral level (Figure 4.2), and the marginal effect of the effective number 
of electoral parties on the likelihood of institutional change across the observed range of 
disproportionality, volatility and democratic age (Figures 4.3-4.5). The solid sloping line in this 
second group of figures indicates how the marginal effect of party system fragmentation changes 
as the value of the conditioning independent variable increases. One can see whether this effect 
is statistically significant by considering the two-tailed 90 per cent confidence intervals that are 
drawn around it (i.e., the dashed lines). The effect of the effective number of electoral parties is 
distinguishable from zero whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are 
both above (or below) the zero line. Superimposed over the marginal effect plot is a histogram 
portraying the frequency distribution for the modifying variables (i.e., electoral 
disproportionality or volatility and democratic age). In the four figures, the observation is at the 
mean of all other variables included in the model.  
 
 The first important conclusion that emerges in Figure 4.2, based on Model 1, is the 
illustration of the effect of party system fragmentation on the likelihood of restrictive reforms 
that was already apparent in Table 4.3. By contrast, the effective number of electoral parties has 
a weaker non-significant effect on the probability of occurrence of permissive reforms. It is, 
hence, notable that parties in power precisely seem to react in case of high party system 
fragmentation by enacting a restrictive electoral reform but not the other way around. 
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Figure 4.2. Probability of electoral reform in the interparty dimension as party system 
fragmentation changes 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 4.3, Model 1. 
 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 look remarkably similar.
155
 As predicted by the second hypothesis, 
party system fragmentation has a strong positive effect on restrictive reforms when there is low 
disproportionality (Figure 4.3). However, this effect declines as the correspondence between 
parties’ vote and seat shares gets worse. The effective number of electoral parties stops having a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of institutional change once Gallagher’s 
Disproportionality Index is more than 6. Roughly 50 per cent of legislative elections in the 
sample have produced a disproportionality lower than this. Hence, the results presented here 
clearly indicate that party system fragmentation only has a statistically significant effect on 
restrictive reform when the disproportionality is low. By contrast, it is interesting to note that the  
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 I am grateful to Matt Golder for kindly providing in his web page the STATA codes to graph the marginal effects 
of the multiplicative models used in Brambor et al. (2006). 
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Figure 4.3. Marginal effect of party system fragmentation on electoral reform in the 
interparty dimension as electoral disproportionality changes 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 4.3, Model 5. 
 
effective number of parties does actually have no impact if the value of the disproportionality 
index is sufficiently high. Moreover, this variable fails to have any distinguishable effect from 
zero on movements towards more proportionality (i.e., permissive reforms). 
 
Likewise, Figure 4.4, based on Model 6, indicates that party system fragmentation will 
increase the likelihood of restrictive reforms as long as we do not move beyond a given threshold 
of electoral volatility -Pedersen’s Index = 25. Once again, the equivalent figure from the same 
model that shows the probability of adopting a permissive electoral system change provides 
much weaker evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. In this regard, results are not anomalous  
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Figure 4.4. Marginal effect of party system fragmentation on electoral reform in the 
interparty dimension as electoral volatility changes 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 4.3, Model 6. 
 
given that the coefficient of Party_System_Fragmentation*Electoral_Volatility on this second 
category of reforms is insignificant (although positive). However, this last coefficient is perhaps 
not too surprising given that the hypothesis linking permissive electoral system change and the 
number of parties was previously rejected in Model 1. Large parties may simply not have 
incentives to adopt a permissive reform when they become the “only sheriffs in town”, thereby 
weakening the results.  
 
 Finally, what about the effect of democratic age? Figure 4.5 plots the marginal effect of 
the effective number of electoral parties as democracies get older. On the one hand, and contrary  
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Figure 4.5. Marginal effect of party system fragmentation on electoral reform in the 
interparty dimension as democracy ages 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 4.3, Model 7. 
 
to my expectations, it should be clear that party system fragmentation has a strong reductive 
effect on the likelihood of observing a permissive reform when the democracy is young. 
However, this reductive effect declines as the number of years under democracy increases. Once 
the level of democratic experience becomes sufficiently large (about 8 years), the effective 
number of parties stops having a significant effect on the likelihood of adopting this kind of 
institutional change.
156
 On the other hand, the figure also indicates that party system 
fragmentation will reduce the likelihood of restrictive reforms after 10 years of democracy but 
have no effect before that because this impact depends on the level of democratic experience. 
Hence, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that the likelihood of efficiency-seeking 
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 The variable Democratic_Age is logged in order to account for potential non-linearities.  
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reforms, as measured by restrictive electoral system changes when the number of parties goes up, 
significantly increases once the country goes beyond the first decade of democracy. 
 
Thus far, considerable evidence has been provided about the positive impact of party 
system fragmentation on restrictive electoral reforms and the modifying role played by the levels 
of disproportionality and volatility and the number of years under democracy. These findings, 
however, need to be taken with some caution, since they might be simply due to the omission of 
the relevant control variables. For this reason, Table A2.2 in Appendix 2 to this thesis displays 
some robustness checks based on estimates of the previous equations but using the Henisz’s 
political constraints index, real GDP per capita and the ideology of the government as additional 
explanatory factors. All the main results remain basically unchanged. More importantly, none of 
the control variables perform particularly well.
157
  
 
As a second robustness check, it needs to be noticed that the findings remain very similar 
when “extreme” electoral systems are excluded from the analyses (see Table A2.3). FPTP and 
PR systems with a single-national district are deemed to be “extreme”. 158  None of the 
interactions between party system fragmentation and the mofidying factors lose statistical 
significance at traditional levels of confidence in this new group of analyses. Table A2.4 shows 
the results of the Cox models displayed as coefficients rather than hazard ratios. Party system 
fragmentation has mixed success in explaining electoral reform there. Moreover, the level of 
electoral disproportionality or volatility is not a significant modifying factor for the effective 
number of parties, nor is the number of years under democracy. Finally, when temporal 
dependence is modelled by including time, time
2
 and time
3
 in the regressions, the main results do 
not change either (see Table A2.5).  
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 Following the suggestion of Henisz himself, all the main results keep remaining basically unchanged when I use 
the CHECKS index of the Database of Political Institutions as a robustness check. 
158
 More specifically, the cases excluded from this part of the analysis are: Canada, Israel (except for 1996 and 
1999), Macedonia (1994), Moldova, Netherlands, Slovakia (1998-2010), Ukraine (1994), United Kingdom, United 
States and Uruguay. As Shugart points out in at least two pieces (2001 and 2008), the performance of a plurality 
system is not always “extreme” in terms of producing an exaggerated relationship between how people vote and 
how their representation is distributed across the competing political parties. Were there data on when the system 
does not generate a clearly indetifiable and accountable majority for the plurality party and a strong opposition to 
monitor that majority and serve as a potential prospective majority at the next election (i.e., a spurious and lopsided 
majority, respectively) for all the countries and time periods considered, I could have used them to identify cases of 
“extreme” performance of a plurality system. Unfortunately, these data are missing for some of them.  
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4.5.2. Why does party system fragmentation matter? 
The statistical evidence presented here suggests that a high degree of party system fragmentation 
positively affects the probability of changing the rules of the game in a restrictive direction. Now 
that this pattern has been observed in a range of analyses, I should begin to investigate various 
explanations for the apparent robustness of this finding. Two hypotheses suggest themselves. 
 First, party system fragmentation decreases executives’ (prime ministers or presidents) 
legislative success rates.
159
 When a particular ruler regularly fails to pass legislative 
packages, he or she becomes less likely to get re-elected. Moreover, this kind of 
argument is also consistent with the idea that politicians consider efficient institutions to 
be valuable. Poor lawmaking abilities of chief executives increase, by this account, the 
likelihood of adopting a more restrictive electoral system. To test this hypothesis, I will 
use a variable that denotes the proportion of executive initiatives introduced to the 
legislature that were approved.
160
 
 
 The number of parties is also associated with shorter durations of cabinets. 161  The 
informed voter may regard having short-lived governments with a certain amount of 
apprehensiveness. Like chief executives’ legislative success rates, this pattern also 
concerns the overall efficiency of the political system. After all, how could one expect a 
democratic regime to function effectively if its governments fall apart all the time? To 
test this mechanism, I will use the number of changes of prime minister since the last 
election.
162
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 For example, the 1993 Electoral Law was enacted in Poland because parties were typically too small and frail to 
sustain working legislative majorities (Ka-Lok Chan 2001). 
160
 Source: Saiegh (2009). 
161
 At least initially, the pursuit of stable government lies at the heart of the 1994-1996 attempts of changing the 
electoral system in Slovakia. At that time, Prime Minister Mečiar told his party’s congress that the lessons of 1994 
(the fall of his government and the difficulty of forming a new one after early elections) showed that the 5 per cent 
threshold was not enough to ensure a manageable number of parties (Birch et al. 2002). 
162
 Source: Hellwig and Samuels (2007). Data for all other cases calculated from information in Keesing's Record of 
World Events. Readers will notice this solution is far from ideal. Should there be information on only those changes 
of prime minister that happen between elections, I could have used it in the manuscript. Unfortunately, these data are 
not available. 
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Table 4.4. Mechanisms of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Permissive coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
         
Changes of Prime Minister 0.005 -0.162 0.538* -0.394 
    
 
(0.409) (0.457) (0.326) (0.67) 
    Legislative Success Rates 
    
-0.017 -0.0102 0.058 0.008 
     
(0.026) (0.028) (0.078) -(0.039) 
Electoral Disproportionality 0.043 0.038 0.054 0.045 -0.508** -0.382 -0.632** -0.555** 
 
(0.0503) (0.054) (0.051) (0.0507) (0.198) (0.301) (0.261) (0.222) 
Electoral Volatility 0.029* 0.029* 0.028* 0.0303** 0.095** 0.095** 0.32 0.105** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.041) (0.042) (0.197) (0.045) 
Democratic Age(logged) 0.121 0.132 -0.035 0.088 0.246 0.223 -0.16 1.268 
 
(0.329) (0.331) (0.301) (0.321) (0.402) (0.402) (0.489) (0.911) 
Changes of Prime Minister* 
 
0.024 
      Electoral Disproportionality 
 
(0.084) 
      Changes of Prime Minister* 
  
-0.021* 
     Electoral Volatility 
  
(0.012) 
     Changes of Prime Minister* 
   
0.006 
    
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
(0.005) 
    
Legislative Success Rates* 
     
-0.002 
  
Electoral Disproportionality 
     
(0.002) 
  
Legislative Success Rates* 
      
-0.002 
 Electoral Volatility 
      
(0.002) 
 Legislative Success Rates* 
       
-0.0008 
Democratic Age(logged) 
       
(0.0007) 
Constant -5.572*** -5.567*** -5.174*** -5.510*** -2.227 -2.654 -6.716 -5.85 
  (1.579) (1.573) (1.542) (1.575) (2.175) (2.328) (5.103) (4.203) 
Restrictive  
                Reform 
Changes of Prime Minister 0.199 1.363*** 1.201*** 0.285 
    
 
(0.399) (0.468) (0.394) (0.56) 
    Legislative Success Rates 
    
-0.032* -0.025 -0.046*** -0.002 
     
(0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.0209) 
Electoral Disproportionality -0.053 -0.031 -0.064 -0.052 -0.358** -0.258 -0.430** -0.428* 
 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.055) (0.045) (0.15) (0.281) (0.195) (0.228) 
Electoral Volatility 0.048*** 0.0507*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.0504* 0.051** 0.081 0.0505 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.025) (0.064) (0.035) 
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Democratic Age(logged) 0.083 0.046 0.063 0.101 -1.620*** -1.644*** -1.301*** -0.507 
 
(0.507) (0.509) (0.497) (0.522) (0.555) (0.55) (0.409) (0.778) 
Changes of Prime Minister* 
 
-0.335** 
      
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
(0.133) 
      
Changes of Prime Minister* 
  
-0.044*** 
     Electoral Volatility 
  
(0.011) 
     Changes of Prime Minister* 
   
-0.001 
    Democratic Age(logged) 
   
(0.004) 
    Legislative Success Rates* 
     
-0.001 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
     
(0.002) 
  Legislative Success Rates* 
      
-0.00003 
 
Electoral Volatility 
      
(0.0008) 
 Legislative Success Rates* 
       
-0.001*** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
       
(0.0005) 
Constant -5.371*** -5.422*** -5.029*** -5.402*** 1.434 1 0.781 -1.755 
 
(1.625) (1.557) (1.652) (1.645) (1.481) (1.852) (2.262) (2.324) 
N (Observations) 1,102 1,102 1,004 1,102 852 852 662 852 
Chi
2
 72.60*** 87.28*** 91.69*** 73.73*** 122.34*** 140.14*** 147.27*** 133.82*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to 
produce more disproportionality. Cluster standard errors by terms in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** 
Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of stability years and the cubic splines are 
included but not shown. 
 
These two mechanisms are tested and results are displayed in Table 4.4. Accordingly to 
the negative findings regarding low party system fragmentation and permissive electoral reforms 
that we have seen in the previous section, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that very successful 
lawmakers and long-lived prime ministers are likely to implement permissive reforms in seven 
out of eight models. By contrast, legislative success rates and prime ministerial durability exert 
an impact on the likelihood of restrictive electoral system changes. More specifically, constant 
changes of prime minister lead politicians to adopt stronger rules of the game when either 
electoral disproportionality or volatility is equal to zero. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
notice that this relationship is less apparent as the values of these two variables go up. High 
legislative success rates are, in turn, less likely to produce restrictive electoral reforms, regardless 
of the levels of disproportionality or volatility observed in a given country. Of primary interest 
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here is the interaction capturing the modifying effect of democratic age. As can be seen in model 
7, the interaction is negative and statistically significant, implying that for sufficiently long-lived 
democracies high legislative success rates decrease the probability of a restrictive electoral 
reform. 
 
Finally, Sartori (2005 [1976]) argues that fragmentation only allows us to partially 
understand the structure of a party system. This is why a polarization index replaces the effective 
number of parties as the main explanatory factor in Table A2.6 of Appendix 2. This new variable 
measures the maximum ideological distance between the executive party and the four main 
parties of the legislature (Keefer and Stasavage 2003). My findings here suggest that parties have 
fewer incentives to enact a permissive reform the bigger the difference between the chief 
executive’s party’s value and the values of the three largest government parties and the largest 
opposition party. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Building on previous research, this chapter provides evidence that party system fragmentation is 
necessary for explaining electoral reform. However, I hope to have illustrated that the existing 
literature does not provide an adequate answer to the question of whether (and how) the number 
of parties affect the likelihood of changing the electoral system. Many other studies find that 
party system size has a positive effect on permissive reforms. Nevertheless, most of them limit 
their scope to a particular region of the world (Best 2011; Harfst 2013; Remmer 2008; Smyth 
2005), or employ a very restrictive definition of electoral reform (Colomer 2004b and 2005). By 
using a new dataset which includes electoral reforms between 1945 and 2010 in 60 democratic 
countries, I provide several contributions to the current state of the art. One is to show that 
restrictive electoral system changes (i.e., movements towards less inclusive rules) are more likely 
to occur when the number of electoral parties is high. By contrast, I do not find any significant 
effect regarding the impact of party system size on the probability of observing permissive 
switches in electoral institutions. Future research should evaluate the determinants of this other 
type of reform. In the meantime, my results suggest that the effect of the number of parties is not 
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completely symmetrical and actors do not adopt more inclusive rules when party system 
fragmentation decreases (see, for example, the Spanish case). 
 
Another important finding is the recognition that party system fragmentation, on the one 
hand, and electoral disproportionality and volatility, and democratic age, on the other hand, 
interact to shape actors’ incentives to reform the rules of the game. Hence, my claims are that the 
number of parties will increase the likelihood of observing a restrictive electoral system change 
only when the correspondence between vote and seat shares of parties or the stability of political 
competition are sufficiently high, or the current democratic period of time has been long enough. 
But the latter is also true for permissive reforms, and this might seem surprising. One possible 
explanation could be my failure to distinguish between different types of new democracies. For 
example, it might be the case that party system size has a negative effect on permissive reforms 
only in those young democracies where accountability works (i.e., where rulers lose office 
dependently of their performance) and political actors have long-term horizons. Unfortunately, 
the analysis presented here (and in all previous studies) has not found any way to take this into 
account. 
 
Despite these uncertainties, one very clear conclusion can be derived from my study: 
Electoral reforms are complex phenomena, results of many different elements that reinforce or 
diminish each other. In this regard, there is clearly more to it than just seat-maximization based 
on the current level of party system fragmentation, as the dominant literature suggests. In other 
words, the conventional wisdom captures only a small fraction of the reality since it simply 
focuses on parties’ desire to maximize their parliamentary representation. However, parties’ 
willingness to change the electoral system is also determined by their policy and office-seeking 
goals (Müller and Strøm 1999). Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 8, a party that ignores a 
popular desire for reform to suit its own private interests may be punished by voters at the ballot 
box (Shugart 2008). 
 
To sum up, a combination of several theoretical approaches provides a comprehensive 
answer to the question of why a reform in the interparty dimension of the electoral system takes 
place in contemporary democracies. A key feature of this chapter is to add nuance to traditional 
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explanations for the occurrence of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension. In addition, by 
dwelling on the specific case of electoral reform, my results can contribute to studies in two 
different fields: legislative-coalition building and political manipulation. However, even though 
my investigation has highlighted the importance of party system fragmentation for the 
occurrence of electoral reforms in the interparty dimension, several questions still need to be 
addressed in order to better understand the workings of the relationship between the party system 
size and the permissiveness of the electoral rules. Future research should test the several possible 
mechanisms at work, as well as provide explanations for the adoption of inclusive electoral 
reforms. Moreover, it would be important to know whether the modifying effect of 
disproportionality and volatility vary for different kinds of democracies. Is there a heterogeneous 
effect depending on democratic age or political freedom? Is it indeed the case that established 
and developing party systems operate differently? Finally, politicians’ values (for example, their 
ideology) may be a key factor in promoting electoral reform. I hope that my chapter will spur the 
interest necessary to address some of these questions and improve our understanding of how the 
number of parties affects the fates of electoral rules. 
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Chapter 5. “The more things change, the more they stay the same”: The determinants of 
electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension 
 
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. 
(Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes 1849) 
 
La salud de las democracias, cualquiera que sean su tipo y su grado, depende de un mísero 
detalle técnico: el procedimiento electoral. Todo lo demás es secundario. 
(José Ortega y Gasset 1993 [1930]: 201]   
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
As I have shown above, reforms are not uncommon in the interparty dimension of electoral 
systems. Sitting governments may rapidly become interested in changing the electoral rules that 
affect the translation of votes into seats for competing political parties, and the overall nature of 
the party system. Modifications of the electoral formula, district magnitude or legal threshold 
occurred in established democracies during the 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., Belgium, Germany 
or Norway), and became prominent in the early stages of democratization in Eastern Europe 
(Bielasiak 2006). This is perhaps not surprising considering that insider parties in all 
democracies are facing important challenges for their own survival in recent times (Mair et al. 
2004). However, a similar pattern seems to have emerged in the intraparty dimension of electoral 
systems, as parties in office appear to have altered on several occasions within the last two 
decades what voters are asked to do in the act of voting, and which is the impact of their vote 
upon the election outcome and on the identity of the candidate who is finally elected (Renwick 
and Pilet 2011). From a static point of view, studies of electoral systems have highlighted the 
extent to which the rules of the game encourage or discourage candidates’ incentives to cultivate 
a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995). However, there is not really a body of theoretically 
driven comparative work on why a candidate-centred electoral system is chosen over a party-
centred one (or the other way around). 
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 In the current context, one would expect the old bias towards party-centeredness in 
electoral systems to diminish over time with the process of increasingly personalization of world 
politics. This development has occurred in some Western European democracies, for example, 
where the role of prime ministers in parliamentary systems increased steadily from the late 1960s 
to the point where their influence over present day politics leads to some authors to coin the term 
“presidentialization” of political parties (Poguntke and Webb 2005).163 The same phenomenon 
has been observed within governments (Blondel and Thiébault 2010). The personalization of 
voting behaviour (Aarts et al. 2013; Bittner 2011) and media coverage (Mughan 2000) has also 
attracted growing scholarly attention. However, in some advanced industrialized democracies 
like the United Kingdom, Sweden, and mainly Germany, there has not been a clear and pervasive 
trend towards more personalization (Karvonen 2010). Moreover, the empirical evidence 
concerning the personalization of national election campaigns in six Western European countries 
is, at best, mixed (Kriesi forthcoming). To sum up, the decline in cleavage politics (Franklin et 
al. 1992)
164
 and voters’ turnout (Franklin 2004), the growing postmaterialism (Inglehart 1971; 
van Deth 1996) and scepticism towards institutions and politicians (Dalton 2004), the erosion of 
party identifications (Dalton 2000) and memberships (van Biezen et al. 2011), and the increase in 
electoral volatility (Mair 2011) require first that we clarify whether there is a tendency towards a 
rising personalization of electoral systems and second that we develop our understanding of how 
various mechanisms drive this change.
165
  
 
Previous studies of electoral institutions have mainly thought of election outcomes in 
purely partisan terms, and have practically overlooked the questions relating to intraparty 
preference voting (Karvonen 2004; Katz 1986; Marsh 1985). The unsurprising result that derives 
from the considerable lack of research in this area is that the intraparty aspect of the rules of the 
game can be considered “the neglected dimension of electoral systems” (Colomer 2011). In 
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 Even when it is in quotation marks, “presidentialization” of PMs in parliamentary systems should not really go 
without qualification. Using evidence from France and Israel, Samuels and Shugart (2010) show that the long-term 
structural factors that Poguntke and Webb (2005) indicate cannot explain party presidentialization there, and 
propose an institutional account of this phenomenon. In broader terms, they think what is generally meant in the 
literature that uses this term would be better referred as personalization. 
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 In the edited book by Evans (1999), leading scholars argue that the class basis of political competition has to 
some degree evolved, but not declined. 
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 For the context of my work, it is important to note that most of this literature refers to leadership personalization 
and I focus on legislator (legislative candidate) personalization. Whether (and how) the two forms of personalization 
are related remains unclear.  
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terms of electoral reform, the core of the literature has focused on examinations of the causes of 
the changes that affect the proportionality of the outcomes (Renwick and Pilet 2011: 3). 
Likewise, Lijphart’s well known criteria for determining the occurrence of a reform only refer to 
elements that can be expected to have an effect on the number of parties and how proportional 
the allocation of seats is among them (Lijphart 1994: 13). And, finally, seat-maximization 
calculations of parties provide the standard explanation of this type of institutional modifications 
(e.g., Benoit 2004; Boix 1999; Colomer 2004b). As a consequence of all this, there has been no 
systematic attempt to investigate what kinds of factors commonly contribute to the continuity 
and change in the intraparty dimension of electoral systems. Moreover, although there are good 
reasons to expect an increasing personalization, a clear empirical prediction about the dynamics 
of the relative importance of candidates and parties in the institutional architecture is also 
missing from the orthodox accounts of electoral reform. In conclusion, the field of comparative 
electoral systems research has not mirrored the growing interest in the personalization of politics 
observed in other areas of work (McAllister 2007). 
 
In this chapter I will address the following interrelated questions: What motivates the 
changes in the intraparty dimension of electoral systems in contemporary democracies, and why 
does the degree of institutional stability in this regard vary across countries and over time? Are 
countries with higher levels of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the way democracy works,166 party 
system nationalization and/or electoral volatility more likely to adopt reforms? If individual 
politicians are becoming increasingly important in many political aspects all over the world, why 
do we observe party-centred reforms in some countries? 
 
In order to do so, I propose a theoretical framework to explain reform of the intraparty 
dimension of electoral systems in contemporary democracies that takes as its independent 
variable the average citizens’ dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. 
Specifically, I argue that the perceived value of a reform for current legislators will be greater 
where there is a high public discontent towards the current working of political institutions. This 
system-level variable can affect the narrow interest in political survival operating at the party-
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 Political dissatisfaction, political discontent and lack of satisfaction with the way democracy works will be used 
in an exchangeable way in this chapter.  
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level. In fact, and despite the pervasiveness of statements that link growing erosion of 
satisfaction with democracy and increasing personalization of electoral systems in contemporary 
democracies, our knowledge about it is certainly far from systematic and is almost always 
confined to anecdotal evidence. Public outrage about the functioning of the electoral system that 
tends to lower legislators’ incentives to keep party-centred rules (as happened in Venezuela in 
the late 1980s or Bolivia in the early 1990s) might also decrease the perceived benefits of 
maintaining candidate-centred institutions (as happened in Italy or Japan in the 1990s); and some 
other institutional factors within which political competition takes place (e.g., party system 
nationalization and electoral volatility) might also affect elites’ calculations regardless of how 
widespread citizens’ disaffection is. All in all, citizens’ disenchantment with the statu quo should 
diminish the value of the current system and encourage parties to favour electoral reform in spite 
of the direction of the proposed change as long as it does not threaten other party’s priorities in 
terms of office-seeking and policy goals. 
 
Yet, before proceeding with the rest of the chapter, two “caveat emptors” have never 
been more apt. As can be seen below, what I am doing is to use a single independent variable 
(i.e., dissatisfaction with the way democracy works) to explain a variety of reforms. I decided to 
use this variable because it is available for an extraordinary number of countries and years. 
However, dissatisfaction with democracy is measuring different kinds of dissatisfaction in 
different circumstances. Moreover, I am also making two additional assumptions when using it: 
first, the wrong operation of the electoral system is mainly responsible for the widespread 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works within the electorate; and, second, both 
respondents and reformers know (and agree about) what is not right when satisfaction with 
democracy is low. This is somewhat remarkable and tells us something about voters and elites’ 
sophistication that is impressive in itself. 
 
The second “caveat emptor” refers to the absence, notable compared to the inclusion of 
the effective number of parties and disproportionality in the regressions of the previous chapter, 
of some other variables about the intraparty effects of the existing rules of the game. The reason 
for not including them is mainly pragmatic and lies in the continuing difficulty of developing 
useful indicators beyond dichotomous classifications on the intraparty dimension. Presumably, 
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highly candidate-centred systems should be unlikely to be made more candidate-centred, and 
likewise we probably would not see highly party-centred made more so. However, this notion of 
compensating is not a theme of my hypotheses on the intraparty dimension in a manner that it is 
for the interparty. Politicians change the electoral system when satisfaction with democracy is 
low because they expect to benefit from the very act of voting for reform (act-contingent 
reasons), and, hence, “extremism” in terms of an exaggerated relationship between how many 
incentives a candidate has to cultivate a personal vote and how valuable is the exhibition of a 
particular party brand does not belong to the logic of reform here.
167
    
 
I test my theory by employing my own dataset of electoral systems employed in 60 
democracies around the world since 1945, and find that the likelihood of adopting a candidate-
centred reform increases in contexts of widespread dissatisfaction with the way democracy 
works in a country. As we will see, although party-centred electoral system changes are more 
likely as the overall level of satisfaction with democracy goes down, the same is not in general 
true with regard to candidate-centred electoral reforms. More importantly, the modifying effect 
of party system inflation, electoral volatility and the length of the current democratic period on 
the likelihood of observing an electoral system change in the intraparty dimension is itself 
indicative of the need of a more comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the 
occurrence of this type of institutional modifications in democratic countries. In this regard, I 
find that high satisfaction with the way democracy works only impedes candidate-centred and 
party-centred reforms when party system inflation and electoral volatility are sufficiently low. 
Finally, a last interactive model shows that dissatisfaction with democracy is particularly helpful 
to understand reforms in the intraparty dimension in democracies that have reached a certain age. 
  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I introduce a 
theoretical framework for understanding the causes of electoral system changes in the intraparty 
dimension. I then elaborate a series of working hypotheses that describe the conditions under 
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 Ideally, I would have been able to identify the sources of low satisfaction with democracy (i.e., either an 
extremely candidate-centred or an extremely party-centred electoral system), and to predict which direction the 
reform would take. Unfortunately, this was not possible without resembling a tautology: A candidate-centred 
electoral system is more likely to be reformed into a party-centred, and the other way around. One would need to 
come up with some sort of factor (like party system fragmentation for the interparty dimension) that, for example, 
implied the adoption of candidate-centred reforms when the value of this variable is low, and vice versa. However, I 
could not find such a variable. 
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which these electoral reforms are more likely to occur. In the fourth and fifth section, I present 
my methods and data, and conduct the corresponding empirical tests. Finally, section six 
concludes. 
 
 
5.2. Personalization of electoral systems and political discontent in contemporary 
democracies 
Why would the intraparty dimension of an electoral system change? Much of the literature on 
electoral reform has taken the interests-driven explanation as the main theoretical perspective 
regarding the adoption and modification of the rules of the game. This view “assumes that 
politicians control the choice of electoral system and that they are motivated to maximize their 
power” (Renwick 2010: 7-9); and is specified most precisely by Kenneth Benoit (2004), but also 
underlies the work of Carles Boix (1999) and Josep Maria Colomer (2004b), among others. 
These studies often stress politicians’ interest in maximizing their seat shares when changing the 
electoral system. Despite the widespread acceptance of this seat-maximization model, some 
serious problems emerge with its potential use to explain electoral reform in the intraparty 
dimension. First and foremost, even if politicians are mainly seat-maximizers, tinkering with the 
intraparty dimension of the electoral rules does not emerge as an obvious path to achieve it. In 
this regard, the intraparty dimension of the electoral system only affects the concentration or 
dispersion of authority within parties (Shugart 2001 and 2005). Hence, the basic distinction with 
regard to it refers to the degree to which candidates for legislative office can profitably cultivate 
a “personal” or a “partisan vote”.  
 
A personal vote is generally defined as that portion of the vote derived from a politician’s 
personal reputation, while a partisan vote represents the return to the candidate from his or her 
party affiliation (Cain et al. 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995). The extent to which candidates have 
an incentive to cultivate a personal vote, and the extent to which parties have an incentive to 
nominate candidates with diverse characteristics and profiles that appeal to constituent 
subgroups, is expected to vary with specific institutional variables on the intraparty dimension of 
electoral systems. In general, we would expect that voters are encouraged to focus on individual 
candidates rather than on political parties and, hence, basically cast a personal vote under the so-
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called candidate-centred rules. By contrast, party-centred systems would give individual 
candidates more ability to rely on the popularity of the party label in order to be elected. 
 
The reason that the seat-maximization is not important for the explanation of reform in 
the intraparty perspective lies in the different ways in which the two dimensions of electoral 
rules tend to affect the allocation of seats. Unlike its interparty counterpart, the intraparty 
dimension does not affect the translation of votes into seats for competing political parties. The 
seat share of each party is a function both of the elements of the interparty dimension of the 
electoral system, a concept borrowed from Matthew Shugart in several pieces (2001 and 2005), 
and of its vote share. Briefly, when a party receives few votes, a restrictive electoral formula, a 
low district magnitude or a high legal threshold contribute to reduce its parliamentary 
representation. By contrast, large parties usually obtain considerably more legislative seats than 
their proportionate vote share under majoritarian features of the electoral system. This is 
advancement in that it isolates the parts of the electoral system responsible for producing the 
number of parties and how proportional the allocation of seats is among them. Moreover, it 
means that the intraparty dimension of the electoral system is not pulling any weight in the seats-
votes relationships among parties. Although some of the variables on the intraparty dimension of 
electoral systems are the same as those on the more familiar interparty dimension (e.g., the 
classical distinction between single-seat district plurality systems and multi-seat district 
proportional representation systems), variations in the former are essentially inconsequential for 
parties’ seat shares. This is why electoral reforms in this second dimension cannot be driven, at 
least directly, by parties’ search of seat-maximization.168  
 
In principle, a candidate-centred reform is a good that represents a return to the 
candidates that have and subsequently advertise their own qualifications for election or reelection 
irrespective of the party they belong to, while a party-centred electoral system change is a good 
shared by all the candidates who bear the “right” party label; and it should be noted that these 
effects exist independently of the size of the party. Hence, the implication of this argument is that 
two deputies from the same party might, in fact, have quite different institutional preferences on 
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 As we will partially see in Chapter 8, parties might obviously gain votes (and hence seats) by adopting a popular 
reform.   
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the intraparty dimension of the electoral system. More importantly, we cannot build without such 
assumption of parties as unitary actors any aprioristic expectations about the patterns of change 
in the intraparty dimension of the electoral rules. Thus, redressing the relative absence of 
systematic effect of classic factors such as party system fragmentation or electoral 
disproportionality for those reforms that entail intraparty modifications force us to come up with 
an entirely new account of institutional change.
169
 Spelling how these variations in electoral 
systems are more or less instrumental in political actors’ pursuit of vote-maximization will serve 
this purpose. 
 
A shortcoming of traditional studies of electoral system change is that they often analyze 
determinants of electoral reform without the proper consideration of “the costs of voter affect” 
(Quintal 1970). However, the fact that “voters are not fools” (Key 1966) suggests that passing 
reforms that voters do not like or failing to enact those that voters are keen on could cost 
politicians votes and thus power (Renwick and Pilet 2011). If citizens’ demands on institutional 
engineering are related to the hypothetical existence of an electoral reward or punishment, then 
one would expect to see at least some attempts to change the electoral system among established 
parties in response to voters’ demands. Hence, act-contingent motivations for electoral reform 
would be present when politicians expect to benefit from the very act of voting for them (Shugart 
2008). According to Alan Renwick (2010), the 1993 reforms in Italy and New Zealand seem to 
illustrate these points: in a context of “public outrage” (Katz 2005: 69) and “growing distrust” 
(Dalton 2004: 29-30; 181), electoral system changes were supported by most politicians that 
feared punishment at the ballot box. Even more importantly, what these two cases show is that 
we should not expect all electoral reforms to trend uniformly over time.    
 
 Among the recent profound changes in the political system that might contribute to 
electoral reform, the lack of satisfaction with the current rules of the game is arguably the most 
consequential. The fact that there is cross-national variation in the proportion of citizens that are 
discontent with the way these rules work could imply that there is also variation in the demand 
for electoral reform. Likewise, the stability of electoral systems in some countries might be 
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 As will be pointed out in the very next paragraph, this is only true when compared to conventional explanations 
of interparty reform because the new account offered here needs not be conceptually different from Shugart’s 
inherent /contingent conditions theory.  
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associated with greater satisfaction with the way democracy works there. According to Seymour 
Lipset (1963: 64), legitimacy “involves the capacity of a political system to engender and 
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for 
the society”. And political legitimacy is the foundation of stable democratic institutions 
(Eckstein 1961). Both the civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963) and the systemic (Easton 1979 
[1965]) approaches have theorized regarding the relationship between the political structure 
(system) and what the citizens want (support). Only if citizens support democracy it is 
predictable that a democratic system will endure. However, I prefer to use the concept political 
discontent. 
 
According to Richard Gunther and José Ramón Montero (2006: 48-49, original italics), 
“political discontent is based on ‘peoples’ judgments about the day-to-day actions of political 
leaders and the operation of governmental institutions and processes”. In this case, only if 
citizens support the way democracy works it is likely that electoral rules will persist. My main 
point here is that the electorate can become dissatisfied with the operation of the intraparty 
dimension of an electoral system because it generates too many or too few incentives to cultivate 
a personal vote and, hence, becomes extreme in Shugart’s (2001) terminology.170 As I will show 
below, this is why a widespread dissatisfaction with the way democracy works among the 
citizenry may lead to party-centred or candidate-centred electoral reforms. And, in fact, several 
descriptive case studies (e.g., Denemark 2001; Katz 2001; Reed and Thies 2001) suggest that it 
is plausible that public discontent is a major factor catalyzing political pressures for electoral 
system change. 
 
The Italian electoral reform of the mid-1990s (as in Japan or in New Zealand at the same 
time or in Colombia a little bit later) points to the need for further thought on the inevitability of 
the trend towards more personalization.
171
 In this regard, Lauri Karvonen (2010) identifies three 
major aspects of the personalization of politics that are pervasive in contemporary politics: 
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 This scholar argues that the two forms of extreme deviations from the efficient ideal in the intraparty dimension 
are the so-called hyper-personalistic systems, such as when intraparty dimension becomes more salient than 
interparty dimension (e.g., pre-reform Japan), and the hyper-centralized systems, such as when legislators’ 
incentives are to campaign for a higher position on a party list rather than for the approbation of voters (e.g., pre-
reform Venezuela).   
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 For an example of a candidate-centred reform, see Mikkel and Pettai’s (2004) on post-independence electoral 
system changes in Estonia.  
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empowerment of political leaders, growing importance of candidates, and increasing media 
coverage of individual politicians. However, when he looks at the evolution of electoral systems 
in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Malta, New Zealand and 
Sweden in order to evaluate whether there is a trend towards more candidate-centeredness, he 
concludes that the evidence is at best mixed. Hence, contrary to what others suggest (Renwick 
and Pilet 2011), the fertile ground for institutional reform that seems to be generated by public 
discontent with the state of a democracy does not necessarily crystallize into more personalized 
electoral systems.      
 
 
5.3. Hypotheses 
The theoretical antecedents reported on the previous section lead me to build the following 
specific hypotheses. First of all, the relationship between the overall satisfaction with democracy 
and the likelihood of electoral reform constitutes the basis for my first hypothesis. In the past, 
several authors argued that a given electoral system may generate some basic conditions for a 
high level of satisfaction with democracy. The problem lay in identifying what were those 
conditions. On the one hand, Arend Lijphart (1999) believed that consensual democracies – with 
proportional electoral systems – engendered higher levels of satisfaction. On the other hand, 
Pippa Norris (1999) claimed the relationship to be the opposite, with majoritarian systems 
producing higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in a given country. In my 
view, Ola Listhaug et al. (2009) provide the most thoughtful position suggesting that this is still 
an empirically open question. In fact, the empirical results in the literature also seem to support 
this judicious stance: while evidence provided by Christopher Anderson and Christine Guillory 
(1997) speaks to the satisfying impact of proportional representation, Francis Castles (1994), and 
Kees Aarts and Jacques Thomassen (2008) find the opposite effects. Finally, John Curtice and 
Phil Shively (2009) conclude that there is little difference between single and multi-member 
districts with regard to the achievement of the best linkage between representatives and 
represented.      
 
The aforementioned studies focused on the interparty dimension of electoral systems. 
However, several pieces in recent times examine the impact of the intraparty dimension on 
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satisfaction with democracy. For example, David Farrell and Ian McAllister (2006) show that 
preferential votes in candidate-centred systems promote a greater sense of fairness about election 
outcomes among citizens, which in turn leads to higher public’s satisfaction with the 
performance of the democratic system. By contrast, Agustí Bosch and Lluís Orriols (2010) do 
not find a clear linear association between the degree of ballot openness and the level of 
satisfaction with democracy. Despite these latter negative results, I seek to demonstrate here that 
electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension can be interpreted as a reaction to pervasive 
discontent regarding the way democracy works. The importance of dynamics of public opinion 
for explaining instances of electoral reform have been extensively documented in several case-
studies on New Zealand (Banducci and Karp 1999), Japan (Shiratori 1995) and Italy (Baldini 
2011).
172
 However, the number of comparative analyses on this issue is still scarce.
173
 In short, 
the question is one of balance between a more open political system in which individual 
representatives can stand apart from the parties of which they are member, and a too open one in 
which parties are not able to deliver and fulfil campaign promises. So, too democracy at the level 
of individual representatives may threaten democratic accountability and responsiveness of 
political parties. This is why I put forward the following hypothesis: Public dissatisfaction with 
the way the existing democratic system works has a positive effect on the probability of reforms 
in the intraparty dimension of electoral systems (H1). 
 
Before testing the impact of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, I first turn to other 
factors that may explain the occurrence of electoral reforms, and that could be formulated as 
supplementary hypotheses. The first variable that is expected to play a role is the level of party 
system nationalization. The likelihood of changes in the intraparty dimension of the electoral 
system is predicted to vary according to the degree of homogeneity of parties’ vote shares across 
districts. In recent times, the study of the nationalization of the party system, defined as the 
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 In the same vein, Mayorga (2001: 201) illustrates the serious shortcomings concerning the intraparty dimension 
of the pre-1994 electoral system in Bolivia by showing that a majority of interviewed persons during the 1990s in 
that country thought that politicians were not concerned with the people’s problems, and parties did not keep the 
promises they made (see also Auersperger Matic [2000] and Mikkel and Pettai [2004] for the Slovenian and 
Estonian cases, respectively). 
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 In one of the few comparative studies I am aware of, Norris (2011) proves that democratic aspirations, measured 
by support for democratic ideals among the citizens, are the strongest and most significant predictors of the 
subsequent adoption of electoral reforms. I take a very different approach because she only monitors major electoral 
reforms and she does so from a cross-national perspective.  
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extent to which parties are uniformly successful in winning votes across districts, has become 
very pressing (e.g., Alemán and Kellam 2008; Bochsler 2010a and b; Caramani 2004; 
Castaneda-Angarita forthcoming; Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Cox 1999a; Crisp et al. 2013; 
Harbers 2010; Hicken et al. 2008; Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Kasuya and Moenius 2008; Lago 
2011; Lago and Montero 2010; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2009; Morgenstern et al. 2009; 
Rodden and Wibbels 2011; Schakel 2013; Simón Cosano 2011). In spite of these recent 
developments, there has not been so far, at least to my knowledge, an attempt to link this feature 
of the party system with the likelihood of reforming electoral rules. In my view, and this is an 
original idea, in poorly-nationalized party systems the likelihood of reelection of MPs usually 
depends on their capacity to oppose the branches of the party that run in other parts of the 
territory. And doing this is easier under electoral rules that provide incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote. In other words, such institutional framework allows them to increase their chances 
of being re-elected by giving them the opportunity to run local campaigns and deliver local 
promises. This is why MPs in poorly-nationalized party systems have an interest-based and, 
more specifically, an outcome-contingent reason in adopting more candidate-centred electoral 
rules based on their micro-level preferences.
174
   
 
Bearing this in mind, I argue that legislators should not respond to widespread 
dissatisfaction with democracy with the same institutional strategies across different levels of 
party system nationalization. Citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy can reduce, increase or 
have no effect on electoral reform in the intraparty dimension depending on the level of party 
system nationalization. For this reason, an unconditional model specification that did not take 
into account the modifying impact of the level of party system nationalization would 
misleadingly suggest that widespread public discontent always leads to an increase in the 
likelihood of an intraparty reform. However, this is not true in two senses. On the one hand, I 
expect the positive effect of citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy on the likelihood of 
candidate-centred electoral reforms to be exacerbated when party system nationalization is 
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 As disproportionality and volatility on the interparty dimension, nationalization does not play an efficiency role 
here. Instead, it looks more like an intraparty version of the micro-mega rule: Adapting the rules to existing patterns 
in political competition. I would like to thank Matthew Shugart for having raised this very last point. 
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low.
175
 In the end, MPs are not political kamikazes and they are interested in political survival. 
Hence, in case of high dissatisfaction with the way democracy works and low party system 
nationalization two forces simultaneously push them to reform the system in a candidate-centred 
direction. First of all, people are politically discontent and for this reason they want changes in 
the rules of the game. Second, voters behave differently across districts and, as a result, 
legislators would appreciate an electoral reform that brings them closer to their constituents (i.e., 
a candidate-centred system change).  
 
To the contrary, the positive impact of citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy on the 
likelihood of party-centred electoral reforms would tend to be mitigated in contexts of important 
differences of party vote shares across districts (i.e., in case of low party system nationalization). 
As stated above, the process of electoral reform is driven by cross-district variations in the 
electoral preferences of citizens faced by politicians able to control the reform process. And, 
arguably, these preferences are more different across districts when party system nationalization 
is low. In this case, we are in front of two forces of opposite direction. On the one hand, we have 
seen that high dissatisfaction with democracy should lead to party-centred changes in the 
intraparty dimension of electoral systems. On the other hand, the fact that party system 
nationalization is low makes parties reluctant to adopt party-centred changes in the rules of the 
game. In such scenario, local elites would not appreciate such reforms. 
 
To sum up, I hypothesize that public dissatisfaction with the way the existing democratic 
system works has a positive effect on the probability of candidate-centred electoral reforms that 
gets stronger as party system nationalization decreases; and the opposite is true for the expected 
positive effect on party-centred reforms as party system nationalization decreases (H2). In other 
words, the marginal effect of public’s dissatisfaction with the way democracy works on the 
probability of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension is positive when party system 
nationalization is at its lowest level. The magnitude of this effect on the likelihood of party-
centred reforms decreases as party system nationalization goes up. At some value of party 
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 My claims are agnostic about the effect of party system nationalization on how satisfied are citizens with the way 
democracy works in a country. According to Lago and Montero (2010), Greece and Sweden have one of the lowest 
and highest nationalized party systems in Western Europe, respectively. However, as Karp et al. (2003) show, 
citizens on average are more satisfied with the way democracy works in the latter rather than in the former.   
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system nationalization, dissatisfaction with democracy has no effect on the probability of this 
kind of electoral reforms. As party system nationalization rises further, the initially positive 
effect of public discontent on party-centred electoral reforms becomes negative and strengthens 
in magnitude as party system nationalization increases. And the effect is the opposite for 
candidate-centred reforms. 
 
The second complementary hypothesis is another interest-based (outcome-contingent) 
explanation, and also slightly modifies the idea that only overall dissatisfaction with democracy 
creates increasing pressures for existing winners to change the intraparty dimension of the 
electoral system. This is that electoral volatility, defined as the net change within the party 
system resulting from individual vote transfers over elections (Gómez Martínez 2012; Pedersen 
1979), affects parties’ calculations and increases uncertainty about their electoral prospects 
(Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), creating incentives for a party-centred reform. High electoral 
volatility means that existing winners today (i.e., those actors with enough parliamentary muscle 
to change the electoral system) have a high chance of becoming losers tomorrow and, hence, are 
interested in the adoption of less risky rules that protect them against the reactions of a highly 
instable electorate (Bielasiak 2006; Geddes 1996; Lijphart 1992; Przeworski 1991; Remmer 
2008). But why more party-centred electoral institutions are safer for incumbents? In order to 
illustrate this point, let’s imagine, for example, some quite candidate-centred electoral rules (for 
example, an open-list PR system with large districts) in a high-volatile political scenario. Voters 
tend to throw the rascals out election after election and current MPs exceptionally collude to 
close the lists. Under a closed-list PR system, voters have no longer influence on changing the 
party-supplied order of candidates. Despite the parties’ risk of being decimated after the 
following election, party leaders guarantee their own survival by placing themselves in the top 
positions of the closed list recently adopted. This is why they have incentives to enact one 
electoral reform of such characteristics.  
  
Thus, the marginal effect of overall satisfaction with democracy on the probability of 
both types of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension is negative when electoral volatility is 
at its lowest level. However, these effects change as electoral volatility increases. At some value 
of electoral volatility, mean satisfaction with democracy has no effect on the probability of party-
163 
 
centred electoral reforms. As electoral volatility is even higher, the initially negative effect of 
political satisfaction on this kind of electoral system changes becomes positive and strengthens 
in magnitude as electoral volatility increases. By contrast, the effect is the opposite with regard 
to candidate-centred reforms. In other words, high levels of electoral volatility reinforce the 
negative effect of the overall satisfaction with democracy on the likelihood of observing a 
candidate-centred electoral reform. Summing up, I hypothesize that public dissatisfaction with 
the way the existing democratic system works has a positive effect on the probability of 
candidate-centred electoral reforms that gets weaker as electoral volatility increases; and the 
opposite is true for the expected positive effect on party-centred reforms as electoral volatility 
increases (H3).  
  
Finally, substantial differences between old and young democracies are expected with 
regard to the impact of satisfaction with democracy on electoral reform. The willingness of 
parties to recognize and act upon situations in which preserving the same electoral system leads 
to a less desirable outcome heavily depends on the age of democracy. The main causal 
mechanisms that explain why actors in recently democratized countries behave differently when 
deciding to change or to keep the electoral system are several (Benoit 2007). On the one hand, 
uncertainty, lack of reliable information, and imperfect understanding of electoral rules and their 
effects often feature prominently in many transitional contexts and can make politicians reluctant 
to change the rules of the game. On the other hand, the high volatility that characterized the first 
decades of democratic elections in Eastern Europe and Latin America complicated the task of 
designing the right institutions to achieve the desired goals, introducing some doses of additional 
institutional instability in those political contexts. A third, but also important, consideration in 
new democratic contexts is the perceived legitimacy of the institutions chosen. For instance, 
Birch et al. (2002) conclude in their study of post communist electoral systems that the 
achievement of collective fairness was considered to be particularly important during the first 
democratic decades in those countries. So, the need to keep quite party-centred rules after a long 
autocratic period characterized by quite personalistic electoral institutions could be an additional 
reason that explains the low explanatory power of overall satisfaction with democracy in Eastern 
Europe. Finally, the process by which governments are chosen in young democracies is often full 
of illustrations of how badly mechanisms of electoral accountability perform there (Rose and 
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Shin 1999). Parties in power can easily circumvent the control of voters, and many of them may 
feel free to keep the same electoral rules even in contexts of high political discontent. On this 
basis, we could expect a poorer effect of the overall level of satisfaction with democracy on 
electoral reform in recently democratized countries.  
 
Yet, the temporal prolongation of the current democratic period involves the existence of 
a learning process based on the acquisition of experience and knowledge over the course of 
increasingly numerous elections. As a result, uncertainty about the consequences of electoral 
reform declines. Further, the initially high levels of electoral volatility are overcome as 
democracies mature and, moreover, instrumentally rational voters are progressively more likely 
to attach weight to the positions adopted by parties in the processes of institutional change. 
Hence, the negative effect of the overall satisfaction with democracy on the probability of 
electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension when democratic age is at its lowest level should 
increase in magnitude as democracies aged and become an even more statistically significant 
predictor of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension. In short, I put forward the following 
hypothesis: Levels of public dissatisfaction with democracy has a positive effect on the 
probability of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension that gets stronger as democratic age 
increases (H4).  
   
 
5.4. Data and research design 
5.4.1. Dependent variable 
My dependent variable is the existence (or absence) of an electoral reform, and its different 
types. For an extensive definition and typology of electoral reform, see Chapter 3.
176
 The 
identification of a case of electoral reform without specifying the direction in which the rules of 
the game change is clearly insufficient. On this basis, it is very useful to distinguish between 
party-centred and candidate-centred reforms, which decrease and increase the amount of 
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 Sources: Birch (2003), Birch et al. (2002), Bowler and Grofman (2000), Colomer (2004a), Gallagher and 
Mitchell (2005a), Golder (2004), Grofman et al. (1999), Grofman and Lijphart (2007 [2002]), the Inter-
Parliamentary Union  (n.d.), Johnson and Wallack (2010 [2003]), Jones (1995 and 1997), Lijphart (1994), Lundell 
and Karvonen (2003), Negretto (2009), Payne (2007), Remmer (2008), Renwick (2011), Shugart and Wattenberg 
(2001), Shvetsova (1999), Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán (2005), Zovatto and Orozco Henríquez (2008), and electoral 
laws of each country. 
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candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote, respectively. In general, incentives to 
cultivate a personal vote can be conceptualized as “the portion of a candidate´s electoral support 
which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 
1987: 9). Hence, voters in party-centred systems “vote on the basis of broad policy options rather 
than on the basis of promised particularistic benefits” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 433). Further 
details of all the episodes of electoral reform identified are given in the Appendix 1 to this thesis. 
 
5.4.2.  Independent variables 
The main independent variable is the mean satisfaction with democracy among the citizenry of 
each country in any given point in time. For the purpose of this chapter, the following question in 
several surveys is used as an indicator of political discontent at the level we need: “On the 
whole, are you not at all satisfied, not very satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with 
the way democracy works in [country]?” This question clearly asks for a general evaluation of 
the performance of democratic institutions. I take the lagged mean (by one year) on a 4-point 
scale, running from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 4 (very satisfied).
177
 This measure considerably 
improves the merits of other measures of political discontent because it is comparable across 
very diverse country cases.  
 
I also include as explanatory factor the Johannes Moenius and Yuko Kasuya’s Weighted 
Party System Inflation Score (2004). It builds upon Gary Cox’s measure (1997 and 1999) and 
provides an estimation of party system inflation on a percentage basis. As Inflation (I) gets 
larger, the nationalization of party systems is worse. If for instance I is 20, then about 20 percent 
of the overall size of the national party system can be attributed to different parties obtaining 
votes in different sub-units of the country, and 80 percent to the average size of the local party 
systems (Cox 1999a: 155-156). But, given that district size is not a constant in most countries, 
                                                          
177
 Sources: The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-2002 (ICPSR 4357); Eurobarometer 60.1 (ICPSR 
3991); Eurobarometer 62.0 (ICPSR 4289); Eurobarometer 63.4 (ICPSR 4564); Eurobarometer  65.2 (ICPSR 20322);  
Eurobarometer 68.1 (ICPSR 23368); Eurobarometer 72.4 (ICPSR 30461); Eurobarometer 73.4 (ICPSR 34384); 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 1990-1997: Trends (ICPSR 4153); Candidate countries eurobarometer 2002-
2004; Comparative study of electoral systems modules 1-3; Latinobarometer 1995-2009; 1998, 2001 and 2010 
Australia Election Studies; 1993, 2000 and 2008 Canada Election Studies; 1995, 1999 and 2003 Croatia Election 
Studies; 1999 and 2009 Israel Election Studies; 1999 and 2005 New Zealand Election Studies; and 2009 Norway 
Election Studies.   
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Moenius and Kasuya (2004: 550) (see also Kasuya and Moenius 2008: 130) introduce a 
weighted measure that is calculated according to the following formula: 
1
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where votnat is the total number of votes cast at the national level; voti is the total number of votes 
cast in district i; natENP is the effective number of electoral parties at the national level; and 
iENP is the effective number of electoral parties in district i.178 In mixed member systems, the 
figures are based on district and total votes in the nominal tier. Figures for France are based on 
first-round votes. 
 
The third independent variable of interest is electoral volatility, which is measured on the 
basis of the Pedersen’s Index in the current term (Pedersen 1979). This index is created by 
adding the net difference (i.e., in absolute terms) in the percentage of votes obtained by each of 
the parties in a given pair of elections and dividing it by two, and ranges from 0 to 100.
179
 Scott 
Mainwaring, Peter Mair and Joshua Tucker kindly shared their data on electoral volatility with 
me.
180
  
 
To sum up, I do not examine the long-term effect of any of these variables on electoral 
reform. In fact, it could be argued that the effect of these explanatory factors occur mostly over a 
series of two or three elections. However, this issue is far from having been completely 
demonstrated in the literature. Moreover, the way in which satisfaction with democracy, party 
system nationalization and electoral volatility could be theorized and calculated to affect the 
likelihood of electoral system change in the long-term (e.g., averaging their value in the last 
                                                          
178
 Sources: Bochsler (2010), Caramani (2000), Constituency Level Electoral Archive (CLEA) from the University 
of Michigan and the Constituency Level Elections (CLE) dataset from Washington University at St. Louis. 
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 To be more precise, electoral volatility is calculated according to the following formula: 
TV = ½ Σ | ∆ pi |, 
where the variation in vote share for each party is ∆ pi  = pi(t + 1) - pi(t), i = 1, ..., n. 
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 Ideally, the amount of available voters in Bartolini and Mair’s sense (1990) would have been proxied by some 
other more precise measure (i.e., the proportion of non-identified citizens with a party). However, the lack of 
appropriate data in this respect has led me to employ Pedersen’s Index as a second best option.  
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years or elections, respectively) and the limited data availability lead me to exclude this idea 
from the empirical analysis.   
 
Finally, I also include in the models as an additional independent variable the duration of 
the current democratic period. A regime qualifies as democratic if all of the following conditions 
are met: one, direct or indirect election of the effective executive; two, election of the legislature; 
three, multiple parties are legally allowed; four, existence of parties outside of the ruling 
coalition; five, the alternation rule is not violated; and six, at no time during their current tenure 
in office the incumbent (person, party, military or hierarchy) unconstitutionally closed the lower 
house of the national legislature nor rewrote the rules in their favour.
181
  
 
5.4.3. Control variables 
I use the following three controls: Henisz’s Political Constraints Index, the real GDP per capita 
(in 1,000s), and the ideology of the government. For an exhaustive discussion of the rationale 
behind their inclusion and their exact operationalization, see Section 4.4.3.  
 
5.4.4. Econometric technique 
With regard to the econometric technique, the detail does not need to be repeated here, given that 
it is introduced in section 4.4.4 of the previous chapter. 
 
 
5.5. Empirical results 
Before the multivariate evidence, the effect of democratic experience on electoral reform is 
evident in the differences between old and young democracies displayed in Table 5.1. Drawing 
on comparisons across all the democracies included in the sample, the data indicate that the 
probability of adopting a new electoral system in the intraparty dimension is directly related to 
the level of democratic experience. The second interesting finding is that the movement towards 
electoral systems that increase the incentives to cultivate a personal vote described in the 
literature is very weak and is only observable in old democracies. The number of candidate-
centred and party-centred reforms in young democracies is almost exactly the same. Hence, the  
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 Source: Cheibub et al. (2009). 
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Table 5.1. Democratic age and the types of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension, 
1945-2010  
    
No 
reform 
Party-
Centred 
Reform 
Ambiguous 
Reform 
Candidate-
Centred 
Reform 
Total 
Democratic 
Age 
 
 
 
Old 
368 13 21 18 420 
(87.61) (3.09) (5) (4.28) (63.54) 
Young 
164 25 29 23 241 
 (68.04) (10.37) (12.03) (9.54)  (36.45) 
Total 
532 38 50 41 661 
(80.48) (5.74) (7.56) (6.2) (100) 
Note: Row percentages in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
evidence does not fit John Carey’s (2008) statement about the existence of a general drift 
towards more personalistic electoral rules. 
 
 Table 5.2 includes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses; and 
Table 5.3 shows the results of the multivariate regression analysis for seven separate models. 
Model 1 only measures the effect of the overall satisfaction with democracy, while Models 2-4 
introduce sequentially party system nationalization, electoral volatility and democratic age. 
Models 5-7 test the validity of the interactive hypotheses, and Figures 5.1-5.4 show the marginal 
effects of satisfaction with democracy on candidate-centred reforms as electoral volatility 
changes, on candidate-centred reforms as democracy ages, and on party-centred reforms as 
democracy ages, respectively. According to Thomas Brambor et al. (2006) and Cindy Kam and 
Robert Franzese (2007), the effect of an interaction term cannot be evaluated through the p-value 
shown in the regression table. Thus, it is necessary to graphically illustrate the marginal effect of 
the overall satisfaction with democracy on the likelihood of electoral reform in the intraparty 
dimension as the value of the modifying variable changes. 
 
 Although the overall lack of satisfaction with democracy among the citizenry is a good 
predictor that the current electoral system will be replaced by a more party-centred one in the 
first and second models, this is no longer the case as the public discontent with how democracy 
works in a given country goes up once we control for either the level of electoral volatility or the 
length of the current democratic period (Models 3 and 4). In overall terms, the likelihood of  
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Satisfaction with Democracy 2.505 0.32 1.53 3.17 690 
Party System Inflation 17.46 25.46 -0.1 154.2 690 
Electoral Volatility 17.97 15.1 0.9 73.08 690 
Democratic Age(logged) 3.66 0.94 0 4.94 690 
Time 24.6 17.02 1 62 690 
Political Constraints Index 0.44 0.13 0.09 0.708 689 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) 19.58 93.68 3.06 59.29 637 
Colour of the Government 2.07 0.91 1 3 637 
Corruption -0.74 1.02 -2.6 1.03 406 
 
candidate-centred reforms seems to be initially unaffected by the overall satisfaction with 
democracy. Moreover, the additive models tell us that neither party system inflation, electoral 
volatility nor democratic age shape politicians’ incentives to adopt electoral system changes in 
the intraparty dimension.  
 
Next, I explore the role of party system nationalization, electoral volatility, and 
democratic age more in depth. Specifically, I aim to investigate the extent to which they modify 
the negative effect of satisfaction with democracy on intraparty electoral reform. I do this by re-
estimating Models 2-4 but including as additional independent variables the following 
interaction terms: Satisfaction with Democracy*Party System Inflation Index, Satisfaction with 
Democracy*Electoral Volatility Index and Satisfaction with Democracy*Democratic Age. Party 
system inflation and electoral volatility are effective at changing the negative effect of 
satisfaction with democracy on candidate-centred and party-centred reforms, respectively. 
Finally, the estimates for the last of the interactions suggest that dissatisfaction with democracy 
only explains party-centred reforms in democracies that have reached a certain age. The first two 
results indicate that political actors lack incentives to enact candidate-centred and party-centred 
electoral reforms when satisfaction with democracy increases only if party system inflation at the 
national level and electoral volatility are low enough, respectively. Moreover, the positive  
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Table 5.3. Determinants of electoral reform in the intraparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Candidate-Centred  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        Satisfaction with Democracy -0.802 -1.044 -0.6 -0.749 -2.663* -2.513 0.438 
 
(0.55) (1.162) (0.758) (0.688) (1.366) (1.728) (2.817) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-0.976 
  
-35.65* -3.726 -3.434 
  
(1.707) 
  
(19.87) (2.458) (2.267) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.014 
 
-0.017 -0.15 -0.017 
   
(0.0207) 
 
(0.027) (0.198) (0.026) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.0404 0.603 0.65 1.958 
    
(0.325) (0.518) (0.527) (2.131) 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
13.39* 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(8.122) 
  Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.057 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.079) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-0.585 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.918) 
Constant -2.120* -1.124 -3.449 -2.133* 1.772 1.309 -5.468 
  (1.286) (2.707) (2.329) (1.296) (3.381) (4.401) (5.872) 
Party-Centred 
  
    
  
    
  Reform         
Satisfaction with Democracy -1.626* -3.042* -1.159 -1.43 -3.563 -5.775* 37.37** 
 
(0.902) (1.561) (1.184) (1.209) (2.899) (3.431) (18.78) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-0.251 
  
-1.204 -1.212 -2.503** 
  
(0.87) 
  
(7.955) (1.207) (1.073) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.0207 
 
0.051 -0.143 0.0806** 
   
(0.015) 
 
(0.035) (0.11) (0.034) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.165 1.193 1.491 29.27** 
    
(0.385) (1.33) (1.514) (12.76) 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
0.172 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(3.842) 
  Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.0902* 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.054) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-11.42** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(5.126) 
Constant 0.097 2.841 -2.161 0.057 -1.513 2.502 -103.2** 
  (1.966) (3.378) (2.813) (2.077) (3.957) (4.94) (47.24) 
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N (Observations) 1,166 679 1,123 1,166 690 658 690 
Chi
2
 23.70*** 31.73*** 30.46*** 25.13*** 61.14*** 51.77*** 120.11*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.05  0.10  0.04  0.05  0.13  0.14  0.201 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the intraparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce more incentives to cultivate a personal vote; and 2 
if it is supposed to produce fewer incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Cluster standard errors by terms in 
parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of 
stability years and the cubic splines are included but not shown. 
 
estimates of the interaction terms also suggest that public satisfaction towards politics could lead 
to intraparty reforms as party system nationalization and/or electoral volatility increases.   
 
By contrast, the results regarding democratic age are puzzling and deserve future 
research. In this regard, the evidence provided in Model 7 suggests, first of all, that satisfaction 
with democracy increases the likelihood of movements towards more party-centeredness in new 
democracies (i.e., when democratic age is equal to zero the coefficient of Satisfaction with 
Democracy is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level). However, this positive 
effect declines as the number of years under democracy increases. In fact, as will be seen below, 
satisfaction with democracy stops having a statistically significant positive effect on the 
likelihood of party-centred reforms beyond a particular democratic age. This indicates that an 
unconditional model specification that did not take account of the modifying impact of the 
number of democratic years would misleadingly suggest that a citizenry that is dissatisfied in 
overall terms with how democracy works in a given country always finds itself facing a increase 
in the likelihood of a party-centred reform. 
 
 Simulations using the CLARIFY software (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003) and 
reported in Figures 5.1-5.4 facilitate the interpretation of the marginal effect of the main 
independent variables. While the information provided in Table 5.3 is informative, it remains 
somewhat limited. First of all, since these are in the end multinomial logistic regressions, the 
magnitude of the effects cannot be assessed just by looking at the coefficients. Second, the 
results in the interactive models do not indicate after all whether satisfaction with democracy has 
a statistically significant impact on electoral reform when the value of the modifying 
independent variables is greater than zero. As a result, I graphically illustrate the probability of a  
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Figure 5.1. Probability of electoral reform in the intraparty dimension as satisfaction with 
democracy changes 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 5.3, Model 1. 
 
given electoral reform to happen according to the variation of satisfaction with democracy 
(Figure 5.1), and the marginal effect of the overall level of satisfaction with democracy on the 
likelihood of institutional change across the observed range of party system nationalization, 
electoral volatility and democratic age (Figures 5.2-5.4). The solid sloping line in this second 
group of figures indicates how the marginal effect of satisfaction with democracy changes as the 
value of the conditioning independent variable increases. One can see whether this effect is 
statistically significant by considering the two-tailed 90% confidence intervals that are drawn 
around it (i.e., the dashed lines). The effect of satisfaction with democracy is distinguishable 
from zero whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are both above (or 
below) the zero line. Superimposed over the marginal effect plot is a histogram portraying the 
frequency distribution for the modifying variables (i.e., party system nationalization, electoral  
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Figure 5.2. Marginal effect of satisfaction with democracy on electoral reform in the 
intraparty dimension as party system inflation changes 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 5.3, Model 5. 
 
volatility and democratic age). In the four figures, the observation is at the mean of all other 
variables included in the model. 
 
The first important conclusion derived from the probability calculus plotted in Figure 5.1, 
based on Model 1, is that satisfaction with democracy shows a stronger effect on the likelihood 
of party-centred reforms than when predicting candidate-centred reforms. This is so because of 
the lack of statistical significance of the satisfaction with democracy term regarding the 
occurrence of candidate-centred reforms reported in Table 5.3, showing once again an 
asymmetric effect of my main explanatory factor on the occurrence of different types of electoral 
reform. 
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Figure 5.3. Marginal effect of satisfaction with democracy on electoral reform in the 
intraparty dimension as electoral volatility changes 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 5.3, Model 6. 
 
Figure 5.2, based on Model 5, indicates that satisfaction with democracy can decrease the 
likelihood of candidate-centred reforms as long as we do not move beyond a given threshold of 
party system inflation –Moenius and Kasuya’s Index <= 0.1.182  Hence, this figure provides 
somewhat weak evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. This last result is perhaps not too 
surprising given that the interaction between satisfaction with democracy and party system 
inflation was positive and statistically significant in Model 5 when predicting candidate-centred 
reforms. Political parties may simply have incentives to keep the same electoral system when 
public satisfaction towards the way democracy works increases in contexts of low party system 
inflation, thereby bringing about these results. 
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 I am grateful to Matt Golder for kindly providing in his web page the STATA codes to graph the marginal effects 
of the multiplicative models used in Brambor et al. (2006). 
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Figure 5.4. Marginal effect of satisfaction with democracy on electoral reform in the 
intraparty dimension as democracy ages 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 5.3, Model 7. 
 
As predicted by the third hypothesis, satisfaction with democracy has a negative effect on 
party-centred reforms when electoral volatility is low (Figure 5.3). However, this effect 
disappears as party competition becomes more instable. In fact, satisfaction with democracy 
stops having a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of institutional change once 
Pedersen’s Volatility Index is more than 15. Roughly more than 50 per cent of legislative 
elections in the sample have produced a volatility lower than this. Hence, the results presented 
here clearly indicate that satisfaction with democracy only has a statistically significant effect on 
the likelihood of party-centred reform when volatility is low. By contrast, it is interesting to note 
that this variable does actually have no impact if the value of the volatility index is sufficiently 
high. Moreover, this variable fails to have any distinguishable effect from zero on movements 
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towards more candidate-centeredness (i.e., those reforms that increase candidates’ incentives to 
cultivate a personal vote). 
 
 Finally, what about the effect of democratic age? Figure 5.4 plots the marginal effects of 
the overall satisfaction with democracy on reforms in the intraparty dimension as democracies 
get older. On the one hand, it should be clear that satisfaction with democracy does not have any 
effect on the likelihood of observing a candidate-centred reform in the intraparty dimension 
when the democracy is young. However, this null effect becomes negative and statistically 
significant as the number of years under democracy increases. Satisfaction with democracy starts 
having a noticeable negative effect on the likelihood of adopting a candidate-centred reform once 
the level of democratic experience becomes sufficiently high. On the other hand, Figure 5.4 
shows that satisfaction with democracy will also decrease the likelihood of party-centred reforms 
after 70 years of democracy. However, contrary to my expectations, satisfaction with democracy 
has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of party-centred reforms in young democracies. 
Hence, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that the likelihood of popular electoral 
reforms, as measured by electoral system changes in the intraparty dimension when satisfaction 
with democracy is low, significantly increases once the country goes beyond the first decades of 
democracy. 
 
As robustness checks, it needs to be noticed that the findings regarding the interactive 
hypotheses remain very similar (although a bit weaker) when a bunch of control variables are 
included in the models (see Table A3.1 in Appendix 3). By contrast, the significant coefficient 
regarding the interaction between satisfaction with democracy and party system inflation on the 
likelihood of candidate-centred reforms disappears when “extreme” electoral systems are 
excluded from the analyses (see Table A3.2 in Appendix 3). Single non-transferable vote 
systems and closed-list PR systems with multi-member districts are deemed to be “extreme”.183 
However, satisfaction with democracy has for the first time a statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of candidate-centred reforms in the bivariate regression (Model 1).  
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 More specifically, the cases excluded from this part of the analysis are: Japan (before 1996), Colombia (before 
2006), Argentina, Bolivia (before 1997), Bulgaria (except for 1990 and 2009), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic 
(before 2002), Ecuador (before 1998), El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras (before 2005), Israel, Moldova, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania (before 2008), Spain, Ukraine (between 1998 and 2006), and Venezuela 
(before 1993). 
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Table A3.3 in Appendix 3 shows the results of the Cox models displayed as coefficients 
rather than hazard ratios. Results are even a bit worse in this last set of econometric tests. 
Satisfaction with democracy only has success in explaining candidate-centred reform when 
introduced without any other main independent variable (see Model 1). Contrary to expectations, 
electoral volatility fosters the occurrence of candidate-centred reforms in one specification (see 
Model 3). Moreover, the levels of neither party system nationalization nor electoral volatility are 
significant modifying factors of the effect of satisfaction with democracy (see Models 5 and 6, 
respectively). Party system inflation increases the likelihood of candidate-centred reforms in 
three out of four models (all but Model 6). Finally, the initial (and counterintuitive) positive 
effect of satisfaction with democracy on party-centred reforms decreases as democratic time goes 
by (see Model 7). 
  
 Finally, when temporal dependence is modelled by including time, time
2
 and time
3
 in the 
regressions, the main results are slightly weaker (see Table A3.4 in Appendix 3). Bearing this in 
mind, and trying to disentangle the mechanism that leads politicians to change the intraparty 
dimension of the electoral rules when satisfaction with democracy is low, I have included in 
Table A3.5 of Appendix 3 the results of a last group of specifications in which the main 
independent variable is political corruption.
184
 For example, reducing the levels of corruption 
was one of the goals a Japanese party or politician tended to appeal to when arguing in favour of 
electoral reform in 1993 (Reed 2005). Likewise, decreasing opportunities for corruption in the 
electoral process is one of the ambitions that underlaid the 1993 reform in Italy (Gambetta and 
Warner 2004). Unfortunately, crossnational data on political corruption are only available from 
1996 onwards. For this reason, we should be careful about the interpretation of the results. In 
either case, they are still informative and suggest that politicians are more likely to adopt a party-
centred reform when the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain are widely spread. 
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 Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002).  
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5.6. Conclusion 
Building on previous research, this chapter provides evidence that overall dissatisfaction with the 
way democracy works in a given country is very important for explaining electoral reform in the 
intraparty dimension. In a nutshell, I hope to have illustrated that the existing literature does not 
provide an adequate answer to the question of whether (and how) this independent variable 
affects the likelihood of changing the intraparty dimension of electoral systems. Many other 
studies argue that widespread dissatisfaction with democracy has a positive effect on these types 
of electoral reforms. Nevertheless, most of them either limit their scope to a particular region of 
the world or time span, employ an excessively restrictive definition of electoral reform that only 
pays attention to major changes (Norris 2011) or only take into consideration candidate-centred 
reforms (Renwick and Pilet 2011). By employing a new dataset which includes electoral reforms 
between 1945 and 2010 in 60 democratic countries, I provide several contributions to the current 
state of the art. One is to show that party-centred electoral system changes (i.e., movements 
towards rules that generate more incentives to cultivate a personal vote) are more likely to occur 
when the overall satisfaction with democracy among the citizens is low. By contrast, I do not 
find any significant linear effect regarding the impact of satisfaction with democracy on the 
probability of observing a candidate-centred change in electoral institutions. Future research 
should evaluate the determinants of this other type of reform. In the meantime, my results 
suggest that the effect of public dissatisfaction is not completely symmetrical and political actors 
only adopt more party-centred rules when satisfaction with democracy is low. Italy in 1993, 
when the voters not only accepted but also demanded an electoral system that would deprive 
them of intraparty choice, is the clear example of this (D’Alimonte 2005). In other words, high 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works provokes party-centred reforms but not the other 
way around. 
 
Yet, another important finding is the recognition that satisfaction with democracy, on the 
one hand, and party system nationalization, electoral volatility, and democratic age, on the other 
hand, interact to shape actors’ incentives to reform the rules of the game in a party-centred 
direction. Hence, my claims are that satisfaction with democracy can decrease the likelihood of 
observing a candidate-centred and a party-centred electoral system change when the uniformity 
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of parties’ vote shares across districts and the stability of political competition are sufficiently 
high in turn (i.e., in case of high party system nationalization and low electoral volatility, 
respectively). Moreover, I have also found that satisfaction with democracy contributes to 
decrease the likelihood of electoral reform in the intraparty dimension when the current 
democratic period of time has been long enough.  
 
Bearing these considerations in mind, one very clear conclusion can be derived from my 
study: Electoral reforms are complex phenomena, results of many different elements that 
reinforce or diminish each other. In this regard, there is clearly more to it than just a linear effect 
of vote-maximization based on the current voters’ disengagement from and distrust of current 
democratic working, as the dominant literature suggests. In other words, the conventional 
wisdom captures only a small fraction of the reality since it simply focuses on parties’ desire to 
maximize their vote shares. However, parties’ willingness to change the electoral system is also 
determined by their cross-district linkages (party system nationalization) or the level of stability 
of the electoral context (electoral volatility). Finally, results in the chapter suggest that general 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works leads to electoral reforms in the intraparty 
dimension but only in the case of established democracies. This finding might entail that a party 
in a democracy that has been in place long enough might be punished by voters at the ballot box 
if it ignores a widespread dissatisfaction with the current operation of democracy and, thus, a 
popular desire for reform (Shugart 2008).
185
  
 
In conclusion, a combination of several theoretical approaches arrives, ultimately, at a 
comprehensive answer to the question of why a reform in the intraparty dimension of the 
electoral system takes place in contemporary democracies. However, even though my 
investigation has highlighted the importance of dissatisfaction with democracy for the 
occurrence of electoral reforms, several questions still need to be addressed in order to better 
understand the workings of the relationship between this independent variable and the incentives 
to cultivate a personal vote generated by the electoral rules. Future research should test the 
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 This is only an implication of my argument that I would like to test in the future. The reforms might also be due 
to current dissatisfaction with democracy that allows elite reformers taking advantage of a permissive public 
opinion. That would be a major finding as well but the analysis in this chapter cannot distinguish between the two 
interpretations. 
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several possible mechanisms at work, as well as provide more general explanations for the 
adoption of intraparty electoral reforms. Moreover, it would be important to know whether the 
modifying effect of party system nationalization and electoral volatility vary for different kinds 
of democracies; is there a heterogeneous effect depending on democratic age or political 
freedom? Is it indeed the case that established and developing party systems operate differently? 
Finally, politicians’ values (for example, their ideology) may be a key factor in promoting 
electoral reform. I hope that this chapter will spur the interest necessary to address some of these 
questions and improve our understanding of how public disquiet about the operation of 
democracy in a country affects the fates of its electoral rules. 
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Part Three 
The occurrence of electoral reforms and its consequences at different levels 
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Chapter 6. “Robbing from the poor and giving to the rich”: The impact of reforms in the 
interparty dimension at the macro-level (I). The case of electoral disproportionality
186
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Disproportionality is of course one of the main consequences of electoral systems. For this 
reason, it has been at the core of an increasing literature which has measured it, has identified 
some of its main determinants, and has discussed its consequences for different political 
institutions such as party systems, parliaments, or governments. In the last century, Douglas W. 
Rae (1971 [1967]: 86), arguably one of the founding fathers of the science of electoral systems, 
emphasized the relevance of disproportionality as the main consequence of the rules of game, 
graphically depicting them as the Sheriff of Nottingham, “apt to steal from the poor and give to 
the rich: strong parties usually obtain more than their proportionate share of legislative seats 
while weak parties receive less than their proportionate share of seats”. And, as he argued later 
(Rae 1971 [1967]: Chapter 9), while most electoral systems share the same directional pattern of 
redistribution, there are still very important differences in its strength or degree.  
 
In most of the literature on electoral systems, indices of disproportionality have been 
expressed as averages over a given number of elections, and their longitudinal evolution from 
one election to the next has been utterly overlooked.
187
 Its fluctuations, however, are anything 
but negligible in countries that have reformed at least some of the components of the electoral 
system. For instance, disproportionality reached a historical minimum in the 1996 New Zealand 
general election by dropping from 18.19 per cent in 1993 down to 3.43 per cent three years later. 
This drastic reduction was largely caused by the adoption of a mixed-member proportional 
(MMP) electoral system (Vowles 2008). The most striking contrasting case is the 1991 Polish 
parliamentary election. With 29 parties having won seats in the Parliament after the first fully 
democratic election and a quite remarkable effective number of almost 11 legislative parties, in 
early 1993 the ruling centre-right parties passed a new electoral law that sought to decrease its 
considerable permissiveness (Benoit and Hayden 2004). As a result, disproportionality in the 
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 Some of the main findings in this chapter are accepted for publication in Party Politics.  
187
 For an exception, see Shugart (1992). 
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1993 election reached a considerable 17.81 per cent, that is, about 14 points more than two years 
previously.  
 
Do electoral system changes always generate the theoretically expected outcomes? While 
most electoral reforms might likely have some consequences for disproportionality, under what 
circumstances do they have larger effects? In other words, are there any contexts that increase or 
decrease their potential impact? In this chapter, I seek to establish whether electoral reforms 
produce changes in the levels of electoral disproportionality, and to identify which type of 
institutional and competitive setting is most likely to enlarge this impact. Although electoral 
reforms are messy processes and reformers seldom have a clear expectation about how they will 
change the structure of the party system (Pilet 2007; Rahat 2011; Renwick 2010), I analyze 
whether electoral system changes influence the degree of disproportionality in the translation of 
votes into seats and argue that the status of established democracies is particularly critical to 
shaping voters’ levels of information about the functioning of the new electoral system but also 
to immunizing them against the effects of particular sorts of institutional change. In other words, 
political actors’ reactions to the changes in the structure of incentives brought about by the new 
electoral rules will depend on the age of democracy. Finally, I also aim at demonstrating that the 
size of the electoral reform conditions its impact on the levels of disproportionality.  
 
This chapter is thus an attempt to fill some of the gaps in the literature by considering 
evidence from 59 democracies with a total of 644 elections carried out under various rules. By 
focusing on a large and diverse sample of democracies, the chapter also highlights the advantage 
of moving beyond country-specific explanations. Some years ago, Arend Lijphart (1994: Chapter 
5) and Dag Anckar (1997) did analyze the determinants of electoral disproportionality with a 
mixture of interesting and problematic results (see for instance Penadés 1997). My chapter 
extends the research design employed by those scholars by adding new observations and 
covariates. Moreover, it will employ appropriate econometric techniques to examine electoral 
disproportionality under different institutional set ups across countries and over time. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. I discuss in the next section the analytical 
literature that defines and explains variations in electoral disproportionality, and elaborate a 
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series of working hypotheses that describe its main determinants. I then present my research 
design and conduct the corresponding empirical tests. Finally, section five concludes. 
 
 
6.2. The effect of electoral reform on disproportionality 
Electoral disproportionality has been defined by Lijphart as “the deviation of parties’ seat shares 
from their vote shares, [a] (…) prima facie (…) simple and straightforward concept”.188 In other 
words, and following now Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (2005: 602), “unless every party 
and independent candidate wins exactly the same share of the seats as they won of the votes -
which of course never happens in the real life- there exists a degree of disproportionality”. By 
contrast, Gary W. Cox and Matthew S. Shugart (1991: 350) focus on a slightly different aspect, 
arguing that electoral disproportionality is related to “the extent to which different methods of 
PR favour large parties over small”.189 
 
Which factors determine electoral disproportionality? As expected, the permissiveness of 
the electoral system emerges as the most potentially important predictor among them. It is well 
established that electoral systems have an impact on the number of parties that receive votes or 
get into the Parliament (Cox 1997; Duverger 1964 [1954]; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971 [1967]; 
Sartori 1997 [1994]; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). However, the number of studies examining 
the effect of the rules of the game on electoral disproportionality is not very large.
190
 Lijphart’s 
contribution (1994) constitutes one remarkable exception to this gap as he finds that categorical 
ballots, explicit or implicit apparentement provisions, proportional formulas, and large 
assemblies decrease electoral disproportionality. Moreover, and above all, he argues that the 
levels of electoral disproportionality respond very sensitively to the variations in the effective 
threshold. Likewise, district magnitude is recognized as the decisive factor by Rein Taagepera 
and Matthew S. Shugart (1989: 124) and John Carey and Simon Hix (2011: 395). By contrast, 
Kenneth Benoit (2000: 382) finds evidence for a strong effect of the electoral formula. Finally, 
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 In the same vein, see Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 104). 
189
 See Benoit (2000: 382) against this conceptualization. 
190
 For instance, Gallagher (1991: 43) limits himself to make an elementary list including the electoral formula, the 
district magnitude, the degree of malapportionment, the legal threshold, and the distribution of votes among parties; 
while Cox and Shugart (1991: 350) highlight the role played by compensatory seats, thresholds, malapportionment 
and the geographical distribution of party support. 
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Anckar’s empirical analyses (1997) reveal that the Gallagher’s Index of Electoral 
Disproportionality is mainly affected by district magnitude and the effective threshold. These 
findings are by no means surprising if we take into account the fact that the effective threshold is 
mainly based on district magnitude (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005c: 607).
191
  
 
Building on these contributions, my expectation is that episodes of electoral system 
change will have an impact on levels of disproportionality. Evidence for the existence of this 
kind of relationship is not negligible (e.g., Anckar 1997; Lijphart 1994), but it is primarily 
focused on consolidated democracies.
192
 As it is well known at least since Maurice Duverger’s 
(1964 [1954]) seminal contribution, the negative consequences of restrictive electoral rules on 
party system fragmentation result from two sorts of mechanisms. First, minor parties are 
typically awarded a much smaller seat share than the share of votes they receive due to the 
operation of a mechanical effect (or proximal, according to Rae [1971 [1967]: 67]). Second, 
electoral restrictiveness is expected to decrease the number of parties by generating incentives 
for strategic entry on the part of political entrepreneurs and tactical voting on the part of voters 
(Cox 1997). Duverger (1964 [1954]) and Rae (1971 [1967]: 68) coin the terms psychological and 
distal effects for these behavioural consequences of non-permissive electoral laws (primarily, a 
higher preference and, hence, propensity to vote for large parties). 
 
The relationship between the number of parties and the levels of electoral 
disproportionality constitute the basis for my first hypothesis. Following Duverger (1964 
[1954]), I will argue that electoral reforms may provoke changes in the levels of 
disproportionality because they operate on party system fragmentation at the electoral and the 
legislative level through different means and, most importantly, at different points in time. The 
mechanical effect of electoral systems will decrease the effective number of parliamentary 
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 Electoral thresholds capture the percentage of votes needed to elect one representative from a district. This can be 
established by law or determined in practice by the number of MPs elected from that district, the so-called effective 
threshold, according to the following formula: 
t = 
   
     
  
where t refers to the effective threshold and m to the district magnitude (Lijphart 1994: 25-29; Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989: 126-141). 
192
 To the best of my knowledge, Benoit’s paper (2000) is one of the few exceptions to this pattern because he uses 
local election data from Hungary. My study aims to illuminate several important facets obscured in this previous 
investigation by using data from national elections in a heterogeneous group of countries that simultaneously include 
old and new democracies.    
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parties just after a restrictive
193
 reform through the automatic application of the change in the 
electoral rules; and the reverse will be true for permissive reforms. By contrast, the psychological 
effect comes from the reactions of political actors to the expected consequences of the electoral 
reform. What I suggest is that this latter effect is slower than the former and, as a consequence, 
the levels of electoral disproportionality change over the course of successive elections following 
an electoral reform. To sum up, I posit that levels of disproportionality will get higher in 
countries where a restrictive electoral reform is adopted; and lower in the case of permissive 
reforms (H1). Part of this impact stems from the fact that party system fragmentation is more 
elastic at the legislative than the electoral level. 
  
The second feature that is predicted to affect the levels of disproportionality is the size of 
the electoral reform. Consistent with the literature on electoral systems, I expect major rather 
than minor changes in the rules of the game to exercise a larger impact on the degree of deviation 
from perfect proportionality. It is well known that major reforms of national electoral systems 
remain quite rare (Birch et al. 2002; Gallagher 2005; Katz 2005; Lijphart 1994; Nohlen 1984b; 
Norris 1995; Taagepera 2007b).
194
 If one takes into account the fact that only major reforms can 
change the whole format of the party system, as I argue here, and that this type of institutional 
changes needs the support of the party or coalition of parties in power to be passed, it is 
understandable that they are far from common. By contrast, mere fine-tuning of the components 
of the electoral system would give a smaller opportunity to politicians to change the levels of 
disproportionality even if they modified a decisive factor of the electoral rules such as the district 
magnitude. For this reason, it might occur more frequently. In short, I hypothesize that the effect 
of electoral reforms on the levels of disproportionality will be higher in case of major changes of 
the electoral system; and lower in the case of minor reforms (H2). 
 
Finally, substantial differences between established and young democracies are expected, 
and not only with regard to the levels of disproportionality but also the impact of electoral 
reforms. Students on this field have claimed that the critical element in observing political 
consequences of electoral laws is the availability of good information about the operation of the 
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 As I mention above, the terms proportional, permissive, inclusive or weak, on the hand, and majoritarian, 
restrictive, exclusive or strong are used interchangeably. 
194
 Against this, see Colomer (2001a). 
188 
 
rules; and this kind of information is arguably less available in young democracies (Cox 1997; 
Duverger 1964 [1954]; Moser and Scheiner 2012). Thus, the ability of citizens to recognize and 
act upon situations where voting for one’s sincere preference leads to a less desirable outcome – 
wasting their vote – heavily depends on the age of democracy (Horowitz and Browne 2005; 
Queralt 2009). Voters’ (and elites’) inexperience with both the operation of the rules and the 
nature of party systems gives rise to expectations of a smaller psychological effect and, hence, a 
larger impact on disproportionality of electoral reforms in new democracies (Benoit 2002). This 
predicted pattern would erode as the democracy matured (Dawisha and Deets 2006; Duch and 
Palmer 2002; Kostadinova 2006; Tavits and Annus 2006). However, this is only part of the story. 
 
Voting in a given election is on its own self-reinforcing (Dinas 2010: 13). By repeating 
the act of voting, as Cees van der Ejk and Mark Franklin put it (2009: 179), citizens get locked 
into particular voting patterns. This idea of habit formation (Franklin 2004) might hamper the 
psychological or distal effects of electoral reforms in old democracies. People under stable 
electoral rules acquire, over time, a "habit of voting" (Franklin and Hobolt 2011). Once such a 
habit has been obtained it is not easily lost, so the psychological effect of a change in electoral 
rules will be felt in the first instance only by those who have not yet acquired that habit –mostly, 
younger voters. More importantly, what I am arguing here is that voters in young democracies 
might be much more sensitive to electoral reforms because their process of partisan anchoring is 
not yet complete. This lack of habituation could counteract the aforementioned effect derived 
from voters’ (and elites’) political inexperience and poor information and leads one to expect a 
smaller impact of electoral system change on disproportionality in new democracies. 
 
In order to illustrate these points, let’s imagine, for example, two countries that adopt a 
more permissive electoral system. Country A and B are a young and a consolidated democracy, 
respectively. As a consequence of the straightforward application of the new electoral rules to 
convert votes into seats, some parties –almost always the large ones– will be less “over-
represented” than they were, receiving a smaller proportion of seats than they did before the 
reform; and the opposite will hold for the small parties. This result will be common to both 
countries. But I expect that the dynamics at the electoral level will diverge to some extent in the 
two countries. While leaders of small parties and their potential supporters in both types of 
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democracies will realize that the new rules provide incentives to run alone and vote for them, 
respectively, the time needed to elapse before they fully understand those new rules may be 
shorter in established democracies. On this basis, we should see a quicker adjustment of the 
behaviour of all political actors to the new electoral arrangements and, as a result, a smaller 
impact of institutional change on the levels of disproportionality in longer-lived democracies. 
However, this effect should be the opposite according to the potentially competing hypothesis of 
habituation. Citizens in old democracies are anchored to particular voting patterns. For this 
reason, we should expect lower rates of party switching among them and, hence, a more 
considerable reduction in the levels of disproportionality as a result of permissive electoral 
system changes.
195
 Summing up, if the first explanation about the role of political 
information/sophistication was right, electoral reforms should have their largest impact on 
electoral disproportionality in recently-democratized countries; this effect would get smaller 
with increasing democratic age (H3a). By contrast, if partisan anchoring was the main 
mechanism driving the modifying effect of democratic experience, electoral reforms should have 
their smallest impact on electoral disproportionality in recently-democratized countries; this 
effect would get larger with increasing democratic age (H3b). 
 
 
6.3. Data and methods 
This section discusses my data and some methodological issues. I start describing the sample and 
then introduce Gallagher’s Least Squares Index in detail. Next, I justify the choice and 
operationalization of the other variables. Finally, this section addresses estimation issues.  
 
6.3.1. Sample 
The dataset includes over 600 observations in 59 countries between 1945 and 2010, with more 
than ten elections on average per country. The sample only includes democracies according to 
Adam Przeworski et al.’s (2000: 54) definition196 and the cases analyzed vary widely in the 
number of elections conducted and electoral reforms adopted, and the amount of variation that 
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 The permissive reform makes votes for small parties more attractive and reduces the attractiveness of votes for 
large parties. But this only affects disproportionality to the extent that voting patterns change. To the extent that 
people keep voting for the same parties as before the reform has less effect. 
196
 In these scholars’ view, democracy is a system in which “incumbents lose elections and leave office when the 
rules so dictate”; the most important feature of his coding is the use of a dichotomous measure. 
190 
 
needs to be explained.
197
 And while the levels of disproportionality are basically explained by 
the type of electoral system, the dispersion is a function of at least three factors: the mean, the 
number of elections, and the frequency of electoral reforms. Moreover, the structure of the data 
is cross-sectional time-series, but the units are elections rather than years. Finally, one could 
argue that electoral disproportionality should be studied with disaggregated data because national 
patterns of this phenomenon (like party system fragmentation) derive from district-level 
outcomes (Cox 1997). However, I think the lack of disaggregated data is not a problem for my 
research design as long as the mean disproportionality at the district-level, contrary to what often 
happens with party system fragmentation, represents an upper bound for countrywide values of 
this variable. Hence, the difficulties generated by the aggregation of the different local party 
systems do not arise here, and electoral disproportionality at the national level is at most equal to 
mean electoral disproportionality at the district-level.
198
 
 
 Before getting into the multivariate regression models, I tested whether I can infer the 
proposed association between electoral reform and changes in disproportionality using simple 
bivariate tools. I first computed the coefficient of variation of electoral disproportionality in old 
and new democracies and plotted these against the number of electoral reforms per election for 
the period 1945-2010. Figure 6.1 shows the result and adds a line for the predicted values of an  
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  These countries fit in two main groups -namely, established democracies that belong to the OECD and new 
democracies from Latin America and Eastern and Southern Europe- and include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, 
Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. Unfortunately, data for Armenia are not available. 
198
 In order to illustrate these points, let’s imagine, first, one country with two equal-sized single-member districts 
whose party system is extremely poorly nationalized because party A only wins votes in district 1 whilst party B 
only wins votes in district 2. Hence, the effective number of electoral parties at the national level is two although 
there is only one party at each district and, as result, the mean score of this index at that level is also one. More in 
general, the national effective number of parties can only be more than or equal to the mean of this index at the 
district-level. Turning to disproportionality, let’s imagine that in the same country party A wins the two seats 
because it obtains one more vote than party B in each district. Hence, the electoral system causes maximum 
disproportionality (i.e., close to 100 per cent) at both levels (i.e., national and district-level). By contrast, maximum 
disproportionality would be registered only at the district-level (national disproportionality would be zero) if one 
different party wins in each district by only one vote. Hence, these numbers show that electoral disproportionality at 
the national level, in contrast to party system fragmentation, is at most equal to electoral disproportionality at the 
district-level. For example, in the 2010 Catalan elections the values of the Gallagher’s index for the four districts 
(i.e., Barcelona [M = 85], Girona [M = 17], Lleida [M = 15] and Tarragona [M = 18]) are 16.7%, 28.8%, 39% and 
34%. The overall disproportionality is 19.5% and is always higher than the mean disproportionality at the district-
level irrespective of calculating the latter as a weighted (DI = 22.99%) or a non-weighted average (DI = 29.6%).  
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Figure 6.1. Dispersion in electoral disproportionality and electoral reform 
 
Notes: The y-axis shows the coefficient of variation in Gallagher’s Least Squares Index of electoral 
disproportionality between 1945 and 2010 in established and new democracies. The x-axis displays the number of 
electoral reforms implemented per election.  
 
OLS regression of the dispersion in Gallagher’s Least Squares Index on the institutional 
instability measure. This simple bivariate model returns a positive value for the number of 
reforms per election that is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. This finding is 
consistent with the first hypothesis that argued that electoral reforms changed the levels of 
disproportionality observed in a given country: despite substantial variation around the 
regression line, disproportionality tends to have varied more in countries with a large number of 
electoral reforms.   
 
 
 
192 
 
6.3.2. Measuring electoral disproportionality 
My dependent variable is the change in Gallagher’s Index of Electoral Disproportionality.199 The 
number of indices used for measuring electoral disproportionality has been remarkably high in 
comparative research. Most of them share similar conceptual traits despite the quite different 
ways in which deviations have been operationalized. The abundance of indices has made the 
measurement of disproportionality a more difficult and controversial issue than the quantification 
of other standard political indicators (Lijphart 1994: 57).
200
 In any case, the canonical index in 
the literature is that of least squares.
201
 Created by Gallagher (1991), it is the best in measuring 
the disproportionality of election results. According to Gallagher and Mitchell (2005: 602), “the 
rationale of the least squares index is that it takes account not only the total amount of vote-seat 
disparity but also the way in which that disparity came about, regarding one large disparity (say, 
8 per cent) as more significant than several small ones (e.g. four each of 2 per cent)”. It is the 
index preferred by Arend Lijphart (1994: 62) for its sensitivity and faithful reflection of the 
deviation of seats from vote shares, and also the index that scored first in the evaluation of 19 
measures of electoral disproportionality performed according to 12 criteria by Rein Taagepera 
and Bernard Grofman (2003).
202
 Since many methods of seat allocation generate their own 
measure of disproportionality (Gallagher 1991: 38), a definitive answer to the question about 
which index should be taken as the best one will finally hinge on which electoral formula is 
under scrutiny. But the fact that the least squares index takes into account both the total amount 
of vote-seat disparity and its size, together with my concern with how different electoral systems 
affect the distribution of seats amongst parties (Borisyuk et al. 2004: 60), lead me to choose it 
over the zoo of other indices (Van Puyenbroeck 2008: 498).  
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 The main source for this data is Michael Gallagher’s dataset 
(www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php). When completing it, I have followed 
Gallagher and Mitchell’s (2005c: 605) recommendations regarding calculation of the least squares index when a 
number of parties are lumped together as “others”. Therefore, I (i) applied Taagepera’s least components approach; 
(ii) disregarded others; and (iii) took the average of (i) and (ii).   
200
 Incidentally, almost all the measures employ the term disproportionality, rather than the contrary, because their 
values increase with increasing disproportionality (Lijphart 1994: 58).  
201
 This measure is calculated according to the following formula:  
DI = √ 
 
  
 ∑     
     
     
 
 
where vi is the percentage of vote obtained by party i and si is the percentage of seats obtained by party i. This index 
has a range from 0 to 100 (Gallagher 1991). Against its use, see Urdánoz Ganuza’s (2006). 
202
 The two most commonly used indices of disproportionality before the 1990s were those proposed by Rae (1971 
[1967]: 8) and Loosemore and Hanby (1971). However, researchers became reluctant to use them after the invention 
of the least squares index because of their over-sensitivity to the number of parties participating in an election 
(mainly, if they were small). 
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6.3.3. Defining electoral reforms 
My main independent variable is the existence (or absence) of an electoral reform, and is coded 
in terms of its different types. For an extensive definition and typology of electoral reform, see 
Chapter 3.
203
 The identification of a case of electoral reform without specifying the direction in 
which the rules of the game change is clearly insufficient. On this basis, I deem it necessary to 
distinguish between permissive and restrictive reforms, which are expected to respectively 
increase and decrease the “hospitality” of the electoral system to small parties (Taagepera 1998: 
415). Given that the underrepresentation of these parties is the main source of disproportionality, 
making easier or more difficult their access to the assemblies and raising or reducing their seat 
share should have an impact on it. Further details of all the episodes of electoral reform identified are 
given in the Appendix 1 to this thesis. 
 
6.3.4. Other independent variables 
I use Richard Katz’s (2005: 58) stringent rules to limit the meaning of “’major reforms of 
national electoral systems’ to the wholesale replacement of the electoral formula through which a 
strong president, or the chamber of parliament to which the national government is responsible, 
is elected”. 204  Accordingly, I consider major reforms those that concern the adoption of 
proportional, mixed member, or majoritarian systems when the electoral rules that were in use 
before the change belonged to the other two big families. Otherwise, I code the reform as minor. 
As predicted by H2, major reforms are expected to amplify the negative (positive) impact on 
electoral disproportionality of permissive (restrictive) reforms. In order to test this effect, I 
introduce two interactions, PermissiveReform*MajorReform and 
RestrictiveReform*MajorReform. The coefficient for them should be negative and positive, 
respectively. 
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 Sources: Birch (2003), Birch et al. (2002), Bowler and Grofman (2000), Colomer (2004a), Gallagher and 
Mitchell (2005a), Golder (2004), Grofman et al. (1999), Grofman and Lijphart (2007 [2002]), the Inter-
Parliamentary Union  (n.d.), Johnson and Wallack (2010 [2003]), Jones (1995 and 1997), Lijphart (1994), Lundell 
and Karvonen (2003), Negretto (2009), Payne (2007), Remmer (2008), Renwick (2011), Shugart and Wattenberg 
(2001), Shvetsova (1999), Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán (2005), Zovatto and Orozco Henríquez (2008), and electoral 
laws of each country. 
204
 If we focus only on established democracies, the list of major reforms since 1950 that meet this criterion only 
includes 14 cases. 
194 
 
I also create the variable DemocraticAge (logged), which is equal to the number of years 
since the transition to democracy.
205
 I do not have any clear expectation about the sign of the 
coefficient for this variable taken alone because it corresponds to its effect on changes in 
electoral disproportionality when there is no reform.
206
 Finally, I also include two additional 
interaction terms in the regression models, PermissiveReform*DemocraticAge and 
RestrictiveReform*DemocraticAge, in order to test the third hypotheses.
207
 I do not have clear 
expectations about these coefficients either. On the one hand, the lack of information in new 
democracies discussed above suggests that reforms will have a larger effect on electoral 
disproportionality there. Thus, the coefficients for the first of these interactions should be 
positive, whereas for the second should be negative. However, according to the habituation 
hypothesis, I expect a negative and a positive coefficient, respectively, for these interaction terms 
since I predict that a permissive reform will have a larger negative effect on electoral 
disproportionality as the democracy matures;
208
 and the reverse is expected for a restrictive 
reform.     
 
6.3.5. Estimation issues 
As far as the estimation technique is concerned, I prefer to avoid employing panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSEs). If I implemented them, I would implicitly assume that the observations 
are contemporaneously correlated across units (Beck 2008), which seems inappropriate given the 
dependent variable under consideration: why would disproportionality in elections celebrated in 
the same year have to be correlated across countries? For this reason, I assume that electoral 
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 Source: Cheibub et al. (2009). 
206
 I take the natural logarithm because I expect the relationship between them and my dependent variable to be non-
linear. 
207
 In a supplementary analysis, I also test the effect of the level of democratic age by including a dummy variable, 
EstablishedDemocracy, which is first coded as “1” for those countries that have remained democratic since the end 
of World War II and “0” otherwise; and then is coded as “1” for the first three elections since the end of the 
autocratic rules and “0” otherwise. Results are not shown, but corroborate those using the more elaborate measure of 
DemocraticAge. 
208
 A third different possibility would be that the two effects might cancel each other out. It would be really nice to 
be able to measure them separately, which you could do if you could discover the proportion of each electorate 
facing one of its first three elections, since an interaction with such a variable would pick up the habituation effect, 
allowing the un-interacted variable to pick up the other effect, if any.  
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disproportionality is correlated within countries. Accordingly, the models are estimated using 
random effects.
209 
 
There is a second technical reason to circumvent the use of PCSEs, and it relates to the 
asymptotic behaviour of the generalized least squares (GLSs) estimators. As is probably known, 
the use of PCSEs entails that the elements in the variances-covariances matrix are estimated over 
time for each panel (country). Therefore, they become efficient only as the repeated observations 
in time approach infinity. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz (1995) consider T > 15 as the 
minimum acceptable threshold to achieve such properties. Unfortunately, the number of 
elections held since the abandonment of dictatorial rule is still small in new democracies. By 
contrast, the maximum-likelihood estimators used here achieve their asymptotic behaviour as the 
number of panels approach infinity. In this sample, J = 59. This fact implies that there are 
sufficient units to achieve the desired behaviour (Gelman and Hill 2006), and that PCSEs with 
GLSs estimators will be outperformed. 
 
Finally, to estimate models with such a structure requires specific attention to time-series 
dependencies – i.e., autocorrelation – and possible problems of unit root (non-stationarity). In 
order to account for the first problem, I have followed the strategy advocated by Beck and Katz 
(1995 and 1996) and added a lagged dependent variable to the right-hand side of the equation 
(see also Keele and Kelly 2006). With regard to the latter, I refrain from using any solution 
because the plot of the data suggests a process of unit root does not exist, and, moreover, I am 
already using a differenced variable as dependent.
210
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 I do this in order to model unit heterogeneity. Random-effects models assume that Cov(xit, μi ) = 0; that is, there 
is no correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the explanatory variables. The Hausman test confirmed 
this condition was fulfilled in all the models. In such a case, random-intercepts models were implemented because 
they provided more efficient estimators than fixed effects, without losing consistency. 
 
210
 Using the level of disproportionality instead of the change is not an option because it could involve a problem of 
endogeneity: if high disproportionality leads to permissive reforms and it is relatively resistant to electoral system 
change we could end up with a result that leads us to wrongly conclude that permissive reforms increase rather than 
decrease the disproportionality of electoral outcomes.   
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6.4. Results 
In this section, I first assess the validity of my hypotheses linking electoral reform and electoral 
disproportionality. Afterwards, I explore the mechanics that lie behind the aforementioned 
relationship by examining the fluctuations in the levels of disproportionality over time.   
 
6.4.1. The institutional determinants of electoral disproportionality 
Table 6.1 includes the descriptive statistics of the variables used; and Table 6.2 displays the 
results of five econometric models with changes in Gallagher’s Index as dependent variable.211 
The most general finding from the specifications is that electoral reforms explain pretty well the 
fluctuations observed in the levels of electoral disproportionality. This overall impression 
bolsters the view of electoral engineers emphasizing the role of institutional change in 
accounting for variations in the degree of correspondence between vote and seat shares of 
parties. Finally, the R-squared are not very high given the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable in the right hand side of the regression equation.
212
 However, the low R
2 
is a result of 
using differences in disproportionality as dependent variable and, hence, is not particularly 
indicative of a poor goodness of fit of the model.  
 
More in depth, I receive broad support for the proposition that a permissive reform has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on electoral disproportionality (p<0.01). My models 
also yield a statistically significant positive effect, albeit weaker, of restrictive reforms on 
electoral disproportionality. In contrast to permissive modifications of the rules of the game, the 
coefficient for restrictive electoral system changes loses statistical significance in the interactive 
models. What do these estimates mean in substantive terms? Taking the coefficients from models 
1, 2 and 4, a permissive reform decreases electoral disproportionality by about 3 per cent. This 
effect is however remarkable if we consider that the estimated coefficients for restrictive reforms 
vary from 1.573 to 1.988. Hence, like in Matthew Shugart’s (2008) work on electoral reforms, I 
find that the impact of a switch from majoritarian to proportional is bigger than the impact of a  
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 Overall, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is negative and statistically significant. In other words, 
positive changes in the levels of disproportionality in the previous election lead to negative fluctuations in the 
current one, holding all the other variables constant. In addition, this suggests "regression to the mean" where 
“random fluctuations” in one direction are likely to be followed by a lesser or even opposite fluctuation at the 
following time point. More importantly, such coefficients are quite incompatible with a unit root. 
212
 The amount of explained variance should improve and, hence, the R
2 
are expected to be high when a lagged 
dependent variable is one of the regressors. 
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Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
∆ Disproportionality -0.12 3.89 -22.9 22.1 644 
Permissive Reform 0.07 0.27 0 1 644 
Restrictive Reform 0.06 0.24 0 1 644 
Major Reform 0.04 0.21 0 1 644 
Democratic Age(logged) 3.301 1.23 0 4.94 644 
Age of the Electoral System(logged) 1.36 0.94 0 3.46 644 
Age of the Major Electoral System(logged) 1.59 0.91 0 3.46 644 
Candidate-Centred Reform 0.02 0.16 0 1 644 
Party-Centred Reform 0.007 0.08 0 1 644 
 
switch in the opposite direction. In either case, I conclude that electoral engineering substantially 
influences levels of disproportionality.  
 
 My estimates partially support hypothesis 2 that predicts a positive association between 
the size of the reform and its impact on electoral disproportionality.  The coefficient estimated 
for the interaction term Permissive*Major has the expected negative sign and is statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level. By contrast, I do not obtain a statistically significant 
coefficient for the other interaction term (Restrictive*Major). Taking the estimated effect for 
permissive reforms, an increase in the size of the institutional change decreases electoral 
disproportionality by about 3.5 percentage points.
213
 Moreover, and relying now on the 
magnitude of the constitutive term, I infer a maximum effect of almost 6 percentage points. To 
illustrate it, model 3 predicts electoral disproportionality in Ukraine in 1998 to decrease between 
5 and 6 percentage points after the introduction of a mixed-member majoritarian system in 1997; 
and, in fact, it almost did because it went from 15.1 percentage points in 1994 to 8.4 percentage 
points four years later. 
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 Following Brambor et al. (2006), I have calculated substantively meaningful marginal effects and standard errors 
in order to see if this effect is statistically significant. I come up with a standard error of 1.85 and a t-value of 2.98. 
Hence, the marginal effect of the interaction term is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. When we do the same 
for major restrictive reforms, we end up with a standard error of 1.93 and a t-value of 1.99 that is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 6.2. Determinants of changes in electoral disproportionality, new and established 
democracies (1945-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      
∆ Disprop. (t-1) -0.379*** -0.382*** -0.377*** -0.384*** -0.386*** 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Permissive Reform -3.150*** -2.796*** -2.009*** -2.896*** -5.626*** 
 
(0.512) (0.549) (0.587) (0.518) (1.625) 
Restrictive Reform 1.573** 1.988*** 0.81 1.781*** -2.104 
 
(0.634) (0.674) (0.752) (0.634) (2.141) 
Major Reform 
 
-1.333* -0.677 
  
  
(0.751) (1.615) 
  
Permissive*Major 
  
-3.531* 
  
   
(1.948) 
  
Restrictive*Major 
  
3.044 
  
   
(2.076) 
  
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
0.386*** 0.259* 
    
(0.139) (0.148) 
Permissive*Democratic Age(logged) 
    
0.904* 
     
(0.517) 
Restrictive*Democratic Age(logged) 
    
1.256* 
     
(0.668) 
Constant -0.092 -0.082 -0.087 -1.477*** -1.021* 
 
(0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.519) (0.55) 
N (Observations) 585 585 585 585 585 
J (Countries) 59 59 59 59 59 
R
2
 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.24 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the Gallagher’s Index of electoral disproportionality; all models are 
random effects with clustered standard errors by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed 
tests). 
 
Model 5 from Table 6.2 shows the results for the third hypotheses. In brief, this last 
specification demonstrates the existence of clear differences between old and new democracies. 
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However, simply breaking down the sampled countries in these two groups is not enough to 
demonstrate the impact of democratic age on the levels of electoral disproportionality. In this 
regard, the coefficient of DemocraticAge is positive and statistically significant. This is 
interesting because it means that consolidated democracies do not create by themselves less 
electoral disproportionality once I control for electoral system change and continuity. The 
absence of conditions favourable to electoral proportionality in new democracies (like a large 
number of lists) might be either overridden by the presence of permissive rules there or 
concealed by the high correlation between democratic age and the emergence of new small 
parties.  
  
Considering the interactions now in detail, I find some initial support for the idea that the 
effect of permissive reforms is higher in recently democratized countries. In this regard, the 
coefficient of Permissive is negative and statistically significant in Model 5 (p<0.01), indicating 
that permissive reforms in contexts of new democracies have relatively strong effects on 
electoral disproportionality. However, this result seems not to be particularly robust over time as 
the interaction term is positive and reaches statistical significance. Moreover, my findings for 
restrictive reforms are in line with the habituation hypothesis. First of all, this type of 
institutional change seems not to be consequential for electoral disproportionality in new 
democracies. Second, the positive effect of restrictive reforms emerges as the number of years 
under democracy increases. Hence, this latter finding returns at least partial evidence in favour of 
the partisan anchoring hypothesis, according to which electoral reforms leads to more variation 
in the levels of disproportionality in established democracies. Nevertheless, these in principle 
favourable results will have to be confirmed below by calculating substantively meaningful 
marginal effects and standard errors. 
 
In effect, according to Thomas Brambor et al. (2006) and Cindy Kam and Robert 
Franzese (2007), the statistical significance of an interaction term cannot be evaluated through 
the p-value shown in the regression table. For this reason, it is necessary to graphically illustrate 
the marginal effect of my main independent variable (that is, electoral reform) on the levels of 
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disproportionality over time.
214
 Figure 6.2 plots the conditional effect of the different types of 
reforms on the levels of disproportionality for a range of values of the modifying variable (i.e., 
the length of democratic rule when the reform is adopted). The graph on the left shows that the 
expected marginal effect of a permissive reform in a recently-democratized country (that is, 
when the years of democracy are equal to zero) is huge (almost six percentage points) and 
negative.
215
 However, this effect, as predicted by the informational hypothesis, tends to drop 
towards zero as democracy matures, and does not produce any statistically significant change in 
the levels of disproportionality after about 100 years of democracy.
216
  
 
If we now turn to restrictive reforms, the graph on the right supports the habituation 
hypothesis that expects a positive association between the size of the effect of this type of 
institutional change and the number of years under democracy.
217
 As predicted, the adoption of 
these new electoral rules does not significantly increase the levels of disproportionality when the 
reform takes place in the first democratic decades. Resistance to changing voting behaviour in 
either direction should be less for younger (less habit-bound) democracies, enlarging the impact 
of the electoral reform on disproportionality. Nevertheless, it can also be seen that restrictive 
changes in the rules of the game do significantly increase electoral disproportionality when the 
democracy has been in place long enough. Hence, this graph demonstrates that the extent to 
which the impact of constraining reforms is actually translated into higher levels of 
disproportionality depends on the presence of the level of anchoring that is only likely to be 
found on mature democracies. To sum up, lack of habituation serves to make difficult voters’ 
responsiveness to restrictive reforms in old democracies but not in new ones. The socialization  
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 To show the statistical significance of the coefficients, I will represent in the vertical axis of a graph the 
magnitude of the marginal effect of the reform, and on the horizontal axis, the different values of the modifying 
variable. The continuous line represents the changes of such effect as contextual conditions are modified. The 
discontinuous lines represent the confidence intervals that will indicate when is the marginal effect statistically 
significant (p<0.05); this will be the case when the two confidence intervals are simultaneously above or below 0. I 
am grateful to Matt Golder for kindly providing in his web page the STATA codes to graph the marginal effects of 
the multiplicative models used in Brambor et al. (2006). 
215
 I recognize that this situation is a bit unrealistic because it assumes that two elections take place in the first 
democratic year, and a more permissive system is adopted in the meantime. 
216
 Keep in mind that the modifying variable has been logged. So, in order to get interpretable results, we have to re-
exponentiate it.  
217
 The habituation hypothesis expected that older democracies should see stronger habituation, less responsiveness 
to reform among the electorate and more elasticity in the disproportionality indices as a final outcome. 
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Figure 6.2. Marginal effect of electoral reform on electoral disproportionality over 
democratic age 
 
Notes: Results are derived from Table 6.2, Model 5. 
 
hypothesis dominates for democracies undertaking restrictive reforms but the sophistication 
("information") hypothesis dominates for democracies undertaking permissive reforms. 
 
Finally, all the models are retested in Table 6.3 using as main independent variables the 
electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension. This group of models provides a sort of placebo 
test of my argument as changes in how the rules of the game affect the distribution of power 
within parties should not affect all else equal the levels of electoral disproportionality. However, 
the absence of any relationship between these two variables is hard to assume easily. For 
example, Carey and Shugart (1995) suggest that changing the district magnitude might have an 
impact on candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Once we exclude the latter from my  
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Table 6.3. Effects of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension on electoral 
disproportionality, new and established democracies (1945-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      
∆ Disprop. (t-1) -0.400*** -0.401*** -0.403*** -0.405*** -0.405*** 
 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Candidate-Centred Reform 0.052 0.243 0.173 0.035 1.079 
 
(0.92) (0.916) (0.987) (0.913) (3.749) 
Party-Centred Reform -0.223 0.406 -0.722 -0.237 2.832 
 
(1.961) (1.962) (2.389) (1.945) (7.433) 
Major Reform 
 
-1.962*** -2.114*** 
  
  
(0.699) (0.739) 
  
Candidate-Centred*Major 
  
0.628 
  
   
(2.691) 
  
Party-Centred*Major 
  
3.496 
  
   
(4.199) 
  
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
0.527*** 0.542*** 
    
(0.163) (0.167) 
Candidate-Centred*Democratic Age(logged) 
    
-0.307 
     
(1.062) 
Party-Centred*Democratic Age(logged) 
    
-0.875 
     
(2.037) 
Constant -0.344* -0.229 -0.232 -2.123*** -2.177*** 
 
(0.177) (0.163) (0.167) (0.576) (0.59) 
N (Observations) 585 585 585 585 585 
J (Countries) 59 59 59 59 59 
R
2
 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Gallagher’s Index of electoral disproportionality; all models are 
random effects with standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
definition of intraparty reforms, my expectations are confirmed by the placebo tests since none 
of the coefficients reaches statistical significance. 
203 
 
 
6.4.2. The effect of electoral reforms over time 
In order to answer the question about the mechanisms, I finally present some additional models 
in Table 6.4 that show that the link between electoral reforms and changes in disproportionality 
is caused by the different time of reaction the mechanical and the psychological effects have 
after a change in the rules of the game.
218
 The dependent variable is the change in Gallagher’s 
Index again and the main independent variables are two interactions between the reforms and the 
number of elections (logged) after them. The reported results demonstrate that the adoption of a 
new electoral system immediately affects the mechanical translation of votes into seats, but 
actors (i.e., the psychological effect) need some time to find out how the new rules work and 
how to adapt their behaviours to this new institutional environment. Hence, what is crucial in a 
reform process is what happens in the immediately following election after it. In fact, the 
statistical significance of all the constitutive terms of the interactions regarding reforms suggest 
that it is only at that moment (i.e., when Time (logged) = 0) that their effect on disproportionality 
is noticeable. Beyond that point in time, none of these institutional changes have an effect 
different from zero at the 0.05 level.
219
  
 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
Do electoral reforms in the interparty dimension always have the theoretically expected impact 
on the degree of disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats? It is well established that 
electoral systems evidently favour larger and more concentrated social groups at the expense of 
smaller and more dispersed ones. In other words, the rules of the game generally help parties that 
are already rich in votes, as the Sheriff of Nottingham favoured individuals already rich in power 
and wealth. Although the variables explaining party system fragmentation have been investigated 
extensively, considerably less is known about the determinants of electoral disproportionality.  
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 Following the suggestion of one reviewer, I include as independent variable the effective number of electoral 
parties. Source: Golder (2005) complemented by Gallagher’s dataset 
(www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php). 
219
 For example, according to Model 3, the marginal effect of restrictive reforms is not statistically significant 
(p<0.05) at the second election after the reform because the upper and the lower bounds of the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals are above and below zero, respectively, when the modifying variable (i.e., the number of 
elections after the change [logged]) is equal to 0.693 (i.e., the natural logarithm of 2). 
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Table 6.4. Effects of electoral reforms on electoral disproportionality over time, new and 
established democracies (1945-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      
∆ Disprop. (t-1) -0.400*** -0.405*** -0.404*** -0.414*** -0.415*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) 
Time after Reform(logged) 0.513*** 0.575*** 0.205 
  
 
(0.168) (0.183) (0.284) 
  
Permissive Reform 
 
-0.632* -2.067*** 
  
  
(0.358) (0.7) 
  
Restrictive Reform 
 
0.826* 1.578* 
  
  
(0.452) (0.805) 
  
Permissive*Time(logged) 
  
1.019*** 
  
   
(0.374) 
  
Restrictive*Time(logged) 
  
-1.290** 
  
   
(0.598) 
  
Time after Major Reform(logged) 
   
0.718*** 0.552** 
    
(0.197) (0.222) 
Major Permissive Reform 
   
-1.346*** -3.358*** 
    
(0.512) (0.845) 
Major Restrictive Reform 
   
1.926*** 3.555*** 
    
(0.603) (0.963) 
Major Permissive*Time(logged) 
    
1.598*** 
     
(0.522) 
Major Restrictive*Time(logged) 
    
-2.383*** 
     
(0.899) 
Constant -1.055*** -1.059** -0.37 -1.555*** -1.252*** 
 
(0.291) (0.416) (0.584) (0.402) (0.441) 
N (Observations) 585 585 585 585 585 
J (Countries) 59 59 59 59 59 
R
2
  0.18 0.19   0.22 0.2 0.23  
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Gallagher’s Index of electoral disproportionality; all models are 
random effects with standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
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And this gap is particularly surprising giving the ubiquity of this phenomenon across different 
electoral systems. In fact, the effects of electoral laws upon the parliamentary representation of 
political parties behave as the Matthew’s Principle, producing a persistent bias in favour of 
strong and against weak competitors (Rae 1971 [1967]: 134).
220
 
 
Taking advantage of the relatively widespread implementation of electoral reforms 
during recent decades, and their huge heterogeneity in terms of the components of the rules that 
were modified and the countries in which they were adopted, I have shown in this chapter that 
changes in the institutional features of the electoral systems generate fluctuations in the 
disproportionality of electoral outcomes. In particular, while permissive electoral system changes 
improve the overall correspondence between the vote and the seat shares that each party obtains, 
restrictive reforms worsen it. In general, the former have a stronger effect than the latter. The 
higher elasticity of party system fragmentation at the parliamentary level seems to explain this 
asymmetric effect. Moreover, these results are also driven by what happens in the first election 
after the reform. 
 
This study also shows the modifying effect of the size of the electoral reform and the 
number of years of democratic rule. Therefore, this chapter questions the validity of analyses that 
treat the effect of institutional change as essentially linear. Specifically, I have first provided 
evidence that major permissive reforms are more strongly related to variations in the levels of 
disproportionality than minor inclusive electoral system changes. My findings, however, are less 
clear regarding major restrictive reforms: while the estimated coefficient has the expected sign, it 
is not significant at traditional levels of statistical significance. 
 
 One of the main results of the chapter lies in the interaction I found between electoral 
reforms and democratic age. When permissive reforms are adopted in young democracies, the 
combination of the lack of information about the exact working of the new rules and the relative 
weakness of parties render voters less likely to electorally react to the new incentives generated 
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 Rae (1971 [1967]: 134) himself includes Mathew 13:12: “For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall 
have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath”. 
206 
 
by them.
221
 However, this pattern changes markedly over time. For example, in countries which 
have been democratic for more than 100 years, citizens, elites or both immediately update their 
behaviour after a permissive reform and subsequently minimize the effect of the electoral system 
change.  
  
Building on the “habit of voting” theory, I have also found that the positive impact of 
restrictive reforms on electoral disproportionality is primarily observed in old democracies. 
Hence, this type of institutional change widens the gap between the vote and seat shares of 
parties when it is adopted in consolidated democracies but not when the country in question has 
recently became democratic. Moreover, these results suggest that reforms in new democracies 
that should theoretically increase the disproportionality of the rules of the game will fail to 
achieve it. 
 
Obviously, some of these unusual electoral system effects that we see in new 
democracies are not necessarily a direct result of their “newness”. Young democracies maintain 
some main characteristics –such as poorly institutionalized party systems and high electoral 
volatility- that distinguish them from most consolidated democracies. But there are many other 
features –for example, high levels of social turmoil- that are also characteristic of new 
democracies. In fact, it is reasonable to think that institutions can only shape politics and, hence, 
really work in the direction theory predicts when society is quite stable. And even though social 
turmoil is more common in new democracies, we see periods of “social unrest” in some 
consolidated democracies as well. Thus, should the “new democracy” category be extended to 
established democracies that have experienced periods of important political change? Although I 
do not have a clear answer to this question, the expected impact on dispropotionality of the major 
(and restrictive) reforms of France in the 1950s and Japan and Italy in the early 1990s lead me to 
think that the key variable is the age of democracy. However, this is an element of reflection that 
perhaps deserves more attention in the future. 
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 Let me remind the reader once again that perhaps a bit counter-intuitively reforms have effects on 
disproportionality when they do not affect parties and voters’ behaviour because they only bring about changes in 
the mechanical consequences of electoral laws but not in their psychological ones. By contrast, disproportionality 
does not change after a reform when the mechanical and psychological consequences of the electoral system change 
go hand in hand. 
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The relevance of these results seems to contradict those who claim, as Shugart (2005: 51) 
did, “that the agenda of proportionality and number of parties is largely closed (…)” and that 
there would only be room for some fine-tuning. By contrast, I think that my theoretical 
discussion and empirical evidence open up a further research agenda on how these episodes of 
electoral engineering are linked to fluctuations in the levels of disproportionality. Besides its 
intrinsic paramount relevance for the field of electoral systems, the establishment of the 
conditions that affect electoral disproportionality has important practical implications. For 
instance, and just to mention a few of them, the emergence of inaccuracies in the transformation 
of votes into seat shares can entail the election of legislators that lack ideological congruence 
with their constituents (Blais and Bodet 2006; Budge and McDonald 2005; Colomer 2001b; 
Golder and Stramski 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; McDonald and Budge 2007; Powell 2000 
and 2009; Powell and Vanberg 2000). Further, if rules repeatedly fail to produce a close 
correspondence between the amounts of votes and seats that each party obtains, considerable 
segments of citizens may increase their distance from the political system and stop participating 
in electoral politics (Franklin 2004), feel less politically efficacious (Banducci and Karp 2009: 
127), or simply experience less satisfaction with the democratic process (Listhaug et al. 2009).
222
 
And there is also the stream of arguments which have been used in the normative debates on the 
advantages and disadvantages of electoral disproportionality. In this regard, while some scholars 
consider that proportionality is a desirable goal of electoral systems and a major criterion by 
which they should be judged (Lijphart 1994: 140), others have been traditionally emphasizing 
the convenience of mitigating it (Hermens 1972 [1941]).
223
 In either case, my findings are good 
news from the point of view of normative democratic theory because they suggest that changes 
at the institutional level can have an impact on the levels of electoral disproportionality.  
 
Finally, the findings presented in this chapter are not in and of themselves sufficient to 
provide a robust theory of the causes of changes in electoral disproportionality. Even reforms 
that have been designed to constrain the overall permissiveness of the electoral rules, such as 
                                                          
222
 In the same vein, Golder (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2005) examine the impact of electoral 
disproportionality on the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions and fiscal policies, respectively. 
223
 I have decided to cite this author as the main historical advocate of the two-party system and one-party 
governments of the British FPTP system despite the fact I do not believe, unlike him, the Weimar PR system 
propelled the rise of Adolf Hitler.  
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many of those adopted in the last two decades in Israel
224
 or the one passed in 2000 in Slovenia, 
have not managed to produce the desired outcome.
225
 Hence, these two last examples highlight 
the inherent limitations of electoral engineers in fulfilling their objectives for institutional 
change. Although electoral reforms tend to be particularly successful at having proximal effects 
like the ones examined here (Scheiner 2008), the fact that electoral rules are not sufficient 
explanations of anything (Duverger 1964 [1954]: 228) and the impact of the electoral system 
change process itself usually prevent electoral reforms from creating their expected outcomes. 
For the same vein, we know that voter coordination is more difficult when a large number of 
parties contest elections (Cox 1997). In this regard, what looks like erratic behaviour on the part 
of voters may really be driven by the actions of parties (Tavits and Annus 2006). Additionally, 
without a way to randomly assign electoral reform, its effect cannot be distinguished from the 
potential –if any– impact of other variables leading to its adoption. Classical cross-national 
analysis in political science which examines the effects of institutions has to deal with the impact 
of a number of unobserved factors on the dependent variable. In many cases, controlling for all 
these unknown but possibly influential factors becomes difficult, if not impossible (Lijphart 
1971). Thus, future comparative studies are needed in order to better specify the causal path 
between electoral reforms and levels of disproportionality and address this potential problem of 
endogeneity. 
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 This refers to the introduction of the direct election of the prime minister, and the progressive implementation of 
several higher legal thresholds despite the former reform was widely derided -Giovanni Sartori called it “the most 
incredibly stupid electoral system ever designed” (quoted in Hazan 2001: 351)- and was repealed in 2001 (Scheiner 
2008).  
225
 In the same vein, D’Alimonte (2005: 272) shows that there was not a significant increase in the average cabinet 
duration after the 1993 electoral reform in Italy. 
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Chapter 7. “One for all, all for one”: The impact of reforms in the intraparty dimension at 
the macro-level. The case of party system nationalization 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
One of the fundamental matters for democracy is the trade-off between local and national 
representation. It is undeniable that national parties help to solve collective action problems and 
reduce transaction costs in the electoral arena, acting as brand names based on voters´ party 
identification, the state of the economy, or the government´s legislative record in office (Kiewiet 
and McCubbins 1991: 39); and party-centred electoral systems seem to reinforce the benefits that 
citizens extract from parties as the main agents of national and programmatic representation. 
Unfortunately, this kind of electoral rules forces us to pay the price of less local representation 
(Shugart et al. 2005), and even the election of unpopular candidates (Riera 2011). Moreover, and 
in spite of a burgeoning literature on the consequences of variations in the intraparty dimension 
of electoral systems, comparative politics has generally overlooked the linkage between electoral 
institutions and one particular feature of party systems: their levels of nationalization. Why do 
some countries (e.g., Lithuania) have several local party systems rather than a single national 
party system?
226
 Why do other countries (e.g., Costa Rica) feature the same parties competing on 
much the same terms in all their districts? In this chapter, I aim to establish a negative 
relationship between the levels of candidate-centeredness of electoral reforms and party system 
nationalization. By candidate-centred electoral system changes I mean those that foster the 
incentives of candidates to cultivate a personal vote.
227
   
 
Stein Rokkan was arguably one of the fathers of the field of comparative politics of the 
last century. One of his chief contributions deals with the formation of national party systems, 
and can be summarized with the idea of “‘politicization’ by which national organized parties 
broke the traditional rules of local elites through the entry into municipal elections” (Rokkan 
                                                          
226
 This occurs when the number of parties seriously contesting elections and obtaining decent vote shares at the 
district level is low, but a very different picture arises when we nationally aggregate votes, and calculate the 
effective number of parties at the national level because different parties gain significant vote shares in different 
parts of the country. 
227
 According to an already classic definition, personal vote can be conceptualized as “the portion of a candidate´s 
electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 
1987: 9). 
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2009 [1970: 227]). A few years earlier, V.O. Key (1949) had started to be influential in this 
regard with his study of state-level party systems in the United States. And while most scholars 
who addressed this issue mainly shared the same focus and concerns, there were still important 
differences in the way they defined and operationalized this pattern. A short list of political 
scientists that dealt with nationalization during the 1960s would include prominent figures such 
as Elmer E. Schattschneider, who coined the term “nationalization of electoral forces” (1960: ch. 
5); Donald E. Stokes, interested in examining the “proportion of district-level electoral variance 
explained by national level forces” (1967: 182-202); and Hans Daalder, who argued that “the 
‘permeation’ of the party system which may lead to a far-reaching homogenization between 
parties at the centre and in regional areas” (1966: 64). In any case, and despite these early 
developments, party system nationalization suffered from “a conflation of terms and imprecise, if 
not ambiguous, definitions” (Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005: 18), and, even more importantly, a 
scarcity of theories that could derive national-level patterns from district-level outcomes (Cox 
1997; Grofman et al. 2009). In other words, Maurice Duverger’s statements about the size of 
party systems (1964 [1954]) remained for decades as a typical example of black-box explanation 
because of the absence of mechanisms linking the local and national levels (Leys 1959; 
Wildavsky 1959). 
 
Richard Katz (1973: 817) was the first scholar to identify two dimensions of 
nationalization. On the one hand, Morgenstern et al. (2009: 1322) coin the term 
static/distributional nationalization (or vote homogeneity in Caramani [2004], and Jones and 
Mainwaring’s [2003] words) to refer to the degree to which there is an equal distribution of party 
votes across different districts at a single point in time. On the other hand, what the same 
scholars call dynamic nationalization considers the degree to which a party’s vote in the various 
districts changes uniformly over time. In other words, the key difference lies in the configuration 
of the electorate as opposed to its movement (Alemán and Kellam 2008: 2-3). Although there is 
no consensus about the dimension of study to prioritize (Schattschneider [1960] addresses the 
static component and Stokes [1965 and 1967] deals with the dynamic, just to name two), in this 
chapter I only consider the former dimension for two different types of reasons. First, and from 
the substantive point of view, the nationalization of party systems understood as an outcome and 
not as a process (Lago and Montero 2010: 4) is closer to what should refer this concept (i.e., the 
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structure of party systems) and to what should bother us (i.e., its political consequences). 
Secondly, and from a methodological perspective, most of the empirical measures of 
nationalization are focused on its distributional component. In addition, if I focused on its 
dynamic dimension, I would analyze changes in changes and, as a consequence, I would lose one 
more legislative term for my empirical analyses.
228
  
 
This chapter is thus an attempt to open up the black box of party system nationalization 
by considering evidence from 44 democracies with different levels of party system 
institutionalization and a total of more than 300 elections carried under diverse rules. Given the 
various ways of measuring party system nationalization, two different indices are used. First of 
all, I employ the score devised by Mark Jones and Scott Mainwaring (2003). As can be seen 
below, this is an index based on the Gini coefficient of inequality in vote shares across 
constituencies. To calculate it, we take its inverse so that party system nationalization increases 
as the values of the index increase. Secondly, I utilize the score proposed by Johannes Moenius 
and Yuko Kasuya (2004). This second index has the advantage of weigthing the contribution of 
each district to party system inflation. In contrast to the former, party system nationalization 
decreases as the values of the index increase.
229
 
 
By dwelling on a long and diverse sample of countries, this chapter moves beyond 
country-specific explanations of party system nationalization. During the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, a couple of studies analyzed the determinants of this phenomenon (e.g., 
Bochsler 2010b; Cox and Knoll 2003; Harbers 2010; Morgenstern et al. 2009). This piece 
extends the works undertaken by these scholars by adding new observations and covariates. 
Methodologically speaking, it is highly advisable to examine party system nationalization under 
different institutional set ups in order to incorporate variability in the sample, and do it 
employing accurate econometric tests. Finally, and not less importantly, the reported findings 
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 Finally, this chapter does not make any contribution to the study of the nationalization of party organization, 
manifestos and legislative voting nor the homogenization of public budgets across sub-national units (Jones and 
Mainwaring 2003: 142). As I point out in the conclusions section, the study of these patterns constitutes a promising 
avenue for further research (see, for example, Alonso Sáenz de Oger and Gómez Fortes [2011] for nationalization of 
party manifestos in the case of Spain). Unfortunately, the almost general lack of comparative data makes very 
difficult the development of a project with such amount of countries. 
229
 Despite the focus on the nationalization of party systems, party linkage and party aggregation will be used 
interchangeably during the whole chapter as antonyms of party system inflation.  
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reinforce the need to consider the type of institutional and competitive setting in which the 
electoral reform is adopted. As I will show below, the levels of ethnic fragmentation and political 
decentralization are particularly critical for shaping elites and citizens’ electoral incentives; and 
so the lack of either of these two factors generates a formidable obstacle to the aforementioned 
expected negative impact of a candidate-centred reform on party system nationalization.  
 
Aside from establishing the factors that affect party system nationalization, the extent to 
which electoral forces are nationalized has also important practical implications for the 
governability and political representation of a democracy. Firstly, the existence of inaccuracies in 
the projection of local party systems into the national one can jeopardize the survival of 
democracy (Stepan 2001; Jones and Mainwaring 2003). In this regard, Richard Rose and Derek 
Urwin (1975: 46) provide us with a possible explanation of this relationship by noting that 
geographically narrow parties are frequently accompanied by separatist goals, whereas parties 
with broad geographic support will tend to have an integrating impact on the state and thus 
provide for a level of political stability that would be absent without their presence (see also 
Bochsler 2010a: 1). Further, if electoral rules repeatedly fail to produce a nationalized party 
system, weaker bonds will exist among members of the legislative party (Alemán and Kellam 
2008; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Stokes 1967), generating, therefore, less party discipline (Jones 
and Mainwaring 2003) and more difficulty in keeping campaign promises.  
 
Thirdly, some scholars argue that uniform parties’ support across the country is positively 
correlated with “policies of nationwide concerns” (Kasuya and Moenius 2008: 127) at the prize 
of representing “the national centre of the political organization instead of the local community” 
(Caramani 2000: 68). By contrast, political competition at the national level between parties 
whose support base lies in a particular geographic region can lead to “an oversupply of pork-
barrel policies and an undersupply of nationally-focused public services” (Hicken et al. 2008). 
Finally, Ignacio Lago-Peñas and Santiago Lago-Peñas (2009) warn us about the risk of 
establishing spurious relationships by pointing out that the composition of public expenditure 
will not be geared towards higher transfer expenditure as nationalization goes up. In fact, 
according to these authors, party linkage only affects discernibly the composition of public 
expenditure by turning it stickier the less the national party system resembles the local ones. To 
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sum up, an increasing cottage industry on the nationalization of party systems has characterized 
this pattern as the prime cause of several political outcomes. While it seems to me at best 
dubious whether nationalization is the cause or simply a mere consequence of all these 
phenomena, they are still clearly important and worthy of investigation. 
 
Do changes in the intraparty dimension of electoral systems generate the expected 
outcomes? At first sight, the answer seems to be affirmative. For example, in the 1998 Swedish 
general election the nationalization of the party system reached a historical minimum in that 
country by declining from 0.83 in the previous election in 1994 to 0.774 four years later.
230
 This 
fact was probably due to the introduction of flexible lists in 1997 (Möller 1999). By contrast, the 
change in party system nationalization in the early 1980s in Greece was exactly the opposite. 
PASOK came to power in 1981 promising to abolish preferential voting (the “cross” in Greek), 
as it was supposed to favour political patronage (Dimitras 1985). This step was successfully 
voted upon in the autumn of 1982. As a result, the nationalization of the party system in the 
following election in 1985 increased by almost half decimal (from 0.849 to 0.876).  
 
Why do we observe this variation in the levels of party system nationalization within 
countries over time? If electoral systems rarely change significantly, and neither do other classic 
determinants of party system nationalization like ethnic fragmentation, how can fluctuations in 
this variable be explained? That is, which factors do explain “endogenous” (i.e., without 
electoral reform) changes in party system nationalization? Finally, while there are probably 
consequences for party system nationalization after almost all electoral reforms, we need to 
know under what circumstances electoral reforms have a larger effect. To put it in a slightly 
different way, in this chapter I am also concerned with which contexts increase the potential 
impact of reforms. 
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the analytical 
literature that define and offer several ways of measuring and explaining variation in party 
system nationalization. I then elaborate a series of theoretical propositions that describe under 
what conditions electoral reforms would be more likely to have an impact on levels of party 
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 These values correspond to Jones and Mainwaring’s (2003) score of party system nationalization. 
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system nationalization. In the fourth and fifth section, I explain the research design that I follow 
and conduct empirical tests on electoral data from a variety of countries. Finally, section six 
concludes. 
 
 
7.2. Theoretical framework 
In spite of the increasing interest in the nationalization of party systems observed during the last 
decade, there is no an established definition of this phenomenon yet (Kasuya and Moenius 2008: 
127). In fact, there is even disagreement about how to name this concept, and, as we will see 
below, this is probably a consequence of disagreements about what is (or should be) the object of 
study. In this regard, while some authors employ the expression “nationalized party system” to 
refer to that constellation of parties in which parties’ respective vote shares do not differ much 
from one sub-national territorial unit to the other (Caramani 2000 and 2004; Jones and 
Mainwaring 2003), other scholars prefer to stress the process through which the members of the 
various local party systems link to each other in national parties (Cox 1997 and 1999; Moenius 
and Kasuya 2004). Gary Cox himself also likes to use the expression coordination to describe 
the behaviour of politicians seeking election to the national legislature from different districts 
and running under a common party label (Cox 1997: 186). By contrast, the national party system 
of a country is inflated when each local party system is not a microcosm of the whole (Cox 
1999a: 155-156). Cox’s focus on the supply side of the political market is likewise shared by 
Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman (1998 and 2004), whose main goal is to explain the causes 
of party aggregation in single-member districts with plurality rule (see also Lago and Montero 
2010). Other labels to refer to nationalization are “district homogeneity” (Morgenstern and 
Potthoff 2005: 21) and “party system congruence” (Thorlakson 2007: 69). All in all, and despite 
this abundance of labels, I follow Daniel Bochsler (2010a: 1) in this respect and define the 
nationalization of the party system as a whole as “an aggregated measure for the territorial 
homogeneity of support of all the parties included in the system” (see also Kasuya and Moenius 
2008: 126). 
 
 Similarly, the number of indices used to measure party system nationalization in 
comparative research has been remarkably high. Although most of them share similar conceptual 
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traits, it is important to distinguish between four main ways to operationalize this variable: 
frequency, variance, distribution and inflation (Bochsler 2010a). This fourfold basic 
classification corresponds to a large extent to the different definitions of party system 
nationalization we have seen above.  
 
Some of the first scholars that examined party system nationalization like Rose and 
Urwin (1975) used indices of frequency (or competition indices) that calculated the number of 
uncontested seats.
231
 The Rose and Urwin’s measure (1975) of uncontested districts would touch 
on Stokes’ conception of nationalized electoral forces since an uncontested district cannot 
partake in any national swing. In this regard, it is worth mentioning some recent scholarship that 
builds on Stokes' measure by Larry Bartels (1998). In a comprehensive study of voting patterns 
between 1868 and 1996 in the United States, this author confirms that a significant nationalizing 
trend began at the end of the nineteenth century and continued throughout the twentieth. This 
particular measure has become in recent times the territorial coverage indices designed by 
Daniele Caramani (2004) and captures “the homogeneity of the supply of parties across districts” 
(Lago and Montero 2010: 26). 
 
 The second and third families of indicators indentified by Bochsler (2010a) compare, on 
the one hand, the electoral support of political parties across territorial units and, on the other, 
their actual number of votes (variance indices) and the expected vote shares (distribution 
coefficients) at the national level. For this reason, the family of distribution coefficients and their 
most frequently employed measure (i.e., the Gini coefficient) can be seen as a particular case of 
the indices of variance: although they take as starting point two different measures of electoral 
support at the district-level, specifically the vote share and the number of votes, they are based in 
the end on some sort of calculated deviation. Examples of indices of variance employed in the 
literature include the mean absolute deviation of regional electoral results from the national ones 
(Rose and Urwin 1975) and the mean coefficient of variation of parties’ electoral returns across 
districts (Caramani 2000). By contrast, Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Imke Harbers (2010) 
take the complement of the Gini coefficient to measure the uneven distribution of vote shares 
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 The number of uncontested seats is not an option here because it is a phenomenon practically confined to 
majoritarian systems in the past. 
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across territorial units, and Bochsler (2010a) proposes a new standardized party system 
nationalization score that relies on a transformation of it. 
 
 Finally, the inflation measures compare the number of parties at the national and local 
level, and refer to the extent to which the average size of the party systems across districts goes 
up over the country as a whole as a result of local variations. Hence, a slightly different concept 
of party system nationalization lies behind this group of measures (Kasuya and Moenius 2008: 
127). It is important to note that some of the most influential scholars in the field like Cox (1997 
and 1999), Chhibber and Kollman (1998 and 2004) and Moenius and Kasuya (2004) employ 
some form of inflation measure. Likewise, Lori Thorlakson (2007) proposes a slightly different 
version by measuring party system nationalization with the standard deviation of the effective 
number of parties across local party systems. 
 
 I close this section by briefly examining the determinants of party system nationalization. 
In general, the incentives for the nationalization of party systems can be institutional and 
sociological. According to Cox (1997 and 1999), institutional incentives pertain to economies of 
scale and have the following general form: some political group from one district seeks to induce 
a number of legislative candidates or members of Parliament from other constituencies to 
participate in a larger organization to accomplish a task that requires their help. Different 
versions of linkage emerge because the task can broadly range: from securing more seats and 
vote to increasing the likelihood of passing legislative packages through the improvement of the 
chances of winning the presidency or controlling the government. For example, the existence of 
upper tiers and national thresholds, or the requirement of qualified majorities, all promote the 
nationalization of party systems.  
 
The nationalization of party systems should also be positively correlated with the value of 
the prize parties pursue when they develop strategies of cross-district coordination. However, the 
only effect in this respect that is well established concerns the degree of political and fiscal 
decentralization: as we will see below, under increasing decentralization, there will be greater 
dissimilarities in party systems across different levels of vote aggregation (Chhibber and 
Kollman 1998: 329) because there is more at stake in lower-level elections and elites and voters 
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behave accordingly.
232
 Finally, nationalization of party systems is by no means surprisingly 
affected by the extent to which social cleavages exist in a country and cross cut or coincide with 
geographical divisions (Epstein 1980; Lijphart 1977: 87-103; Sartori 1986). In other words, the 
importance of minorities in a society and their territorial concentration emerge as a powerful 
obstacle to nationalization. 
 
 
7.3. Working hypotheses 
Building on these contributions, my expectation is that episodes of reform in the intraparty 
dimension of the electoral system will have an impact on the degree of party system 
nationalization. To be more specific, I argue that the extent to which local party systems 
resemble the national one will depend on the amount of incentives electoral systems offer to 
candidates to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995). The more important the 
personal reputation (or the less important the party labels), the lower the nationalization 
becomes. And, accordingly, all else equal, an unvarying degree of nationalization should be 
found on those countries not changing the incentives electoral systems generate to cultivate a 
personal vote.  
 
 In spite of the findings of Scott Morgenstern and Stephen Swindle about the poor job of 
electoral system variables in explaining the differing levels of localism (2005: 145), I argue that 
the nationalization of the party system will be seriously affected as the intraparty dimension of 
electoral rules changes. On the supply side, the presence of candidate-centred rules introduces a 
new source of heterogeneity in district-level political competition. Relevant factors for the 
electoral decision like societal cleavages, economic variables or the quality of the local 
candidates do not tend to be uniformly distributed within one country. Hence, parties’ vote share 
would differ across districts even though electoral rules were not candidate-centred. What I 
suggest here is that the effect of one of the sources of this district-level heterogeneity, the quality 
of local candidates, becomes more important as electoral institutions become less party-
                                                          
232
 The other effects that remain untested refer to bicameralism and presidentialism.   
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centred.
233
 In sum, my first hypothesis is as follows: Levels of nationalization of the party system 
will get higher in countries where a party-centred electoral reform is adopted; and the reverse 
will happen when a candidate-centred reform is adopted (H1). 
 
 Substantial differences between ethnically-fragmented and homogenous societies are 
expected not only with regard to the levels of nationalization of the party system (Bardi and Mair 
2008; Caramani 2004; Thorlakson 2007) but also concerning the impact of electoral reforms. 
Experts in comparative politics have argued that one of the critical elements in observing party 
system fragmentation is the presence of a large number of ethnic groups (Amorim Neto and Cox 
1997; Golder 2006; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Taagepera 1999); and 
this positive effect is arguably taking place at the national and the district-level simultaneously. 
Thus, the ability of a heterogeneous population to recognize and express differences across 
districts will heavily depend on the incentives generated by the electoral system to cultivate a 
personal vote, that is, its degree of candidate-centeredness (Morgenstern et al. 2009: 1328).  
 
For example, let’s imagine two countries that adopt a more candidate-centred electoral 
system. Country A is an ethnic fragmented society, while country B is more homogenous. As a 
consequence of the straightforward application of the new electoral rules, agents of 
representation will get more dependent on personal reputation, decreasing the degree to which 
the party system is nationalized. This result will be common to both countries. However, the 
actual impact of the reform will diverge to some extent in them: while candidates/parties (voters) 
in both types of democracies will recognize the change in the incentives to cultivate (cast) a 
personal vote, local electoral campaigns and candidates will deviate more from a somehow 
national pattern in ethnically fragmented scenarios. Before the electoral system change, the 
presence of party-centred rules constrained the attempts of narrow political interests only present 
in some parts of the national territory to run exclusively local campaigns and field merely 
autonomous candidates. But once these institutional incentives decline or cease to exist, locally-
concentrated parties are free to follow these electoral strategies in order to maximize their votes. 
On this basis, I expect a larger adjustment of the behaviour of all the political actors to the new 
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 At this point, I will not deal with the exact mechanisms (campaigns specially tailored to suit sub national 
constituencies, local dignitaries not joining statewide parties or different salience of issues, just to name a few) that 
could explain this outcome.  
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electoral arrangements in fragmented societies and, as a result, a bigger impact of institutional 
change on the nationalization of the party system. Summing up, I hypothesize that the positive 
effect of party-centred electoral reforms on the nationalization of the party system will get lower 
as ethnic fragmentation increases (H2). By contrast, the negative effect of candidate-centred 
electoral reforms on the nationalization of the party system will get even higher as ethnic 
fragmentation increases.  
 
The last feature that is predicted to modify the size of the effect of the electoral system 
change is the level of political decentralization. Consistent with the literature on nationalization, 
I expect electoral support of parties and, subsequently, the format of the local party systems to 
differ more across districts in federal countries (Cox 1999a; Jones and Mainwaring 2003). 
Following Jonathan Rodden (2004: 482), I define decentralization as “a shift of authority 
towards local governments and away from central governments, with total government authority 
over society and economy imagined as fixed”. Stokes (1967: 196-98) was the first scholar that 
documented the existence of a relationship between these two variables when he argued that the 
nationalization of congressional politics in the United States was largely driven by “the 
enormously increased salience of the federal government and the presidency in the period of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal”. This finding was extended later on to other 
federations like Canada, India and the United Kingdom (Chhibber and Kollman 2004); Australia, 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland (Thorlakson 2007), Argentina (Calvo and Escolar 2005) or 
Brazil (Samuels 2003). Although case studies or small-N analyses focused on systems with 
single-member districts have predominated, it is certainly possible to study these effects 
simultaneously in more than a few proportional representation systems (Chhibber and Kollman 
(1998: 340). For example, Dawn Brancati (2008) and Harbers (2010) successfully test the effect 
of decentralization on the nationalization of party systems in 37 and 16 democracies, 
respectively. However, all these ideas about the impact of devolution assume its linearity. Only 
Pablo Simón (2013), in a recently published piece, argues that the impact of decentralization on 
the nationalization of party systems is conditional on the extent to which electoral law 
encourages personal voting. And this is what I intend to argue here. 
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 In my last explanation of the existence of cross-district linkage of legislators, high-quality 
candidates from one district, who are the ones that will be elected under electoral rules that 
generate personal votes, will find it useful to promote alliances with high-quality candidates from 
other districts when authority is concentrated. And the higher the value of the national office, the 
smaller the deterrent effect of candidate-centred rules on nationalization is. By contrast, the 
negative impact of this kind of rules on nationalization will be particularly strong in those 
democracies that have decided to delegate powers from central states down to sub-national 
governments. In other words, I believe that the positive effect of party-centred electoral reforms 
on the nationalization of the party system will get lower as political decentralization is greater 
(H3). By contrast, the negative effect of candidate-centred electoral reforms on the 
nationalization of the party system will get even higher as the level of political decentralization 
increases. 
  
 
7.4. Research design: Variables, data and technique 
My first dependent variable is the change in the Jones and Mainwaring’s (2003) Party System 
Nationalization Score.
234
 It is calculated according to the following formula: 
PSNS = ∑ PNSi * pi, 
where PNS is a measure of the nationalization of each party, based on the Gini coefficient of 
inequality (Gi) in vote shares across constituencies; and pi is the party’s share of the national 
vote. To calculate it, I take the inverse of the Gini coefficient:  
PNS = 1 - Gi. 
The Stata program INEDQDEC0 (Jenkins 2010) was used to create the Gini coefficient. 
Parties that received less than a five percent share of the vote at the national level are excluded 
from this analysis.
235
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 Sources: Bochsler (2010), Caramani (2000), Constituency Level Electoral Archive (CLEA) from the University 
of Michigan and the Constituency Level Elections (CLE) dataset from Washington University at St. Louis. Figures 
for two-round systems (like in France) are based on first-round votes. 
235
 In mixed member systems, the figures are based on district and total votes in the nominal tier. In the prototypical 
mixed‐member system, half of the seats in a legislative chamber (the nominal tier) are elected in single‐seat districts 
and the other half (the list tier) are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation (Shugart and 
Watenberg 2001).  
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Alternatively, I use Moenius and Kasuya’s Party System Inflation Index (2004). It builds 
upon Cox’s measure (1997 and 1999) and provides an estimation of party system inflation on a 
percentage basis.
236
 Hence, as Inflation (I) gets larger, the nationalization of party systems is 
lower. If for instance I is 20, then about 20 percent of the overall size of the national party 
system can be attributed to different parties obtaining votes in different sub-units of the country, 
and 80 percent to the average size of the local party systems (Cox 1999a: 155-156). But, given 
that district size is not a constant in most countries, Moenius and Kasuya (2004: 550) (see also 
Kasuya and Moenius 2008: 130) introduce a weighted measure that is calculated according to the 
following formula: 
1
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where votnat is the total number of votes cast at the national level; voti is the number of votes cast 
in district i; natENP  is the effective number of electoral parties at the national level; and iENP is 
the effective number of electoral parties in district i.
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 Finally, all the models are retested using as dependent variable the average effective 
number of electoral parties at the district-level.
238
 This third group of models provide a sort of 
placebo test of my argument as changes in the intraparty dimension should not affect all else 
equal the mean party size at the sub-national level.
239
 Another possible placebo test would have 
involved employing reforms in the interparty dimension as predictors of changes in the 
nationalization of party systems. However, assuming the absence of any relationship between 
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 Sources: Bochsler (2010), Caramani (2000), Constituency Level Electoral Archive (CLEA) from the University 
of Michigan and the Constituency Level Elections (CLE) dataset from Washington University at St. Louis. Figures 
for two-round systems (like in France) are based on first-round votes. 
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 In mixed member systems, the figures are based on district and total votes in the nominal tier. In the prototypical 
mixed‐member system, half of the seats in a legislative chamber (the nominal tier) are elected in single‐seat districts 
and the other half (the list tier) are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation (Shugart and 
Watenberg 2001). 
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 Sources: Bochsler (2010), Caramani (2000), Constituency Level Electoral Archive (CLEA) from the University 
of Michigan and the Constituency Level Elections (CLE) dataset from Washington University at St. Louis. Figures 
for two-round systems (like in France) are based on first-round votes. 
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 In mixed member systems, the figures are based on district and total votes in the nominal tier. In the prototypical 
mixed‐member system, half of the seats in a legislative chamber (the nominal tier) are elected in single‐seat districts 
and the other half (the list tier) are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation (Shugart and 
Watenberg 2001).  
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these two variables is far from straightforward. In this regard, Cox (1999a) suggests that the 
presence of upper tiers and national thresholds seems to encourage nationalization, while low 
district magnitude seems to discourage it.  
 
My main independent variable is the existence (or absence) of an electoral reform, and its 
different types. For an extensive definition and typology of electoral reform, see Chapter 3.
240
 
The identification of a case of electoral reform without specifying the direction in which the 
rules of the game change is clearly insufficient. On this basis, it is very useful to distinguish 
between candidate-centred reforms (dummy variable Candidate-Centred Reforms = 1), that 
increase the candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote, and party-centred (dummy 
variable Party-Centred Reforms = 1), that decrease them (Carey and Shugart 1995). In general, 
personal vote can be conceptualized as “the portion of a candidate´s electoral support which 
originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 1987: 
9).
241
 Further details of all the episodes of electoral reform identified are given in the Appendix 1 to this 
thesis. 
 
I also use Ethnic Fragmentation as explanatory factor. This variable reflects the 
probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethno linguistic group.
242
 Although the data was originally collected in 1985, this should not 
entail a problem because the ethnic composition of a country is usually constant over time.
243
 
Hence, I have entered the same value for all elections in each country, which means that my 
coding of this variable only varies across countries and not within them.
244
 Finally, I use as 
independent variable Political Decentralization, which is equal to the Regional Authority Index 
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 Sources: Birch (2003), Birch et al. (2002), Bowler and Grofman (2000), Colomer (2004a), Gallagher and 
Mitchell (2005a), Golder (2004), Grofman et al. (1999), Grofman and Lijphart (2007 [2002]), the Inter-
Parliamentary Union  (n.d.), Johnson and Wallack (2010 [2003]), Jones (1995 and 1997), Lijphart (1994), Lundell 
and Karvonen (2003), Negretto (2009), Payne (2007), Remmer (2008), Renwick (2011), Shugart and Wattenberg 
(2001), Shvetsova (1999), Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán (2005), Zovatto and Orozco Henríquez (2008), and electoral 
laws of each country. 
241
 The reference category is no reform, or reform that does not change the incentives to cultivate a personal vote. 
242
 To be more precise, it is calculated as: 
EF = 1 - Σgi
2
, 
where gi is the percentage of the population comprised by the i
th 
ethnic group. 
243
 By contrast, Stoll (2013) leverages changing ethnic composition of the Israelian electorate to probe the limits of 
electoral system explanations on ethnic mobilization. 
244
 Source: Roeder (2001). For original sources, check there. Robustness checks using Alesina et al. (2003) and 
Fearon’s (2003) data clearly showed that the findings are not source-specific.  
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designed by Gary Marks et al. (2008). This index is a summary of the authority exercised by a 
regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole, and the authority exercised 
by a regional government over those who live in the region. I do not have any clear expectation 
about the sign of the coefficient for these variables taken alone because they correspond to their 
effects on changes in party system nationalization when there is no reform.  
 
I also include four interaction terms in the regression models, Candidate-
CentredReform*EthnicFragmentation, Party-CentredReform*Ethnic Fragmentation, Candidate-
CentredReform*Political Decentralization, and Party-CentredReform*Political Decentralization 
in order to test the second and third hypotheses. I expect negative coefficients for these 
interaction terms in the regressions that take party system nationalization as dependent variable 
since I predict that ethnic fragmentation and political decentralization will tend to boost (offset) 
the negative (positive) effect of a candidate-centred (party-centred) reform on party system 
nationalization. By contrast, the reverse is true for the regressions that take party system inflation 
as dependent variable. 
 
With regard to case selection, the sample only includes democracies according to Adam 
Przeworski et al.’s definition245 (2000: 54). In spite of this constraint, the countries analyzed vary 
widely in the number of contests conducted, the number of electoral reforms adopted, and the 
levels and amount of variation that needs to be explained. Specifically, the number of elections 
examined ranges from 31 in the United States to 2 in Hungary and Paraguay. Moreover, although 
I do not include any African country, my sample is made up of a number of quite heterogeneous 
democracies in terms of stability of their electoral institutions. On the one hand, I examine quite 
a lot of countries with no electoral reforms at all such as Argentina, Hungary and the United 
States. On the other hand, I have for instance Dominican Republic (four changes in 10 elections), 
Venezuela (three changes in four elections), Lithuania (three changes in three elections), Italy 
(three changes in 14 elections) Guatemala (three changes in three elections) and Austria (three 
changes in 20 elections) with relatively unstable electoral systems. Finally, with regard to the 
mean and the standard deviation of party system nationalization in each country, I combine 
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 According to these authors’ dictum, democracy is a system in which “incumbents lose elections and leave office 
when the rules so dictate”. The most important feature of their coding is the use of a dichotomous measure.  
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democracies in which party system nationalization is high (like Israel and the Netherlands) with 
countries in which it is low (like Lithuania and Switzerland), and democracies where party 
system nationalization varies a lot (like Lithuania and Italy) with countries where party system 
nationalization stays practically constant (like El Salvador and Nicaragua). And while the levels 
are basically explained by the type of electoral system, the standard deviation is a function of at 
least three factors: the mean, the number of elections, and the frequency of electoral reforms. 
Summing up, the dataset includes well over 300 observations in 44 countries between 1945 and 
2010.  
 
 Before getting into the multivariate regression models, I tested whether I could infer the 
proposed association between electoral reform and change in party system nationalization using 
simple bivariate tools. I first computed the coefficient of variation of party system nationalization 
for old and new democracies and plotted these against the number of electoral reforms per 
election for the period 1945-2010. Figure 7.1 shows the result and adds a line for the predicted 
values of an OLS regression of the dispersion in Jones and Mainwaring’s party system 
nationalization score on the institutional instability measure. This simple bivariate model returns 
a positive value for the number of reforms per election that is not however statistically 
significant at traditional confidence levels. This finding should not be taken as inconsistent with 
the first hypothesis that argued that electoral reforms changed the levels of party system 
nationalization observed in a given country, though: the relatively small number of cases in each 
category makes me think that I could be committing a type II error if I wrongly accept the null 
hypothesis.   
 
As far as the estimation technique is concerned, the detail does not need to be repeated 
here given that is is introduced in section 6.3.5 of the previous chapter. 
 
 
7.5. Results 
Table 7.1 includes the descriptive statistics of the variables used. And Table 7.2 displays the 
results of five econometric models where the dependent variable is the change in Jones and 
Mainwaring’s Index of party system nationalization. Almost all my theoretical expectations bear  
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Figure 7.1. Dispersion in party system nationalization and electoral reform 
 
Notes: The y-axis shows the coefficient of variation in Jones and Mainwaring’s Index of party system 
nationalization between 1945 and 2010 in established and new democracies. The x-axis displays the number of 
electoral reforms implemented per election. 
 
out. First of all, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is always negative and 
statistically significant. In other words, positive changes in the levels of party system 
nationalization in the previous election lead to negative fluctuations in the current one. Indeed, 
holding all the other variables constant, the results suggest that an increase of 1 point in my 
nationalization index in the previous elections will produce a decrease of at least 0.2 points in the 
current one. In addition, we find clear evidence for the first hypothesis in the case of candidate-
centred reforms but not when a more party-centred electoral system is adopted. In other words, 
the coefficient of Candidate-Centred Reform is negative and statistically significant at the 
traditionally levels of confidence in models 1 and 2, indicating that the values of the Jones and  
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Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
∆ Party System Nationalization -0.0003 0.0701 -0.407 0.35 375 
∆ Party System Inflation 0.006 0.16 -1.008 1.38 375 
∆ Average ENEP District-Level 0.03 0.71 0.03 0.71 375 
Party-Centred Reform 0.04 0.19 0 1 375 
Candidate-Centred Reform 0.04 0.208 0 1 375 
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.26 0.21 0.007 0.74 375 
Political Decentralization 11.79 8.49 0 32.1 301 
 
Mainwaring’s index after one of these institutional changes will tend to decrease; but the 
opposite is in general not true for Party-Centred Reforms. 
 
In a similar vein, clear differences between ethnically fragmented and homogenous 
societies on the one hand, and centralized and decentralized democracies on the other emerge. 
However, simply breaking down the sampled countries in two groups is not enough to 
demonstrate the impact of these variables on party system nationalization. In this regard, the 
coefficient of EthnicFragmentation is negative and statistically significant in Models 2 and 3. 
This is a bit surprising because it means that ethnic heterogeneity by itself still creates fewer 
opportunities for party system nationalization once we control for electoral system change and 
continuity and we take a differenced dependent variable. In addition, the coefficient of 
Candidate-Centred*Ethnic Fragmentation is negative and statistically significant in Model 3 
(p<0.05), indicating that the negative effect of a candidate-centred reform on the nationalization 
of the party system tends to be bigger in countries whose society is more diverse. In other words, 
these results slightly imply that candidate-centred reforms in contexts of ethnic heterogeneity 
have relatively stronger effects. By contrast, the absence of conditions favourable to party system 
nationalization in fragmented social contexts might not be overridden by the presence of party-
centred reforms. 
 
I also find evidence for the last hypothesis on decentralization. This theoretical 
expectation suggested that the negative effect of candidate-centred reforms on party system 
nationalization will be low in politically centralized scenarios, but will tend to increase as the  
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Table 7.2. Determinants of changes in party system nationalization, new and established 
democracies (1945-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      ∆ Party System Nationalization (t-1) -0.278*** -0.407*** -0.407*** -0.201** -0.201** 
 
(0.0508) (0.118) (0.121) (0.073) (0.073) 
Party-Centred Reform -0.018 -0.045 -0.049 -0.032 0.027 
 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.079) -0.047 (0.028) 
Candidate-Centred Reform -0.025** -0.034** 0.008 -0.012* 0.014* 
 
(0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 
 
-0.032* -0.0239* 
  
  
(0.017) (0.012) 
  Party-Centred*Ethnic 
  
0.012 
  
   
(0.209) 
  Candidate-Centred*Ethnic 
  
-0.138** 
  
   
(0.066) 
  Political Decentralization 
   
-0.001 -0.0005 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Party-Centred*Decentralization 
    
-0.005 
     
(0.005) 
Candidate-Centred*Decentralization 
    
-0.002** 
     
(0.001) 
Constant -0.001 0.009** 0.007* 0.014 0.007 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.017) 
N (Observations) 347 347 347 270 270 
J (Countries) 44 44 44 27 27 
R
2
 0.092 
  
0.062 0.089 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Jones and Mainwaring’s Index of party system nationalization; 
specifications in the first, fourth and fifth columns are fixed effects models; specifications in the second and third 
columns are random effects models; all of them have clustered standard errors by country in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
central authority starts to delegate its powers to sub-national units. Indeed, the coefficient on 
Candidate-Centred Reform is positive, indicating higher values of the Jones and Mainwaring’s 
Index when an electoral system of this type is adopted in centralized countries. However, when 
this kind of institutional change and the level of political decentralization are interacted, the 
effect becomes negative and statistically significant. This result fits my theoretical expectation  
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Table 7.3. Determinants of changes in party system inflation, new and established 
democracies (1945-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      ∆ Party System Inflation (t-1) -0.647*** -0.602*** -0.602*** -0.436*** -0.439*** 
 
(0.105) (0.113) (0.116) (0.072) (0.069) 
Party-Centred Reform 0.086 0.102 0.105 0.105 -0.097* 
 
(0.117) (0.108) (0.211) (0.136) (0.056) 
Candidate-Centred Reform 0.035** 0.021 -0.0256 0.021 0.015 
 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.022) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 
 
0.036 0.0303 
  
  
(0.028) (0.025) 
  Party-Centred*Ethnic 
  
-0.012 
  
   
(0.515) 
  Candidate-Centred*Ethnic 
  
0.176** 
  
   
(0.089) 
  Political Decentralization 
   
0.0003 -0.0009 
    
(0.004) (0.003) 
Party-Centred*Decentralization 
    
0.021 
     
(0.017) 
Candidate-Centred*Decentralization 
    
0.0007 
     
(0.002) 
Constant 0.007* -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.012 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.054) (0.043) 
N (Observations) 374 374 374 317 317 
J (Countries) 40 40 40 29 29 
R
2
 0.371     0.195 0.254 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Moenius and Kasuya’s Weighted Index of party system inflation; 
models 1, 4 and 5 are fixed effects with clustered standard errors by country in parentheses; models 2 and 3 are 
random effects with clustered standard errors by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed 
tests). 
 
because it would mean that candidate-centred reforms decrease the level of party system 
nationalization in case of decentralized countries. 
 
The coefficient estimates of Table 7.3 show slightly weaker evidence for the 
aforementioned hypotheses. More specifically, for each candidate-centred reform registered the  
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Table 7.4. Determinants of changes in the average effective number of electoral parties at 
the district-level, new and established democracies (1945-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      ∆ Average ENEP (t-1) -0.380*** -0.352*** -0.324*** -0.326*** -0.322*** 
 
(0.063) (0.069) (0.079) (0.062) (0.062) 
Party-Centred Reform -0.267 -0.418 -0.911* -0.301 -0.092 
 
(0.247) (0.331) (0.479) (0.273) (0.081) 
Candidate-Centred Reform 0.425 0.22 0.608 0.348 -0.171 
 
(0.255) (0.262) -0.409 (0.339) (0.491) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 
 
0.216 0.15 
  
  
(0.283) (0.19) 
  Party-Centred*Ethnic 
  
1.371 
  
   
(1.151) 
  Candidate-Centred*Ethnic 
  
-1.424 
  
   
(1.141) 
  Political Decentralization 
   
0.003 0.002 
    
(0.0105) (0.0109) 
Party-Centred*Decentralization 
    
0.017 
     
(0.023) 
Candidate-Centred*Decentralization 
    
0.044 
     
(0.045) 
Constant 0.081*** 0.017 0.044 -0.007 0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.052) (0.035) (0.128) (0.133) 
N (Observations) 317 317 317 268 268 
J (Countries) 35 35 35 26 26 
R
2
 0.156 
  
0.133 0.14 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the average Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number of electoral 
parties at the district-level; models 1, 4 and 5 are fixed effects with clustered standard errors by country in 
parentheses; models 2 and 3 are random effects with clustered standard errors by country in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
inflation of the party system at the national level increases by about 3.5% (see Model 1). This 
effect is significant at the 5% level. Thus, the analysis gives empirical credence to the idea that 
institutional change matters for changes in the levels of party system nationalization. Indeed, 
contrary to what one may think, this effect is huge. Most of these reforms involve tiny 
modifications of some of the features of the electoral system. Hence, finding any significant 
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effect of them on party system nationalization constitutes a quite remarkable result. With regard 
to the interactive hypotheses, it is first of all worth mentioning that there are not much many 
positive changes in the inflation of the national party system in ethnic heterogeneous rather than 
homogenous countries. According to Model 3, the second quite remarkable pattern is that the 
positive effect of candidate-centred reforms on party system inflation only gets statistically 
significant in sufficiently ethnically fragmented countries. Hence, not all the candidate-centred 
reforms have the expected expansive impact on inflation of the national party system. Finally, all 
these effects lose statistical significance when are controlled for the relevant variables regarding 
the level of political decentralization. 
 
 The negative findings with regard to the placebo test mentioned earlier seem to cross-
validate some of my main claims, as shown in Table 7.4. The almost complete lack of statistical 
significance of the main predictors appears to indicate that reforms in the intraparty dimension of 
the electoral system affect coordination across rather than within districts. According to Model 3, 
party-centred electoral system changes in totally homogenous countries from the ethnic point of 
view decrease the average effective number of electoral parties at the district-level. However, 
this effect is not robust across specifications. Moreover, the absence of absolute ethnic 
uniformity among the democracies studied here casts some doubts on the relevance of this effect.  
 
Finally, I plot in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 the conditional effect of the different types of 
reforms on the levels of party system nationalization for a reasonable range of values of the 
modifying variables (the degree of ethnic fragmentation and political decentralization, 
respectively). According to Thomas Brambor et al. (2006) and Cindy Kam and Robert Franzese 
(2007), the effect of an interaction term cannot be evaluated through the p-value shown in the 
regression table. Thus, it is necessary to graphically illustrate the marginal effect of our main 
independent variable (that is, electoral reform) on the nationalization of the party system over 
ethnic heterogeneity and political decentralization.
246
 As predicted in the hypotheses section, the  
                                                          
246
 To appreciate the statistical significance, I will represent in the vertical axis of a graph the magnitude of the 
marginal effect of the reform, and on the horizontal axis, the different values of the modifying variable. The 
continuous line represents the changes of such effect as contextual conditions are modified. The discontinuous lines 
represent the confidence intervals that will indicate when is the marginal effect statistically significant (p<0.01); this 
will be the case when the two confidence intervals are simultaneously above or below 0. I am grateful to Matt 
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Figure 7.2. Marginal effect of electoral reform on party system nationalization over ethnic 
fragmentation 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 7.2, Model 3. 
 
presence of a candidate-centred reform has a strong constraining effect on party system 
nationalization in heterogeneous societies. However, Figure 7.2 also shows that this impact stops 
having a statistically significant effect once social heterogeneity drops beyond a certain point 
(less than 0.2). Hence, the results presented here clearly indicate that candidate-centred reforms 
can be expected to have a null impact on the nationalization of party systems when the degree of 
ethnic heterogeneity is low enough (like in Japan or Portugal, among others). Likewise, we can 
see in Figure 7.3 that the expected marginal effect of candidate-centred reform in a relatively-
centralized country (that is, when the value of the regional authority index is lower than 5) is  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Golder for kindly providing in his web page the STATA codes to graph the marginal effects of the multiplicative 
models used in Brambor et al. (2006). 
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Figure 7.3. Marginal effect of electoral reform on party system nationalization over 
political decentralization 
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 7.2, Model 5. 
 
positive. I still do not know why in countries where political authority is quite centralized and a 
candidate-centred reform is adopted (for example, in Estonia or Iceland in the 1990s) findings 
run to counter my expectations. However, this effect, as hypothesized, tends to disappear as 
countries become decentralized. In fact, a candidate-centred reform produces a statistically 
significant negative change in party system nationalization of about 7 points when the modifying 
variable reaches its maximum value (as in the case of Germany or Belgium after the 1990s).
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 I also tried a triple interaction between each type of electoral reform, ethnic fragmentation and political 
decentralization but it did not reach statistical significance at the traditional confidence levels. 
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7.6. Conclusion 
Although the variables explaining party system fragmentation have been investigated 
extensively, considerably less is known about the determinants of party system nationalization 
(Cox 1999a; Grofman et al. 2009). And this gap is particularly surprising giving the huge 
variation of this phenomenon across different political systems, and its important impact on the 
governability and survival of democracies (Jones and Mainwaring 2003). 
 
Because of the relatively wide spread of electoral reforms during recent decades, and 
their large heterogeneity in terms of the components of the systems that were modified and the 
countries in which the changes were adopted, I have argued in this chapter that modifications in 
the features of the electoral systems generate fluctuations in the levels of party system 
nationalization. To be more specific, in this chapter I have tried to show that electoral reforms 
matter for the uniformity in vote shares of parties across districts, and to examine to what degree 
do the levels of ethnic fragmentation and political decentralization modify the impact of these 
episodes of electoral engineering. 
 
The results of this study support the proposition that electoral reforms generate levels of 
party system nationalization that differ from those generally observed in scenarios of institutional 
continuity. In particular, I have shown that candidate-centred electoral system changes decrease 
party system nationalization. For example, my results point to a novel implication of the 2002 
electoral reform in Belgium: the reduced impact of the list vote passed that year there not only 
enhanced the personalization of campaigns, undermining the parties’ programmatic debates (De 
Winter 2005: 431), but also contributed to deepen the lack of nationalization of their party 
system. By contrast, party-centred reforms do not increase it. Again as in Chapter 6, what I think 
I have here is an asymmetry in the difficulty found in adapting to reforms in one direction rather 
than the other. Reactions to candidate-centred reforms are easy to achieve since local candidates 
are pressing for these reactions and they are closer to the voters than national parties per se are. 
A reform in the other direction will be counteracted by candidates attempting to vitiate the 
purposes of the reform, and national leaders will find it hard to get their message through about 
the new voters’ need to vote for parties rather than candidates. Moreover, that argument could be 
a hard sell in countries used to candidate-centred elections. 
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Some of the main results of the chapter precisely lie in the interactions between electoral 
reforms and ethnic heterogeneity on the one hand and political decentralization on the other. 
When candidate-centred electoral system changes are adopted in ethnically fragmented societies, 
the combination of the institutional incentives generated by the new rules and the relative 
weakness of national parties render political elites and voters more likely to behave differently 
across districts. And this pattern is similar in the districts of politically decentralized countries. 
By contrast, in democracies centralized enough (i.e., those that score less than five in Marks et 
al.’s [2008] index) either citizens, politicians or both seem to react in an unexpected way, and 
party system nationalization increases when a candidate-centred reform is adopted. Hence, the 
new incentives for personal vote created by these electoral reforms are swamped by other factors 
(in this case, political centralization) and do not necessarily translate into actual behaviour 
(Morgenstern and Swindle 2005: 165). 
 
The findings presented in this chapter are not in and of themselves sufficient to provide a 
robust theory of the causes of changes in party system nationalization. For example, we know 
that electoral reforms are more likely to happen in some given contexts (see Chapter 5 for more 
on this). So, I have not identified the causal effect of these contexts on the nationalization of 
party systems and what looks like the impact of institutional engineering may really be driven by 
its own determinants. Without a way to randomly assign electoral reform, its effect cannot be 
distinguished from the potential – if any – impact of other variables leading to its adoption. 
Hence, I do not deny the possibility that party systems cause electoral reforms, not the other way 
around. In fact, the data from the sampled countries suggest that party system fluctuations occur 
prior to electoral reforms. To sum up, future comparative studies are necessary in order to 
address this potential problem of endogeneity and clearly specify the causal path.  
 
Finally, my research points to further analyses that should deal with the effects of reforms 
in the intraparty dimension of electoral system on other political variables that go beyond the 
strict electoral arena like the centralization of parties’ organization, the homogenization of 
manifestos or the nationalization of budgets. Moreover, I am completely agnostic about the 
positive and negative externalities nationalization of party systems can involve. All I am saying 
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is that the convergence and divergence of electoral forces across territorial units are coherent 
with different modes of representation.  
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Chapter 8. “Is it safe?” The consequences of electoral reforms at the meso-level. The case 
of parties’ electoral performance248 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Are electoral reforms damaging for parties’ electoral performance? This has been a largely 
neglected topic in the discipline so far. We know that several factors (cleavages, party 
identification, government’s performance, and so on) have an impact on vote decisions; but we 
do not have yet a body of comparative work on how institutional stances of parties influence 
their vote shares. In the last two decades, there has been a heightened scholarly interest in trying 
to understand why one electoral system is used rather than another (e.g., Blais 2008; Colomer 
2004a; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005a; Renwick 2010). These studies attempt to explain the 
origins of electoral rules or determine whether changes in party systems parallel changes in 
electoral institutions.  However, the effectiveness of modifying the rules of the game as a tool for 
winning votes is not well understood: we have no information on whether and when electoral 
reforms have the desired effect of adding to votes totals for those parties that support the 
electoral system change.   
 
Uncovering how voters react to electoral reforms is interesting not simply from the point 
of view of party strategies but also as it enhances our general knowledge of the functioning of 
the representational process. In other words, it sheds light on voters' choices and their 
preferences about electoral systems and on party strategies for survival in the electoral game. So, 
studying the electoral consequences of institutional engineering also contributes to several 
central themes in the discipline, including why one electoral system is used rather than another 
(Shugart 2005), the extent of elite responsiveness to the public in the institutional domain (Cain 
et al. 2006), and the role of electoral accountability as the basis of political representation 
(Przeworski et al. 1999).   
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 After two chapters in which I have examined the consequences of electoral reforms at the macro (i.e., country) 
level, I intend to do so at the meso (i.e., party) level in this one.  
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 The arguments presented in the existing literature do not provide any hint about the 
potential impact of the positions adopted by parties in processes of institutional change on their 
subsequent electoral performance. On the one hand, it is argued that risk-averse parties seek to 
maximize their seat shares when implementing an electoral reform (Benoit 2004). Within this 
framework, voters might penalize incumbents that pursue their own interest at will by blatantly 
manipulating the rules of the game (Katz 2005). On the other hand, a couple of studies argue that 
act-contingent motivations also play an important role in electoral reform processes (Reed and 
Thies 2001; Shugart 2008). In other words, parties are not necessarily seat-maximizers; they also 
have incentives to pay attention to voters’ preferences on electoral reform in the hope of gaining 
votes. Both arguments essentially rest on the assumption that parties behave according to what is 
electorally most beneficial. However, the arguments disagree on the definition of electoral 
benefits: according to the former it is beneficial to maximize seats while according to the latter it 
is beneficial to maximize votes. Which of these arguments is empirically valid? 
 
In this chapter, I argue that whether electoral reforms are damaging or rewarding in terms 
of votes depends on the type of new rules that are enacted, the way in which the electoral reform 
process is publicly framed and passed in Parliament by the ruling elites and the party system 
context in which they are implemented. First of all, I differentiate between permissive and 
restrictive changes in the interparty dimension of the electoral systems. I then argue that in 
situations of high party system fragmentation voters view restrictive electoral reforms more 
favourably regardless of their general ideological placement. Improving cabinet durability and 
increasing the legislative passage rate are examples of pragmatic concerns that lead voters to 
judge positively such reforms in these contexts. Given that high party system fragmentation can 
be perceived as responsible for these shortcomings, voters are more likely to reward parties that 
support restrictive electoral system shifts when there are lots of parties. By contrast, increasing 
the permissiveness of the rules rather than keeping the system unchanged or trying to make it 
more restrictive may be counterproductive in a context of high party system fragmentation. 
 
In situations where party system fragmentation is relatively low, support for permissive 
electoral reform may be perceived as enhancing democracy (Blais et al. 2005), improving the 
electoral appeal of the party. This willingness to open up the system is likely to be rewarded at 
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the polling booth when there are few parties. Fostering the representation of women or ethnic 
minorities might also be two positive by-products of increasing the overall permissiveness of the 
system.  
 
 Measuring the main independent variable in the analysis requires information on the 
positions taken by political parties regarding electoral reform processes. There is no existing 
comprehensive dataset that provides such information on a comparative basis. For this reason, 
we (i.e., Damien Bol and I) have created an original dataset. Compared to other datasets, the one 
employed here has two main advantages. First of all, it focuses on electoral reform processes, 
and not only instances in which an electoral system change was actually enacted. As has been 
previously noticed, episodes of real electoral reform are rare. Hence, relying only on the cases of 
successful electoral system change implies an important loss of information. Moreover, this 
design allows me to test whether the electoral impact of parties’ positions is greater in those 
processes where the reform was finally enacted. Second, in taking parties and not only 
governments into account, the dataset offers more precise information. Once again, the actual 
preference of a government (or the opposition) is a poor estimator of the positions of the political 
parties that compose them; and, in the end, parties within the government rather than the 
government as such are those held accountable by the electorate.
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The arguments are tested with data from 20 (old and new) democracies across 30 
processes of electoral reform. The findings show that support for restrictive reforms in contexts 
of high party system size is associated with vote gains, as is advocacy of permissive reforms in 
systems with relatively low fragmentation. These findings bring novel insights to our knowledge 
regarding the limits of political manipulation of the rules of the game. Moreover, they alert us to 
the need to take into account the previous level of party system fragmentation in understanding 
electoral results after an institutional change. The results also suggest, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, that seat-maximization is not necessarily the key to parties’ preferences on electoral 
reform.  
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 To illustrate this point, let’s take for example the case of the 2010 referendum on electoral reform in the United 
Kingdom. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats (both in government) were totally against and totally in 
favour of the electoral reform, respectively. If we took the government as a unit of analysis instead of the parties that 
form part of it, we would conclude that the cabinet as a whole was neither in favour nor against the institutional 
change proposed. 
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8.2. The determinants of electoral system changes 
It is generally assumed that electoral reforms are minor and infrequent (Birch et al. 2002; 
Gallagher 2005; Lijphart 1994; Nohlen 1984b; Norris 1995; Taagepera 2007b).
250
 Several 
explanations have been proposed for why this is the case. First, electoral system changes may be 
discouraged because they require incumbents to change the rules of the game they are winning 
(Katz 2005; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011). Self-interested parties in government should be better 
off if they kept the rules that put them in power. Second, it is also argued that instances of 
electoral reform will be limited because of the presence of a large number of veto players 
(Tsebelis 2002). Attempts at electoral reform require the support of all the veto players in a given 
democracy to be successfully passed. Moreover, constant electoral reforms may also threaten the 
survival of the democratic regime itself by generating alienation in the electorate, and hampering 
successful coordination at the parties/candidates and voters’ levels (Cox 1997). 
 
 Some studies argue explicitly that there are few electoral reforms because only a 
combination of some inherent conditions together with a triggering event or events -
contingencies- leads politicians to change the rules under which they were elected (Shugart 
2008). Seat-maximization motivations may be useful in explaining certain instances of electoral 
reform, but they do not provide information as to whether the support of a party for electoral 
system change will affect its vote share. This suggests that the link between being in favour of a 
given reform and the number of seats additionally gained is not necessarily straightforward. In 
any event, the arguments presented in these studies would also lead one to believe that parties’ 
willingness to support some particular electoral reforms could be inhibited by the potential threat 
of a loss of votes, whatever its promised benefits in terms of the translation of those votes into 
seats. And this is, in fact, what Shugart’s theory seems to imply.  
 
 According to him, act-contingent motivations for electoral reform are present when 
politicians expect to benefit (in terms of popular support) from the very act of voting for reform. 
Whether or not they sincerely prefer an alternative electoral system, the concept of ‘reform’ is 
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 Against this, see Colomer (2001a). 
241 
 
itself popular and leads them to support the electoral reform. When might party leaders take the 
plunge and publicly advocate electoral reform? There is no easy answer to this question. In fact, 
this is where the whole theory of electoral reform developed in a previous chapter comes in. 
Briefly speaking, there is some evidence that parties do change the interparty dimension of the 
electoral rules in a restrictive way to respond to high levels of party system fragmentation. In 
such contexts, cabinet instability is high and legislative productivity is low; and politicians fear 
electoral losses if they do not fix these problems and please the electorate by adopting a new 
system. Hence, parties’ positions on electoral reform heavily hinge on the overall level of party 
system fragmentation produced by the current rules.  
 
 At the same time, there is also some evidence that parties change the rules of the game to 
respond to some movements in the electoral arena that could jeopardize their political survival in 
the near future (Colomer 2004b). That is, parties are in constant search of more beneficial 
institutional arrangements, and their strategies in the electoral engineering domain are guided by 
previous (and anticipated) vote shares. This line of reasoning paints a picture of an unstable and 
dynamic institutional arena when party system fragmentation increases -a picture according to 
which the proliferation of small parties in the legislature is reflected in a widespread preference 
for permissive electoral institutions able to keep all of them in. In a similar vein, Kenneth Benoit 
(2004: 373-4) argues that that “a change in electoral institutions will occur when a political party 
or coalition of political parties supports an alternative which will bring it more seats than the 
statu quo electoral system”. And, analogously, Carles Boix (1999) explains the introduction of 
proportional representation (PR) as a damage-limitation strategy by right-wing parties in the face 
of a rising electoral threat from the left. 
 
 Finally, there is still a third strand of research that suggests that governments implement 
reforms to assuage public opinion (Dalton 2004). Using data from the World Values Survey, 
Norris (2011) demonstrates that democratic aspirations, measured as support to democratic 
ideals, are a strong, significant, and robust predictor of the occurrence of subsequent electoral 
reforms. Similarly, a recent paper by Alan Renwick and Jean-Benoit Pilet (2011) suggests there 
is an impact of citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy on the likelihood of electoral reform. 
This study, as most empirical studies on electoral reform to date, however, concentrates on the 
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determinants of institutional change. Furthermore, it lacks more precise information on actors’ 
positions disaggregated at least to the party-level. Whether democratic aspirations and 
dissatisfaction with democracy are associated or not, being perceived by voters as reformist 
actors could be in itself a valuable electoral asset in this context. For this reason, incumbent 
parties would be interested in enacting electoral reforms as a way of pleasing a corpus of critical 
citizens (Norris 1999).  
 
 To sum up, these three sets of studies provide somewhat different predictions as to 
whether (and which) electoral reforms are potentially beneficial from an electoral point of view. 
Yet, we still lack empirical evidence about whether (and when) electoral reforms lead to vote 
gains. Looking beyond the causes of the reform and incorporating information on parties’ stances 
may provide a fuller picture of the dynamics of electoral systems.  
 
 
8.3. Redistributive versus efficient electoral reforms 
The theoretical argument in this chapter is based on two assumptions. First, I argue that electoral 
reforms can be divided into two groups: electoral system changes which are more electorate-
friendly in essence versus those that are less popular. Second, I believe that voter utility is 
different for each type of modification of the rules of the game. In particular, I consider that 
restrictive reforms in case of high party system fragmentation are efficient and, hence, electorate-
friendly.  
 
 That voters may use institutional-related considerations in their decision making is 
apparent in the comparison of the efficient versus redistributive nature of electoral reforms 
(Tsebelis 1990). Institutional changes are efficient “if they improve … the condition of all (or 
almost all) individuals or groups in society.” By contrast, redistributive electoral reforms 
typically concern the improvement of “the conditions of one group of society at the expense of 
another” (pp. 104-106). Although electoral systems are in many ways archetypical redistributive 
institutions -that is, zero sum games where the seats that a party wins under an alternative status 
quo are lost by another party-, there are circumstances in which efficient aspects of the electoral 
system come to the fore (Renwick 2010: 11). For example, Sarah Birch et al. (2002) argue that 
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designers of founding electoral systems in Eastern Europe were focused on the long-term 
collective good, and tried to ensure fair outcomes by extensively adopting proportional 
representation. Similarly, other students of electoral systems have recognized that parties might 
also rank alternative institutions according to their capacity to balance representation against 
governability, encouraging conciliation and conflict management between rival, possibly violent, 
groups in society, or making elections accessible and meaningful (Benoit 2007). Given that 
people focus on these contrasting considerations in the case of electoral reforms, it is also likely 
that their voting behaviour reacts to the different parties’ positions on this issue. In other words, a 
direct implication of these arguments is that popular reactions should also reward parties that 
engage in processes of efficient electoral reform. 
 
Consider then the changes in the interparty dimension of the electoral systems. High 
party system fragmentation requires institutional action if it is to be “fixed”. A lack of change in 
this context or, even worse, a proportional reform is likely to be seen as a sign of 
unresponsiveness and self-interest; and a rational voter should reject an unresponsive party. 
Small party system size, on the other hand, gives opportunities for opening the system to new 
entrants. Supporting a restrictive modification of the electoral law in this type of scenario is 
therefore likely to be perceived as blatant manipulation, and rational voters should not vote for a 
party that advocates such a reform.  
 
By contrast, proposing restrictive electoral reforms in case of high party system 
fragmentation serves the purpose of building a reputation of commitment to the general interest 
although the fact that the party in question is large devalues to some extent such a proposal. If 
voters were concerned about the general lack of efficiency of the system in these contexts, it 
would be important to know where a party stands in the field of institutional engineering once we 
control for other usual determinants of electoral behaviour. The expression of a particular party’s 
position in an electoral reform process may not be about achieving pragmatic solutions; rather, it 
may be a commitment to the general good organization of the institutional structure of a country. 
Either pushing for a restrictive reform when party system fragmentation is low or advocating a 
permissive institutional change when the number of parties is high will very likely provoke 
discomfort among the electorate and undermine the credibility and commitment of the party to 
244 
 
an efficient solution of institutional problems. Furthermore, just as parties are likely to be as 
more credible and committed when they attempt to deal with a malfunctioning electoral system, 
so they are likely to be seen as exhibiting extra doses of credibility and to appear specially 
committed when they advocate a reform that in principle goes against their strictly electoral self-
interest (e.g., a small party pursuing a restrictive electoral system change in case of high party 
system fragmentation). Such counter-intuitive institutional strategies may, thus, not only ensure 
the vote of existing supporters but are also likely to appeal to potential new voters.   
 
 How supporting the “right” electoral reform can matter is illustrated vividly by the final 
election in New Zealand under the former first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. Much of the 
political competition between the parties in 1993 there revolved around the issue of electoral 
reform. While the Alliance strongly and publicly favoured mixed-member proportional (MMP), 
Labour was formally opposed to MMP but informally split on the issue, and New Zealand First’s 
leader Winston Peters privately favoured the reform although the party did not take any formal 
stance, National was the only party that vociferously opposed the change in the rules (Denemark 
2001). In the end, the fact that the National Party suffered at the polls (losing almost 13 points) 
may also have been due, at least partially, to its support of an unpopular electoral system -not 
only throughout several past decades but also during the 1993 binding referendum campaign on 
electoral reform.
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 The example of the 1993 New Zealand election, although anecdotal, serves the purpose 
of illustrating how voters may prefer proportionality over majoritarianism in the case of low 
party system fragmentation. And this preference for a more proportional system was reinforced 
when twice in a row in the early 1980s the victory in seat shares went to the party that received 
fewer votes. Given these preferences of voters on institutional alternatives, support for FPTP was 
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 While plausible, the attribution of the swing against the National Party to its stance on the electoral reform 
referéndum should not go without qualification. According to Levine and Roberts (1994), those most likely when 
likely in the election to stop supporting the National Party were those most angry about the government’s record but 
also those most upset about the operation of an allegedly unjust system that considerably privileged the two major 
parties. Hence, it could be argued that the opposition to change the electoral system mostly apparent among National 
Party legislators contributed to the strong vote against it.    
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likely to undermine the electoral performance of the party and lead to loss of voter support – as it 
actually did.
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8.4. Research design and measurement 
If this theoretical argument was valid, the following implications should hold: first, voters should 
be aware of parties’ positions in the electoral reform processes; and second, they should take into 
consideration these stances when casting their vote.
253
 Since according to Duverger electoral 
reforms may have effects on parties’ vote totals only in the case of successful attempts to change 
the rules of the game, there should be no clear predictions about the electoral consequences of 
advocating institutional modifications when they are not finally implemented. By contrast, 
following my “theory” we should observe a positive impact of supporting the “right” electoral 
reform on parties’ vote totals even in the case of no actual electoral system change. In order to 
test these observable implications, I look at several processes of electoral reform in Western and 
Eastern Europe from 1956 to 2008. The unit of analysis is a political party at a given election and 
the data are organized as party panels.  
 
Before I move to the main body of this research, a note on case selection needs to be 
made. First, I study processes in which major rules that shape electoral outcomes at the national 
level are at stake. I limit the meaning of major reform of national electoral systems to the 
wholesale replacement of the electoral formula (Katz 2005). I prefer to confine my analysis to 
such relatively small number of cases because my argument requires electoral reform to be a 
salient issue in the political arena; and this is better ensured when the wholesale replacement of 
the electoral formula is at stake, as it is directly related to the principle of representation in place 
in the country (Nohlen 1984a). Obviously, parties are freer to do what they like for less salient 
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 Another typical example of how parties’ positions regarding reform may affect their subsequent electoral 
performance is the 1953 Italian election. The losses then of all four centrist parties (i.e., Democrazia Cristiana, 
Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano, Partito Liberale Italianoand Partito Repubblicano Italiano) were perceived as 
directly attributable to the legge truffa (LaPalombara 1953: 686). 
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 Both these two requirements are clearly associated with the question of whether the issue of electoral system 
change is salient to the general public. Given that I will focus on major electoral reforms, I do not believe this is a 
problem.  
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reforms (for example, raising a legal threshold). For this reason, we don't expect responsive (or 
responsible) behavior from parties in the absence of salience.  
 
Yet, the identification of a case of electoral reform without specifying the direction in 
which the rules of the game change is clearly insufficient. On this basis, it is very useful to 
distinguish between permissive and restrictive reforms, which are expected to decrease and 
increase the overall disproportionality produced by the electoral rules, respectively (Taagepera 
and Shugart 1989). In general, disproportionality can be defined as “the deviation of parties’ seat 
shares from their vote shares” (Lijphart 1994: 57). An electoral reform is coded as permissive 
when politicians consider switching from a majoritarian to either a mixed or a proportional 
formula, or when they think about replacing a mixed system with a proportional one. Moreover, 
the replacement of first past the post by a majority runoff system is expected to create less 
deviation of parties’ seat shares from their vote shares and, as a result, is considered to be a 
permissive reform. And the reverse holds for restrictive reforms. 
 
In order to guarantee saliency again, I follow Matthew Shugart (2008) in only 
considering those processes that are at least arms length from the government and its 
parliamentary majority, because a certain threshold of seriousness has been crossed when a 
government allows a body outside its direct control to study the electoral system and make a 
formal recommendation for a new system. Furthermore, the dataset does not only gather 
information on successful electoral reforms. As long as the research question is whether parties’ 
positions on electoral reform have an impact on their future vote totals, all the processes of major 
electoral reform that cross this threshold of seriousness and for which data are available are 
considered. Moreover, combining failed and successful attempts of electoral reform allows me to 
see whether the impact of parties’ positions on vote totals is larger in the latter. Finally, the 
dataset used to conduct the analysis is particularly suitable for a comparative study of the impact 
of parties’ positions in electoral reform processes on their subsequent performance at the polls 
because it includes a numerous and heterogeneous list of cases that offer a substantial amount of 
variation.  
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Because the main hypothesis is addressed through a hierarchical analysis comprising two 
levels of interest (party and process), multilevel modelling is the most appropriate technique to 
assess the effects of my independent variables. In addition, the hypothesis concerning the effect 
of parties’ positions across different levels of party system fragmentation implies the 
implementation of a random-intercepts model, and the specification of a cross-level interaction 
between one level-1 and one level-2 contextual variable whereby the marginal effect of this main 
independent variable (i.e., parties’ positions) varies across parties within the same election. 
Third, when analyzing the impact of level-1 variables across different contextual units, a 
multilevel analysis is a better choice for technical reasons such as avoiding the truncation of the 
variance and correcting the standard errors (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).  
 
The dependent variable, Vote Change, is operationalized as the change in the percentage 
of votes received by a given party across two consecutive national legislative elections. Negative 
values on this variable indicate the vote share lost while positive values indicate the vote share 
gained by the party. 
 
8.4.1. The independent variable 
The preferences of parties have been coded by national experts (one per country) who were 
asked about the degree of support for the proposal of electoral reform by each parliamentary 
party at the beginning of the process. Table 8.1 reports some relevant information about the 
electoral reform processes examined. Experts were told to only rely on official and public 
materials such as discourses, manifestos or legislative votes. The coding scheme is fourfold and 
ranges from “fully against the proposal” to “fully in favour of it”, with “somehow against” and 
“somehow in favour” in the middle.254  The “fully” positions were attributed to parties that 
expressed an unconditional support or opposition to the proposal and that were unified on the 
subject. The “somehow” positions were given to parties with a more balanced view, either 
because they were internally divided or because they did not support the implementation of the 
reform unconditionally.
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 The intermediate categories would make more sense as “somewhat for (or against)” but I prefer to stick to the 
original wording of the expert survey. 
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 The processes of electoral reform analyzed include: Albania 2003, Albania 2008, Austria 1989, Belgium 2000, 
Bolivia 1993, Canada 1989, Colombia 2002, Czech Republic 1998, France 1985, France 1986, France 2007, Ireland 
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Table 8.1. Description of the electoral reform processes 
Country Year Electoral 
Rules 
Electoral 
Reform 
Direction Outcome Expert 
Albania 2003 FPTP 2RS Proportional Adopted Fisnik Korenica/Dren Doli 
Albania 2008 Mixed List PR Proportional Adopted Fisnik Korenica/Dren Doli 
Austria 1989 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Non-adopted Wolfgang C. Müller 
Belgium 2000 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Non-adopted Jean-Benoit Pilet 
Bolivia 1994 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Adopted Miguel Centellas 
Canada 1989 FPTP Mixed Proportional Non-adopted Louis Massicotte 
Colombia 2003 “SNTV” List PR Majoritarian Adopted Matthew Shugart 
Czech R. 1998 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Non-adopted Sean Hanley 
France 1985 2RS List PR Proportional Adopted Pierre Martin 
France 1986 List PR 2RS Majoritarian Non-adopted Pierre Martin 
France 2007 2RS Mixed Proportional Non-adopted Pierre Martin 
Ireland 1959 STV FPTP Majoritarian Non-adopted Conor Little 
Ireland 1968 STV FPTP Majoritarian Non-adopted Conor Little 
Israel 1992 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Adopted Gideon Rahat 
Israel 2001 Mixed List PR Proportional Adopted Gideon Rahat 
Italy 1993 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Adopted Caterina Paolucci 
Italy  2005 Mixed List PR + bonus Proportional Adopted Caterina Paolucci 
Japan 1955 SNTV FPTP Majoritarian Non-adopted Kuni Nemoto 
Japan 1994 SNTV Mixed Majoritarian Adopted Kuni Nemoto 
Lithuania 2000 2RS FPTP Majoritarian Adopted Algis Krupavicius 
Lithuania 2004 FPTP 2RS Proportional Adopted Algis Krupavicius 
Macedonia 1998 FPTP Mixed Proportional Adopted Trajche Panov 
Macedonia 2002 Mixed List PR Proportional Adopted Trajche Panov 
Netherlands 2002 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Non-adopted Henk van der Kolk 
New Zealand 1992 FPTP Mixed Proportional Adopted Stephen Levine 
Romania 2004 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Non-adopted Alexandra Ionascu 
Romania 2008 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Adopted Daniela Vintila 
Ukraine 2005 Mixed List PR Proportional Adopted Erik Herron 
U. Kingdom 1997 FPTP Mixed Proportional Non-adopted Alan Renwick 
Venezuela 1993 List PR Mixed Majoritarian Adopted Brian Crisp 
 
The extent of support for change, however, is not in itself a useful indicator for testing the 
hypothesis because the “theory” only takes into account the expected impact of the proposed 
change on the party system size. Thus, parties’ positions were re-coded according to this latter 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1959, Ireland 1968, Israel 1992, Israel 2001, Italy 1993, Italy 2005, Japan 1955, Japan 1994, Lithuania 2000, 
Lithuania 2004, Macedonia 1998, Macedonia 2002, Netherlands 2002, New Zealand 1992, Romania 2004, Romania 
2008, Ukraine 2005, United Kingdom 1997 and Venezuela 1993. The date indicates the year in which the proposal 
formally entered the government’s agenda. I would like to specially thank Damien Bol for having kindly shared his 
dataset with me. I am currently in the process of including new electoral reform processes (for example, Spain 
2008). Table 8.1 reports the formula that was intended to be replaced, the proposed formula to do it, the expected 
impact of the change in terms of proportionality, whether the new electoral system was finally adopted, and the 
name of the national expert that helped me or us to code the parties’ positions.   
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consideration. The resulting variable provides a measure for the disproportionality-
proportionality position of a party, and takes value 0 if it is “totally against” implementing a 
proportional reform, 1 if it is “somehow against”, 2 if it is “somehow in favour” and 3 if it is 
“totally in favour”. Positions are coded in the opposed direction when a majoritarian reform is 
discussed. 
 
 Finally, it is important to make a point on party system fragmentation. As can be seen in 
the previous sections, the entire chapter revolves around the idea that the number of parties 
highly determines the impact of parties’ positions in electoral reform processes on their 
subsequent vote totals. In other words, parties’ stances in favour of a more restrictive system 
have a positive effect on their subsequent electoral performance when electoral party system 
fragmentation is high; and the reverse is expected when fragmentation is low. For this reason, 
the key independent variable is an interaction between the stance of each party in the reform 
process and the level of party system fragmentation, which is captured by the effective number 
of electoral parties (ENEP). This index was first introduced by Markku Laakso and Rein 
Taagepera in 1979, and indicates “the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would have 
the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as have the actual parties of unequal size” 
(p. 4). Its exact operationalization corresponds to the inverse of the sum of the square of all 
parties’ vote shares, and ranges from 1 to infinity (in fact, to the number of parties that obtain at 
least one vote).
256
 In the past two decades, the effective number of parties “has become the most 
widely used measure” of party system size (Lijphart 1994: 70) because it considerably improves 
on earlier measures of party system fragmentation. First, it is comparable across very diverse 
countries. Moreover, it weights the count of parties by their relative electoral strength, and, 
hence, takes into account their “coalition” and “blackmail” power (Sartori 2005 [1976]). Maurice 
Duverger (1964 [1954]: 207-208) clearly had the concept of effective parties in mind when 
discussing party systems (see also Clark and Golder 2006: 680). However, using it also entails 
potential problems that cannot be ignored.
257
 
                                                          
256
 Source: Golder (2005) complemented by Gallagher’s dataset 
(www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php). 
257
 One such potential problem corresponds to the “other” and “independent” categories. In this chapter, I correct the 
effective number of electoral parties by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera 
(1997). This operation essentially requires calculating the effective number of electoral parties treating both 
categories as a single party (smallest effective number of parties), then recalculating the effective number of parties 
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8.4.2. Control variables 
In order to reliably estimate whether parties’ positions on electoral reform make them gain or 
lose votes, it is also necessary to control for several other variables potentially influencing 
parties’ vote shares. First, it has long been observed that parties in government tend to lose votes, 
i.e., bear the "cost of ruling" (Mackie and Rose 1983). Thus, if an existing party belonged to a 
governing coalition before a given election was held, then their vote loss might be greater 
regardless of any electoral reform. Government incumbent is measured by a dummy variable 
coded 1 if a party was in office and 0 otherwise (Müller and Strøm 2000). Further, poor 
economic performance may trigger overall vote shifts (Anderson 1995).This effect is captured by 
a change in the real GDP per capita (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars, divided by 
1000).
258
 Alternatively, I also use the mean three-year GDP growth (two years prior to election 
year + election year),
259
 the unemployment
260
 and the inflation rate (measured by the annual 
growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator)
261
 of the election year. These measures of economic 
performance are interacted with the incumbency variable because I expect to see government 
parties performing worse in hard economic times. Finally, turnout change is measured by a 
difference in voter turnout between the previous and the current elections.
262
 I include this 
control because the question of whether higher turnout would benefit some particular parties is 
still an empirically open question (Lavezzolo Pérez and Riera Sagrera 2008; Lutz and Marsh 
2006). Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 8.2. The actual number of 
cases each country or process provides depends on the number of parliamentary parties. It is 
important to note that there is neither country nor process that supplies more than 9 per cent of 
the total number of cases in any of the analyses presented below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as if every vote in the “other” and “independent” categories belonged to a different party (largest effective number 
of parties) and taking the mean. The incidence of independent candidacies is only high in Russia and Ukraine.   
258
 Source: Bolt and van Zanden (2013). 
259
 Calculated from data in Bolt and van Zanden (2013). 
260
 Source: Year Book of Labour Statistics, International Labour Office. 
261
 Source: www.worldbank.org. 
262
 Sources: www.idea.int and author's calculations. 
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Table 8.2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
∆ Votes -0.69 8.42 -32.5 32.48 174 
Support PR 1.65 1.28 0 3 174 
Support Change 1.72 1.27 0 3 174 
ENEP 5.84 2.34 2.72 10.46 174 
Adopted 0.51 0.501 0 1 174 
Incumbent 0.31 0.46 0 1 174 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) 11.86 6.85 2.28 21.77 174 
∆ Turnout -3.03 9.107 -21.65 24.14 174 
Seats/Votes Ratio 0.98 0.63 0 5.86 173 
Ideology 0.12 0.93 -3.74 2.43 75 
 
 
8.5. Analysis 
8.5.1. Benchmark models 
The regression results reported in Table 8.3 confirm that the positions parties take on electoral 
reform have a different effect on vote share according to the level of party system fragmentation. 
Model 1 only uses the control variables as explanatory factors. Model 2 adds parties’ positions 
on electoral reform and shows that parties that have supported a proportional electoral reform are 
not more likely to gain votes than parties that have advocated a restrictive change in the rules of 
the game. Model 3 introduces the common effective number of electoral parties that will be used 
in interactions that capture the role of party system size. The variable reaches statistical 
significance, indicating that fragmented party systems have a positive effect on votes gained by 
the parties. These two first results hold when the variables are used together (Model 4). When the 
relevant interaction effects are added, however (Model 5), we see a different story. In a barely 
fragmented party system, parties that have supported a proportional reform are more likely to 
gain votes than parties that have advocated a restrictive change in the rules of the game; the 
effect of the variable Support PR is positive and highly significant. By contrast, as party system 
fragmentation increases, support for a permissive electoral reform becomes damaging: the effect 
of the interaction Effective Number of Electoral Parties*Support PR is statistically significant 
and negative, indicating that parties that have supported a permissive electoral system change in  
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Table 8.3. Regression analysis of vote share gained or lost by parties, hierarchical linear 
models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      
Incumbent -12.26*** -12.59*** -12.20*** -12.55*** -12.46*** 
 
(2.656) (2.666) (2.638) (2.646) (2.511) 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) -0.094 -0.0874 -0.109 -0.102 -0.135 
 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.1) 
Incumbent*Real GDP per Capita 0.536*** 0.542*** 0.502*** 0.507*** 0.541*** 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.189) (0.18) 
∆ Turnout 0.047 0.059 0.053 0.065 0.064 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.063) 
Support PR 
 
-0.59 
 
-0.625 4.357*** 
  
(0.476) 
 
(0.473) (1.216) 
ENEP 
  
0.478* 0.491* 1.984*** 
   
(0.262) (0.262) (0.42) 
Support PR*ENEP 
    
-0.845*** 
     
(0.192) 
Constant 2.303 3.282** -0.189 0.778 -7.742*** 
 
(1.445) (1.645) (1.982) (2.109) (2.781) 
Intercept Variance at Level 1 26.06*** 20.44*** 21.13*** 22.40*** 23.57*** 
 
(4.478) (3.655) (3.939) (3.642) (1.838) 
Intercept Variance at Level 2 2.067*** 2.065*** 2.060*** 2.058*** 2.005*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Log Likelihood -606.48 -605.54 -605.25 -604.21 -595.69 
AIC 1226.97 1227.08 1226.508 1226.42 1211.39 
BIC 1249.08 1252.35 1251.78 1254.85 1242.98 
N (Observations) 174 174 174 174 174 
J (Processes) 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: The dependent variable is Vote Change; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed tests); Standard errors in 
parentheses; Hierarchical linear models are specified.  
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a context of high party system fragmentation are more likely to lose votes than parties that were 
in favour of a restrictive reform. For example, Austrian parties in 1989 (i.e., in a barely 
fragmented party system) that decreased their support for the proposed majoritarian reform by 
one point on my scale were expected to have a positive change in the vote share from the 1986 to 
the 1990 election of about 2.07 per cent (4.35-0.84*2.72). 
263
 By contrast, Belgian parties in 
2000 (i.e., in a highly fragmented party system) that increased their support for keeping the 
extremely proportional electoral system then in force by one point on my scale tended to lose 
4.28 per cent of votes in the 2003 elections (4.35-0.84*10.28).
264
 Given that the median absolute 
change in vote share for the parties and elections under consideration is 5.60 per cent, supporting 
the “right” electoral system is a consequential decision for any political party. 
  
 In addition to the variables measuring parties’ positions on electoral reform, government 
membership and economic performance have statistically significant effects on changes in vote 
shares. Compared to opposition parties, parties in government lose about 12 per cent more of 
their votes.
265
 The result indicates that there are significant costs of ruling, in line with the 
negative incumbency advantage suggested by Kaare Strøm et al. (2008). Also, when economy is 
doing well, the likelihood that any given party in government will lose votes is lower.
 266
 This 
effect most likely reflects economic voting dynamic: in case of good economic times, i.e., when 
the economy grows at fast rates, citizens will reward the incumbent. By contrast, when the 
economic growth is equal to zero, the parties that are in government will suffer important 
                                                          
263
 The case selected is Austria 1989 because it has the lowest effective number of electoral parties (i.e., 2.72) 
among the sampled countries. There, the Freedom Party, that was completely against the restrictive electoral reform 
proposed, made substantial gains (+6.91 percent) while the Christian Democrats, that were somewhat in favour, 
were down more than 9 percentage points. Finally, the Greens, that were fully against, and the Socialists, that were 
somewhat in favour, managed to hold their 1986 positions. 
264
 Analogously, the case selected is Belgium 2000 because of its very high effective number of electoral parties 
(i.e., 10.28). There, the two Green parties, for example, strongly opposed to a restrictive reform and suffered severe 
losses in the 2003 elections (i.e., -4.44 percent for the Flemish Agalev and -3.33 percent for the Francophone 
ECOLO) while the two parties that were slightly in favour of the reform proposed (i.e., Vlaams Liberale 
Democraten, VLD, and Parti Réformateur Libéral, PRL) made some electoral gains (1.15 per cent and 1.17 per 
cent, respectively). 
265
 This coefficient corresponds to the effect of ruling when economic growth is equal to zero. When the variable 
incumbency is included in the models in a linear way, the effect is smaller but still statistically significant.  
266
 The use of unemployment rates as robustness checks regarding these points (not reported) did not change the 
results at all and showed clearly that the findings are not economic growth-specific. 
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electoral loses.
267
 Finally, turnout does not exert any significant effect on parties’ vote shares, 
and results are remarkably robust to its inclusion or exclusion.  
 
 I plot then in Figure 8.1 the conditional effect for parties’ support of a more inclusive 
formula on their vote totals in the following election for a reasonable range of values of the 
effective number of electoral parties. According to Thomas Brambor et al. (2006) and Cindy 
Kam and Robert Franzese (2007), the effect of an interaction term cannot be evaluated through 
the p-value shown in the regression table. Thus, it is necessary to graphically illustrate the 
marginal effect of the main explanatory factor on parties’ electoral performance over different 
values of the modifying variable. As predicted in the hypotheses section, supporting a permissive 
electoral reform has a strong reductive effect on a party’s vote totals when party system 
fragmentation is sufficiently high (i.e., when the effective number of electoral parties is higher 
than 6 or so) but not when it is lower than that threshold. Moreover, Figure 8.1 corroborates my 
hypothesis in a second sense because it shows positive statistically significant effects at low 
values of party system fragmentation (less than 3.5). Finally, Figure 8.1 clearly shows that the 
type of reform advocated by the party does not have any statistically significant effect on its vote 
totals at the following election when the effective number of electoral parties is between 3.5 and 
6. To sum up, the results presented here clearly indicate that parties that support a proportional 
reform should expect to be punished by the electorate only when the effective number of parties 
is already high. 
 
As a final matter of illustration, Figure 8.2 shows the relationship between the estimates 
of the support for a more permissive system with the level of party system fragmentation. As 
argues in my hypothesis and shown in the models above, there is a pattern of association 
according to which the strength (or slope) of the support for more PR decreases as the effective 
number of electoral parties goes up. This graph permits us to visualize clearly the exact dynamics 
of this conditional effect and to underline the existence of outliers. For example, despite the  
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 This clear result is in contrast to the inconclusive findings found in much of the extant economic voting literature 
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). One reason for this will be the fact that my model focuses on parties rather than 
governments, as advocated by van der Brug et al. (2007). Another is the fact that this model controls for what must 
have been a major omitted variable in previous work -effects of support for or opposition to electoral reforms of 
different types. 
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Figure 8.1. Marginal effect of pro-PR on vote change as effective number of electoral 
parties increases, hierarchical linear models  
 
Note: Results are derived from Table 8.3, Model 5. 
 
considerable party system fragmentation brought about by the 1999 Israeli elections, parties did 
not benefit for advocating the preservation of the direct election of the Prime Minister (i.e., the 
theoretically more restrictive system). The fact that this clause, employed for the first time in 
1996, did not help to curb the extraordinarily high party system fragmentation registered in that 
country could be the reason (Hazan 2001). 
 
8.5.2. Additional tests 
Thus far, support for electoral reforms has been treated as exogenous. This provides the most 
direct test of the theoretical argument, which does not directly relate the expected change in vote 
shares to a party’s position on electoral reform. It is, however, also interesting to explore whether  
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Figure 8.2. Support for more PR slope and party system fragmentation at the electoral 
level 
 
Note: The fitted model from which this estimate is calculated is a random slopes model that contains only one 
independent variable (the position of the party regarding increasing the permissiveness of the electoral system), and 
whose dependent variable is the change in vote share.  
 
the potential endogeneity of the “treatment” matters. In terms of electoral reforms, the general 
expectation is that as parties’ electoral prospects get worse their incentives to modify the rules of 
the game increase. Hence, it is unreasonable to expect parties’ positions on electoral reform to be 
randomly assigned (e.g., Colomer 2004b). Rather, some pre-treatment variables (e.g., parties’ 
foreseen electoral fortunes) are likely to have an effect on the support of the party for electoral 
system change. To address this identification problem, it will be important to find a way to 
instrument parties’ positions on electoral reform so that their impact on future vote totals are not 
confounded by parties’ expected change in vote shares. But before getting into that, the 
following variables had to be coded.  
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First, I constructed an indicator to measure whether the electoral reform was finally 
adopted. In order to get an indicator for the degree of reformism of a party with regard to the 
electoral system, I used the original answers from the national experts’ survey about its degree of 
support for the reform. I then included one interaction term in the regression models -
Adopted*ProChange- in order to see whether the electoral benefit of a party that supports an 
electoral reform depends on the actual implementation of the institutional change. Thus, the 
alternative hypothesis that needs to be tested is the following: parties’ institutional preferences 
on electoral reform that correspond with actual changes in electoral legislation are associated 
with changes in vote totals. Yet, as seen above, it is reasonable to expect endogeneity problems 
to begin to arise when testing such a hypothesis. How can we make parties’ preferences for 
electoral system change exogenous to their electoral prospects? In this section I address this issue 
through the use of parties’ ideology together with seats/votes ratio under the current electoral 
rules as instruments of actual positions on reform.
268
  
 
The goal of this last analysis is to examine whether those parties that support the electoral 
reform would be more likely to electorally benefit from it under the counterfactual situation of 
not supporting it. Following the conventional terminology in the Neyman-Rubin framework of 
causal inference (Neyman 1990 [1923]; Rubin 1974 and 2006; Angrist et al. 1996; see for a 
review Sekhon 2009), this effect is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT, where 
treated here are those supporting the electoral system change). To be sure, by using ideology and 
seats/votes ratio as instrumental variables of actual support in order to account for the selection 
problem, the treatment effect parameter becomes what is known as the Local Average Treatment 
Effect (LATE). To get an unbiased estimate of the LATE, however, the instruments need to 
satisfy two critical criteria (Abadie 2003): the exclusionary restriction and the non-zero causal 
effect of the instrument on the treatment.
269
 Regarding the latter, suffice it to say that several 
previous studies have found significant effects of both instruments on politicians’ preferences for 
electoral reform (Bol 2011; Bowler et al. 2006; Pilet and Bol 2011). Moreover, ideology and 
seats/votes ratio help to predict attitudes towards electoral reform in this case: bivariate 
                                                          
268
 Sources: Manifesto Project Database (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/) and author's calculations, respectively. 
269
 The list is longer, but for the sake of simplicity I have decided to focus on these two assumptions. 
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correlations confirm that the four variables are reliably related.
270
 I later provide more evidence 
on how these relationships hold even when pre-treatment characteristics are taken into account. 
 
The second assumption requires more scrutiny. Exclusion postulates that if let’s say left-
wing parties are fundamentally different from right-wing parties in various respects related to 
subsequent electoral performance, the instrumental variable could have an impact on parties’ 
vote shares irrespective of whether the party supported the electoral system change or not. In 
other words, to function as a satisfactory instrument ideological position must not be 
systematically related to electoral performance. Otherwise left parties would always gain (or 
always lose). In practice this happens about half the time. So if we see ideological position as a 
randomizing device for distinguishing between pro- and anti-PR parties, it has face validity as 
such a tool. Hence, exclusion depends merely on how well ideology and seats-votes ratio work 
as randomization devices in distinguishing between the two groups.  
 
The effects of these additional propositions are presented below, and the results confirm 
my expectations. First, I present several additional “naïve” models in Table 8.4 which include 
parties’ positions towards electoral change system (first linearly [i.e., not interacted with 
anything] and then interacted with Adopted) as predictors of change in vote totals and some 
interesting patterns emerge. As can be seen in Models 1 and 3, parties do not gain additional 
votes due to the mere act of supporting any kind of electoral reform. However, Models 4 and 5 
indicate that those parties that support an electoral system change that is finally adopted 
(whatever impact it is expected to have on the party system) do perform significantly worse in 
the following elections. These findings provide new insights for our current understanding of the 
consequences of electoral system design. The results here show that, despite the unprecedented 
erosion of political support observed in Western Europe in the last two decades (Dalton 2004), 
crediting “reformist” parties may not be automatic. In theory, citizens who are critical about the 
way democracy works should electorally reward a party that advocates an electoral system  
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 The correlation between Support PR and Seats-Votes Ratio is -0.263 (statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level); the correlation between Support PR and Ideology is -0.409 (statistically significant at the 1 per cent level); 
and the correlation between ProChange and Seats-Votes Ratio is -0.211 (statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level). All these correlations are a bit low, significance lvl notwithstanding, and can create problems because they 
can badly bias the estimate.   
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Table 8.4. Regression analysis of vote share gained or lost by parties, hierarchical linear 
models (II) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
      
Incumbent -11.38*** -12.25*** -11.40*** -12.50*** -12.77*** 
 
(2.685) (2.661) (2.695) (2.64) (2.615) 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) -0.114 -0.111 -0.117 -0.178* -0.200* 
 
(0.106) (0.11) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) 
Incumbent*Real GDP per Capita 0.484** 0.532*** 0.484** 0.599*** 0.560*** 
 
(0.191) (0.191) (0.192) (0.19) (0.188) 
∆ Turnout 0.042 0.051 0.043 0.075 0.096 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) 
Support Change -0.871* 
 
-0.852* 0.669 0.647 
 
(0.488) 
 
(0.506) (0.674) (0.68) 
Adopted 
 
-0.753 -0.189 5.376** 4.701** 
  
(1.281) (1.318) (2.117) (2.169) 
Support Change*Adopted 
   
-3.271*** -3.226*** 
    
(0.991) (0.994) 
Support PR 
    
-0.622 
     
(0.482) 
ENEP 
    
0.540** 
     
(0.255) 
Constant 3.951** 2.915 4.070** 2.819 1.54 
 
(1.707) (1.784) (1.902) (1.887) (2.569) 
Intercept Variance at Level 1 24.2*** 26.97*** 18.22*** 17.80*** 24.81*** 
 
(3.885) (4.623) (4.602) (3.674) (4.29) 
Intercept Variance at Level 2 2.060*** 2.069*** 2.063*** 2.035*** 2.023*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
Log Likelihood -604.69 -605.14 -603.49 -597.28 -594.58 
AIC 1225.4 1226.29 1224.99 1214.56 1213.17 
BIC 1250.67 1251.56 1253.42 1246.15 1251.08 
N (Observations) 174 174 174 174 174 
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J (Processes) 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: The dependent variable is Vote Change; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed tests); Standard errors in 
parentheses; Hierarchical linear models are specified.  
 
change (Norris 1999). However, this expectation extracted from the literature is not corroborated 
by the empirical analyses. There are two basic reasons that might explain these negative findings. 
 
First of all, voters should expect parties to pursue the adoption of the system that best 
serves their interests. Parties’ attempts to change the rules of the game can be perceived by 
voters as a blatant manipulation, and, as a result, they will opt for another party.
271
 Moreover, 
support for reforms is not randomly assigned to the parties of interest in at least a second 
important sense: established parties that are sinking ships have incentives to change the electoral 
system so that they minimize the losses they will face at the following election. Hence, what is 
essentially needed is to reverse the direction of causality and to specify models in which 
preferences for electoral reform are used as outcomes rather than predictors because there are 
good reasons to think that negative changes in vote totals lead parties to adopt reformist positions 
on electoral reform and not the other way around.  
 
Models in Table 8.5 replicate the analysis presented in previous tables using ideology and 
the seats/votes ratio as instruments for support of electoral reforms. The results confirm that the 
original findings about the modifying effect of party system size on the relationship between 
support of a permissive electoral reform and change in vote totals also hold when I address the 
endogeneity problems. Hence, this new evidence increases the credibility of the previous 
analysis and seems to corroborate the story mentioned above: the commitment to the general 
interest by parties that support a restrictive reform when the number of parties is high is 
rewarded by voters at ensuing elections. 
 
First of all, the assumption regarding the power of the instruments holds in all the tests. 
As is shown in the first and third columns, knowing the ideology or the seats-votes ratio of a  
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 The sample only includes cases from the last three decades and, nowadays, many citizens lack a party 
identification and become swing voters. Hence, the interests of parties are not necessarily the interests of their voters 
in one election. 
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Table 8.5. Regression analysis of vote share gained or lost by parties, hierarchical linear 
and two-stage least squares models 
  1
st
-stage 2SLS 1
st
-stage 2SLS 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) 
     
Incumbent 
 
-11.11** 
 
-12.88*** 
  
(5.016) 
 
(2.351) 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) 
 
-0.174 
 
-0.074 
  
(0.19) 
 
(0.093) 
Incumbent*Real GDP per Capita 
 
0.412 
 
0.567*** 
  
(0.282) 
 
(0.168) 
∆ Turnout 
 
-0.170* 
 
0.036 
  
(0.095) 
 
(0.058) 
Ideology -0.533*** 
   
 
(0.141) 
   
Support PR 
 
12.02*** 
 
18.96*** 
  
(4.486) 
 
(6.726) 
ENEP 
 
4.483*** 
 
6.016*** 
  
(1.459) 
 
(1.284) 
Support PR*ENEP 
 
-2.256*** 
 
-3.622*** 
  
(0.814) 
 
(0.797) 
Seats/Votes Ratio 
  
-0.455*** 
 
   
(0.148) 
 
Constant 1.619*** -20.45** 2.042*** -30.01*** 
 
(0.161) (8.37) (0.198) (10.97) 
Intercept Variance at Level 1 0.082 1.512*** 0.154*** 1.935*** 
 
(0.088) (0.086) (0.058) (0.055) 
Intercept Variance at Level 2 1.044** 21.57*** 0.705*** 17.65*** 
 
(0.506) (6.114) (0.26) (4.231) 
Log Likelihood -116.58 -216.08 -283.45 -577.61 
AIC 241.17 452.17 574.906 1175.22 
BIC 250.44 475.35 587.51 1206.75 
N (Observations) 75 75 173 173 
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J (Processes) 14 14 30 30 
Note: Entries are hierarchical linear coefficients; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed tests); Standard errors in 
parentheses.  
 
party helps us to predict whether it will support an electoral reform. The estimate comes from an 
OLS regression and hence it represents the marginal effect of moving the position of a party 
towards the right pole of the ideological scale or increasing its seats-votes ratio on its support to 
a more permissive electoral system. Both instruments appear to decrease the level of support of 
the party to the reform. The results of the two-stage least squares estimations (2SLS) appear in 
the second and fourth columns. More specifically, the second column shows that being one point 
more in favour of a permissive reform (instrumented by the ideology of the party) increases the 
vote share at the following election by 12.3 per cent when the effective number of parties is 
equal to zero (i.e., an impossible situation). However, this positive effect marginally declines by 
2.2 per cent as the number of parties increases. This effect is slightly larger when we use 
seats/votes ratio as instrument in the fourth column. In this latter model, I find that support for a 
permissive reform (instrumented by the seats/votes ratio of the party) increases its vote share in 
the subsequent election by more than 18 percentage points (p<0.01) when the effective number 
of electoral parties is zero; this positive effect tends to decline by 3.6 percentage points as party 
system fragmentation marginally increases.  
 
 Finally, Figure 8.3 shows that the hypothesized conditional effect between support for a 
more permissive electoral system and party system fragmentation at the electoral level is 
significant in case of quite low and quite high effective numbers of parties, when I make parties’ 
positions with regard to electoral reform exogenous. This means that parties that support more 
permissive and restrictive electoral rules in case of low and high party system fragmentation, 
respectively, are rewarded by the citizens in the subsequent electoral contest.  
 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
There is an increasing interest in whether and how established parties institutionally respond to 
challenges from newly mobilized political alternatives (Katz and Mair 1995). The common  
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Figure 8.3. Marginal effect of pro-PR on vote change as effective number of electoral 
parties increases, hierarchical linear and two-stage least squares models 
 
Note: Results are derived from the first model in Table 8.5. Left-Right ideology is used as an IV of being Pro-PR in 
predicting vote change. 
 
assumption in the studies that take electoral systems as endogenous is that parties are seat 
maximizers-a goal that becomes a driving force behind the willingness to tinker with the 
electoral rules. The results of the current chapter make an important contribution to this evolving 
literature and, more broadly, to the huge literature on representation theory. More specifically, 
the study tackles the yet unanswered question of whether parties’ positions on electoral reform, 
assumed to have been undertaken to maximize one’s seat share, actually have an impact on vote 
shares. The results indicate that parties’ positions on this issue do have an impact on vote totals, 
but this effect differs according to whether the number of parties is at the moment high or low. In 
the case of the former, supporting a restrictive reform is associated with increased vote totals, 
while supporting a permissive electoral system change is associated with decreased vote totals; 
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and the reverse holds for situations of low party system fragmentation. Additional analysis 
showed that, perhaps surprisingly, parties are not rewarded for advocating a reform that is finally 
implemented. This finding implies that being on the winning side by itself, independent of the 
direction of the institutional change, does not improve the electoral prospects of a party. Future 
studies are necessary in order to examine whether this result is driven by actors’ extraordinary 
myopia or it is caused by the already very dark electoral prospects of actual reformers.  
 
Although the distinction between fragmented and concentrated party systems is present in 
many different studies, its potentially profound modifying effect on the electoral consequences 
of parties’ preferences for institutional change has not been sufficiently recognized. This chapter 
puts this distinction at the centre of its theoretical argument. By doing so, it has been able to 
provide novel contributions to the study of parties’ electoral fortunes. First, previous research has 
generated contradictory expectations about the incentives of parties to reform the electoral 
system either in a permissive or a restrictive direction. Both courses of action may lead to higher 
levels of electoral success. Distinguishing between the two aforementioned contexts has helped 
me to better understand the contradictory incentives that parties face.  
   
The striking contrast in fragmented versus concentrated party systems and their 
consequences for electoral competition further illuminate the complex nature of voter-party 
linkages, thus contributing to the literature on representation. The findings in this chapter imply, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom in electoral systems literature, that obtaining electoral 
benefits may not always require the eventual adoption of the reform. Even more importantly, the 
preferred electoral reform in some cases entails the reduction of the overall proportionality 
produced by the current electoral system. In fragmented party systems scenarios, the accepted 
logic of increasing the proportionality of the rules may prove electorally damaging as in these 
contexts voters may have considerations other than (or at least in addition to) the permissiveness 
of the system.  
 
  Future research might examine further how other contextual factors (e.g., the level of 
electoral disproportionality or the proportion of wasted votes) modify the impact of parties’ 
institutional preferences on their subsequent electoral performance. An individual-level analysis 
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of voting decisions after electoral reform processes would be an especially desirable and fruitful 
avenue for future research. Electoral system changes are not simply vote-winning tactics in the 
hands of political parties but have important consequences for electoral volatility and party 
system instability. These reforms and their electoral effects can provide valuable insights about 
both political representation and competition. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
The Principal of my Reform is to prevent the necessity of revolution... I am reforming to 
preserve, not to overthrow. 
(Earl Grey’s speaking in the 1831 parliamentary debate on extending suffrage) 
 
Louie, I think this is the beginning of a beautiful friendship. 
(Humphrey Bogart as Rick in Casablanca 1942) 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
From pre-Socratic philosophers in Ancient Greece like Heraclitus of Ephesus or Parmenides of 
Elea to some of the key physicists of the scientific revolution like Galileo Galilei and Isaac 
Newton, the study of the dynamics of continuity and change of any material body – in my case a 
political institution, the electoral system – has always prompted the interest of thinkers around 
the world. However, this is a topic that can be hardly confined to the past. At the time of writing 
this conclusion, a new Israeli government based on an agreement that included a commitment to 
raise the electoral threshold from 2% to 4% had just formed. Why do electoral reforms 
sometimes take place? And do they affect aggregate party systems and citizens’ voting 
behaviour? These are the two main questions I have addressed in this dissertation. By developing 
various analyses on several datasets concerning the occurrence of electoral reforms, I have 
provided a fairly comprehensive answer to both questions.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I first summarize the main results of my analyses. In order to 
do so, I briefly discuss the main theoretical expectations specified in this dissertation, and assess 
their validity against the empirical evidence included in it. I then list the limitations of this study, 
and elaborate on the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. Before concluding the 
chapter, I introduce several possible avenues for further research. 
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9.2. Main findings 
In this dissertation, I make two groups of propositions about the occurrence of electoral reforms. 
A first set of propositions concerns the determinants of electoral system changes. Parties modify 
the rules of the game on the basis of a combination of vote, office and policy-maximizing 
reasons. The difference between cases in which an electoral reform is adopted and cases in which 
it is not lies not only in the characteristics of the proposed electoral system change, but also in 
other political factors. First, the higher the effective number of electoral parties the more likely it 
is that a restrictive reform will be adopted. Second, the higher the overall dissatisfaction with the 
way a democracy works, the more likely it is that a party-centred reform will be adopted. Parties 
clearly take these two pragmatic considerations into account in deciding whether to change or 
not to change a particular set of electoral rules, calculating the chances of vote and/or seat gains 
or losses and perhaps even the prospect of exclusion from the political game should the reform 
be adopted.  
  
This is not the whole story, however. In this dissertation, I have found profound 
differences between old and new democracies with regard to the likelihood of electoral reform. 
This result implies that, in their decision to change an electoral system or not, parties are also 
taking into account the implications of at least three pieces of information: (1) the number of 
parties that will compete in future elections; (2) the distribution of voters’ preferences over these 
parties; and (3) the effects of electoral rules themselves (Andrews and Jackman 2005). There are 
no a priori reasons to distrust politicians who claim that their attempts to change the electoral 
system are due to their genuine commitment to the right operation of the political system. Yet, 
such commitments seem more prevalent when they face a sufficiently established electorate. 
Moreover, whether the option of changing the rules of the game is appealing to parties also 
crucially depends on the apparent willingness of voters to reward efficient changes in the rules of 
the game. In other words, as can be seen below more in depth, it is the voters themselves who 
hold the key to electoral reform.  
 
 A last but certainly important result from the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 goes back to 
the idea of how politicians change the electoral system on the basis of maximizing a combination 
of votes, seats, office and policy. One of the modest goals of Chapter 4 was to show that the 
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effect of party system fragmentation on electoral reforms in the interparty dimension is 
essentially contingent on the values of other explanatory factors. The results demonstrate that 
parties are willing to adopt a restrictive electoral reform with high party system fragmentation as 
long as electoral disproportionality and/or volatility are relatively low. With regard to reforms in 
the intraparty dimension, I have shown that party system inflation at the national level and 
electoral volatility contribute to modify the negative impact of satisfaction with democracy on 
the likelihood of implementing a new electoral system that change the incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote. Widespread satisfaction among the electorate towards the way the political system 
works in a country does only have the expected negative effect on the likelihood of candidate-
centred and party-centred reforms when political competition at the country level occurs between 
parties that represent broad national instead of specific local constituencies (i.e., in case of high 
party system nationalization), and voters’ behaviour remain stable over time (i.e., in case of low 
electoral volatility), respectively.   
 
 A second group of propositions concerns the impact of electoral reforms on several 
political outcomes. In  this sense, the results of aggregate-level analyses suggest that electoral 
system changes in both the interparty and the intraparty dimensions affect the disproportionality 
of electoral outcomes and the level of party system nationalization, respectively. On the one 
hand, the overall degree of correspondence between parties’ vote and seat shares changes 
because the adoption of a new electoral system immediately affects the mechanical translation of 
votes into seats, but actors need some time to find out how the new rules work and how to adapt 
their behaviours to this new institutional environment. Hence, one crucial factor in a reform 
process can be the gradual adaptation of actors to the change in the structure of incentives 
brought about by the new rules. Although the size of some of the electoral reforms examined is, 
a priori, small, this finding nonetheless suggests that an electoral reform can create incentives for 
political actors to change their electoral strategies by turning the whole system more or less 
permissive. Thus, electoral engineering in the interparty dimension seems to be a powerful 
device in the hands of parties to modify the structure of party systems. Note, in addition, that a 
systematic difference has been found with regard to this point between old and new democracies. 
Permissive reforms tend to be more influential in new democracies, whereas restrictive reforms 
have a larger impact in old democracies.    
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 There is one remarkable exception to the rule that democratic age modifies the effect of 
other variables in determining the occurrence of electoral reforms or explaining their 
consequences. In contexts where actors adopt candidate-centred reforms, party system 
nationalization gets worse; but the size of this effect does not depend on the length of the current 
democratic rule. By contrast, my findings suggest that the negative effect of candidate-centred 
reforms on party system nationalization is magnified by the degree of ethnic fragmentation and 
the level of political decentralization. 
 
 Finally, a systematic difference has been found with regard to performance in the 
following elections between parties that support efficient electoral reforms and parties that 
advocate redistributive changes in the rules of the game. Parties that promote permissive reforms 
in contexts of low party system fragmentation tend to be rewarded by the citizenry in the 
following elections, whereas parties that endorse this type of institutional change when the 
effective number of electoral parties is high are badly punished by the electorate. In view of the 
fact that parties’ positions on electoral reform is already likely to be endogenous to a series of 
other variables that could also drive their performance in the polling booth, I adopted an 
instrumental approach to address this potential problem of endogeneity. The similarities between 
effects in both types of analyses give me confidence in the robustness and generalizability of my 
findings.       
 
 
9.3. Contributions  
As explained in Chapter 1, the contribution of this dissertation is basically threefold: first, it 
addresses the essential paradox entailed by incumbents who change the rules of the game they 
are winning (Katz 2005); second, it addresses the lack of a body of theoretically driven 
comparative work on why one electoral system is chosen over another (Shugart 2005; Taagepera 
2007a); and, third, it evaluates the long list of effects the literature attributes to electoral rules. 
With regard to the first, I have argued that the paradox is demystified when we take account of 
the rising proportion of parties in office that do not get re-elected (Müller and Strøm 2000), and 
the diversity of goals (votes, seats, office and policy) that parties pursue (Müller and Strøm 
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1999). With regard to the second and third, I have sought to fill the void in the literature that 
takes electoral systems as the dependent variable by offering an empirical and theoretically 
grounded explanation of why an electoral reform happens in contemporary democracies. Hence, 
the contribution of the thesis could be summarized as follows: better theory (by combining 
several theoretical frameworks), better data (by assembling my own dataset of electoral 
reforms), and better methods (by offering sophisticated quantitative evidence supporting my 
arguments). In short, I have, first of all, re-addressed what electoral reform comprises by 
expanding the scope of the enterprise beyond “major” electoral system changes and seat-
maximization motivations (Leyenaar and Hazan 2011). Secondly, I have created my own 
database that includes, among others, cases of electoral reform, party preferences about electoral 
system change and updated information on party system fragmentation, electoral 
disproportionality and volatility. And, thirdly, I have systematically analyzed, using the proper 
econometric techniques (i.e., cross-sectional time series and event history analysis, hierarchical 
modelling and instrumental variables), the main determinants and consequences of electoral 
reforms. Bearing these innovations in mind have proved quite fruitful, I summarize in the 
following pages the main lessons that can be drawn from this study. 
  
9.3.1. From the theoretical point of view 
This dissertation has aimed to make several contributions to the electoral systems literature. A 
first one is conceptual, bringing different types of electoral system changes in different countries 
and at different time points together in one category (that of electoral reform), which 
encompasses not only instances of actual change but also instances of attempted change, thus 
placing efforts at reform that bore fruit within the context of reform efforts in general. This more 
encompassing view of electoral reform has permitted me to build an impressive dataset for 60 
democracies between 1945 and 2010. This dataset has allowed me to examine the electoral 
performance of parties that supported and opposed efforts to achieve electoral reform whether or 
not the institutional change in question was actually enacted, providing a larger N for 
investigating the causes and consequences of these party stances at ensuing elections and 
permitting me to distinguish effects of support and opposition from effects of the reform itself.  
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 The thesis makes a second contribution to the existing literature in that it examines 
together changes in both the interparty and the intraparty dimensions of electoral systems. In 
particular, it shows that circumstances can lead to a modification in the rules that affect not only 
the proportionality but also the nature and degree of choice available to the voter. These 
dimensions had not been taken into account jointly in almost any previous comparative-empirical 
study of electoral systems (for an exception, see for example Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). 
 
 Thirdly, this dissertation enriches the extensive literature on the electoral success and 
failure of parties with an additional explanation. Although it has been mentioned several times in 
the existing literature that parties that blatantly manipulate the rules of the game could suffer 
important electoral loses, this had never systematically shown until now. In thir regard, I do not 
only argue but also empirically demonstrate that voters pay attention to political parties’ 
positions on electoral reform, and that this is a factor that should not be ignored when explaining 
pro-reform (and anti-reform) parties’ electoral performance.  
  
 Furthermore, this dissertation offers a plausible explanation for the finding that high party 
system fragmentation increases the likelihood of restrictive electoral reforms. A currently 
permissive system that gives rise to a considerable number of parties in the electoral arena 
appears to be seen by both parties and voters as unattractive because of inefficiencies that render 
parties unable to enact the policies they propose and achieve the goals they pursue. It is in these 
cases that the micro-mega rule (Colomer 2004b and 2005) does not work. On top of this, parties 
become less interested in their own survival because of the effects that too permissive systems 
can have on cabinet stability or legislative productivity.   
 
 A fifth contribution lies in the fact that this dissertation integrates several different 
theories in a research field that remains largely unexplored.
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 Some of the 60 countries under 
study in this dissertation had never been subject to comparative-empirical analysis, presumably 
because of the modest size of the reforms or their infrequent occurrence. Seat-maximization 
arguments, for example, had typically been applied either to major electoral reforms in large-N 
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 For example, just to name a few, the seat-maximization approach (Benoit 2004 and 2007), the micro-mega rule 
(Colomer 2004b and 2005) and the inherent and contingent framework (Shugart 2008). 
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studies, or to every tinkering with the rules in small-N studies. In order to be of use to us, 
however, these theories should work for any kind of significant electoral reform in any 
contemporary democracy. By testing them on my own dataset regarding electoral system changes 
in 60 countries between 1945 and 2010, this dissertation adds important information about the 
validity of these theories. For instance, it has turned out that the likelihood of electoral reform in 
the interparty dimension is highly influenced by the degree of party system fragmentation, 
although the effect is shown to be the opposite of what would have been expected according to 
the literature. In this regard, contrary to previous findings, my results suggest that large numbers 
of parties lead to more restrictive electoral systems. Moreover, I have also found that the more 
disproportional the current electoral outcomes are, or the more volatile the current political 
scenario is, the less powerful this relationship becomes. This defies the logic of standard mono-
causal explanations of electoral reform that are typically assumed to have only one independent 
variable, yet it confirms a recent finding in the relevant literature (Renwick 2010). 
 
 Finally, the finding that the positive impact of restrictive reforms on electoral 
disproportionality is primarily observed in established democracies sheds new light on the notion 
of habitual voting,
273
 which is key to turnout and political socialization models (Dinas 2010; 
Franklin 2004). The idea that citizens get locked into particular voting patterns has been widely 
developed since the seminal work by David Butler and Donald Stokes in 1974 (e.g., van der Eijk 
and Franklin 2009: 179). In line with the findings in this dissertation, it may be claimed that 
electoral reforms in some contexts fail at immediately changing the format of the party system 
because most of the voters are established and have a full prior electoral record under the 
previous system. Taking this into account would open new avenues for modelling the causes and 
consequences of electoral reform.  
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 It is established democracies that see the greatest impact of restrictive reforms since that is where habit will be 
strongest. For this reason, it takes some elections after these kinds of electoral system changes to observe their 
psychological effects within the electorate (basically, vote switches from small to large parties). By contrast, the 
mechanical effects brought about by the new institutions (i.e., underrepresentation of small parties) emerge in the 
immediately first election after the reform, provoking a change in the levels of disproportionality. This is why 
habitual voting in established democracies makes increase the disproportionality of electoral outcomes after a 
restrictive system change.   
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9.3.2. From the applied point of view 
My dissertation illustrates the two-step outcome prescriptive social sciences usually produce. 
First of all, there is the analysis of a phenomenon; and second, there is the potential use of 
research findings to influence new public policies. With regard to the former, suffice it to say 
that I hope to have improved on existing accounts of electoral reforms in contemporary 
democracies by developing an analytical, comprehensive, comparative, and longitudinal model 
that takes steps towards explaining why reforms take place and with what consequences. In a 
nutshell, I have applied to a considerable group of countries some of the arguments that have 
been traditionally used to explain institutional change keeping in mind that “science cannot 
confirm theories, it can only fail to prove them wrong” (Franklin 2004: 211). With regard to the 
potential implications of my research in the domain of public policies, the comparative study of 
recent experiences of institutional reform in these countries may help us to improve our attempts 
at electoral engineering in the democracies of the future. However, before doing all this we need 
to answer a couple of prior questions: Does this matter at all? And how does this matter? 
 
 First of all, my findings have shown that parties behave as if electoral reforms mattered 
for the effectiveness of democratic government. In this regard, we have seen that the likelihood 
of adopting a more restrictive electoral system is determined by the presence of a large number 
of parties at the electoral arena and parties’ interest in having electoral rules as much effective as 
possible. However, changing electoral institutions towards less permissiveness also implies 
constraining political competition by increasing the barriers of entrance for small parties. Hence, 
if a restrictive reform is actually efficient in the sense that it reduces all the parties’ obstacles for 
the maximization of office and policy, it could still be the case that it is redistributive because it 
particularly benefits some parties over others. This brings us to the questions of trade-offs 
between reducing fragmentation and restricting entry of new parties (Carey and Hix 2011), and 
the achievement of the golden mean in the realm of the interparty dimension of electoral systems 
as the desirable middle between two extremes, one of excessive and the other of deficient party 
system fragmentation (Aristotle [1975 [1934]]). 
 
 A second potential implication of this dissertation from the practical point of view relates 
to the consequences of electoral reforms. The repeated occurrence of electoral system changes is 
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theoretically expected to have alienating effects on voters in general – for whom institutional 
instability is a de facto restriction of their right to cast a well-informed vote and control the 
government – and on supporters of some specific parties in particular – those particularly 
damaged by the redistributive effects of the reforms. My analyses suggest a broad predictability 
of some of the consequences of reforms which have implications for electoral engineering more 
generally (Norris 2004). However, I also find that observing these effects is sometimes hard 
since they are frequently invisible in the first post-reform election, or when the electorate is 
particularly strongly locked into voting patterns. In such cases, the public is likely to go through 
“a period of enhanced surprise, disappointment, and frustration” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 
218). 
 
 
9.4. Limitations 
When discussing the findings, we have to be aware of the limitations of this study. In terms of its 
scope (see Chapter 1), the analyses are confined to democracies from particular regions of the 
world, and to the time period between 1945 and 2010. In these contexts, only some specific 
modifications of electoral laws could be studied. Yet, the aim of the thesis is to draw valid 
inferences (or at least to try to do so) concerning any electoral reform in any contemporary 
democracy at any given time point. It is clear that the generalizability of my findings should be 
tested in future research. Results of the analyses in Chapters 4 to 7 suggest that the points in time 
in which electoral reforms take place matter for their causes and consequences. To be more 
specific, I conclude in most of these chapters that democratic age affects the causes and 
consequences of electoral reforms. However, future studies should concentrate on differences in 
the effects of my main independent variables caused by other types of modifying factors. 
Furthermore, my findings only hold to the extent that the assumptions that were made for this 
research, listed in the first chapter, hold as well. For example, the assumption that parties care 
about votes, seats, office and policy is not undisputed and my findings indicate that those who 
dispute it are wrong. Otherwise, I would have different findings. As another case in point, 
institutional strategies of parties are assumed to have an electoral impact, which is clearly a gross 
novelty that my findings validate.   
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Moreover, the thesis’ results necessarily hinge upon assumed homogeneity of cases. For 
example, all the democracies under study are assumed to be equal (Przeworski et al.’s 2000) 
once we control for the length of the current democratic age. However, one could question the 
extent to which all the European democracies were alike once the Berlin Wall fell. Moreover, 
should the ‘new democracy’ category be extended to other countries that have experienced 
periods of strong social and political turmoil, like France in the 1950s, or perhaps New Zealand, 
Japan and Italy in the late 1980s and early 1990s? In order to minimize problems related to this, 
the democracies examined were made as homogenous as possible by including country fixed 
effects when possible. Nevertheless, the fact that electoral reforms do not take place in some 
countries meant that these countries could not contribute to my findings most of the times. In 
addition, there are data missing on some main independent variables for some observations. The 
suspicion that these data are not missing at random makes it even harder to assess how 
homogenous my group of countries really is.   
  
In a similar vein, the institutional responses to inefficiencies of the political system are 
assumed to be homogenous across cases. In other words, the adoption of a mixed system in Italy 
in 1993 is assumed to be the same as the adoption of a mixed system in Bulgaria in 2009. It is 
difficult to assess, however, to what extent the Italian parties’ approach to high party system 
fragmentation in the early 1990s was actually similar to that of Bulgarian parties in the late 
2000s. 
 
A limitation caused by the relatively small number of actual cases of reform and the 
multidimensionality of the concept of electoral system change is that it is operationalized as a 
categorical variable in this study (see Chapter 3). Each country-year (or country-term in Chapters 
6 and 7) observation is coded as “non-reform” (or ambiguous reform), “permissive reform” or 
“restrictive reform” in the interparty dimension, and “non-reform” (or ambiguous reform), 
“candidate-centred reform” or “party-centred reform” in the intraparty dimension whereas it is 
obvious that the degree of permissiveness of the electoral rules and the amount of incentives they 
create to cultivate a personal vote are continua. The type of electoral reform is measured on the 
basis of the largest effect it is expected to have. But this is a possibly consequential 
simplification. It could be the case that, for example, there is a difference between a mere 
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formula shift from D’Hondt to Hare – as was the case of Germany in 1985 – or a major electoral 
reform from a two-round to a proportional representation (PR) system – e.g., the French case in 
1985. These cases are both coded as “permissive reform”, however. The small number of 
observations prevents me from drawing valid inferences on these points. Other drawbacks of the 
operationalization of electoral system change used in this study include the difficulty in 
classifying bundles of reform (i.e., those changes that simultaneously affect more than one 
dimension of the system), and the somewhat arbitrariness of any threshold for continuous 
dimensions (i.e., 20% for number of districts, legal thresholds or assembly size following 
Lijphart [1994]). Finally, data availability problems also play a role when it comes to the 
classification of episodes of reform that are, in fact, side-effects of other larger transformation 
processes – e.g., the 1990 German reunification.   
 
 Problems related to the small number of observations plague the analyses on the 
determinants of electoral reform. This limits the number of variables that can be tested, and the 
way in which such tests can be conducted. Furthermore, one has to be aware of alternative 
hypotheses for the effects found. One of these several factors that have been left out of the 
analyses for practical reasons is the international diffusion of institutional change (Blais and 
Massicotte 1997; Lundell 2009). Parties in a given country could just imitate others’ behaviour 
abroad. Although it is very difficult to study these effects in light of the small number of 
observations, Damien Bol, Jean-Benoit Pilet and I (2013) have recently examined whether cross-
national diffusion exists in the adoption of mechanisms to temper PR in Europe between 1945 
and 2010.    
 
Several problems arise with the estimation of the effects of parties’ positions regarding 
institutional change on their popular support in the following elections (Chapter 8). On a general 
note, the way of estimating the effects of interest assumes that these positions interact with the 
level of party system fragmentation. This is in accordance with the theoretical expectations on 
Chapter 4. However, models become very unstable due to the small number cases at the second-
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level. It is certainly possible that my exclusive reliance on these 30 attempts (successful or not) 
of electoral reform affects my findings.
274
   
  
 At least two main problems relate to the whole methodological approach in this 
dissertation. First, hypotheses have been only tested with quantitative tools. Although I display 
robustness checks for almost all of them, and all the theoretical expectations have been 
formulated after a careful study of cases, it would certainly be important to trace the processes 
involved in a qualitative setting (Fearon and Laitin 2008). Moreover, actors’ motivations 
regarding electoral reform have been inferred from the circumstances in which different electoral 
system changes take place, but they probably cannot be nailed down in the absence of 
appropriate survey data and/or focus group interviews. Hence, it could be argued that the extense 
discussion of the motivations of voters and party leaders included mostly in Chapter 4 but also in 
Chapter 5 has left them open to possible alternative interpretations. Second, the main 
independent variables were aggregate measures and calculated at the national level. However, 
some of the propositions refer to processes that involve individual voters or take place at the 
district-level. This is a possibly more consequential problem as it raises the spectre of potential 
ecological inference problems. 
 
 Alternative hypotheses for the causes of electoral reform could not all be addressed. More 
specifically, I would like to point out the ideological congruence between representatives and 
people. In this regard, it is possible that it is not either high cabinet stability or low passage rates 
but the presence of ideological distance between institutions and voters that may cause electoral 
reforms in the interparty dimension. When reviewing the most relevant academic works on 
electoral systems in Chapter 2 I noticed that there is a relatively huge literature examining the 
relationship between ideological congruence and electoral rules (Blais and Bodet 2006; Budge 
and McDonald 2005; Colomer 2001b; Golder and Stramski 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; 
McDonald and Budge 2007; Powell 2000 and 2009; Powell and Vanberg 2000). Thus, it would 
be interesting to examine whether attempts to foster more congruence lead to electoral system 
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 The power for level 2 effects is dependent upon the number of groups (de Leeuw and Kreft 1998). To conduct 
research with enough power, sufficiently large sample sizes are required in multilevel models. However, the number 
of individual observations is not as important as the number of groups in a study. In order to detect cross-level 
interactions, recommendations have been made that at least 20 groups are needed. The fact that even with such small 
number of cases I get significant results gives me additional confidence in the reliability of the results.  
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changes in the interparty dimension. Checks based on the dataset analyzed in Chapter 4 suggest 
that the determinants were related to cabinet instability or lack of legislative productivity rather 
than to an ideological gap between voters and representatives but it is, however, possible that 
these initial null findings were caused by the lack of data.     
 
Finally, and related to this, there are several other consequences that have been left out of 
the analyses for practical reasons (more on this in the next section). More specifically, the impact 
of electoral reform on cabinet stability, legislative passage rates and satisfaction with democracy 
has not been modelled in this study. However, most electoral system changes should be 
important to explain fluctuations in some of these variables. Especially when reforming towards 
more candidate-centeredness, voters should feel more satisfied about the way democracy works 
in their country (Renwick and Pilet 2011). Thus, one might want to model the effect of electoral 
reform in the intraparty dimension on public discontent about the operation of democracy. I will 
get back to these issues later on in this chapter.  
 
Bearing all these general limitations in mind, the following avenues for further research 
can be sketched.    
 
 
9.5. Avenues for further research 
As I have previously argued, it should be in the interest of all of us (not only political scientists 
but also citizens) to carefully investigate the origins as well as the consequences of the 
institutional measures that are taken by politicians (as justified as they may be) to safeguard the 
quality of democracy and guarantee its good working order. I consider this dissertation as a 
modest contribution to achieve these goals. However, I have not been able to address several 
empirical questions concerning electoral reforms in this dissertation because of space and time 
constraints. Some of them are pressing puzzles that future research should concentrate on. Other, 
equally pressing, matters are being already dealt with in some of my current work in progress 
(see, for example, Franklin and Riera 2013). Finally, some other topics like those concerning the 
consequences of electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension (Krauss et al. 2008) or the 
integrated examination of the impact of electoral institutions on party systems and voter 
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behaviour through the combination of content analysis, semi-directed interviews, internet panel 
surveys and a series of laboratory experiments (Blais 2010) are even now starting to be 
addressed in promising international comparative projects. Specifically, I would like to mention 
the following avenues for future research that start where the findings of this study leave off.   
     
 First, as discussed in Chapter 1, the attribution of any systemic-level effects to some of 
the main explanatory variables for the passage of electoral reform hinges on findings from a 
qualitative analysis that examines the exact mechanisms leading to electoral reform. The idea 
here would be to use narratives as a way of presenting empirical information (Büthe 2002). For 
this reason, I would follow a research strategy based on the “most-similar-systems” design 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). The criteria of selection of the cases would be twofold: first, to 
ensure variability in the dependent variable (Geddes 1990); and second, to minimize variation in 
other factors derived from the literature that could explain the different outcome (Lijphart 1975). 
In particular, I would compare two pairs of cases in the near future: one, Lithuania and Ukraine; 
and two, Argentina and Venezuela.
275
 Lithuania and Argentina would be my puzzling cases 
where theories of electoral reform predicted something (a change of the electoral system) that did 
not happen.
276
 Appendix 4 to this thesis is devoted to preliminarily address the politics of 
electoral reform in these four countries. 
 
 
 Second, my findings suggest that the dynamics of party competition and voting behaviour 
are affected when an electoral reform is adopted. The results in Part 2 of this dissertation that the 
levels of electoral disproportionality become lower when a permissive electoral system change is 
implemented suggest that parties and voters do not immediately react to the change in incentives 
operated by the new rules. However, this particular institutional change increases the options a 
voter has in the polling station in the long-run and may, hemce, reduce the initial impact of the 
electoral reform on the levels of disproportionality. Future research should focus on the causal 
mechanisms that explain this differential effect over time. In addition, the smaller impact of 
restrictive reforms on electoral disproportionality means that other mechanisms operate when the 
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 Each combination of cases offers similar ecological traits (i.e., electoral system in use and its eventual inclusion 
in the Constitution, type of regime, dynamics of coalition bargaining, and turnover rate of the party in power).  
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 Following Mahoney and Goertz (2004), I have searched for “negative” cases. 
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new electoral system is supposed to produce a worse correspondence between parties’ vote and 
seat shares. Obviously, it is important to carefully disentangle the exact mechanisms driving the 
effects of electoral reforms, as practitioners’ opinions on the utility of a particular institutional 
change are likely to depend on how fast they are in changing political outcomes. Appendix 5 to 
this thesis is devoted to examine some initial analyses regarding the causal mechanisms driving 
the consequences of electoral reforms. 
 
 A second way to examine how electoral reform plays a role in voting behaviour change 
would be made possible by the existence of rich survey data going back to the time of the 
institutional change in two established democracies. These would be Italy and New Zealand. 
Unfortunately, I will only focus on New Zealand in the Appendix 6 to this thesis. In this other 
potential avenue for further research, I would try to show that incoming cohorts and established 
voters relatively immune to the operation of the former electoral system are particularly 
responsive to changes in the rules of game, being at the forefront of modifications in party 
system patterns. For most analyses of the New Zealand part, I would use panel data from the 
1990, 1993 and 1996 waves of the New Zealand Election Studies.
277
 
 
 Third, electoral reforms do not only have an impact on electoral disproportionality, party 
system nationalization or parties’ electoral fortunes. As mentioned in Chapter 2, electoral 
systems are thought to have a long list of consequences that are hard to confine to these three 
outcomes. For example, the rules of the game tend to have an impact on how long governments 
last or how often they pass their laws. In the same vein, electoral reform is likely to produce 
changes in the way citizens evaluate the operation of democracy in a given country (Bosch and 
Orriols 2011; Farrell and McAllister 2006). Moreover, candidate quality, legislative 
organization, or parties’ appointments may matter more under some institutional frameworks 
than others (see Krauss et al. 2008). Or, finally, while the analyses in this thesis found a clear 
impact of reforms in the interparty dimension on electoral disproportionality, this might be very 
well due to changes in the allocation of seats that mainly happen at the sub-national level. These 
are empirically observable consequences of (my theory of) electoral reforms that could be tested 
elsewhere.  
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 Details about the data can be found on its website (www.nzes.org). 
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A fourth question that arises from the results is whether the effects found of party system 
fragmentation and satisfaction with democracy on the one hand, and electoral reforms on the 
other are really causal or simply an artefact of some other exogenous variable. In order to 
address this potential problem of endogeneity, I would like first to think about alternative 
research designs that turned the allocation of the main determinants of electoral reforms as good 
as random. Second, and with regard to the consequences of electoral reforms, I would like to 
collect data of votes on proposals of electoral reform made in the legislatures and compare 
episodes slightly successful with those that only marginally failed to be passed in order to see 
how actual institutional change has an effect on political outcomes. Moreover, building on an 
idea of Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal (2001), I would like to investigate the party 
system and voting behaviour effects of electoral reform using the 1993 permissive electoral 
reform in New Zealand as a case study an constructing a comparable synthetic control case.
278
   
 
Finally, the 2008 economic crisis resulted in deeply unpopular austerity measures and 
bank rescue actions in many countries (Kriesi 2013). Confronted with a dramatic increase in the 
public’s dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in general and government popularity in 
particular, it crucially remains to be seen to what extent politicians (and incumbents) try to 
improve their approval and increase their chances of survival by introducing electoral reforms 
that boost citizens’ involvement in the electoral choice (i.e., by passing candidate-centred 
reforms) or decrease their chances of becoming absolute losers (i.e., by passing permissive 
reforms). What seems clear is that the economic crisis has so far triggered a wave of proposed 
legislation pursuing the reduction of assembly sizes (Jacobs 2013). This trend is also observable 
at the subnational level in some countries.
279
 I wish to investigate the causes and motivations, the 
nature and extent and the (potential) consequences of this group of reforms by determining if 
they seek to gratify the electorate (i.e., they are crowd-pleasers) or draw away citizens’ attention 
from tough changes such as budget cuts (i.e., they are key janglers).
280
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 I intentionally use the word “case” instead of “country” because I am afraid I will have to employ subnational 
jurisdictions in order to obtain the control unit. 
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 On the Spanish case, see Riera and Montero (2013). 
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 This is the terminology adopted by Jacobs and Farrell in the call for papers of a Workshop on ‘Crowd-pleasers or 
key janglers? The impact of drops in political legitimacy on democratic reform and their consequences’ that was part 
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9.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, can only seat-maximization strategies explain electoral reforms? In some idealized 
models, electoral reform can appear as an effective way in obtaining the highest number possible 
of seats for a party in power. However, unless a party holds an absolute majority of seats in 
parliament, its ability to change the electoral system largely depends on the willingness of one or 
several other parties to cooperate. This is why an electoral reform process can sometimes be 
depicted as a positive-sum game.  
 
 As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, parties are not only interested in maximizing seats, but 
also votes, office and policy (Müller and Strøm 1999). In the electoral arena, the level of party 
system fragmentation and the overall satisfaction with democracy determine the usefulness of the 
strategic changes of the electoral system. In countries that display either a high cabinet instability 
or a low legislative productivity, advocating a restrictive electoral reform may mean higher vote 
shares for parties. By contrast, in settings where the public discontent towards the operation of 
democracy is broad, supporting a reform in the intraparty dimension is likely to become 
electorally successful. Moreover, the evidence provided in Chapter 8 seems to preliminarily 
support the idea that not only act-contingent reasons are present when politicians vote for reform 
(Shugart 2008), but that they also electorally benefit for doing so. 
 
 It can thus be concluded that, when applied under the right circumstances (i.e., high or 
low party system fragmentation and high discontent with the way democracy works), the strategy 
of altering the electoral system is in the interest of reforming parties, that enact a restrictive or a 
permissive reform and an electoral system change in the intraparty dimension to address a 
current malfunctioning of the political system that provokes the emergence within the electorate 
of negative attitudes towards the operation of democratic institutions and processes. By adopting 
a particular and/or appropriate new set of electoral institutions in a given context, parties can 
increase cabinet stability, legislative productivity and overall satisfaction with democracy. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of a wider conference on ‘Political Legitimacy and the Paradox of Regulation’ (University of Leiden, January 24-25, 
2013),  although I would prefer a different labelling.  
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makes electoral reform a powerful tool in the hands of these parties that want to change the party 
system while still performing well in the following elections. 
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Appendix 1. Episodes of electoral reforms 
Table A1.1. Electoral reforms in the interparty dimension, 1945-2010 
Country Term Reform Disproportionality 
Albania 1992-1996 
Change from MMP to MMM and decreased number of upper seats;  
U: introduction of a legal threshold for coalitions  Up 
Albania 1996-1997 Increased number of upper seats; U: decreased legal threshold for parties Down 
Albania 1997-2001 Change from MMM to MMP; U: increased legal threshold for parties Down 
Albania 2001-2005 L: formula shift from majority runoff to plurality Up 
Albania 2005-2009 Change from MMP to PR and increased legal threshold for parties Down 
Armenia 1995-1999 L: decreased number of districts and change from majority runoff to plurality Mixed 
Armenia 1999-2003 L: decreased number of districts Down 
Armenia 2003-2007 L: decreased number of districts Down 
Australia 1946-1949 Increased number of districts Down 
Austria 1970-1971 
L: decreased number of districts and formula shift from Droop to Hare;  
U: decreased number of districts  Down 
Austria 1990-1994 
Increased number of tiers; L: increased number of districts; U1: it resembles previous L; U2: 
decreased number of districts Mixed 
Belgium 1991-1995 Decreased assembly size; L: decreased number of districts Mixed 
Belgium 1999-2003 Decreased number of tiers; decreased number of districts; introduction of a legal threshold Up 
Bolivia 1985-1989 Increased legal threshold Up 
Bolivia 1989-1993 Formula shift from Hare to St. Laguë and decreased legal threshold Mixed 
Bolivia 1993-1997 Change from PR to MMP Ambiguous 
Bulgaria  1990-1991 Change from MMM to PR and decreased assembly size Mixed 
Bulgaria  2005-2009 Change from PR to MMM Up 
Colombia 1958-1960 Increased assembly size Down 
Colombia 1968-1970 Decreased legal threshold Down 
Colombia 1990-1991 Decreased assembly size and increased number of districts Up 
Colombia  2002-2006 Formula shift from Hare to D'Hondt Up 
Costa Rica 1958-1962 Increased assembly size Down 
Croatia  1992-1995 
Increased number of upper seats; U: increased legal threshold for parties and introduction of 
one for coalitions; L: decreased number of districts Mixed 
Croatia  1995-2000 Change from MMM to PR Down 
Cyprus 1976-1981 Change from FPTP to reinforced PR Down 
Cyprus 1981-1985 Increased assembly size Down 
Cyprus 1991-1996 Decreased legal threshold Down 
Czech Republic 1998-2002 Decreased number of tiers and increased number of districts Up 
Denmark 1947-1950 Increased number of upper seats Down 
Denmark 1953 
Increased assembly size and decreased number of upper seats; 
L: formula shift from D’Hondt to modified St. Laguë; U: increased legal threshold Mixed 
Denmark 1960-1964 U: decreased legal threshold Down 
Denmark 1968-1971 L: decreased number of districts Down 
Denmark 2005-2007 L: formula shift from modified St. Laguë to D’Hondt; U: decreased number of districts Mixed 
Dominican Republic 1970-1974 Increased assembly size Down 
Dominican Republic 1978-1982 Increased assembly size Down 
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Country Term Reform Disproportionality 
Dominican Republic 1994-1998 Increased assembly size Down 
Dominican Republic 1998-2002 Increased number of districts Up 
Ecuador 1996-1998 Change from PR to “MNTV”; increased assembly size and increased number of upper seats Mixed 
Ecuador 1998-2002 Change from “MNTV” to PR Down 
Ecuador 2002-2006 Change from PR to “MMM” Up 
Ecuador 2006-2009 Increased assembly size Down 
El Salvador 1988-1991 Increased assembly size and number of tiers Down 
El Salvador 2003-2006 Decreased number of tiers Up 
France 1946-1951 Change from PR to “MMM” Up 
France 1956-1958 Change from “MMM” to majority runoff Up 
France 1981-1986 Change from majority runoff to PR Down 
France 1986-1988 Change from PR to majority runoff Up 
Germany 1949-1953 
Increased assembly size; increased number of upper seats; increased number of votes;  
U: increased legal threshold Mixed 
Germany 1953-1957 U: increased legal threshold Up 
Germany 1983-1987 U: formula shift from D’Hondt to Hare Down 
Germany 1987-1990 Increased assembly size; U: decreased legal threshold Down 
Germany 2005-2009 U: formula shift from Hare to St. Laguë Ambiguous 
Greece 1974-1977 L: formula shift from Hare to Droop Up 
Greece 1981-1985 U1: elimination of the legal threshold Down 
Greece 1985-1989 
Decreased number of tiers and introduction of guaranteed seats for small parties provided 
they cross a given threshold Down 
Greece 1990-1993 Introduction of a legal threshold Up 
Greece 2000-2004 Decreased plurality-vote bonus Down 
Greece 2007-2009 Increased plurality-vote bonus Up 
Guatemala 1990-1994 Decreased assembly size Up 
Guatemala 1995-1999 Increased assembly size Down 
Guatemala 1999-2003 Increased assembly size Down 
Hungary 1990-1994 U: increased legal threshold Up 
Iceland 1959 Change from MMM to PR Down 
Iceland 1983-1987 Formula shift from D'Hondt to Hare Down 
Iceland 1999-2003 
Increased number of upper seats; U: introduction of a legal threshold;  
L: decreased number of districts Mixed 
Israel 1949-1951 Formula shift from D’Hondt to Hare and increased legal threshold Mixed 
Israel 1969-1973 Formula shift from Hare to D'Hondt and increased legal threshold Up 
Israel 1988-1992 Change from PR to “MMM” Up 
Israel 1999-2003 Change from “MMM” to PR Down 
Israel 2003-2006 Increased legal threshold Up 
Italy 1946-1948 L: formula shift from Imperiali to reinforced Imperiali Up 
Italy 1948-1953 Change from PR to “MMM” Up 
Italy 1953-1958 Change from “MMM” to PR Down 
Italy 1992-1994 Change from PR to MMM Up 
Italy 2001-2006 Change from MMM to bonus-PR Down 
Japan 1993-1996 Change from SNTV to MMM Up 
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Country Term Reform Disproportionality 
Latvia 1993-1995 Increased legal threshold Up 
Lithuania 1992-1996 U: increased legal threshold Up 
Lithuania 1996-2000 L: formula shift from majority runoff to plurality Up 
Lithuania 2000-2004 L: formula shift from plurality to majority runoff Down 
Macedonia 1994-1998 Change from FPTP to MMM Down 
Macedonia 1998-2002 Change from MMM to PR Down 
Malta 1981-1987 Introduction of the majority-vote guarantee Down 
Malta 1992-1996 Introduction of the plurality-vote guarantee Ambiguous 
Moldova 1998-2001 Increased legal threshold Up 
Moldova 2009 Decreased legal threshold Down 
Moldova 2009-2010 Decreased legal threshold Down 
Netherlands 1952-1956 Increased assembly size Down 
New Zealand 1993-1996 Change from FPTP to MMP Down 
Nicaragua 1984-1990 Decreased number of tiers Up 
Nicaragua 1990-1996 Increased number of tiers; L: increased number of districts Mixed 
Norway 1949-1953 Decreased number of districts and formula shift from D’Hondt to modified St. Laguë Down 
Norway 1985-1989 Increased number of tiers Down 
Norway 2001-2005 Increased number of upper seats Down 
Panama 1989-1994 Decreased legal threshold Down 
Paraguay 1989-1993 Change from PR-bonus to PR and increased number of districts Down 
Peru 2001-2006 Introduction of a legal threshold Up 
Poland 1991-1993 
U: formula shift from modified St. Laguë to D'Hondt; increased legal threshold;  
L: formula shift from Hare to D'Hondt; increased number of districts; new legal threshold Up 
Poland 1997-2001 Reduction of the number of tiers and formula shift from D'Hondt to St. Laguë Down 
Poland 2001-2005 Formula shift from modified St. Laguë to D'Hondt Up 
Romania 1990-1992 Introduction of a legal threshold Up 
Romania 1996-2000 Increased legal threshold Up 
Romania 2004-2008 Change from PR to MMP Ambiguous 
Slovakia 1994-1998 Decreased number of tiers and districts; increased legal threshold for coalitions Down 
Slovakia 1998-2002 Decreased legal threshold for coalitions Down 
Slovenia 1996-2000 Formula shift from Hare to Droop and increased legal threshold Up 
Sweden 1948-1952 Formula shift from D’Hondt to modified St. Laguë Down 
Sweden 1968-1970 Increased assembly size and introduction of an upper tier; L: decreased number of districts Down 
Ukraine 1994-1998 Change from FPTP to MMM Down 
Ukraine 2002-2006 Change from MMM to PR Down 
Venezuela 1963-1968 Increased assembly size Down 
Venezuela 1988-1993 Change from PR to MMP Ambiguous 
Venezuela 1993-1998 Increased number of lower seats Up 
Venezuela 1998-2000 Decreased assembly size and increased number of lower seats Up 
Venezuela 2005-2010 Change from MMP to MMM Up 
Notes: FPTP (first past the post); MMM (mixed-member majoritarian); MMP (mixed-member proportional); PR (proportional representation); 
SNTV (single non-transferable vote). Sources: Birch (2003), Birch et al. (2002), Bowler and Grofman (2000), Colomer (2004a), Gallagher and 
Mitchell (2005a), Golder (2004), Grofman et al. (1999), Grofman and Lijphart (2007 [2002]), the Inter-Parliamentary Union  (n.d.), Johnson and 
Wallack (2010 [2003]), Jones (1995 and 1997), Lijphart (1994), Lundell and Karvonen (2003), Negretto (2009), Payne (2007), Remmer (2008), 
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Renwick (2011), Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), Shvetsova (1999), Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán (2005), Zovatto and Orozco Henríquez (2008), 
and electoral laws of each country. 
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Table A1.2. Electoral reforms in the intraparty dimension, 1945-2010 
Country Term Reform 
Incentives to Cultivate a 
Personal Vote 
Albania 1992-1996 Decreased number of upper seats Up 
Albania 1996-1997 Increased number of upper seats Down 
Albania 1997-2001 Decreased number of upper seats Up 
Albania 2001-2005 L: formula shift from majority runoff to plurality Down 
Albania 2005-2009 Change from MMP to closed-list PR Down 
Armenia 1995-1999 L: decreased number of districts and change from majority runoff to plurality Down 
Armenia 1999-2003 L: decreased number of districts Down 
Armenia 2003-2007 L: decreased number of districts Down 
Australia 1946-1949 Change from preferential block to alternative vote Down 
Australia 1983-1984 Introduction of the above line option  Down 
Austria 1945-1949 Introduction of flexible lists Up 
Austria 1970-1971 
Instead of deleting and ranking, the voters could hereafter cast a preferential vote for a 
candidate Down 
Austria 1990-1994 
Increased number of tiers; L: increased number of districts; U1: it resembles previous L; 
U2: decreased number of districts; Strengthening of the preferential system Up 
Belgium 1999-2003 Reduction of the significance of the list order  Up 
Bolivia 1993-1997 Change from closed-list PR to MMP Up 
Bulgaria  1990-1991 Change from MMM to closed-list PR Down 
Bulgaria  2005-2009 Change from closed-list PR to MMM Up 
Colombia  2002-2006 Change from “SNTV” to closed-list PR Down 
Croatia  1992-1995 Increased number of upper seats; L: decreased number of districts Down 
Croatia  1995-2000 Change from MMM to closed-list PR Down 
Cyprus 1976-1981 Change from FPTP to closed-list PR Down 
Czech Republic 1998-2002 
Decrease in the number of preferential votes and decrease in the threshold to change the 
list order Up 
Czech Republic 2006-2010 
Increase in the number of preferential votes and decrease in the threshold to change the list 
order Mixed 
Denmark 1953 Increased assembly size Up 
Denmark 1968-1971 L: decreased number of districts Up 
Dominican Republic 1970-1974 Increased assembly size Down 
Dominican Republic 1978-1982 Increased assembly size Down 
Dominican Republic 1994-1998 Increased assembly size Down 
Dominican Republic 1998-2002 Introduction of preferential voting Up 
Ecuador 1996-1998 Change from closed-list PR to “MNTV”; increased assembly size Up 
Ecuador 1998-2002 Change from “MNTV” to open-list PR Down 
Ecuador 2002-2006 Change from open-list PR to “MMM” Ambiguous 
Ecuador 2006-2009 Increased assembly size Up 
Estonia 1992-1995 L: Limitation of vote pooling to only some particular candidates Up 
Estonia 1999-2003 U: Introduction of preferential vote Up 
Finland 1951-1954 Change from multiple lists to open lists Up 
France 1956-1958 Change from “MMM” to majority runoff Up 
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Country Term Reform 
Incentives to Cultivate a 
Personal Vote 
France 1981-1986 Change from majority runoff to closed-list PR Down 
France 1986-1988 Change from closed-list PR to majority runoff Up 
Germany 1949-1953 Introduction of a second vote Up 
Greece 1981-1985 Elimination of the preferential vote Down 
Greece 1985-1989 Re-introduction of the preferential vote Up 
Guatemala 1990-1994 Decreased assembly size Up 
Guatemala 1995-1999 Increased assembly size Down 
Guatemala 1999-2003 Increased assembly size Down 
Honduras 2001-2005 Change from closed-list PR to open-list PR Up 
Iceland 1959 Change from MMM to closed-list PR Down 
Iceland 1999-2003 Strengthening of the preferential system Up 
Israel 1988-1992 Change from closed-list PR to “MMM” Up 
Israel 1999-2003 Change from “MMM” to closed-list PR Down 
Italy 1946-1948 Reduction of the number of seats allocated in the national pool Up 
Italy 1987-1992 Decreased number of preferences Up 
Italy 1992-1994 Change from open-list PR to MMM Down 
Italy 2001-2006 Change from MMM to closed-list PR Down 
Japan 1993-1996 Change from SNTV to MMM Down 
Lithuania 1992-1996 U: Introduction of flexible lists Up 
Lithuania 1996-2000 L: formula shift from majority runoff to plurality Down 
Lithuania 2000-2004 L: formula shift from plurality to majority runoff Up 
Lithuania 2004-2008 U: Change from flexible to open lists Up 
Macedonia 1994-1998 Change from FPTP to MMM Down 
Macedonia 1998-2002 Change from MMM to closed-list PR Down 
Netherlands 1952-1956 Increased assembly size Up 
Netherlands 1986-1990 
Introduction of the possibility that one candidate pool all his or her votes from various 
districts Up 
Netherlands 1994-1998 Reduction of the eligibility threshold Up 
New Zealand 1993-1996 Change from FPTP to MMP Down 
Nicaragua 1990-1996 L: increased number of districts Up 
Norway 1949-1953 Decreased number of districts Down 
Paraguay 1989-1993 Increased number of districts Up 
Poland 1991-1993 L: increased number of districts Down 
Romania 2004-2008 Change from PR to MMP Up 
Slovakia 1994-1998 Decreased number of districts Up 
Slovakia 2002-2006 Decreased eligibility threshold Up 
Slovenia 1996-2000 Elimination of the national lists Up 
Sweden 1968-1970 Increased assembly size; L: decreased number of districts Down 
Sweden 1994-1998 Introduction of flexible lists Up 
Ukraine 1994-1998 Change from FPTP to MMM Down 
Ukraine 2002-2006 Change from MMM to PR Down 
Venezuela 1963-1968 Increased assembly size Down 
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Country Term Reform 
Incentives to Cultivate a 
Personal Vote 
Venezuela 1988-1993 Change from PR to MMP Up 
Venezuela 1993-1998 Increased number of lower seats Up 
Venezuela 1998-2000 Increased number of lower seats Up 
Notes: FPTP (first past the post); MMM (mixed-member majoritarian); MMP (mixed-member proportional); PR (proportional representation); 
SNTV (single non-transferable vote). Sources: Birch (2003), Birch et al. (2002), Bowler and Grofman (2000), Colomer (2004a), Gallagher and 
Mitchell (2005a), Golder (2004), Grofman et al. (1999), Grofman and Lijphart (2007 [2002]), the Inter-Parliamentary Union  (n.d.), Johnson and 
Wallack (2010 [2003]), Jones (1995 and 1997), Lijphart (1994), Lundell and Karvonen (2003), Negretto (2009), Payne (2007), Remmer (2008), 
Renwick (2011), Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), Shvetsova (1999), Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán (2005), Zovatto and Orozco Henríquez (2008), 
and electoral laws of each country. 
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Appendix 2. The determinants of reforms in the interparty dimension 
Table A2.1. Determinants of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (II) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Permissive  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        Party System Fragmentation -0.122 -0.088 -0.127 -0.102 0.072 -0.075 -0.690** 
(Legislative Level) (0.126) (0.118) (0.123) (0.122) (0.169) (0.209) (0.34) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.084*** 
  
0.126*** 0.013 0.058*** 
  
(0.015) 
  
(0.046) (0.037) (0.021) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.027*** 
 
0.018** 0.023 0.018** 
   
(0.006) 
 
-0.00794 (0.021) (0.008) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.361*** -0.298* -0.221 -0.946*** 
    
(0.125) (0.166) (0.257) (0.364) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.027 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.019) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
0.0004 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.005) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.200* 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
-0.106 
Constant -3.015*** -3.942*** -4.024*** -2.367*** -4.149*** -3.741*** -1.873* 
  (0.488) (0.565) (0.593) (0.547) (0.838) (1.226) (1.088) 
Restrictive  
              Reform 
Party System Fragmentation 0.241*** 0.271*** 0.187* 0.248*** 0.266* 0.522** -0.287 
(Legislative Level) (0.073) (0.073) (0.096) (0.069) (0.159) (0.258) (0.241) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.028 
  
-0.004 -0.079 -0.038 
  
(0.025) 
  
(0.075) (0.054) (0.032) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.031*** 
 
0.0290*** 0.0809*** 0.0310*** 
   
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) (0.031) (0.008) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.553*** -0.478* -0.225 -1.135*** 
    
(0.184) (0.266) (0.429) (0.36) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.011 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.022) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
-0.008 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.006) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.169** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.083) 
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Constant -4.512*** -4.823*** -5.769*** -3.487*** -4.574*** -6.385*** -2.624*** 
  (0.457) (0.538) (0.694) (0.508) (1.005) (1.86) (0.914) 
N (Observations) 2,895 2,853 2,709 2,895 2,679 1,722 2,679 
Chi
2
 50.25*** 97.54*** 82.60*** 94.66*** 112.14*** 86.81*** 108.99*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.05  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.09  0.11  0.09 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to 
produce more disproportionality. Cluster standard errors by terms in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** 
Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of stability years and the cubic splines are 
included but not shown. 
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Table A2.2. Determinants of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (III) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Permissive coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        
Party System Fragmentation -0.039 -0.129 -0.117 -0.052 0.146 -0.533 -0.691** 
(Electoral Level) (0.095) (0.106) (0.11) (0.103) (0.186) (0.373) (0.298) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.107*** 
  
0.213*** 0.059* 0.089*** 
  
(0.019) 
  
(0.056) (0.032) (0.023) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.037*** 
 
0.022 -0.011 0.025* 
   
(0.012) 
 
(0.014) (0.0408) (0.015) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.629*** -0.629** -0.885* -1.469*** 
    
(0.239) (0.306) (0.493) (0.468) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.027** 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.011) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
0.0109 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.009) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.204** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.102) 
Political Constraints Index -1.51 -1.206 -2.439** -1.394 -2.132 -3.031 -1.752 
 (1.113) (1.382) (1.183) (1.077) (1.306) (2.248) (1.24) 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) -0.014 0.0006 0.031 0.027 0.068* 0.158** 0.059 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.033) (0.037) (0.069) (0.037) 
Ideology of Government 0.158 0.213 0.181 0.151 0.183 0.043 0.144 
 
(0.198) (0.191) (0.211) (0.202) (0.208) (0.293) (0.211) 
Constant -2.795*** -3.868*** -4.045*** -2.004** -4.782*** -2.243 -1.407 
  (0.902) (0.954) (1.135) (0.971) (1.603) (2.028) (1.478) 
Restrictive                
Reform               
Party System Fragmentation 0.185** 0.201** 0.105 0.178** 0.480*** 0.535 -0.357 
(Electoral Level) (0.079) (0.0801) (0.108) (0.0806) (0.179) (0.343) (0.293) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
-0.034 
  
0.192* -0.146* -0.076* 
  
(0.036) 
  
(0.109) (0.082) (0.044) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.031*** 
 
0.036*** 0.123* 0.0401*** 
   
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) (0.062) (0.0108) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.365 -0.162 -0.383 -0.921* 
    
(0.365) (0.372) (0.498) (0.492) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.065** 
  
Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.028) 
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Party System Fragmentation* 
     
-0.014 
 
Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.009) 
 
Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.172* 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.102) 
Political Constraints Index 0.204 0.063 -1.039 0.207 -1.527 -1.631 -1.245 
 (1.321) (1.246) (1.471) (1.315) (1.275) (1.519) (1.23) 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) -0.051* -0.056* -0.012 -0.029 -0.018 0.025 -0.014 
 
(0.0306) (0.0305) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.056) (0.0304) 
Ideology of Government -0.202 -0.225 -0.193 -0.204 -0.235 -0.379 -0.285 
 
(0.225) (0.225) (0.237) (0.225) (0.234) (0.3) (0.247) 
Constant -3.554*** -3.172*** -4.484*** -3.074*** -4.856*** -4.875 -1.516 
 
(1.064) (1.049) (1.373) (1.099) (1.551) (3.097) (1.24) 
N (Observations) 1,598 1,594 1,546 1,598 1,543 1,072 1,543 
Chi
2
 51.56*** 85.38*** 65.20*** 61.03*** 126.85*** 104.20*** 128.00*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.12  0.15  0.12 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to 
produce more disproportionality. Cluster standard errors by terms in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** 
Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of stability years and the cubic splines are 
included but not shown. 
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Table A2.3. Determinants of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (IV) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Permissive  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        
Party System Fragmentation -0.065 -0.157** -0.098 -0.066 -0.121 -0.243 -0.443** 
(Electoral Level) (0.083) (0.079) -0.081 (0.081) (0.126) (0.217) (0.221) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.103*** 
  
0.101*** -0.0006 0.0840*** 
  
(0.018) 
  
(0.036) -0.0651 (0.02) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.028*** 
 
0.0200** 0.013 0.021** 
   
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) (0.026) (0.008) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.339** -0.307* -0.111 -0.767** 
    
(0.136) (0.183) (0.269) (0.385) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.002 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.008) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
0.003 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.004) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.112 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.0807) 
Constant -3.158*** -3.704*** -4.032*** -2.503*** -3.819*** -3.112** -2.534*** 
  (0.469) (0.49) (0.578) (0.537) (0.853) (1.401) (0.94) 
Restrictive  
              Reform 
Party System Fragmentation 0.165** 0.181*** 0.0609 0.143** 0.351** 0.451** -0.297 
(Electoral Level) (0.064) (0.063) (0.096) (0.059) (0.171) (0.218) (0.214) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
-0.002 
  
0.122 -0.086 -0.046 
  
(0.0302) 
  
(0.088) (0.065) (0.042) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.027*** 
 
0.023** 0.0909*** 0.027*** 
   
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.033) (0.009) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.538*** -0.479* -0.194 -1.165*** 
    
(0.2) (0.272) (0.401) (0.363) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.037* 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.022) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
-0.009* 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.005) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.155* 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.079) 
Constant -4.225*** -4.244*** -4.978*** -3.191*** -4.742*** -6.291*** -2.048** 
  (0.509) (0.524) (0.753) (0.532) (1.108) (1.87) (0.894) 
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N (Observations) 2,344 2,314 2,187 2,344 2,166 1,362 2,166 
Chi
2
 39.07*** 74.89*** 52.95*** 67.30*** 95.56*** 46.60*** 92.46*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.09 0.09  
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to 
produce more disproportionality. Cluster standard errors by terms in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** 
Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of stability years and the cubic splines are 
included but not shown. 
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Table A2.4. Determinants of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Semiparametric duration models/Cox models 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  Permissive Restrictive Permissive Restrictive Permissive Restrictive Permissive Restrictive Permissive Restrictive Permissive Restrictive Permissive Restrictive 
               
Party System Fragmentation -0.095 0.137** -0.124 0.137** -0.153* 0.036 -0.115 0.108 -0.095 0.139 -0.156 0.154 -0.285** -0.119 
(Electoral Level) (0.078) (0.067) (0.078) (0.067) (0.088) (0.087) (0.077) (0.066) (0.128) (0.145) (0.166) (0.141) (0.125) (0.139) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
  
0.094*** -0.004 
    
0.094** 0.005 0.075*** -0.066 0.0805*** -0.056 
   
(0.019) (0.032) 
    
(0.046) (0.118) (0.022) (0.0505) -0.021 (0.049) 
Electoral Volatility 
    
0.028*** 0.023*** 
  
0.008 0.019** 0.006 0.036 0.009 0.0204** 
     
(0.006) (0.008) 
  
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.022) (0.008) (0.009) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.014** -0.011* -0.014** -0.0107 -0.037** -0.037** 
       
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
        
-0.003 -0.015 
    
Electoral Disproportionality 
        
(0.008) (0.022) 
    
Party System Fragmentation* 
          
0.000521 -0.003 
  
Electoral Volatility 
          
(0.00364) (0.004) 
  
Party System Fragmentation* 
            
0.005* 0.005* 
Democratic Age(logged) 
            
(0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(L) -303.36 -231.5 -288.96 -231.33 -258.39 -180.95 -293.64 -223.96 -246.18 -177.8 -246.27 -177.72 -244.73 -176.62 
Number of Observations 718 718 716 716 661 661 707 707 660 660 660 660 660 660 
Number of Failures 64 53 63 53 47 34 53 42 46 34 46 34 46 34 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is 
supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to produce more disproportionality. * Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05; *** 
Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table A2.5. Determinants of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (V) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Permissive  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        
Party System Fragmentation -0.009 -0.07 -0.0504 -0.015 0.008 -0.0905 -0.598*** 
(Electoral Level) (0.073) (0.073) (0.077) (0.072) (0.129) (0.155) (0.217) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.091*** 
  
0.108** 0.011 0.071*** 
  
(0.015) 
  
(0.048) (0.032) (0.018) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.028*** 
 
0.019** 0.022 0.022*** 
   
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.021) (0.008) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.324** -0.25 -0.173 -1.042*** 
    
(0.129) (0.17) (0.255) (0.346) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.008 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.0105) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
0.0008 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.003) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.188*** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.072) 
Constant -3.168*** -3.843*** -4.143*** -2.568*** -4.254*** -3.412** -1.846** 
  (0.505) (0.542) (0.69) (0.571) (0.975) (1.429) (0.902) 
Restrictive  
              Reform 
Party System Fragmentation 0.197*** 0.213*** 0.097 0.177*** 0.318** 0.483** -0.342* 
(Electoral Level) (0.056) (0.053) (0.086) (0.054) (0.145) (0.204) (0.195) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
-0.009 
  
0.077 -0.0970* -0.057 
  
(0.026) 
  
(0.0905) (0.0502) (0.035) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.029*** 
 
0.0290*** 0.096*** 0.032*** 
   
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.031) (0.009) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.460** -0.386 -0.127 -1.196*** 
    
(0.197) (0.259) (0.415) (0.333) 
Party System Fragmentation* 
    
-0.0302 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.019) 
  Party System Fragmentation* 
     
-0.009* 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.005) 
 Party System Fragmentation* 
      
0.173*** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.066) 
Constant -4.137*** -4.079*** -5.099*** -3.287*** -4.632*** -6.090*** -1.832** 
  (0.545) (0.568) (0.947) (0.584) (1.22) (2.02) (0.926) 
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N (Observations) 2,883 2,853 2,700 2,883 2,679 1,722 2,679 
Chi
2
 56.90*** 117.23*** 81.84*** 85.87*** 123.48*** 103.80*** 130.98*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.10  0.09 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to 
produce more disproportionality. Cluster standard errors by terms in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** 
Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). I include t, t
2 
and t
3
 but they are not shown. 
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Table A2.6. Determinants of electoral reform in the interparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (VI) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Permissive  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        
Polarization -0.594*** -0.444** -0.641*** -0.509** -0.376 -0.149 -1.610** 
 
(0.201) (0.204) (0.223) (0.201) (0.363) (0.509) (0.681) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.0908*** 
  
0.0803*** 0.044 0.076*** 
  
(0.017) 
  
(0.026) (0.0305) (0.023) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.023** 
 
0.009 0.019 0.009 
   
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.342** -0.285 -0.119 -0.493* 
    
(0.164) (0.235) (0.397) (0.276) 
Polarization* 
    
-0.012 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.039) 
  Polarization* 
     
-0.027 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.028) 
 Polarization* 
      
0.363* 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.193) 
Constant -3.048*** -3.832*** -4.015*** -2.427*** -3.783*** -4.230*** -3.213*** 
  (0.278) (0.373) (0.54) (0.397) (0.866) (1.381) (0.899) 
Restrictive  
              Reform 
Polarization -0.298 -0.268 -0.103 -0.197 0.074 -0.516 1.021* 
 
(0.215) (0.207) (0.257) (0.232) (0.424) (0.643) (0.592) 
Electoral Disproportionality 
 
0.005 
  
-0.033 -0.0704 -0.056 
  
(0.029) 
  
(0.042) (0.057) (0.039) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.035*** 
 
0.037*** 0.037* 0.037*** 
   
(0.011) 
 
(0.0109) (0.019) (0.011) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.425 -0.171 -0.137 0.286 
    
(0.265) -0.339 -0.49 -0.337 
Polarization* 
    
-0.029 
  Electoral Disproportionality 
    
(0.042) 
  Polarization* 
     
0.012 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.015) 
 Polarization* 
      
-0.408* 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.214) 
Constant -3.030*** -3.318*** -4.926*** -2.319*** -4.303*** -3.942*** -5.386*** 
  (0.361) (0.446) (0.797) (0.449) (0.939) (1.386) (0.956) 
309 
 
N (Observations) 1,821 1,790 1,462 1,821 1,728 1,073 1,728 
Chi
2
 44.44*** 73.57*** 76.28*** 57.51*** 114.55*** 101.12*** 105.25*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.10  0.12  0.11 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the interparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce less disproportionality; and 2 if it is supposed to 
produce more disproportionality. Cluster standard errors by terms in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** 
Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of stability years and the cubic splines are 
included but not shown. 
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Appendix 3. The determinants of reforms in the intraparty dimension 
 
Table A3.1. Determinants of electoral reform in the intraparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (II) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Candidate-Centred  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        Satisfaction with Democracy -0.998 -1.732 -1.067 -0.96 -2.727* -3.161 -0.814 
 
(0.774) (1.697) (0.853) (0.803) (1.623) (2.313) (4.52) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-1.658 
  
-44.99** -3.664 -3.899 
  
(1.484) 
  
(20.53) (2.855) (2.826) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.001 
 
-0.044 -0.416 -0.0501* 
   
(0.029) 
 
(0.028) (0.328) (0.028) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.0908 0.989 0.878 1.403 
    
(0.483) (0.872) -0.848 -3.516 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
16.82** 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(8.233) 
  Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.15 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.135) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-0.201 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(1.431) 
Political Constraints Index -0.055 0.309 -0.045 -0.046 -0.551 -0.486 -0.543 
 (0.321) (0.5) (0.36) (0.33) (0.389) (0.407) (0.389) 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) -0.003 0.009 0.008 0.001 -0.072 -0.074 -0.067 
 
(0.029) (0.069) (0.044) (0.0409) (0.065) (0.067) (0.07) 
Ideology of Government -1.553 -4.958 -0.255 -1.6 2.076 1.901 1.769 
 
(2.486) (3.606) (2.583) (2.508) (2.265) (2.007) (1.995) 
Constant -0.706 2.587 -1.782 -0.611 1.695 3.419 -2.626 
  (2.345) (4.672) (3.094) (2.355) (4.354) (6.111) (10.65) 
Party-Centred 
  
    
  
    
  Reform         
Satisfaction with Democracy -1.396 -2.86 -1.1 -1.44 -5.009 -8.865*** 278.0** 
 
(1.468) (3.146) (1.603) (1.501) (3.643) (2.941) (135.4) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-1.315 
  
-14.38 -1.133 -50.95* 
  
(1.725) 
  
(11.31) (1.856) (28.8) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.003 
 
0.101 -0.669** 0.279* 
   
(0.013) 
 
(0.0709) (0.293) (0.169) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
0.233 -0.563 -0.762 211.4** 
    
(0.47) (0.556) (0.63) (103.1) 
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Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
5.67 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(4.983) 
  
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.316*** 
 
Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.107) 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-79.22** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(38.18) 
Political Constraints Index 0.365 -0.362 0.449 0.351 -0.521 -0.387 -0.012 
 (0.416) (0.829) (0.497) (0.436) (0.916) (1.307) (0.95) 
Real GDP per Capita(in 1,000s) 0.014 0.131 0.023 -0.004 0.378* 0.464** -0.297** 
 
(0.057) (0.15) (0.063) (0.056) (0.212) (0.222) (0.149) 
Ideology of Government -2.131** -4.579 -2.235 -2.035** -10.25* -11.52* -42.90* 
 
(1.041) (2.927) (1.406) (1.037) (5.27) (5.901) (23.15) 
Constant -0.123 2.999 -1.207 -0.413 5.681 14.67*** -735.1** 
  (3.182) (6.008) (3.625) (2.805) (4.934) (3.826) (360.7) 
N (Observations) 867 571 847 867 588 561 588 
Chi
2
 38.90*** 101.32*** 47.93*** 39.42*** 181.67*** 196.51*** 
 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.07 0.21 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.24 0.36 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the intraparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce more incentives to cultivate a personal vote; and 2 
if it is supposed to produce fewer incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Cluster standard errors by terms in 
parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of 
stability years and the cubic splines are included but not shown. 
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Table A3.2. Determinants of electoral reform in the intraparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (III) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Candidate-Centred  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        
Satisfaction with Democracy -1.301* -1.056 -0.864 -1.08 -1.738 -1.813 0.391 
 
(0.735) (1.379) (0.995) (0.949) (1.462) (1.68) (3.872) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-0.501 
  
-21.86 -2.997 -2.667 
  
(1.361) 
  
(18.31) (2.169) (2.058) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.027 
 
-0.011 -0.113 -0.0105 
   
(0.024) 
 
(0.026) (0.163) (0.023) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.155 0.307 0.421 1.259 
    
(0.431) (0.657) (0.681) (2.908) 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
8.039 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(8.008) 
  Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.045 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.068) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-0.401 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(1.207) 
Constant -1.161 -1.51 -3.905 -1.291 -0.146 -0.301 -5.256 
  (1.738) (3.329) (3.068) (1.792) (3.751) (4.013) (8.885) 
Party-Centred 
  
    
  
    
  Reform         
Satisfaction with Democracy -1.857** -1.788 -1.121 -1.292 -2.506 -4.116 126.3** 
 
(0.935) (1.82) (1.445) (1.431) (4.316) (4.191) (49.36) 
Party System Inflation 
 
0.016 
  
-5.905 -0.703 -3.896 
  
(1.441) 
  
(11.59) (2.895) (3.507) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.019 
 
0.025 -0.186 0.179** 
   
(0.021) 
 
(0.033) (0.139) (0.088) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.428 0.533 0.853 96.14** 
    
(0.529) (1.747) (1.759) (38.36) 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
2.56 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(5.478) 
  Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.096* 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.056) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-38.39** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(15.62) 
Constant 0.32 0.164 -2.88 -0.047 -0.809 1.794 -338.4** 
  (2.077) (4.641) (4.046) (2.415) (6.139) (7.135) (132.1) 
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N (Observations) 927 552 893 927 560 528 560 
Chi
2
 16.43* 89.00*** 22.92** 17.76 119.75*** 175.90*** 415.82*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.07  0.15  0.07  0.07  0.15 0.16  0.29 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the intraparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce more incentives to cultivate a personal vote; and 2 
if it is supposed to produce fewer incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Cluster standard errors by terms in 
parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of 
stability years and the cubic splines are included but not shown. 
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Table A3.4. Determinants of electoral reform in the intraparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (IV) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Candidate-Centred  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        Satisfaction with Democracy -0.766 -1.138 -0.663 -0.845 -2.444* -2.498 0.864 
 
(0.564) (1.195) (0.746) (0.691) (1.331) (1.669) (2.533) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-1.431 
  
-34.54 -3.995 -3.809 
  
(1.957) 
  
(22.05) (3.094) (2.774) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.011 
 
-0.007 -0.17 -0.006 
   
(0.021) 
 
(0.028) (0.212) (0.026) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
0.0624 0.646 0.62 2.155 
    
(0.325) (0.451) (0.443) (1.871) 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
12.72 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(9.036) 
  Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.069 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.083) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-0.645 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(0.798) 
Constant -1.411 1 -2.299 -1.375 2.241 2.572 -5.485 
  (1.31) (2.807) (2.547) (1.343) (3.414) (4.078) (5.512) 
Party-Centred 
  
    
  
    
  Reform         
Satisfaction with Democracy -1.515* -2.869* -0.958 -1.402 -3.29 -5.594 43.90** 
 
(0.854) (1.47) (1.183) (1.17) (2.993) (3.646) (18.65) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-0.386 
  
-0.769 -1.138 -1.942 
  
(0.847) 
  
(7.74) (1.521) (1.284) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.026 
 
0.063* -0.013 0.0840*** 
   
(0.019) 
 
(0.035) (0.104) (0.025) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.098 1.286 1.607 34.30** 
    
(0.394) (1.278) (1.482) (13.67) 
Satisfaction with Democracy* 
    
-0.064 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(3.776) 
  Satisfaction with Democracy* 
     
0.0901* 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.053) 
 Satisfaction with Democracy* 
      
-13.66** 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(5.861) 
Constant 0.329 2.838 -2.845 0.281 -2.435 1.467 -120.0*** 
 
(2.105) (3.653) (3.554) (2.249) (4.996) (5.252) (45.7) 
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N (Observations) 1,166 679 1,123 1,166 690 658 690 
Chi
2
 25.70*** 53.86*** 34.01*** 29.31*** 71.51*** 62.56*** 155.76*** 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.05  0.109  0.04  0.05  0.13  0.14  0.21 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the intraparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce more incentives to cultivate a personal vote; and 2 
if it is supposed to produce fewer incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Cluster standard errors by terms in 
parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). I include t, t
2 
and 
t
3
 but they are not shown. 
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Table A3.5. Determinants of electoral reform in the intraparty dimension: Discrete time 
duration models/Binary times-series cross-section models (V) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Candidate-Centred  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  coefficient  Coefficient 
Reform (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
        Corruption 0.334 0.647 0.024 0.228 1.062 1.592 -6.908 
 
(0.257) (0.53) (0.395) (0.37) (0.763) (1.06) (4.48) 
Party System Inflation 
 
-5.159 
  
-9.237 -6.482 -6.738 
  
(4.579) 
  
(8.033) (5.289) (4.716) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.031 
 
-0.008 0.004 0.001 
   
(0.019) 
 
(0.0303) (0.026) (0.026) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.267 0.083 0.449 0.957 
    
(0.345) (0.5) (0.48) (0.786) 
Corruption* 
    
-8.733 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(6.477) 
  Corruption* 
     
-0.035 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.035) 
 Corruption* 
      
2.233* 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(1.181) 
Constant -3.704*** -2.263*** -5.289*** -2.996*** -1.993 -3.449* -5.419 
  (0.466) (0.683) (1.21) (1.056) (2.203) (1.909) (3.498) 
Party-Centred 
  
    
  
    
  Reform         
Corruption 1.399*** 3.836*** 1.306** 1.378*** 8.125** 29.92*** -38.49 
 
(0.504) (0.696) (0.554) (0.502) (4.031) (8.966) (33.31) 
Party System Inflation 
 
0.613 
  
3.715** 2.144 2.611 
  
(1.241) 
  
(1.877) (1.819) (1.835) 
Electoral Volatility 
  
0.0502*** 
 
0.164*** 0.480*** 0.467* 
   
(0.018) 
 
(0.057) (0.12) (0.244) 
Democratic Age(logged) 
   
-0.136 -1.395 -4.574*** -16.84 
    
(0.332) (1.089) (1.382) (11) 
Corruption* 
    
-8.365** 
  Party System Inflation 
    
(3.995) 
  Corruption* 
     
-0.328** 
 Electoral Volatility 
     
(0.132) 
 Corruption* 
      
21.05 
Democratic Age(logged) 
      
(15.34) 
Constant -4.183*** -7.142*** -6.785*** -3.825*** -20.13** -36.90*** -22.92 
 
(0.518) (0.98) (1.327) (0.99) (8.267) (9.213) (16.69) 
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N (Observations) 937 406 917 937 406 391 406 
Chi
2
 25.40*** 365.55*** 34.47*** 34.65*** 263.80*** 277.15*** 365.14*** 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.07  0.25 0.12 0.07 0.36 0.39 0.42 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 0 if there is no reform or the reform that takes place has an ambiguous 
impact in the intraparty dimension; 1 if it is supposed to produce more incentives to cultivate a personal vote; and 2 
if it is supposed to produce fewer incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Cluster standard errors by terms in 
parentheses. * Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05; *** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The counter of 
stability years and the cubic splines are included but not shown. 
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Appendix 4. The politics of electoral reform from a micro-perspective 
 
 
In the following paragraphs, I will describe more in depth each of these paired comparisons of 
cases. Table A4.1 offers some relevant data on the selected cases. 
 
Lithuania and Ukraine. On March 2004, the Ukrainian Rada passed a new electoral law 
according to which all 450 members of parliament would be elected from party lists from then 
onwards (Hesli 2007). The system that had been in place during the two previous elections in 
Ukraine differed little from the mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system used in Lithuania 
since its first democratic election in 1992 (Mikkel and Pettai 2004): one half of the seats is 
elected in single-member constituencies, and the other half is nationally allocated to parties. And 
although both former Soviet Union republics adopted a semi-presidential type of regime in the 
aftermath of the fall of communism (Elgie 1999), some of the differences in the institutional 
setting of these two countries were significant enough as to help to explain why the mixed 
electoral system only survived in Lithuania. To put it in few words, electoral rules were not able 
to structure the party system, and to enable more effective decision-making in Ukraine (Birch et 
al. 2002). This lack of efficiency was probably one of the factors at the heart of the progressive 
disappearance of single-member districts in the Ukrainian electoral system.
282
 By contrast, the 
preservation of the mixed system in Lithuania seems to challenge the validity of seat-
maxizimation accounts of electoral reforms: despite the facts that the ruling parties controlled a 
legislative majority during the first two democratic terms, and were expecting to suffer losses in 
the immediately following elections, they did not abandon the current electoral system, and pass 
a more permissive law. 
 
Argentina and Venezuela. Since they became democratic for the last time in the twentieth 
century,
283
 a system of closed-lists proportional representation with seats allocation by the 
D’Hondt formula had been used in these two Latin American countries (Golder 2004). They also  
                                                          
282
 The mixed system whose abandonment I plan to explain in the future had replaced itself the pure majoritarian 
rules that had been used in the first democratic election.  
283
 According to Cheibub et al. (2009), the last founding elections after an autocratic period took place in 1983 and 
1963 in Argentina and Venezuela, respectively. 
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Table A4.1. Electoral reforms from a micro-perspective 
Country 
Year 
Previous 
ES New ES 
Type of ER in the interparty 
dimension 
Type of ER in the intraparty 
dimension 
Ukraine 2002 MMM CLPR Permissive? Party-centred 
Lithuania 1992 MMM No reform X X 
Venezuela 1988 CLPR MMP Restrictive? Candidate-centred 
Argentina 1999 CLPR No reform X X 
 
have in common at least two additional traits: first, presidentialism (Mainwaring and Shugart 
1997);
284
 and second, the level of institutionalization of the party system (Mainwaring 1995).
285
 
Finally, the Venezuelan and the Argentinean political system and economy were in disarray by 
the late 1980s and 1990s, respectively (Crisp and Rey 2001; Negretto 2004). These big 
similarities notwithstanding, a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system was only adopted in 
Venezuela just before the 1993 election. Why did not Argentinean incumbents attempt to change 
electoral rules just like Venezuelan did? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
284
 They significantly differ, however, in the constellations of presidential powers over legislation attributed by the 
Constitution because Argentinean heads of state are by far stronger than Venezuelan. 
285
 In this scholars´ view, we are in front of two relatively well-institutionalized party systems. 
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Appendix 5. Generational replacement or sophisticated learning? On the causal 
mechanisms explaining changes in voting behavior after an electoral reform 
 
 
In the near future, I plan to address this second set of questions adopting two different research 
designs. First of all, working with Mark Franklin, I will try to delve into the mechanism driving 
the effect of electoral reforms on the evolution of party systems and the change in voters’ 
behaviour.
286
 We will examine this impact particularly in terms of its timing in both the 
interparty and the intraparty dimensions of electoral systems.
287
 We will do so by exploiting the 
data on electoral reforms in 60 contemporary democracies that I have already collected for this 
dissertation. If these effects are driven by generational replacement, their magnitude should 
augment linearly as the number of elections after the reform increases. If they reflect actors’ 
learning about the operation of the new rules, they should cease to increase after a given quite 
small number of elections and should be decisively affected by the citizenry’s average level of 
political knowledge.  
 
Figure A5.1 shows the evolution of the effective number of electoral parties in two 
countries where a restrictive and a permissive electoral reform is adopted, respectively (i.e., 
France in 1958 and New Zealand in 1993). As can be seen, party system fragmentation at the 
electoral level sharply decreases as a result of the introduction of the majority two-round system 
in France in 1958 (Duverger 1986). By contrast, the adoption of the mixed-member proportional 
system does not have the expected positive impact on the effective number of electoral parties in 
New Zealand in 1993 (more on this case below). Conversely, Figure A5.2 shows exactly the 
opposite: electoral disproportionality behaves as expected after the New Zealand reform in the 
1990s but not in France in the late 1950s. Figure A5.3 displays an idealized and simplified 
picture of the evolution over time of the effective number of electoral parties in response to the 
adoption of a permissive reform in a given country according to different theories; and, finally, 
Figure A5.4 illustrates the expected effect on this same index when a restrictive reform is 
adopted. 
                                                          
286
 This paper will be presented in the upcoming annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association 
(Chicago, April 2013). 
287
 In the next paragraphs, I will only focus on the interparty dimension. 
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Figure A5.1. Party system fragmentation at the electoral level, France (1945-1981) and New 
Zealand (1946-2008) 
 
Note: A restrictive electoral reform takes place in France in 1958 and a permissive electoral reform takes place in 
New Zealand in 1993. Party system fragmentation at the electoral level is captured with Laakso and Taagepera’s 
(1979) effective number of electoral parties. To be more precise, the formula is: 
ENEP = __1__         
                n 
                 pi
2
, 
                i=1 
where pi is the percentage of votes obtained by party i. The source is Golder (2004) complemented by Gallagher’s 
dataset (www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php). 
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Figure A5.2. Electoral disproportionality, France (1945-1981) and New Zealand (1946-
2008) 
 
Note: A restrictive electoral reform takes place in France in 1958 and a permissive electoral reform takes place in 
New Zealand in 1993. Electoral disproportionality is calculated according to the following formula: 
Disproportionality Index (DI) = √ 
 
  
 ∑     
     
     
 
 where vi is the percentage of vote obtained by party i and si is 
the percentage of seats obtained by party i. This index can range from 0 to 100 (Gallagher 1991). The source is 
Gallagher’s dataset (www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php). 
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Figure A5.3. Expected long-term evolution of the effective number of electoral parties 
following a permissive electoral reform 
 
 
Table A5.1 contains six models showing the effects over time of electoral reforms on 
changes in the effective number of electoral parties. All of these models are corrected for time-
serial dependencies by bringing a lagged dependent variable into play and appear to vindicate the 
idea that incorporating a temporal dimension could help to understand the effects of electoral 
reforms. However, this is only true for restrictive electoral system changes. None of the 
coefficients regarding permissive reforms reaches significance at traditional levels of statistical 
confidence. Particularly interesting are the findings in the model concerning the generational 
replacement mechanism (i.e., model 6). In this model we see how restrictive reforms have the 
expected negative effect on the effective number of electoral parties only just after the 
institutional change (i.e., when the proportion of new electorate is zero or close to zero). The 
coefficient of the constitutive term Restrictive Reform is -0.492 and is statistically significant at  
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Figure A5.4. Expected long-term evolution of the effective number of electoral parties 
following a restrictive electoral reform 
 
 
the 10% meaning by that that the effective number of electoral parties decreases by almost halt a 
party in the immediately first election after the restrictive reform. This effect gets increasingly 
smaller until it becomes statistically insignificant as the cohorts socialized under the old electoral 
system are progressively replaced by new ones. 
 
 Models in Table A5.2 test whether the effects of reforms over time differ across levels of 
human development. In order to do so, I run the previous Models 1, 2 and 4 in low (new Models 
1, 3 and 5) and high-developed (new Models 2, 4 and 6) cases.
288
 With no exception, models that 
estimate the effects of reforms in high-developed countries are well behaved and vary over time.  
                                                          
288
 Those cases whose human development index is above the median are considered high-developed whereas those 
whose score is below the median are considered low-developed. 
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Table A5.1. Effects of electoral reforms on party system fragmentation at the electoral level 
over time, new and established democracies (1945-2010) 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
∆ ENEP (t-1) -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.19** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Time after the Reform(logged) 0.07 
     
 
(0.11) 
     Time after the Reform 
 
0.009 
    
  
(0.01) 
    Time after the Reform(quadratic) 
  
0.0002 
   
   
(0.0004) 
   Threshold 3 
   
0.107 
  
    
(0.14) 
  Threshold 6 
    
0.14 
 
     
(0.14) 
 Generation 
     
-0.13 
      
(0.23) 
Permissive Reform -0.19 -0.16 -0.14 -0.17 -0.106 -0.12 
 
(0.27) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19) (0.15) (0.201) 
Restrictive Reform 0.54 0.4 0.23 0.22 0.15 -0.49* 
 
(0.37) (0.29) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.25) 
Permissive*Time(logged) 0.103 
     
 
(0.13) 
     Permissive*Time 
 
0.02 
    
  
(0.02) 
    Permissive*Time(quadratic) 
  
0.001 
   
   
(0.0009) 
   Permissive*Threshold 3 
   
0.18 
  
    
(0.18) 
  Permissive*Threshold 6 
    
0.04 
 
     
(0.18) 
 Permissive*Generation 
     
0.04 
      
(0.33) 
Restrictive*Time(logged) -0.506** 
     
 
(0.24) 
     Restrictive*Time 
 
-0.16** 
    
  
(0.07) 
    Restrictive*Time(quadratic) 
  
-0.02** 
   
   
(0.01) 
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Restrictive*Threshold 3 
   
-0.402 
  
    
(0.303) 
  Restrictive*Threshold 6 
    
-0.69** 
 
     
(0.29) 
 Restrictive*Generation 
     
0.64 
      
(0.53) 
ENEP -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
 Constant 1.15*** 1.24*** 1.28*** 1.18*** 1.201*** 0.21** 
 
(0.35) (0.27) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.12) 
N (Observations) 585 585 585 585 585 532 
J (Countries) 59 59 59 59 59 57 
R
2
 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.04  
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number of electoral parties; all 
models are random effects with robust standard errors by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(two-tailed tests). 
 
To the contrary, the introduction of the number of elections after the occurrence of the reform 
does not appear to be associated with a modifying number of parties. In a pretty well-connected 
way, Duverger (1964 [1954]: 228) predicted that his theory would receive slightly less support 
among non-established democracies, where voters and elites are less likely to have coordinated 
their expectations about parties/candidates’ viability. 
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Table A5.2. Effects of electoral reforms on party system fragmentation at the electoral level 
over time by human development (1945-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Variables (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
∆ ENEP (t-1) 0.03 -0.18*** 0.03 -0.18*** 0.03 -0.21** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Time after the Reform(logged) -0.27 -0.01 
    
 
(0.35) (0.17) 
    Time after the Reform 
  
-0.05 -0.005 
  
   
(0.06) (0.01) 
  Threshold 3 
    
0.02 -0.02 
     
(0.31) (0.12) 
Permissive Reform -0.91 -0.02 -0.69 -0.07 -0.42 -0.003 
 
(0.83) (0.45) (0.61) (0.204) (0.51) (0.18) 
Restrictive Reform -0.54 0.46 -0.42 0.39 -0.29 0.25 
 
(0.73) (0.54) (0.507) (0.44) (0.405) (0.47) 
Permissive*Time(logged) 0.34 0.003 
    
 
(0.39) (0.19) 
    Permissive*Time 
  
0.05 0.005 
  
   
(0.07) (0.01) 
  Permissive*Threshold 3 
    
0.09 -0.006 
     
(0.47) (0.24) 
Restrictive*Time(logged) 0.16 -0.65** 
    
 
(0.44) (0.27) 
    Restrictive*Time 
  
0.03 -0.302*** 
  
   
(0.11) (0.09) 
  Restrictive*Threshold 3 
    
0.54 -1.201* 
     
(0.64) (0.62) 
ENEP -0.43*** -0.09** -0.44*** -0.09** -0.42*** -0.09** 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Constant 2.53*** 0.51 2.39*** 0.55* 2.03*** 0.47** 
 
(0.85) (0.49) (0.66) (0.28) (0.51) (0.208) 
N (Observations) 164 163 164 163 164 163 
J (Countries) 48 25 48 25 48 25 
R2 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.13 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number of electoral parties; all 
models are random effects with robust standard errors by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(two-tailed tests). 
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Appendix 6. “Under Capricorn”: Generations, marginality, tactical voting and electoral 
reform in New Zealand 
 
 
After more than eight decades of having consistently used the British system of “first past the 
post” (FPTP) for parliamentary elections, New Zealand decided to adopt mixed-member 
proportional (MMP) rules for the 1996 elections. The former system had permanently favoured 
the two largest parties, since 1936 being National and Labour. The new electoral rules were in 
turn supposed to help the rest of the parties by fostering their vote shares and increasing the 
number of MPs they get; and, in fact, they partially did. As can be seen in Table A6.1, the minor 
parliamentary parties in 1993 (i.e., New Zealand First and Alliance) improved their legislative 
representation after the electoral system change. And two other new parties (i.e., Act and United 
Future) obtained seats for the first time. In spite of this considerable increase in the amount of 
parliamentary fragmentation, major parties kept most of their voters and they only lost about 8 
per cent of their vote share. Moreover, if we examine the vote share of the two top parties in each 
district we will see that major parties almost lost no single vote at the constituency-level. As 
evidence shows, viable parties at the district-level (i.e., those ranked first and second) barely lost 
1% between 1993 and 1996. These numbers suggest that all the changes registered in the New 
Zealand party system were taking place at the mechanical level. Why voters’ behaviour changed 
so little after such radical electoral reform? How can we explain the small increase in the appeal 
of minor parties among New Zealand voters in the 1996 elections? In this appendix, I will argue 
that the adoption of the MMP system had a small impact on voting behaviour at the aggregate 
level because only two particular groups of the electorate (i.e., young voters and citizens that 
lived in safe districts under the former rules) were affected by the reform. 
 
Before going into the analyses, a particular feature of the data requires highlighting. In 
1993 (i.e., the last election under the first-past-the-post [FPTP] system), 49 per cent of the youth 
sample (i.e., those between 18 and 24 years in 1996) were not eligible to vote. To minimize age 
differences I only focus on those individuals born between 1972 and 1978. In the 1996 general 
election, there was not voting-age restriction for any of the respondents, since all were older than 
18. The interesting variation, however, comes in the 1993 election. Importantly, not all the young  
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Table A6.1. 1993 and 1996 election results in New Zealand 
Parties 
1993 1996 
 
Votes Seats Votes Seats 
National Party 35.05% 50 33.87% 44 
Labour Party 34.68% 45 28.19% 37 
Alliance 18.21% 2 10.10% 13 
New Zealand First 8.40% 2 13.35% 17 
Other Parties 3.66% 0 7.54% 0 
Act 
  
6.10% 8 
United 
  
0.88% 1 
Total 100% 99 100% 120 
Source: Electoral Commission website. 
 
surveyed were eligible to vote in 1993. The pattern I exploit here is the fact that about half of 
them had not reached voting age at the time of that election. Since we have information about 
their electoral record as provided by the 1996 wave, we can examine the impact of the act of 
voting in 1993 by distinguishing between those who were eligible to vote in 1993 and those who 
were not.  
 
 This research design provides a very demanding test of the habitual voting theory 
because, even after a radical episode of electoral reform, the participation in a single given 
election lead voters to repeat the same behaviour in the following one (under a different electoral 
system). In effect, as pointed out above, a mixed-member proportional system was adopted in 
New Zealand in 1993; and Tables A6.2 and A6.3 and Figures A6.1 and A6.2 try to examine 
whether those young voters that were already eligible in the last election under the previous 
system are more prone in 1996 to: a) vote for a viable party at the district-level in 1993; b) vote 
for either the National or the Labour Party; c) or simply participate. Evidence in all of them is at 
best mixed. The first column in the first table presents the “naïve” model which includes 1993 
vote of a viable party as a predictor of 1996 vote for this same party. Following Cox (1997), I 
consider as viable those parties that end either first or second at the district-level in the previous 
election. Ignoring unobserved heterogenity, voting a viable party at the district-level in 1993 
appears to exert a very strong impact on the likelihood to keep voting it in 1996.
289
  
                                                          
289
 Note that I do not distinguish between keep voting the same viable party than in 1993 or switch to the other. 
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Table A6.2. Using 1993 eligibility as an instrumental variable of voting a major party in 
1993 in predicting a vote for a major party in 1996 
 
The impact of 1993 
viable on 1996 
viable 
The impact of 1993 
turnout on 1996 
viable 
The impact of 1993 
eligible on 1996 
viable (logit)  
Independent 
Variables 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Voted Viable 93 
1.45***  
(0.09)   
  
Voted 93 
 
0.25**  
(0.11)  
 
Eligible 93 
  
0.16  
(0.16)  
N 3647 3647 3647 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses clustered at the district-level; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05 (two-tailed tests).  
 
Table A6.3. Using 1993 eligibility as an instrumental variable of voting a major party in 
1993 in predicting a vote for a major party in 1996, restricted sample  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent 
Variables 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
Eligibility (t - 1) 0.34 0.39 0.14 0.34 0.81*** 0.83*** 
 
(0.3) (0.28) (0.32) (0.28) (0.28 (0.21) 
Constant 0.36 0.3 0.26 0.26 0.98 1.02*** 
 
(0.25) (0.23) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) 
N 186 472 186 472 234 564 
AIC 246.99 612.22 256.07 623.25 235.33 494.81 
BIC 253.44 620.53 262.52 631.56 242.24 503.48 
Note: Entries are unstandardized logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The errors are clustered at the 
district-level. The dependent variable is voting at the PR tier in 1996 for either one of the two viable parties at the 
district-level in 1993 in the first two models; voting for National or Labour in the third and the fourth models; and 
just voting in the fifth and sixth models; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 (two-tailed tests).  
 
Unfortunately, the impact of 1993 turnout on 1996 vote for a viable party displayed in the second 
column is weaker although still statiscally significant at the 5% level. Finally, the non-significant 
effect of 1993 eligibility on 1996 vote for a viable party at the district-level leads me to cast 
some important doubts about the properties of the research design chosen. Likewise, evidence in 
Table A6.4 suggests that only 1996 turnout (and not vote for any particular party) is associated 
with 1993 eligibility. 
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Figure A6.1. Percentage of 1996 voters of major/viable parties according to age, restricted sample 
 
Source: 1996 New Zealand Election Studies. 
 
Even more importantly, 80 per cent of the 1996 sample was registered in a safe district 
(more than 5% margin between the first and the second candidate in 1993). Since we have 
information about their subsequent voting behaviour, we can examine the impact of being 
relatively immunized from the operation of the previous electoral system on their vote choice in 
1996 (i.e., under the new electoral system). Figures A6.3 and A6.4 plot the proportion of 
different groups of voters (i.e., of a viable party at the local-level, of either the National or the 
Labour Party, or of all sorts of participants) at the two 1996 tiers against district marginality in 
1993. The simple bivariate associations displayed in the graphs seem to suggest that people are 
more prone in 1996 to vote and to do so for a viable party at the district-level when they are 
registered in districts that were marginal in 1993. In the same vein, the regression of district 
marginality at t – 1 on vote for a formerly viable party at the district-level in Model 1 (logit with  
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Figure A6.2. Percentage of 1996 participants according to age, restricted sample 
 
Source: 1996 New Zealand Election Studies. 
clustered standard errors) and on participation in general in Models 5 and 6 (logit with clustered 
standard errors and multilevel logistic regression, respectively) yields the expected negative 
coefficients that are significant at traditional levels of statistical confidence. 
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Table A6.4. Using 1993 district marginality as an instrumental variable of voting a major 
party in 1993 in predicting a vote for a major party in 1996 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent 
variables 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
coefficient 
(se) 
District Margin at t - 1 
    
-1.57** -1.18* 
     
(0.71) (0.69) 
District Margin at t – 1 (logged) -0.06* -0.01 -0.03 0.008 
  
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
  Constant 0.25** 0.34*** 0.30006** 0.41*** 3.21*** 3.25*** 
 
(0.1003) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.18) (0.15) 
N 4074 4074 4074 4074 4273 4273 
AIC 5497.87 5477.34 5514.66 5471.71 1723.91 1714.805     
BIC 5510.5 5496.28 5527.29 5490.65 1736.63 1733.88 
Note: Entries are unstandardized logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The errors are clustered at the 
district-level in columns 1, 3 and 5. In the second, fourth and sixth columns, a multilevel logistic regression with 
random intercepts per district has been implemented. The dependent variable is voting at the PR tier in 1996 for 
either one of the two viable parties at the district-level in 1993 in the first two models; voting for National or Labour 
in the third and the fourth models; and just voting in the fifth and sixth models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 (two-tailed 
tests).  
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Figure A6.3. Percentage of 1996 voters of major/viable parties according to 1993 district 
marginality 
 
Source: 1996 New Zealand Election Studies. 
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Figure A6.4. Percentage of 1996 participants according to 1993 district marginality 
 
Source: 1996 New Zealand Election Studies. 
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